Westside Lighting v. Green CA2/5
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketB348413
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/19/26 Westside Lighting v. Green CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
WESTSIDE LIGHTING, INC., et B348413
al.,
Los Angeles County
Plaintiffs and Respondents, Super. Ct.
No. 23STCV07695
v.
AARON GREEN et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Armen Tamzarian, Judge. Dismissed in part;
affirmed in part.
Cumming & Associates and William Reid Cumming; Jeff
Lewis Law, Jeffrey Lewis, Kyla R. Dayton and Tim Cotter for
Defendants and Appellants.
Ervin Cohen & Jessup, Christopher Heck, Jacqueline
McGuinness and Jack D. Hensley for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Defendants and appellants Aaron Green, Direct Green
Solutions, LLC (DGS), EOS Organization, LLC (EOS), and Lux
Technology Group, Inc. (Lux) (collectively, appellants) appeal
from a judgment entered after a bench trial in favor of plaintiffs
and respondents Westside Lighting, Inc. (Westside) and
Manochehr “Mike” Nazarian (collectively, respondents). The trial
court found that Green obtained more than $2.3 million from
respondents through fraud and theft, and that Green, DGS, EOS,
and Lux were alter egos of one another. It held all four jointly
and severally liable and trebled most of the award under Penal
Code section 496, subdivision (c).1
Lux is a suspended corporation and may not prosecute an
appeal. The remaining appellants contend the statement of
decision lacks the findings of knowledge section 496 requires; a
one-year statute of limitations bars the trebling of damages; the
court misconstrued the parties’ written partnership agreement;
and the court could not use outside reverse piercing to hold DGS
and EOS liable. As discussed below, the trial court found every
element of section 496 as to Green, including knowledge, and
appellants do not show the evidence fails to support those
findings. Appellants forfeited the statute of limitations defense
by abandoning it after it was plead. The contract arguments, if
correct, would not change the judgment, which rests on fraud,
conversion, and theft. And appellants forfeited the fact-
dependent parts of their outside reverse piercing argument by
never presenting them to the trial court. Accordingly, we dismiss
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
Lux’s appeal and affirm the judgment as to Green, DGS, and
EOS.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We state the facts in the light most favorable to the
judgment. (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.)
A. The Oral Partnership
Nazarian owns a lighting and electrical wholesale business.
He formed Westside to work on Commercial Lighting Incentive
Program (CLIP) projects with Green. CLIP was a rebate
program run by utility companies to encourage energy-efficient
lighting.
In 2016, Nazarian and Green agreed orally to partner on
CLIP projects. Nazarian would supply the capital to buy lighting
fixtures from manufacturers. Green would secure the projects
and see that the rebates were paid to the partnership. Nazarian
would be repaid for the capital expended on supplies first, and
the two men would split the remaining profit equally.
Green met with Nazarian weekly and brought spreadsheets
reporting the status of each project. Green later admitted under
oath that the information in the spreadsheets was false. At
Green’s direction, Nazarian sent payments to accounts in the
names of “E2 Lighting” and “You Xiaoli,” which Green described
as the manufacturer’s agent and the manufacturer of lighting
fixtures. Nazarian also sent money directly to Green. The
vendor accounts were not what Green said they were. The “E2
Lighting” account belonged to EOS, a company Green controlled
3
and never disclosed to Nazarian. The “You Xiaoli” account was
Green’s own, opened under a fictitious name. Green admitted he
used these accounts to keep Nazarian from contacting vendors
directly. When Green needed to redirect payments, he prepared
a letter on E2 Lighting letterhead announcing a change of bank;
Green set up the new account to belong to EOS. Green also sent
respondents CLIP applications bearing forged signatures.
B. The Written Partnership Agreement
In June 2019, Westside entered into a written partnership
agreement with DGS, forming M&A Energy, G.P. Green signed
for DGS, which was an entity that had not yet been formed and
was not organized until after this lawsuit was filed. Exhibit A to
the agreement listed $2,056,922.03 as Westside’s capital
contribution. Section 6.5 provided that if DGS or its affiliates
received certain rebate payments, DGS would remit them to the
partnership “less the amount required to cover interest, costs and
expenses incurred by [DGS] or its Affiliates in connection with”
those payments. The agreement also contained an integration
clause. Respondents never received any rebate revenue or any
revenue or profit from their investment.
C. Trial
Respondents sued on April 6, 2023. The operative second
amended complaint alleged fraud against Green, and breach of
fiduciary duty, conversion, breach of contract, violation of
section 496, an accounting, and unfair business practices against
4
all defendants. Appellants’ answer generally pleaded “the
applicable statutes of limitations” as an affirmative defense.
On April 22, 2025, the first day of a bench trial, the court
took judicial notice that the Secretary of State listed defendant
Lux, a corporation respondents alleged was Green’s alter ego, as
“Suspended – FTB.” It struck Lux’s answer and entered its
default. The bench trial was held on six dates in April 2025.
The court served a tentative statement of decision.
Appellants filed 29 objections, which the court overruled. After
the final statement of decision issued, appellants filed
supplemental objections that largely repeated the first set.
D. The Statement of Decision and Judgment
The court found that Green and Nazarian were partners
under the oral agreement, and that DGS owed Westside fiduciary
duties as its partner under the written agreement. EOS and Lux
were not partners with Westside. It found Green liable for fraud.
It found that Green and “his alter ego companies, DGS, EOS, and
Lux,” were liable for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion; on
the conversion claim, it found that they “wrongfully took
possession of payments made by plaintiffs,” except three
payments to outside vendors totaling $26,198.70. It found DGS
and Green liable for breach of contract.
On the section 496 claim, the court defined theft by
reference to section 484, which includes defrauding a person of
money by a knowing false representation, and stated that
felonious intent is “the specific intent to permanently deprive the
owner of his or her property.” It found that respondents
“satisfied all the elements with respect to Aaron Green,” and that
5
“[a]s Mr. Green’s alter ego companies, DGS, EOS, and Lux are
also liable.”
The court found Green, DGS, and EOS alter egos of one
another. Green was the sole owner and officer of DGS, which had
no capital, kept no formalities, and did no business under the
written agreement. As to EOS, the court found: “It is true that
EOS had other minority investors and at times had some capital
investment, or at least some assets. But the other factors weigh
heavily in favor of alter ego.” Green controlled EOS, used it to
pay personal expenses, moved money between EOS and his other
companies without regard to EOS’s business, and kept records
inconsistent with a separate existence. “A large percentage of
plaintiffs’ payments” under both agreements “ended up in EOS’s
accounts and ultimately in Mr. Green’s accounts,” and Green
concealed EOS from respondents “in furtherance of his scheme to
defraud them.” The court found that Lux, by its default,
conceded the alter ego allegations against it.
Respondents invested $2,360,860.64. Nazarian invested
$100,000 himself; the rest came from Westside ($779,784.51) and
from Westside Electric Wholesale, Inc. ($1,481,076.13), which
assigned its claims to Westside. The court found they could
recover that sum on their claims for breach of fiduciary duty,
fraud, and breach of contract, and as restitution under the fraud
and fiduciary duty claims. On conversion and section 496,
Westside could recover $2,234,661.94, the total less the three
vendor payments. The court found that respondents were
entitled to treble damages under section 496. After respondents
elected the greater remedy, the court awarded Nazarian his
$100,000 and Westside its $2,234,661.94 under section 496, each
with prejudgment interest, trebled. It awarded the $26,198.70 on
6
the contract claim, because the 10 percent contract interest rate
made that the greater remedy for that sum.
The judgment, entered June 9, 2025, awarded Westside
$10,019,815.52 and Nazarian $422,521.56 against Green, DGS,
EOS, and Lux jointly and severally. It provided that respondents
could recover attorney fees and costs by postjudgment motion.
Appellants timely appealed. The trial court later awarded fees
and costs and entered an amended judgment. Appellants do not
challenge the amount of the fees and costs award.
DISCUSSION
A judgment is presumed correct, and “the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to
the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that
justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5
Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) We review findings of fact for substantial
evidence and conclusions of law de novo. (Thompson v. Asimos,
supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.) Even where error is shown, we
reverse only if it is reasonably probable the appealing party
would have obtained a more favorable result without it. (Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 13; Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th
780, 800.)
A. Lux May Not Prosecute This Appeal
Lux is a California corporation. Its corporate powers were
suspended for failure to pay taxes. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 23301.)
Respondents raised the suspension in the trial court. The court
took judicial notice that Lux’s status with the Secretary of State
7
was “Suspended – FTB,” struck Lux’s answer, and entered its
default. A suspended corporation may be relieved of its
suspension by filing its returns, paying what it owes, and
obtaining a certificate of revivor from the Franchise Tax Board.
(Rev. & Tax. Code, § 23305.)
The suspension that cost Lux its defense also bars its
appeal. A suspended corporation “may not prosecute or defend
an action” or “appeal from an adverse judgment.” (Grell v. Laci
Le Beau Corp. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1300, 1306.) A corporation
with no right to defend has no right to appeal from the judgment
entered against it. (Boyle v. Lakeview Creamery Co. (1937) 9
Cal.2d 16, 20 (Boyle).) “Taking an appeal from an adverse
judgment of the superior court is one of the privileges which the
law denies to a domestic corporation suspended under section
23301.” (Gar-Lo, Inc. v. Prudential Sav. & Loan Assn. (1974) 41
Cal.App.3d 242, 245 (Gar-Lo).)
No party asked us to dismiss Lux’s appeal. But Lux’s
capacity to prosecute this appeal is fairly included in the issues
before us. (See Gov. Code, § 68081; People v. Alice (2007) 41
Cal.4th 668, 677 [“Section 68081 does not require that a party
actually have briefed an issue; it requires only that the party had
the opportunity to do so” and “the opportunity to brief an issue
includes the opportunity to brief any issues that are fairly
included within that issue”].) Lux’s opening brief acknowledges
its suspension and the default that followed. The trial court
determined that Lux was suspended and struck its answer. Lux
does not challenge that ruling, and we presume it correct.
(Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608–609.) The same
suspension deprives Lux of the power to prosecute this appeal.
(Boyle, supra, 9 Cal.2d at p. 20.)
8
In the rest of this opinion, “appellants” refers to Green,
DGS, and EOS.
B. The Section 496 Findings as to Green Are Adequate
and Supported
Section 496, subdivision (a) reaches every person who
receives property “that has been obtained in any manner
constituting theft,” knowing it was so obtained. Subdivision (c)
gives anyone injured by a violation a civil action for three times
the actual damages, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney fees. A
plaintiff may recover under subdivision (c) “when property has
been obtained in any manner constituting theft.” (Siry
Investment, L.P. v. Farkhondehpour (2022) 13 Cal.5th 333, 361
(Siry).) Not every commercial dispute involving fraud is theft.
“To prove theft, a plaintiff must establish criminal intent on the
part of the defendant beyond ‘mere proof of nonperformance or
actual falsity.’ ” (Id. at pp. 361–362, quoting People v. Ashley
(1954) 42 Cal.2d 246, 264.)
Appellants contend the trial court had to find, for each
investment and each defendant, actual knowledge that the funds
were stolen.
1. Green
As to Green, appellants cite no authority requiring a
separate finding for each transaction, and we are aware of none.
A trial court “is required only to set out ultimate findings rather
than evidentiary ones.” (Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville (2000) 79
Cal.App.4th 1106, 1125.) The trial court defined theft as
9
requiring the specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of
property, then found that respondents had proved every element
of section 496 as to Green. That is a finding of the ultimate fact.
Appellants asked the court to explain why each payment fell
within section 496, and the court declined to make findings on
individual items of evidence. It was not required to repeat its
finding for each of the more than 50 payments.
The question is whether Green meant to deprive
respondents of their money, not merely to misstate how the
projects were going. The evidence answers it. Green told
Nazarian to pay vendors through accounts that were not theirs;
the accounts belonged to Green and to a company he had
concealed. He admitted he set them up that way to keep
Nazarian from reaching the vendors. When an account had to
change, he prepared a letter on E2 Lighting letterhead
redirecting the money to EOS. The trial court found that much of
the money ended up in Green’s own accounts, that he used EOS
to pay personal expenses, and that he hid EOS “in furtherance of
his scheme to defraud” respondents. Respondents never saw a
dollar of rebate revenue or a dollar of their capital back. A
person who routes another’s money through false accounts into
his own pocket, and conceals the route, intends to keep it. And
having obtained the money by his own knowing
misrepresentation, Green knew how it was obtained. This is not
the ordinary commercial default Siry describes. (Siry, supra, 13
Cal.5th at pp. 361–362.)
Appellants also point out that part of the money paid for
real labor and materials. That does not bear on knowledge.
Theft by false pretense is complete when property is obtained by
a knowing misrepresentation (see § 484, subd. (a)); what the
10
recipient later does with the money does not change the intent
with which he obtained it. If appellants mean the damages
should have been reduced by what was spent on the projects, they
have not developed that argument as a challenge to the measure
of damages.
Finally, appellants rely on a remark the trial court made
during trial questioning the use of section 496 in this setting.
The statement of decision addresses such remarks directly:
statements made during trial “are superseded by this statement
of decision and do not set forth the court’s analysis of the issues.”
We review the findings the court made in its statement of
decision, not the comments of the judge during trial that are not
part of the final ruling.
2. The Entities
As to DGS and EOS, appellants are correct that the trial
court made no separate finding that either knew the funds were
stolen. It held them liable on the section 496 claim as Green’s
alter egos. The validity of that holding depends on whether the
court could disregard their separate existence to make them
answerable for Green’s violation. That is the outside reverse
piercing question, which we address in part E.
C. Appellants Forfeited the One-Year Statute of
Limitations
Appellants contend that treble damages under section 496,
subdivision (c) are a penalty governed by the one-year statute of
limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (a),
11
and that the investments, made between 2016 and 2019, were
outside it. They rely on Menefee v. Ostawari (1991) 228
Cal.App.3d 239, which held a mandatory treble damages remedy
to be a penalty subject to that statute (id. at pp. 243–245), and on
Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116, which held that a
plaintiff who proves a violation of section 496, subdivision (a)
causing actual damage is entitled to treble damages (id. at
pp. 126–129). At least one federal district court has applied the
one-year statute to section 496 treble damages. (May v. Google
LLC (N.D.Cal., Nov. 4, 2024, No. 24-cv-01314-BLF) 2024 WL
4681604.) The question is not frivolous, but it is not properly
before us.
Appellants pleaded a general statute of limitations defense
in their answer; the answer makes no specific mention of either
section 496 or Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision
(a). Appellants concede they did not pursue this statute of
limitations argument at trial. Their objections to the tentative
statement of decision did not raise it. Neither did their
supplemental objections filed after judgment. Accordingly, the
trial court never ruled on it.
Appellants offer three reasons we should decide the defense
in their favor anyway.
First, appellants rely on Coy v. County of Los Angeles
(1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1077 for the proposition that their general
plea preserved the defense. Coy held that a plaintiff waived his
objection to the form of the defendant’s limitations plea by not
raising it diligently. (Id. at p. 1086, fn. 5.) The defense there was
raised at summary judgment and decided by the jury. (Ibid.)
Coy concerns the sufficiency of a pleading, and we accept for
purposes of this appeal that appellants’ pleading was adequate.
12
But Coy says nothing about a defense that is pleaded but then
abandoned. Pleading the defense is not the same as proving it.
The statute appellants invoke makes the point: if the plaintiff
disputes a limitations plea, “the party pleading must establish,
on the trial, the facts showing that the cause of action is so
barred.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 458.) The defendant bears that
burden, and appellants did not try to carry it. (Samuels v. Mix
(1999) 22 Cal.4th 1, 10.)
Second, appellants contend the bar appears on the face of
the complaint, relying on Langstaff v. Mitchell (1931) 119
Cal.App. 407, 409, which recognized that a complaint’s failure to
state a cause of action may be raised for the first time on appeal.
The statute of limitations is not an element of respondents’
causes of action. It is an affirmative defense. Langstaff did not
involve one, and it does not convert an abandoned defense into a
pleading defect.
Third, appellants contend the question is one of law on
undisputed facts. An appellate court “ ‘has discretion to consider
issues raised for the first time on appeal where the relevant facts
are undisputed and could not have been altered by the
presentation of additional evidence. [Citations.]’ ” (American
Indian Health & Services Corp. v. Kent (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th
772, 789, quoting Duran v. Obesity Research Institute, LLC (2016)
1 Cal.App.5th 635, 646.) The dates of the investments are
undisputed. But other facts that would determine whether the
defense succeeds are not. Respondents contend that Green
concealed EOS and the diversion of their money until discovery in
this lawsuit, that any limitations period was tolled by that
concealment, and that the violation continued as long as Green
withheld their money. Appellants answer that the discovery rule
13
does not apply to a statutory penalty. Even if appellants are
right about that, the answer would not dispose of respondents’
other theories, which depend on what Green concealed, for how
long, and when he last withheld respondents’ property. No one
tried those facts, because appellants never put the facts
necessary for the defense, or for that matter the defense itself, at
issue. Appellants fault respondents for never proving a discovery
date, but respondents had no reason to. The affirmative defense
was never tried. We therefore do not reach the merits of the
limitations defense.
D. The Contract Arguments Would Not Change the
Judgment
1. The Expense Provision
Appellants contend that sections 6.5 and 8.1 of the written
agreement entitled DGS and its affiliates to deduct the costs of
generating rebates before revenue reached the partnership, and
that the court erred by not deducting $863,184.87 in expenses
EOS incurred. They argue the deduction would have reduced the
damages by about one third.
Appellants raised this point below. It fails on its own
terms. Section 6.5 governs how much rebate revenue DGS had to
remit to the partnership. The trial court did not award
respondents rebate revenue or a share of partnership profits. It
rejected respondents’ claim for benefit-of-the-bargain damages
and instead measured their recovery by the money they invested
and lost. A provision netting expenses against rebates before
distribution is not relevant to the damages awarded: it says
14
nothing about how much of respondents’ capital was wrongfully
taken from them. Appellants subtract rebate expenses from
invested capital without explaining why one bears on the other.
We need not decide whether the expense figure was proved, or
whether Nazarian’s testimony about the parties’ understanding
was admissible, to construe the agreement.
2. The Integration Clause
Appellants contend that the written agreement’s
integration clause terminated the oral partnership, that the parol
evidence rule barred evidence of the oral agreement’s terms, and
that the court failed to determine whether the writing was
integrated, as Code of Civil Procedure section 1856, subdivision
(d) requires.2 Respondents answer that the oral agreement was
between Nazarian and Green, who were not parties to the
written agreement, and that the written agreement carried
forward Westside’s prior contributions.
We need not resolve the dispute. Assuming the court
should have found the writing integrated and barred enforcement
of the oral agreement, appellants do not show a reasonable
probability of a more favorable result. (Cassim v. Allstate Ins.
Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 800.)
The parol evidence rule limits proof of contract terms. It
“does not exclude other evidence . . . to establish illegality or
fraud.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1856, subd. (g).) Evidence of fraud is
admissible even where it contradicts an integrated writing.
2 Both sides cite section 1856 as part of the Civil Code. It is
in the Code of Civil Procedure.
15
(Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production
Credit Assn. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1169, 1182.) The judgment does
not rest on the oral agreement’s terms. Almost all of it is the
section 496 award, which rests on Green’s theft of respondents’
money. The court also found Green liable for fraud, and all four
defendants liable for conversion. None of those findings depends
on what the oral agreement required.
Appellants respond that the fiduciary duties the court
enforced, and the amount recoverable, depend on which
partnership existed and on what terms. That would matter if the
judgment rested only on fiduciary duty or contract. It does not.
Only one component of the award rests on contract: $26,198.70
that Westside paid to two vendors in 2017, with interest. That
component does not depend on the oral agreement either.
Respondents’ contract claim was pleaded under the written
agreement alone. That agreement recognized Westside’s earlier
contributions as capital. The integration clause is a term of the
written agreement; it cannot bar enforcement of the writing in
which it appears. Appellants do not contend the vendor
payments fell outside the contributions the written agreement
recognized.
E. Outside Reverse Piercing Was Available Against DGS
and EOS
The court found Green, DGS, and EOS alter egos of one
another. Relying on Curci Investments, LLC v. Baldwin (2017)
14 Cal.App.5th 214 (Curci), it described reverse veil piercing as a
means “to satisfy the debt of an individual through the assets of
an entity of which the individual is an insider.” When, as here,
16
the creditor stands outside the entity, the cases call this outside
reverse piercing. (Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp.
(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1513 (Postal Instant Press).)
Because the court held the entities liable on the section 496 claim
as Green’s alter egos, the trebled portion of the judgment against
DGS and EOS depends on that doctrine.
On appeal, appellants contend that outside reverse piercing
is unavailable to a creditor like respondents; that EOS’s minority
investors preclude it; and that the court did not consider whether
respondents had adequate alternative remedies. Respondents
contend appellants raised none of these points below. That is not
quite accurate. In their objections to the court’s statement of
decision, appellants called the court’s ruling on EOS “a reverse
piercing,” argued that the court had not explained why an
inequitable result would follow if EOS’s separate existence were
respected, and argued that alter ego had to be established for
each cause of action. But they did not argue that the remedy was
categorically unavailable, did not mention the minority investors,
and did not contend that respondents had an adequate remedy
against Green alone.
1. Availability
Whether outside reverse piercing is available at all is a
question of law on undisputed facts, which we may decide though
appellants did not raise it below. (See American Indian Health &
Services Corp. v. Kent, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 789.) Postal
Instant Press, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at page 1513, rejected
outside reverse piercing to reach a corporation’s assets. Later
decisions have treated that decision as “expressly limited to
17
corporations,” and have held outside reverse piercing available
against a limited liability company. (Curci, supra, 14
Cal.App.5th at p. 222; Blizzard Energy, Inc. v. Schaefers (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 832, 847; Reliant Life Shares, LLC v. Cooper
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 14, 38.) DGS and EOS are limited liability
companies. The remedy was available as to them.
2. DGS
As to DGS, there is nothing more to decide. Green was its
sole owner and officer. It had no capital, kept no formalities, did
none of the business the written agreement contemplated, and
was not formed until after this lawsuit was filed. There is no
innocent member whose interest the judgment could affect. (See
Curci, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 222.) The contention that the
court had to consider respondents’ other remedies is forfeited as
to DGS for the reasons given next.
3. EOS
EOS is different. It had other investors. Green testified to
who they were and what they held. The trial court acknowledged
them. Appellants contend that under the cases permitting
outside reverse piercing, those investors bar the remedy, or at
least required the court to weigh their interests and to consider
whether respondents had other adequate remedies.
Those contentions are forfeited. The cases treat them as
questions of fact and equity for the trial court. Curci described
“the required fact-driven analysis,” which includes the traditional
alter ego factors and “whether [the creditor] has any plain,
18
speedy, and adequate remedy at law.” (Curci, supra, 14
Cal.App.5th at p. 224.) Questions of this kind must be presented
where evidence can be taken. EOS was a party, represented at
trial by the same counsel as Green. Appellants point to nothing
in the record showing that EOS argued in the trial court that its
investors were innocent, that execution against its assets would
harm them, or that respondents could be made whole by
remedies against Green alone. “ ‘ “New theories of defense, just
like new theories of liability, may not be asserted for the first
time on appeal.” [Citation.]’ ” (American Indian Health &
Services Corp. v. Kent, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 789, quoting
Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 4
Cal.App.5th 982, 997.)
The objection appellants did make fares no better. They
argued the court had not explained why an inequitable result
would follow if EOS’s separateness were respected. The final
statement of decision answered that objection. It found both
elements of alter ego satisfied as to EOS, and it identified the
inequity: Green controlled EOS, used it to pay personal
expenses, moved money between EOS and his other companies
without regard to its business, ran “[a] large percentage of
plaintiffs’ payments” through EOS into his own accounts, and
concealed EOS from respondents “in furtherance of his scheme to
defraud them.” Appellants do not discuss the evidence
supporting those findings, and we do not reweigh it. (Foreman &
Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.) We do not
suggest that the court’s acknowledgment of the minority
investors was the fact-driven weighing of their interests that
Curci describes. We hold only that appellants did not ask for
that weighing, and cannot obtain reversal for its absence now.
19
F. Respondents Are Entitled to Attorney Fees on
Appeal
Respondents request their fees on appeal. Section 496,
subdivision (c) authorizes reasonable attorney fees to a person
injured by a violation of subdivision (a). Statutory fee provisions
are interpreted to include fees on appeal unless the statute
provides otherwise. (Morcos v. Board of Retirement (1990) 51
Cal.3d 924, 927, 929.) Respondents are entitled to their
reasonable fees on appeal from Green, DGS, and EOS, in an
amount the trial court shall determine.
20
DISPOSITION
The appeal of Lux Technology Group, Inc. is dismissed.
The judgment is affirmed as to Aaron Green, Direct Green
Solutions, LLC, and EOS Organization, LLC. Plaintiffs and
respondents Westside Lighting, Inc. and Manochehr Nazarian
are awarded their costs on appeal. They are also awarded their
reasonable attorney fees on appeal under Penal Code section 496,
subdivision (c), against Aaron Green, Direct Green Solutions,
LLC, and EOS Organization, LLC, in an amount to be
determined by the trial court.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
BAKER, J.
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