Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION* IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE TRUCONNECT COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, A172474 v. (City and County of San MAXIMUS INC. et al., Francisco Super. Ct. No.CGC-21-589607) Defendants and Respondents. The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) hired respondents Maximus Inc. and Solix Inc. to design and implement a new software platform for a program to provide telephone service to lower-income Californians. Appellant TruConnect, Inc. sued Maximus and Solix for damages it allegedly suffered because the new platform was defective. The trial court sustained a demurrer to TruConnect’s claims after it concluded that defendants did not owe TruConnect a duty of care and were not unjustly enriched. We conclude that the trial court was correct, and we therefore affirm. * Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts IIB and IIC. 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 TruConnect provides free wireless telephone service to eligible low- income Californians under a government-subsidized program called “LifeLine.” The Federal Communications Commission established LifeLine in 1985, and the CPUC oversees the program in California. TruConnect’s only business is purchasing wireless services from carriers that have their own transmission facilities, then reselling those services to TruConnect’s own subscribers through LifeLine. The company earns more than 90 percent of its revenue through services provided to California LifeLine enrollees. The CPUC is authorized to administer LifeLine under the Moore Universal Telephone Service Act (Pub. Util. Code, § 871 et seq.).2 The commission in 1983 adopted General Order 153 to implement the program in California. The CPUC reimburses LifeLine providers for providing service. TruConnect is the second largest provider of LifeLine services in California. Because of the logistical complexities of enrolling subscribers and providing reimbursement, the CPUC contracts with a third-party administrator to process enrollments and track reimbursements. TruConnect was pleased with the company that served as the administrator from December 2011 through March 2019. In summer 2018, the CPUC hired Maximus as a new third-party contractor to administer the LifeLine program. TruConnect offered to help Maximus develop its LifeLine 1 The following facts are taken from the allegations of TruConnect’s second amended complaint, which we accept as true on appeal from the sustaining of a demurrer. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 543.) 2 All unspecified statutory references are to the Public Utilities Code. 2 administration platform to ensure a smooth transition. Maximus declined TruConnect’s offer and instead hired Solix as a subcontractor. According to TruConnect’s operative complaint, Maximus and Solix “negligently designed and implemented a software platform for administering the LifeLine program that proved grossly inadequate when the platform was launched on April 2, 2019. Hundreds of thousands of TruConnect’s LifeLine applicants and renewing subscribers who met the program’s objective eligibility requirements were denied approval due to the platform’s failure. As a result, TruConnect suffered tens of millions of dollars in lost revenues and incurred millions of dollars in personnel time necessary to fix Maximus’ defective platform.” It took “months” to solve several problems with the new platform. The operative complaint alleges that both the CPUC’s deputy executive director and Maximus “asked TruConnect to commit its team of software engineers and operational and technical staff to the task of salvaging the platform.” TruConnect personnel “spent hundreds of thousands of hours working to resolve the platform’s countless programming defects,” which cost TruConnect “well in excess of $3 million dollars in time and resources.” Both the CPUC and Maximus expressed gratitude for TruConnect’s assistance. TruConnect first sought reimbursement from the CPUC. The commission approved some initial claims for lost revenues and costs, but in September 2020 it adopted Resolution T-17707, which rejected reimbursement for lost-opportunity costs (i.e., revenue TruConnect claimed it lost because otherwise eligible customers were rejected by the defective platform). TruConnect in September 2020 sued the CPUC, Maximus, and Solix. The company soon recognized that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the 3 CPUC, and it requested dismissal of the case less than two months after it was filed. TruConnect initiated this lawsuit in February 2021 against Maximus and Solix only, and it later filed a first amended complaint. Maximus and Solix demurred to the complaint, and the trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend based on the conclusion that section 1759 barred the complaint. This court reversed the ruling and remanded to the trial court to consider whether the lawsuit failed for any other reason. (TruConnect Communications, Inc. v. Maximus Inc. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 497 (TruConnect I).) TruConnect then filed a second amended complaint, which is the operative complaint. It alleges causes of action for negligence, negligent interference with prospective economic relations, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and unlawful business practices in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et sequitur. Maximus and Solix demurred to the second amended complaint on the ground that it failed to state a valid cause of action. Solix demurred to the complaint on the ground that the CPUC was a necessary and indispensable party that could not be joined because the court lacked jurisdiction over it (§ 1759). Maximus and Solix each joined in the other’s demurrer. The trial court sustained Maximus’s demurrer without leave to amend. It concluded that TruConnect failed to allege that defendants owed the company a duty sufficient to state a claim for negligence. And the court also concluded that the second amended complaint failed to state a cause of action under any other theory TruConnect advanced.3 3 The court overruled Solix’s demurrer because it concluded that the CPUC is not a necessary and indispensable party to the action. But because the court also concluded that the complaint did not state a cause of action, it dismissed the complaint in its entirety as to both defendants. 4 TruConnect appealed from the subsequent judgment. Maximus and Solix have filed a joint respondents’ brief. Because they do not distinguish between the companies when responding to TruConnect’s arguments, we will apply the same analysis to both of them. The CPUC has filed an amicus curiae brief in support of defendants. II. DISCUSSION A. TruConnect’s Negligence Cause of Action and Derivative Claims Fail Since Defendants Did Not Owe the Company a Duty of Care. As we have said, the trial court concluded that TruConnect failed to allege that defendants owed the company a duty of care sufficient to state a claim for negligence. Although we recognize that some relevant factors weigh in favor of finding a duty, the greater weight of them compels us to agree with the trial court. Negligence is conduct that “ ‘falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others.’ ” (Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 396 (Bily), quoting Rest.2d Torts, § 282.) “Recovery in a negligence action depends as a threshold matter on whether the defendant had ‘ “a duty to use due care toward an interest of [the plaintiff’s] that enjoys legal protection against unintentional invasion.” ’ [Citations.] We review de novo whether this ‘ “essential prerequisite” ’ to recovery is satisfied.” (Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 397–398 (Gas Leak Cases).) “In California, the ‘general rule’ is that people owe a duty of care to avoid causing harm to others and that they are thus usually liable for injuries their negligence inflicts.” (Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 398.) This rule is statutorily based: “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to 5 another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) But while courts “frequently beg[in their] analysis by presuming a duty of care[, they] have not universally done so.” (Gas Leak Cases, at p. 400.) One area where courts do not begin by presuming a duty of care is with claims of “liability in negligence for purely economic losses,” for which there is instead a contrasting “general rule of no recovery.” (Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 400.) Recognizing “a duty to manage business affairs so as to prevent purely economic loss to third parties in their financial transactions is the exception, not the rule, in negligence law.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 58.) The justifications advanced for not presuming a duty of care in these cases “include foreseeability and the prevention of limitless liability.” (Sharkey, The Irresistible Simplicity of Preventing Harm (2023) 16 J. Tort L. 143, 154.) Still, the presumption of no duty of care when only economic losses are sustained has been criticized, especially when the rule is applied in situations where the plaintiff victim was known by the defendant tortfeasor and the parties were connected, as “when they have a contractual or quasi- contractual relationship.” (Id. at p. 155) The Legislature has created statutory exceptions to the rule. In response to a Supreme Court decision that disallowed homeowners from suing developers and contractors in negligence for construction defects that had not caused property damages (Aas v. Superior Court (2000) 24 Cal.4th 627, 632), the Legislature created a “statutory mechanism specifically designed for homeowners seeking redress against negligent builders” for 6 economic loss without accompanying property damage. (Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 412, citing Civ. Code, § 895 et seq.) The common law has also created exceptions, with the primary one being “where the plaintiff and the defendant have a ‘special relationship.’ ” (Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 400.) What is meant by a special relationship “is that the plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of a particular transaction but was harmed by the defendant’s negligence in carrying it out.” (Ibid.) Here, TruConnect maintains it had such a relationship with Maximus, while defendants deny it. Whether the parties have a special relationship is a critical, but not the exclusive, factor bearing on whether there is a duty of care, as the analysis “turns on a careful consideration of ‘ “ ‘ “the sum total” ’ ” ’ of the policy considerations at play, not a mere tallying of some finite, one-size-fits-all set of factors.” (Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 401.) California courts “have employed a checklist of factors to consider in assessing legal duty in the absence of privity of contract between a plaintiff and a defendant.” (Bily, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 397.) These factors include “the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him [or her], the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm.” (Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650.) After applying these factors, Biakanja permitted a sole beneficiary of a will to bring a negligence claim against a notary public—a person with whom she had no contractual relationship—for negligently failing to have the will properly attested, resulting in the beneficiary suffering economic injury by recovering only one eighth of the estate. (Id. at pp. 650–651.) We therefore 7 proceed to discuss each of the relevant Biakanja factors as applied to the circumstances of this case, and we ultimately conclude that this is not one of those rare situations in which a duty can be found to have been owed to protect against the purely economic interests of a non-contracting plaintiff. Extent to which transaction was meant to benefit TruConnect: As we have said, a “special relationship” exists between parties when “the plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of a particular transaction but was harmed by the defendant’s negligence in carrying it out.” (Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 400.) The parties have sharply different views on whether such a relationship existed here, but we think defendants have the better argument. TruConnect and defendants were essentially separate subcontractors of the PUC in the effort to provide telephone service to lower- income Californians. While it is no doubt true that Maximus’s agreement with the CPUC necessarily affected TruConnect’s economic interests, there is no indication that the parties entered into the agreement for the purpose of benefitting those interests. And even though the agreement affected TruConnect, it could be effected without necessarily doing so. This contrasts with the facts in Biakanja, where the will was intended to benefit a specific person, i.e., the beneficiary plaintiff. Although we are not persuaded by TruConnect’s argument that the first Biakanja factor was met here, we accept that it is a close question. Maximus and the CPUC insist their contract was meant to further the LifeLine program’s goal of providing universal telephone service, and not to benefit TruConnect. As the CPUC puts it in its amicus brief, “[T]he primary purpose of the Commission’s contract with Maximus is to benefit low-income customers; a secondary purpose is to benefit the Commission in carrying out its statutory obligation to verify LifeLine applicants’ eligibility under State 8 law to receive subsidized basic communication service.” Although the CPUC characterizes customer eligibility as a “secondary” purpose, it appears that this was Maximus’s only specific role in the LifeLine program―a role that is necessarily connected to TruConnect’s interest in obtaining such customers. TruConnect and Maximus were linked in the effort to expand universal phone service. But TruConnect goes too far in arguing that parties to a contract need only to have known that the contract “would directly and necessarily affect the economic interests of a third-party plaintiff” in order to show that the contract was meant to benefit that third party (or class of which the plaintiff is a member). If that were the case, an intent to benefit would be established whenever harm to a third party was foreseeable, which is not the law. (E.g., Bily, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 398 [declining to allow recovery for “merely foreseeable” users of audit reports].) At the same time, defendants go too far in arguing that a plaintiff asserting a claim for negligence for only economic losses must make an identical intent-to-benefit showing that is necessary when alleging a cause of action for breach of contract. They rely on Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817 (Goonewardene), where an employer outsourced its payroll functions by hiring an independent payroll service provider. (Id. at p. 820.) An employee sued both the employer and the payroll company alleging that the employer failed to pay her money owed under the Labor Code and then fired her when she raised the wage-and-hour claims. (Goonewardene at pp. 820, 822.) Our Supreme Court first analyzed whether the employee could maintain a cause of action for breach of contract against the payroll company under the state’s third party beneficiary doctrine. (Id. at pp. 826–827, citing Civ. Code, § 1559 [“A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third 9 person, may be enforced by him [or her] at any time before the parties thereto rescind it.”].) Under state common law, courts “carefully examine[] the express provisions of the contract at issue, as well as all of the relevant circumstances under which the contract was agreed to, in order to determine not only (1) whether the third party would in fact benefit from the contract, but also (2) whether a motivating purpose of the contracting parties was to provide a benefit to the third party, and (3) whether permitting a third party to bring its own breach of contract action against a contracting party is consistent with the objectives of the contract and the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties.” (Goonewardene at pp. 839–830.) Goonewardene held that the employee could not maintain a cause of action for breach of contract since the motivating purpose of a contract with a payroll company is to benefit the employer with the employer’s interests in mind, “not to provide a benefit to its employees with regard to the amount of wages they receive.” (Id. at p. 835.) We agree with defendants to the extent they argue that TruConnect could not maintain a cause of action for breach of contract against it under third party beneficiary principles (something TruConnect does not claim). (E.g., Martinez v. Socoma Companies, Inc. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 394, 397, 401 [even though government program was meant to benefit disadvantaged residents, those residents could not maintain breach of contract claim because there was no intent to confer a direct right to them].) Goonewardene went on to hold, based on a variety of policy considerations, that the plaintiff likewise could not maintain a negligence cause of action against the payroll company because the company had no special relationship with the employee that would give rise to a duty of care. (Goonewardene, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 837, 839–841.) The court observed that since California’s third party beneficiary law did not apply to the 10 employee, “it would clearly be anomalous to impose tort liability.” (Id. at p. 840.) Defendants here apparently interpret this statement to mean that whenever a plaintiff is not a third party beneficiary of a contract, the first Biakanja factor cannot be met, and a negligence action must necessarily fail. This is an overstatement.4 (See Beacon Residential Community Assn. v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP (2014) 59 Cal.4th 568, 584 (Beacon) [“[W]e have never held that third party beneficiary status is a prerequisite to alleging negligence.”], italics added; Heyer v. Flaig (1969) 70 Cal.2d 223, 227 [contractual theory of recovery “conceptually superfluous” where “the crux of the action must lie in tort . . . ; there can be no recovery without negligence”], disapproved on another ground in Laird v. Blacker (1992) 2 Cal.4th 606, 617; Levy v. Only Cremations for Pets, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 203, 213–214, 217–218 [although complaint against pet-cremation service did not state valid contract cause of action, it did state a valid cause for negligence since 4 Defendants repeatedly cite Lichtman v. Siemens Industry Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 914 for this proposition. Lichtman reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of a company that maintained a battery backup system for traffic lights and was sued by passengers injured in a car accident when the lights were out. (Id. at p. 918.) The court held that the company had not shown as a matter of law that it owed no duty of care to the passengers for allegedly negligently maintaining the system. (Ibid.) In a section titled “Duty―Overview” (id. at p. 920), the court discussed the overlap between duties arising from contract and common law and noted that “in the Biakanja context, the consideration concerning ‘the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff’ serves as a bridge between the absence of privity and liability, particularly in situations where the only claimed losses are economic.” (Id. at pp. 921–922.) The court ultimately concluded that the contract between the battery-system company and a city was “clearly intended to, and [did], affect plaintiffs.” (Id. at p. 924.) While this is no doubt correct, defendants overstate this holding insofar as they claim that the intent-to-benefit element is identical in contract and negligence actions. 11 defendant company owed the plaintiffs a duty arising out of a special relationship]; Ratcliff Architects v. Vanir Construction Management, Inc. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 595, 605 [although declining to find duty, acknowledging that public policy may support a duty to third parties even where contract specifically excluded third party beneficiaries from having any rights under a contract].) Defendants also place excessive reliance on Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th 391. In Gas Leak Cases, “a massive, months-long leak from a natural gas storage facility” (id. at p. 394) caused around 15,000 residents of a Los Angeles suburb to evacuate. (Id. at p. 396.) Businesses seeking to represent a class of all people and entities conducting business within five miles of the defendant’s natural gas storage facility sued for the economic loss caused by the leak. (Ibid.) Gas Leak Cases held that there was no tort duty to compensate for “purely economic losses suffered from mere proximity to an industrial accident” since such a duty would “create intractable line-drawing problems for courts.” (Id. at pp. 394–395.) Policy considerations no doubt support limiting the “potentially overwhelming liability . . . stemming from man-made calamity” where it would be challenging to limit the class of plaintiffs either geographically or temporally. (Id. at pp. 403, 408, 411.) But this case is vastly different, as there is only one plaintiff, whose claims are limited in time and scope. Defendants and the CPUC also overstate the holding of Giacometti v. Aulla, LLC (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1139 when they claim that a contract is meant to benefit a third party only if that is the “ ‘prime’ ” or “sole” purpose of the agreement. The plaintiff waiters in Giacometti alleged that their restaurant managers improperly allocated a percentage of the waiters’ tips to themselves. (Id. at p. 1135.) The waiters sued the accountants hired 12 by the restaurant to prepare yearend W-2 documents for negligence since the forms allegedly overreported the employees’ income based on the misallocated tips. (Id. at pp. 1135–1136.) The court held that the accountants did not owe a duty of care to the waiters based in part on the fact that “the restaurant’s intention in hiring the accountants was not to benefit the employees but to fulfill a legal obligation to furnish pay information to the IRS.” (Id. at p. 1139.) The facts here are unlike those in Giacometti. The defendant accountants in Giacometti were not alleged to have been hired to compile or verify payroll numbers, to have failed to properly analyze payroll records, or to have known or to have had reason to believe that the documents they were provided contained incorrect information. (Ibid.) Here, by contrast, defendants are alleged to be the source of incorrect (or missing) information, contrary to the very reason they were hired. We disagree with TruConnect that J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799 (J’Aire) compels reversal. There, a company that ran a restaurant at a county airport sued a general contractor for allegedly taking too long to complete work on the premises that the restaurant leased from the county. (Id. at p. 802.) The court concluded that the contractor owed a duty to the lessee since the contract between the county and the contractor was for the renovation of a space where the appellant did business, so “[t]he contract could not have been performed without impinging on that business. Thus respondent’s performance was intended to, and did, directly affect [the restaurant].” (Id. at p. 804.) TruConnect contends that under J’Aire, the intent-to-benefit factor is met “where the contracting parties knew at the time of contracting that the defendant’s performance would directly and necessarily affect the third-party plaintiff’s economic interests.” But again, in J’Aire, the relevant contract could not be performed without benefitting the 13 plaintiff. Here, while it is true that some telecommunications company (or companies) will benefit when a program administrator correctly identifies eligible customers, that company will not necessarily be TruConnect. J’Aire stressed that “[l]iability for negligent conduct may only be imposed where there is a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff or to a class of which the plaintiff is a member.” (J’Aire, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 803.) TruConnect apparently contends that because it was in a class affected by Maximus’s agreement with the CPUC, the agreement was intended to benefit the company. We are not persuaded. Again, the question turns on whether the agreement would necessarily benefit the identified plaintiff. For example, in Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1001, 1014, the court held that the defendant health plans owed a duty of care to plaintiff emergency-service providers where the plans delegated their financial responsibility for emergency services to practice associations that became insolvent. The court noted that the emergency-service providers were “a specific and well-defined class, which was reasonably identifiable by their practice specialization, hospital affiliation, and geographic location” when the defendant health plans delegated its financial responsibility to a practice association. (Id. at p. 1014.) Although the contracts between the health plan and the practice association “may have broadly covered all health care services rendered for the Health Plans’ enrollees, the specific contractual delegation of the Health Plans’ statutory obligation to reimburse [plaintiff] emergency service providers for their emergency services and care [citation] was necessarily intended to have an effect on plaintiffs.” (Ibid.) In other words, this delegation involved specific, identifiable service providers. Here, by contrast, the agreement between the CPUC and Maximus was intended to 14 help the CPUC identify people who qualified for LifeLine―but not to assign them to any particular carrier. TruConnect also relies on Beacon, supra, 59 Cal.4th 568, which held that a project’s principal architect who was alleged to have negligently designed a residential building owed a duty of care to future homeowners since the architect’s work was intended to benefit the homeowners who would live in the units. (Id. at pp. 571, 586.) The court concluded that the defendant architects “ ‘were more than well aware that future homeowners would necessarily be affected by the work that they performed.’ ” (Id. at p. 584.) TruConnect would have us interpret this holding to mean that, as a party that necessarily is affected by accurate information from the LifeLine program administrator, it was an intended beneficiary of the CPUC’s agreement with Maximus. Again, though, even though the affected homeowners could not be identified when the architects were hired to design the building in Beacon, any work by an architect necessarily affects the people who will live in the specific dwellings that an architect designs. Here, by contrast, the only party that would necessarily be affected by Maximus’s performance was the CPUC, which contracted for administration of LifeLine. The decision whether to impose a duty is ultimately a policy question, and the policy considerations present in Beacon are absent here. Beacon’s “average home buyer” plaintiffs were “akin to ‘the “presumptively powerless consumer” in product liability cases,’ ” who “ ‘ “clearly relies on the skill of the developer and on its implied representation that the house will be erected in reasonably workmanlike manner and will be reasonably fit for habitation. [The homeowner] has no architect or other professional advisor of his own, he has no real competency to inspect on his own, his actual examination is, in the nature of things, largely superficial, and his opportunity for obtaining 15 meaningful protective changes in the conveyancing documents prepared by the builder vendor is negligible.” ’ ” (Beacon, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 584– 585.) TruConnect, by contrast, is a business that is more akin to the sophisticated plaintiffs in Bily, supra, 3 Cal.4th 370, where our Supreme Court concluded that an accountant auditor does not owe a general duty of care to people other than the auditor’s client. (Id. at pp. 375–376.) Plaintiffs were people who relied on an audit opinion before investing in a company, and who ultimately lost their investments after the company filed for bankruptcy. (Id. at pp. 377–378.) Among the factors weighing against finding a duty was that “the generally more sophisticated class of plaintiffs in auditor liability cases (e.g., business lenders and investors) permits the effective use of contract rather than tort liability to control and adjust the relevant risks through ‘private ordering.’ ” (Id. at p. 398.) The court was further concerned that exposing an auditor to negligence claims from “all foreseeable third parties” would result in “potential liability far out of proportion to its fault.” (Ibid.) In our view, the biggest policy consideration weighing in TruConnect’s favor is that absent a finding of duty, the company lacks a remedy for what is alleged to be a significant financial loss. This is different from the situation in Goonewardene, where “perhaps” the “most significant[]” factor weighing against a duty was that the plaintiff employee could sue her employer directly. (Goonewardene, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 839.) “California law already provides the employee with a full and complete remedy for any wage loss the employee sustains as a result of the payroll company’s negligent conduct. An employee’s interest in this regard is fully protected by the employee’s well- established right[s] under the labor statutes to recover in a civil action 16 against the employer . . . . Given the employer’s clear and direct liability for any wage loss caused by the payroll company’s negligence in calculating the wages that are due, the imposition of a separate tort duty of care on a payroll company is generally unnecessary to adequately protect the employee’s interests.” (Ibid., italics added.) Here, by contrast, TruConnect has no right to recover from the CPUC. But imposing liability in this situation still risks the imposition of “liability out of proportion to fault or [the promotion of] virtually unlimited responsibility for intangible injury” (Bily, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 398) where a relatively sophisticated plaintiff could take steps to protect itself in contract, either through its own agreement with the CPUC or through insurance.5 According to defendants, the absence of this first Biakanja element is dispositive. Our Supreme Court has stressed, though, that “[d]iscerning whether there is a special relationship justifying liability [for purely economic loss] can . . . be a subtle enterprise,” and the court has “emphasized that [its] duty determination [has] rested not just on” the intent-to-benefit factor, but 5 TruConnect claims that it would be unjust to consider its ability to insure against loss since defendants had equal access to insurance. The cases upon which it relies are inapposite because, unlike here, the power differential between the plaintiffs and the defendants was extreme. One involved a situation where the defendants were far more sophisticated than the plaintiffs who sued in tort. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1153 [defendant companies that exposed plaintiff employees’ household members to asbestos were in better position to prevent harm, and tort system contemplates that cost will be insured by defendants].) The other did not mention insurance but instead involved a defendant residential care facility charged with a duty to prevent a sexual assault against a developmentally disabled adult where “[t]he array of [the facility’s] possible safety precautions all involved costs that pale in comparison” to the “the toll of [a] possible attack on a disabled client.” (Jane IL Doe v. Brightstar Residential Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 171, 183.) 17 also on the remaining Biakanja factors. (Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 401, italics added.) On balance, though, the remaining factors do not weigh in favor of finding a duty. Foreseeability of harm: We agree with the trial court that it was foreseeable that any error in defendants’ platform identifying eligible customers would harm TruConnect. Regardless of whether the CPUC and Maximus’s agreement was intended to benefit TruConnect, defendants certainly had to have known that inaccurate information would harm TruConnect’s business. In arguing to the contrary, Maximus focuses on the CPUC’s alleged unfulfilled promises to make TruConnect whole after the company suffered financial loss. According to Maximus, it “had no reason to anticipate (1) that the CPUC would promise to make TruConnect whole; (2) the CPUC would later provisionally reimburse TruConnect; and (3) the CPUC would then change position, demand claw-backs, and refuse any further payment.” But the test is whether a defendant could have anticipated whether negligent breach of an agreement would cause harm, not how the other party to the agreement would respond to that harm. (E.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Cambridge Integrated Services Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 35, 46 (National Union) [“wholly foreseeable” that insurer’s mishandling of workers’ compensation claims would affect excess insurer].) Again, though, mere foreseeability of harm does not give rise to a duty in negligence. (Bily, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 398.) Degree of certainty that TruConnect suffered injury: According to the operative complaint, “The profound problems afflicting Maximus’ platform and TruConnect’s current lack of access to data within Maximus’ control makes it impossible for TruConnect to conduct a customer-by-customer 18 accounting of its losses. But a comparison of TruConnect’s total subscriber numbers before and after the Maximus launch reveal a loss of well over 200,000 new and renewing customers―costing the company more than $20 million in lost revenues.” The complaint further alleges that TruConnect employees spent “hundreds of thousands of hours” trying to fix problems with defendants’ platform “at a cost well in excess of $3 million dollars in time and resources” in order to mitigate damages caused by defendants’ alleged negligence. Defendants claim, and the trial court agreed, that the alleged damages are uncertain. They point to the CPUC’s resolution that denied TruConnect’s reimbursement request for lost-opportunity costs. Resolution T-17707 concluded that LifeLine program rules forbid recovery of “ ‘lost opportunities’ or ‘missed opportunities’ costs.” It further noted that the CPUC “must be vigilant and protect the health of the fund” that supports LifeLine, and allowing carriers to receive money for service they never provided “makes no sense” and would encourage other carriers to submit similar claims. And it also concluded that even if lost-opportunity costs were recoverable, “the proposed recovery of those costs [was] too vague and uncertain to calculate with any precision.” As we noted in TruConnect I, the comment about vagueness and uncertainty “was made in the context of a company seeking money through a routine reimbursement procedure, as opposed to seeking damages through a court’s factfinding process.” (TruConnect I, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 509.) Although we made this observation in the context of whether TruConnect’s lawsuit would conflict with a CPUC order or interfere with the commission’s oversight of LifeLine in violation of section 1759 (TrueConnect I at p. 506), it is also relevant here. Were the complaint allowed to proceed, further discovery presumably would shed light 19 on possible limitations in determining alleged damages with certainty. We are still concerned, though, that any potential damages would be disproportionate to fault, especially where the CPUC’s agreement with Maximus was not intended to benefit TruConnect. Closeness of connection between defendants’ conduct and injury suffered: The theory of TruConnect’s complaint is that absent bugs in defendants’ software platform, the company would have enrolled many more customers, and the company lost out on millions in revenue when the platform erroneously determined those potential customers were in fact ineligible for LifeLine. We agree with the trial court that if this theory were proven, defendants’ conduct could be found to have injured TruConnect. (National Union, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.) Moral blame attached to defendants’ conduct: “Negligence in the execution of contractual duties is generally held to be morally blameworthy conduct.” (National Union, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 47, citing J’Aire, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 805; see also Gilead Tenofovir Cases (2026) 20 Cal.5th 390, 422 [courts required “to evaluate moral blame categorically rather than by reference to [defendant’s] precise circumstances and motivations”], italics added; TruConnect I, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 513 [“While we accept that Maximus was generally acting under its contractual relationship with the CPUC, we do not agree that the CPUC, by virtue of that relationship, authorized or directed Maximus to injure third parties with software malfunctions and errors.”].) Policy of preventing future harm: “The overall policy of preventing future harm is ordinarily served, in tort law, by imposing the costs of negligent conduct upon those responsible. The policy question is whether that consideration is outweighed, for a category of negligent conduct, by laws 20 or mores indicating approval of the conduct or by the undesirable consequences of allowing potential liability.” (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 781–782.) We agree with defendants that imposing liabil