Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 Westside Lighting v. Green CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE WESTSIDE LIGHTING, INC., et B348413 al., Los Angeles County Plaintiffs and Respondents, Super. Ct. No. 23STCV07695 v. AARON GREEN et al., Defendants and Appellants. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Armen Tamzarian, Judge. Dismissed in part; affirmed in part. Cumming & Associates and William Reid Cumming; Jeff Lewis Law, Jeffrey Lewis, Kyla R. Dayton and Tim Cotter for Defendants and Appellants. Ervin Cohen & Jessup, Christopher Heck, Jacqueline McGuinness and Jack D. Hensley for Plaintiffs and Respondents. Defendants and appellants Aaron Green, Direct Green Solutions, LLC (DGS), EOS Organization, LLC (EOS), and Lux Technology Group, Inc. (Lux) (collectively, appellants) appeal from a judgment entered after a bench trial in favor of plaintiffs and respondents Westside Lighting, Inc. (Westside) and Manochehr “Mike” Nazarian (collectively, respondents). The trial court found that Green obtained more than $2.3 million from respondents through fraud and theft, and that Green, DGS, EOS, and Lux were alter egos of one another. It held all four jointly and severally liable and trebled most of the award under Penal Code section 496, subdivision (c).1 Lux is a suspended corporation and may not prosecute an appeal. The remaining appellants contend the statement of decision lacks the findings of knowledge section 496 requires; a one-year statute of limitations bars the trebling of damages; the court misconstrued the parties’ written partnership agreement; and the court could not use outside reverse piercing to hold DGS and EOS liable. As discussed below, the trial court found every element of section 496 as to Green, including knowledge, and appellants do not show the evidence fails to support those findings. Appellants forfeited the statute of limitations defense by abandoning it after it was plead. The contract arguments, if correct, would not change the judgment, which rests on fraud, conversion, and theft. And appellants forfeited the fact- dependent parts of their outside reverse piercing argument by never presenting them to the trial court. Accordingly, we dismiss 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Lux’s appeal and affirm the judgment as to Green, DGS, and EOS. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND We state the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment. (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) A. The Oral Partnership Nazarian owns a lighting and electrical wholesale business. He formed Westside to work on Commercial Lighting Incentive Program (CLIP) projects with Green. CLIP was a rebate program run by utility companies to encourage energy-efficient lighting. In 2016, Nazarian and Green agreed orally to partner on CLIP projects. Nazarian would supply the capital to buy lighting fixtures from manufacturers. Green would secure the projects and see that the rebates were paid to the partnership. Nazarian would be repaid for the capital expended on supplies first, and the two men would split the remaining profit equally. Green met with Nazarian weekly and brought spreadsheets reporting the status of each project. Green later admitted under oath that the information in the spreadsheets was false. At Green’s direction, Nazarian sent payments to accounts in the names of “E2 Lighting” and “You Xiaoli,” which Green described as the manufacturer’s agent and the manufacturer of lighting fixtures. Nazarian also sent money directly to Green. The vendor accounts were not what Green said they were. The “E2 Lighting” account belonged to EOS, a company Green controlled 3 and never disclosed to Nazarian. The “You Xiaoli” account was Green’s own, opened under a fictitious name. Green admitted he used these accounts to keep Nazarian from contacting vendors directly. When Green needed to redirect payments, he prepared a letter on E2 Lighting letterhead announcing a change of bank; Green set up the new account to belong to EOS. Green also sent respondents CLIP applications bearing forged signatures. B. The Written Partnership Agreement In June 2019, Westside entered into a written partnership agreement with DGS, forming M&A Energy, G.P. Green signed for DGS, which was an entity that had not yet been formed and was not organized until after this lawsuit was filed. Exhibit A to the agreement listed $2,056,922.03 as Westside’s capital contribution. Section 6.5 provided that if DGS or its affiliates received certain rebate payments, DGS would remit them to the partnership “less the amount required to cover interest, costs and expenses incurred by [DGS] or its Affiliates in connection with” those payments. The agreement also contained an integration clause. Respondents never received any rebate revenue or any revenue or profit from their investment. C. Trial Respondents sued on April 6, 2023. The operative second amended complaint alleged fraud against Green, and breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, breach of contract, violation of section 496, an accounting, and unfair business practices against 4 all defendants. Appellants’ answer generally pleaded “the applicable statutes of limitations” as an affirmative defense. On April 22, 2025, the first day of a bench trial, the court took judicial notice that the Secretary of State listed defendant Lux, a corporation respondents alleged was Green’s alter ego, as “Suspended – FTB.” It struck Lux’s answer and entered its default. The bench trial was held on six dates in April 2025. The court served a tentative statement of decision. Appellants filed 29 objections, which the court overruled. After the final statement of decision issued, appellants filed supplemental objections that largely repeated the first set. D. The Statement of Decision and Judgment The court found that Green and Nazarian were partners under the oral agreement, and that DGS owed Westside fiduciary duties as its partner under the written agreement. EOS and Lux were not partners with Westside. It found Green liable for fraud. It found that Green and “his alter ego companies, DGS, EOS, and Lux,” were liable for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion; on the conversion claim, it found that they “wrongfully took possession of payments made by plaintiffs,” except three payments to outside vendors totaling $26,198.70. It found DGS and Green liable for breach of contract. On the section 496 claim, the court defined theft by reference to section 484, which includes defrauding a person of money by a knowing false representation, and stated that felonious intent is “the specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of his or her property.” It found that respondents “satisfied all the elements with respect to Aaron Green,” and that 5 “[a]s Mr. Green’s alter ego companies, DGS, EOS, and Lux are also liable.” The court found Green, DGS, and EOS alter egos of one another. Green was the sole owner and officer of DGS, which had no capital, kept no formalities, and did no business under the written agreement. As to EOS, the court found: “It is true that EOS had other minority investors and at times had some capital investment, or at least some assets. But the other factors weigh heavily in favor of alter ego.” Green controlled EOS, used it to pay personal expenses, moved money between EOS and his other companies without regard to EOS’s business, and kept records inconsistent with a separate existence. “A large percentage of plaintiffs’ payments” under both agreements “ended up in EOS’s accounts and ultimately in Mr. Green’s accounts,” and Green concealed EOS from respondents “in furtherance of his scheme to defraud them.” The court found that Lux, by its default, conceded the alter ego allegations against it. Respondents invested $2,360,860.64. Nazarian invested $100,000 himself; the rest came from Westside ($779,784.51) and from Westside Electric Wholesale, Inc. ($1,481,076.13), which assigned its claims to Westside. The court found they could recover that sum on their claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and breach of contract, and as restitution under the fraud and fiduciary duty claims. On conversion and section 496, Westside could recover $2,234,661.94, the total less the three vendor payments. The court found that respondents were entitled to treble damages under section 496. After respondents elected the greater remedy, the court awarded Nazarian his $100,000 and Westside its $2,234,661.94 under section 496, each with prejudgment interest, trebled. It awarded the $26,198.70 on 6 the contract claim, because the 10 percent contract interest rate made that the greater remedy for that sum. The judgment, entered June 9, 2025, awarded Westside $10,019,815.52 and Nazarian $422,521.56 against Green, DGS, EOS, and Lux jointly and severally. It provided that respondents could recover attorney fees and costs by postjudgment motion. Appellants timely appealed. The trial court later awarded fees and costs and entered an amended judgment. Appellants do not challenge the amount of the fees and costs award. DISCUSSION A judgment is presumed correct, and “the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) We review findings of fact for substantial evidence and conclusions of law de novo. (Thompson v. Asimos, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.) Even where error is shown, we reverse only if it is reasonably probable the appealing party would have obtained a more favorable result without it. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800.) A. Lux May Not Prosecute This Appeal Lux is a California corporation. Its corporate powers were suspended for failure to pay taxes. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 23301.) Respondents raised the suspension in the trial court. The court took judicial notice that Lux’s status with the Secretary of State 7 was “Suspended – FTB,” struck Lux’s answer, and entered its default. A suspended corporation may be relieved of its suspension by filing its returns, paying what it owes, and obtaining a certificate of revivor from the Franchise Tax Board. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 23305.) The suspension that cost Lux its defense also bars its appeal. A suspended corporation “may not prosecute or defend an action” or “appeal from an adverse judgment.” (Grell v. Laci Le Beau Corp. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1300, 1306.) A corporation with no right to defend has no right to appeal from the judgment entered against it. (Boyle v. Lakeview Creamery Co. (1937) 9 Cal.2d 16, 20 (Boyle).) “Taking an appeal from an adverse judgment of the superior court is one of the privileges which the law denies to a domestic corporation suspended under section 23301.” (Gar-Lo, Inc. v. Prudential Sav. & Loan Assn. (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 242, 245 (Gar-Lo).) No party asked us to dismiss Lux’s appeal. But Lux’s capacity to prosecute this appeal is fairly included in the issues before us. (See Gov. Code, § 68081; People v. Alice (2007) 41 Cal.4th 668, 677 [“Section 68081 does not require that a party actually have briefed an issue; it requires only that the party had the opportunity to do so” and “the opportunity to brief an issue includes the opportunity to brief any issues that are fairly included within that issue”].) Lux’s opening brief acknowledges its suspension and the default that followed. The trial court determined that Lux was suspended and struck its answer. Lux does not challenge that ruling, and we presume it correct. (Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608–609.) The same suspension deprives Lux of the power to prosecute this appeal. (Boyle, supra, 9 Cal.2d at p. 20.) 8 In the rest of this opinion, “appellants” refers to Green, DGS, and EOS. B. The Section 496 Findings as to Green Are Adequate and Supported Section 496, subdivision (a) reaches every person who receives property “that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft,” knowing it was so obtained. Subdivision (c) gives anyone injured by a violation a civil action for three times the actual damages, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney fees. A plaintiff may recover under subdivision (c) “when property has been obtained in any manner constituting theft.” (Siry Investment, L.P. v. Farkhondehpour (2022) 13 Cal.5th 333, 361 (Siry).) Not every commercial dispute involving fraud is theft. “To prove theft, a plaintiff must establish criminal intent on the part of the defendant beyond ‘mere proof of nonperformance or actual falsity.’ ” (Id. at pp. 361–362, quoting People v. Ashley (1954) 42 Cal.2d 246, 264.) Appellants contend the trial court had to find, for each investment and each defendant, actual knowledge that the funds were stolen. 1. Green As to Green, appellants cite no authority requiring a separate finding for each transaction, and we are aware of none. A trial court “is required only to set out ultimate findings rather than evidentiary ones.” (Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1125.) The trial court defined theft as 9 requiring the specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of property, then found that respondents had proved every element of section 496 as to Green. That is a finding of the ultimate fact. Appellants asked the court to explain why each payment fell within section 496, and the court declined to make findings on individual items of evidence. It was not required to repeat its finding for each of the more than 50 payments. The question is whether Green meant to deprive respondents of their money, not merely to misstate how the projects were going. The evidence answers it. Green told Nazarian to pay vendors through accounts that were not theirs; the accounts belonged to Green and to a company he had concealed. He admitted he set them up that way to keep Nazarian from reaching the vendors. When an account had to change, he prepared a letter on E2 Lighting letterhead redirecting the money to EOS. The trial court found that much of the money ended up in Green’s own accounts, that he used EOS to pay personal expenses, and that he hid EOS “in furtherance of his scheme to defraud” respondents. Respondents never saw a dollar of rebate revenue or a dollar of their capital back. A person who routes another’s money through false accounts into his own pocket, and conceals the route, intends to keep it. And having obtained the money by his own knowing misrepresentation, Green knew how it was obtained. This is not the ordinary commercial default Siry describes. (Siry, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 361–362.) Appellants also point out that part of the money paid for real labor and materials. That does not bear on knowledge. Theft by false pretense is complete when property is obtained by a knowing misrepresentation (see § 484, subd. (a)); what the 10 recipient later does with the money does not change the intent with which he obtained it. If appellants mean the damages should have been reduced by what was spent on the projects, they have not developed that argument as a challenge to the measure of damages. Finally, appellants rely on a remark the trial court made during trial questioning the use of section 496 in this setting. The statement of decision addresses such remarks directly: statements made during trial “are superseded by this statement of decision and do not set forth the court’s analysis of the issues.” We review the findings the court made in its statement of decision, not the comments of the judge during trial that are not part of the final ruling. 2. The Entities As to DGS and EOS, appellants are correct that the trial court made no separate finding that either knew the funds were stolen. It held them liable on the section 496 claim as Green’s alter egos. The validity of that holding depends on whether the court could disregard their separate existence to make them answerable for Green’s violation. That is the outside reverse piercing question, which we address in part E. C. Appellants Forfeited the One-Year Statute of Limitations Appellants contend that treble damages under section 496, subdivision (c) are a penalty governed by the one-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (a), 11 and that the investments, made between 2016 and 2019, were outside it. They rely on Menefee v. Ostawari (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 239, which held a mandatory treble damages remedy to be a penalty subject to that statute (id. at pp. 243–245), and on Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116, which held that a plaintiff who proves a violation of section 496, subdivision (a) causing actual damage is entitled to treble damages (id. at pp. 126–129). At least one federal district court has applied the one-year statute to section 496 treble damages. (May v. Google LLC (N.D.Cal., Nov. 4, 2024, No. 24-cv-01314-BLF) 2024 WL 4681604.) The question is not frivolous, but it is not properly before us. Appellants pleaded a general statute of limitations defense in their answer; the answer makes no specific mention of either section 496 or Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (a). Appellants concede they did not pursue this statute of limitations argument at trial. Their objections to the tentative statement of decision did not raise it. Neither did their supplemental objections filed after judgment. Accordingly, the trial court never ruled on it. Appellants offer three reasons we should decide the defense in their favor anyway. First, appellants rely on Coy v. County of Los Angeles (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1077 for the proposition that their general plea preserved the defense. Coy held that a plaintiff waived his objection to the form of the defendant’s limitations plea by not raising it diligently. (Id. at p. 1086, fn. 5.) The defense there was raised at summary judgment and decided by the jury. (Ibid.) Coy concerns the sufficiency of a pleading, and we accept for purposes of this appeal that appellants’ pleading was adequate. 12 But Coy says nothing about a defense that is pleaded but then abandoned. Pleading the defense is not the same as proving it. The statute appellants invoke makes the point: if the plaintiff disputes a limitations plea, “the party pleading must establish, on the trial, the facts showing that the cause of action is so barred.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 458.) The defendant bears that burden, and appellants did not try to carry it. (Samuels v. Mix (1999) 22 Cal.4th 1, 10.) Second, appellants contend the bar appears on the face of the complaint, relying on Langstaff v. Mitchell (1931) 119 Cal.App. 407, 409, which recognized that a complaint’s failure to state a cause of action may be raised for the first time on appeal. The statute of limitations is not an element of respondents’ causes of action. It is an affirmative defense. Langstaff did not involve one, and it does not convert an abandoned defense into a pleading defect. Third, appellants contend the question is one of law on undisputed facts. An appellate court “ ‘has discretion to consider issues raised for the first time on appeal where the relevant facts are undisputed and could not have been altered by the presentation of additional evidence. [Citations.]’ ” (American Indian Health & Services Corp. v. Kent (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 772, 789, quoting Duran v. Obesity Research Institute, LLC (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 635, 646.) The dates of the investments are undisputed. But other facts that would determine whether the defense succeeds are not. Respondents contend that Green concealed EOS and the diversion of their money until discovery in this lawsuit, that any limitations period was tolled by that concealment, and that the violation continued as long as Green withheld their money. Appellants answer that the discovery rule 13 does not apply to a statutory penalty. Even if appellants are right about that, the answer would not dispose of respondents’ other theories, which depend on what Green concealed, for how long, and when he last withheld respondents’ property. No one tried those facts, because appellants never put the facts necessary for the defense, or for that matter the defense itself, at issue. Appellants fault respondents for never proving a discovery date, but respondents had no reason to. The affirmative defense was never tried. We therefore do not reach the merits of the limitations defense. D. The Contract Arguments Would Not Change the Judgment 1. The Expense Provision Appellants contend that sections 6.5 and 8.1 of the written agreement entitled DGS and its affiliates to deduct the costs of generating rebates before revenue reached the partnership, and that the court erred by not deducting $863,184.87 in expenses EOS incurred. They argue the deduction would have reduced the damages by about one third. Appellants raised this point below. It fails on its own terms. Section 6.5 governs how much rebate revenue DGS had to remit to the partnership. The trial court did not award respondents rebate revenue or a share of partnership profits. It rejected respondents’ claim for benefit-of-the-bargain damages and instead measured their recovery by the money they invested and lost. A provision netting expenses against rebates before distribution is not relevant to the damages awarded: it says 14 nothing about how much of respondents’ capital was wrongfully taken from them. Appellants subtract rebate expenses from invested capital without explaining why one bears on the other. We need not decide whether the expense figure was proved, or whether Nazarian’s testimony about the parties’ understanding was admissible, to construe the agreement. 2. The Integration Clause Appellants contend that the written agreement’s integration clause terminated the oral partnership, that the parol evidence rule barred evidence of the oral agreement’s terms, and that the court failed to determine whether the writing was integrated, as Code of Civil Procedure section 1856, subdivision (d) requires.2 Respondents answer that the oral agreement was between Nazarian and Green, who were not parties to the written agreement, and that the written agreement carried forward Westside’s prior contributions. We need not resolve the dispute. Assuming the court should have found the writing integrated and barred enforcement of the oral agreement, appellants do not show a reasonable probability of a more favorable result. (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 800.) The parol evidence rule limits proof of contract terms. It “does not exclude other evidence . . . to establish illegality or fraud.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1856, subd. (g).) Evidence of fraud is admissible even where it contradicts an integrated writing. 2 Both sides cite section 1856 as part of the Civil Code. It is in the Code of Civil Procedure. 15 (Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Assn. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1169, 1182.) The judgment does not rest on the oral agreement’s terms. Almost all of it is the section 496 award, which rests on Green’s theft of respondents’ money. The court also found Green liable for fraud, and all four defendants liable for conversion. None of those findings depends on what the oral agreement required. Appellants respond that the fiduciary duties the court enforced, and the amount recoverable, depend on which partnership existed and on what terms. That would matter if the judgment rested only on fiduciary duty or contract. It does not. Only one component of the award rests on contract: $26,198.70 that Westside paid to two vendors in 2017, with interest. That component does not depend on the oral agreement either. Respondents’ contract claim was pleaded under the written agreement alone. That agreement recognized Westside’s earlier contributions as capital. The integration clause is a term of the written agreement; it cannot bar enforcement of the writing in which it appears. Appellants do not contend the vendor payments fell outside the contributions the written agreement recognized. E. Outside Reverse Piercing Was Available Against DGS and EOS The court found Green, DGS, and EOS alter egos of one another. Relying on Curci Investments, LLC v. Baldwin (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 214 (Curci), it described reverse veil piercing as a means “to satisfy the debt of an individual through the assets of an entity of which the individual is an insider.” When, as here, 16 the creditor stands outside the entity, the cases call this outside reverse piercing. (Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1513 (Postal Instant Press).) Because the court held the entities liable on the section 496 claim as Green’s alter egos, the trebled portion of the judgment against DGS and EOS depends on that doctrine. On appeal, appellants contend that outside reverse piercing is unavailable to a creditor like respondents; that EOS’s minority investors preclude it; and that the court did not consider whether respondents had adequate alternative remedies. Respondents contend appellants raised none of these points below. That is not quite accurate. In their objections to the court’s statement of decision, appellants called the court’s ruling on EOS “a reverse piercing,” argued that the court had not explained why an inequitable result would follow if EOS’s separate existence were respected, and argued that alter ego had to be established for each cause of action. But they did not argue that the remedy was categorically unavailable, did not mention the minority investors, and did not contend that respondents had an adequate remedy against Green alone. 1. Availability Whether outside reverse piercing is available at all is a question of law on undisputed facts, which we may decide though appellants did not raise it below. (See American Indian Health & Services Corp. v. Kent, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 789.) Postal Instant Press, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at page 1513, rejected outside reverse piercing to reach a corporation’s assets. Later decisions have treated that decision as “expressly limited to 17 corporations,” and have held outside reverse piercing available against a limited liability company. (Curci, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 222; Blizzard Energy, Inc. v. Schaefers (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 832, 847; Reliant Life Shares, LLC v. Cooper (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 14, 38.) DGS and EOS are limited liability companies. The remedy was available as to them. 2. DGS As to DGS, there is nothing more to decide. Green was its sole owner and officer. It had no capital, kept no formalities, did none of the business the written agreement contemplated, and was not formed until after this lawsuit was filed. There is no innocent member whose interest the judgment could affect. (See Curci, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 222.) The contention that the court had to consider respondents’ other remedies is forfeited as to DGS for the reasons given next. 3. EOS EOS is different. It had other investors. Green testified to who they were and what they held. The trial court acknowledged them. Appellants contend that under the cases permitting outside reverse piercing, those investors bar the remedy, or at least required the court to weigh their interests and to consider whether respondents had other adequate remedies. Those contentions are forfeited. The cases treat them as questions of fact and equity for the trial court. Curci described “the required fact-driven analysis,” which includes the traditional alter ego factors and “whether [the creditor] has any plain, 18 speedy, and adequate remedy at law.” (Curci, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 224.) Questions of this kind must be presented where evidence can be taken. EOS was a party, represented at trial by the same counsel as Green. Appellants point to nothing in the record showing that EOS argued in the trial court that its investors were innocent, that execution against its assets would harm them, or that respondents could be made whole by remedies against Green alone. “ ‘ “New theories of defense, just like new theories of liability, may not be asserted for the first time on appeal.” [Citation.]’ ” (American Indian Health & Services Corp. v. Kent, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 789, quoting Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 982, 997.) The objection appellants did make fares no better. They argued the court had not explained why an inequitable result would follow if EOS’s separateness were respected. The final statement of decision answered that objection. It found both elements of alter ego satisfied as to EOS, and it identified the inequity: Green controlled EOS, used it to pay personal expenses, moved money between EOS and his other companies without regard to its business, ran “[a] large percentage of plaintiffs’ payments” through EOS into his own accounts, and concealed EOS from respondents “in furtherance of his scheme to defraud them.” Appellants do not discuss the evidence supporting those findings, and we do not reweigh it. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.) We do not suggest that the court’s acknowledgment of the minority investors was the fact-driven weighing of their interests that Curci describes. We hold only that appellants did not ask for that weighing, and cannot obtain reversal for its absence now. 19 F. Respondents Are Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal Respondents request their fees on appeal. Section 496, subdivision (c) authorizes reasonable attorney fees to a person injured by a violation of subdivision (a). Statutory fee provisions are interpreted to include fees on appeal unless the statute provides otherwise. (Morcos v. Board of Retirement (1990) 51 Cal.3d 924, 927, 929.) Respondents are entitled to their reasonable fees on appeal from Green, DGS, and EOS, in an amount the trial court shall determine. 20 DISPOSITION The appeal of Lux Technology Group, Inc. is dismissed. The judgment is affirmed as to Aaron Green, Direct Green Solutions, LLC, and EOS Organization, LLC. Plaintiffs and respondents Westside Lighting, Inc. and Manochehr Nazarian are awarded their costs on appeal. They are also awarded their reasonable attorney fees on appeal under Penal Code section 496, subdivision (c), against Aaron Green, Direct Green Solutions, LLC, and EOS Organization, LLC, in an amount to be determined by the trial court. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. MOOR, J. WE CONCUR: HOFFSTADT, P. J. BAKER, J. 21