United Rentals North America Inc v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket24-2818
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 24-2818
UNITED RENTALS (NORTH AMERICA), Inc.
v.
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Appellant
_____________________________
On Appeal from the U.S. District Court, D.N.J.
Judge Stanley R. Chesler, No. 2:19-cv-17169
Before: Restrepo, Freeman, and Mascott, Circuit Judges
Submitted: Jan. 21, 2026; Filed: Nov. 20, 2026
_____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION1
MASCOTT, Circuit Judge.
Conti Enterprises, Inc. (“Conti”) is a construction company. It leased a boom lift from
United Rentals, Inc. (“United”). United was responsible for maintaining the boom lift, but
the lift malfunctioned. Two carpenters were injured in the accident. They filed complaints
against several defendants, including United. Those complaints have been resolved. The
question that remains is whether United was insured against these claims. The District
Court held that United was covered under the insurance policy that Conti had with Liberty
1
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding
precedent.
Mutual Insurance Company (“Liberty”). We agree, and will affirm the District Court’s
orders. The terms of the governing contract extended coverage to United related to Conti’s
use, operation, or maintenance of United’s equipment without a requirement that a
negligent act or omission by Conti caused the harm.
I.2
As an insurance policy is a type of contract, we look to New Jersey contract law to
govern our resolution of this case.3 Under New Jersey law, when the language governing
an insurance contract “is clear, that is the end of the inquiry.” Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 948 A.2d 1285, 1289 (N.J. 2008). If the language is ambiguous,
doubts in duty-to-defend cases “should be resolved in favor of the insured and thus in favor
of coverage.” Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1260 (N.J. 1992)
(“Generally, an insurance policy should be interpreted according to its plain and ordinary
meaning. . . . When the meaning of a phrase is ambiguous, the ambiguity is resolved in
favor of the insured, and in line with an insured’s objectively reasonable expectations. . . .”
(citations omitted)).
Here, the language of the insurance policy is clear. In its policy with Conti, Liberty
extended coverage to any business from which Conti leased equipment—here, United.4
2
We write only for the parties and recite only those facts pertinent to our decision.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is
plenary. Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014).
3
Federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply the law of the forum state. Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Here, the forum state is New Jersey.
4
Although Liberty initially recognized United as “an additional insured under the
policy,” App. 679, it now disputes that United and Conti had a written agreement adding
United to the policy. But the 2009 Rental Agreement between Conti and United satisfied
2
United was covered for injuries and damages “caused, in whole or in part, by [Conti’s]
maintenance, operation or use of equipment leased to” Conti. App. 299.5 United’s
damages were caused, at a minimum at least in part, by Conti’s operation or use of the
boom lift that it had leased from United, so United is covered.
Liberty maintains that its policy extends coverage to United only when Conti is at fault
for the damages—and that United, not Conti, was at fault, because United alone was
responsible for maintaining the boom lift. Liberty’s assertion might have been correct if
its policy had used the same contractual language that appears in the cases it cites as
authority to dispute its coverage of the claims against United. The policies considered in
those earlier cases extended coverage to the relevant parties “only with respect to
liability . . . caused, in whole or in part, by [the insured’s] acts or omissions.”6 But
Liberty’s policy at issue in this case was distinct. It covered United for injuries caused by
this requirement, so United was covered. App. 8–9 (“Customer agrees to maintain and
carry, at its sole cost, adequate liability . . . and casualty insurance . . . including, but not
limited to all risks of loss or damage covered by the standard extended coverage
endorsement, to cover any damage or liability arising from the handling, transportation,
maintenance, operation, possession or use of the Equipment during the entire Rental
Period. When requested, customer shall supply to United proof of such insurance by
Certificate of Insurance clearly setting forth the coverage for the Equipment and naming
United as loss payee and additional insured; such insurance and evidence thereof to be in
amounts and form satisfactory to United.” (internal quotation omitted) (omissions in
original)).
5
See id. (announcing at the top of the page that the following “endorsement changes
the policy” and giving instructions to “please read it carefully” and then providing that the
policy will “include as an insured any person or organization from whom [Conti] lease[s]
equipment” and restricting coverage to “‘bodily injury,’ ‘property damage’ or ‘personal
and advertising injury’ caused, in whole, or in part, by [Conti’s] maintenance, operation or
use” of that leased equipment).
6
Schafer v. Paragano Custom Bldg., Inc., 2010 WL 624108, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Feb. 24, 2010) (covering injury and damage caused by the acts or omissions of
the principal insured party or those acting on their behalf); Kostera v. Bacharach Inst. for
Rehab., 2015 WL 4643642, at *15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 6, 2015) (same).
3
Conti’s “operation or use” of the boom lift, “in whole or in part,” without more specifically
delineating fault. See App. at 299. The only other court we have identified as having
previously interpreted this language reached the same conclusion.7
Because the District Court correctly interpreted the clear language of the insurance
contract, we will affirm the District Court’s orders.8
II.
When Liberty had all but lost its case, it threw a Hail Mary and filed a motion to recuse
Judge Chesler from the case. The District Court’s denial of that motion was sound.
By statute, a “judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). “A party
moving for disqualification under § 455(a) need not show actual bias.” In re Kensington
Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 302 (3d Cir. 2004). We review a decision not to recuse for abuse
of discretion. Id. at 300–01 & n.12.
Liberty says that Judge Chesler should be recused because he “was a policyholder of
Liberty Mutual and had a significant claim history with Liberty.” App. 1658. That
argument fails for three independent reasons. First, as a statutory matter, when Congress
enacted § 455, it expressly provided that a judge need not recuse based on his interest as
7
NES Equip. Servs. Corp. v. Acadia Ins. Co., 2016 WL 6988708, *3, *7–8 (Mass.
Super. Sept. 28, 2016) (covering injury and damage “caused in whole or in part, by [the
principal insured party’s] maintenance, operation or use of equipment leased to use by such
person or organization”).
8
These are the orders from April 28, 2022; June 16, 2022; October 14, 2022; and
January 17, 2025.
4
“a policyholder in a mutual insurance company.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4)(iii).9 Here,
Liberty is a mutual insurance company, and Judge Chesler is a policyholder. The plain
text of the statute tells us that this relationship, without more, is not cause for recusal. And
nothing about Judge Chesler’s claim history gives rise to reasonable questions about his
impartiality.
Second, the relevant Judicial Conference ethics advisory opinion does not supply a
ground for recusal, either. It advises—
that when an insurance company is a party, the judge ordinarily need not recuse
unless . . . the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the
judge’s interest in the company. This could occur if, as a result of a judgment
against the insurance company, the judge’s premiums could be significantly
increased or coverage substantially reduced.
Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Op.
26, Disqualification Based on Holding Insurance Policy from Company that is a Party.
Here, a judgment against Liberty would neither significantly increase the premiums, nor
substantially reduce the coverage, of Judge Chesler’s homeowners, auto, and personal
liability policies with Liberty.
Third, Liberty’s motion was untimely. It came nearly five years after Judge Chesler
was assigned to the case, and two years after the District Court granted summary judgment
to Liberty. From the outset, Liberty had its own records documenting Judge Chesler’s
insurance policies. It waited five years to seek his recusal based on that information, and
9
See id. § 455(b)(4), § 455(d)(4)(iii) (expressly excluding from the recusal category
of “financial interest” the “proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance
company” where the proceeding’s outcome does not “substantially affect the value of the
interest”).
5
now it hopes to get a second bite at the apple. The judicial process “can hardly tolerate the
practice of a litigant with knowledge of circumstances suggesting possible bias or prejudice
holding back, while calling upon the court for hopefully favorable rulings, and then seeking
recusal when they are not forthcoming.” Kensington, 368 F.3d at 312 (quoting Smith v.
Danyo, 585 F.2d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1978)).
Liberty argues that Judge Chesler erred by not disclosing his relationship to Liberty.
This, too, is without merit. True, “parties should be apprised of any possible ground for
disqualification known privately to the judge.” Id. at 314 (quoting United States v.
Schreiber, 599 F.2d 534, 537 (3d Cir. 1979)). But Judge Chesler’s status as a policyholder
was neither a possible ground for disqualification, nor known privately to him: Liberty’s
own records documented Judge Chesler’s policies and claims history.
We will affirm the District Court’s order denying Liberty’s recusal motion.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the orders of the District Court.
6