Codan Forsikring A/S v. Bogus

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 25-1770 CODAN FORSIKRING A/S, as subrogee of Hays Ships Ltd., Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SEAN BOGUS; NORTHEAST MARINE PILOTS, INC., Defendants, Appellees. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Myong J. Joun, U.S. District Judge] Before Barron, Chief Judge, Lynch and Gelpí, Circuit Judges. Olaf Aprans, with whom Liam T. O'Connell and Farrell Smith O'Connell Aarsheim Aprans LLP were on brief, for appellant. Joshua Parks, with whom Colten H. Erickson and Adler Pollock & Sheehan PC were on brief, for appellee Northeast Marine Pilots, Inc. Brendan P. O'Shea and Clayton L. Diamond on brief for American Pilots' Association as amicus curiae supporting appellee Northeast Marine Pilots, Inc. November 3, 2026  LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Codan Forsikring ("Codan"), as subrogee of Hays Ships Ltd. ("Hays"), appeals from the district court's partial grant of Defendant Northeast Marine Pilots, Inc.'s ("Northeast Pilots") Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.1 See Codan Forsikring A/S v. Bogus, No. 24-CV-12056, 2025 WL 2405584 (D. Mass. July 10, 2025). The district court held that Codan's complaint failed to plausibly allege that Northeast Pilots was vicariously liable under federal maritime law for pilot Sean Bogus's actions in piloting a vessel, and so dismissed Codan's negligence, indemnity, and contribution claims against Northeast Pilots. Codan argues on appeal that Northeast Pilots is vicariously liable because Codan has plausibly alleged that Bogus is Northeast Pilots' agent-employee and shareholder. Under well-settled federal maritime law, a maritime pilot association is not liable for a member pilot's actions in piloting a vessel unless the association exercises control over the pilot's performance of his navigational duties. Because the 1 No party contests that this court has interlocutory appellate jurisdiction because the partial dismissal "determin[ed] the rights and liabilities of the parties to" an admiralty case "in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3); see, e.g., Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Steam Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1064 (1st Cir. 1987) ("For an interlocutory order to be appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3), it need not address all of the rights and liabilities at issue in the litigation. It suffices that the order conclusively lashes down the merits of some particular claim or defense." (citations omitted)). - 2 - complaint does not allege facts that plausibly lead to such an inference of control by Northeast Pilots, we affirm. I. When reviewing the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "we recount the underlying facts as alleged in the complaint, but disregard any conclusory allegations." Humana Inc. v. Biogen, Inc., 126 F.4th 94, 98 (1st Cir. 2025) (citation modified). We also note Codan's concessions at oral argument, as appropriate. This dispute arises out of the complaint's assertion that Bogus, as pilot of a maritime vessel while exercising his pilot duties, caused an allision on May 23, 2020.2 The complaint alleges that Bogus is a licensed pilot and that as to Northeast Pilots he is an employee, member, partner, and shareholder-owner. Hays owns a large, 3,424-ton foreign vessel named KOMMANDOR SUSAN that "was required to use a compulsory marine pilot when arriving or departing the Port of New Bedford" and "was required to hire its aforementioned compulsory marine pilot from Northeast Pilots." The vessel thus "contracted with and requested a marine pilot from Northeast Pilots, for her departure." Northeast Pilots dispatched Bogus in response to this request. Bogus began navigating the 2 An allision is "[t]he contact of a vessel with a stationary object such as an anchored vessel or a pier." Allision, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). - 3 - vessel out of the port, and he briefly paused the vessel due to reduced visibility before resuming the departure. The vessel's master and a deck officer shouted to Bogus that the vessel's rear was approaching a hurricane barrier, but Bogus did not alter the vessel's course. The vessel struck the barrier, which the United States Army Corps of Engineers owns and maintains, and the allision substantially damaged the vessel and the barrier. Codan, as insurer for the vessel and Hays, paid more than $750,000 to resolve a claim by the United States Army Corps of Engineers and repair the vessel. The vessel also lost approximately ten days of employment. Codan, as subrogee of Hays, filed this lawsuit on August 9, 2024, against Bogus3 and Northeast Pilots alleging: (1) negligence; (2) indemnity; (3) contribution; (4) breach of contract; and (5) breach of warranty. Codan pled admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 for all five claims. On July 10, 2025, the district court granted in part Northeast Pilots' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and dismissed the first three counts alleging negligence, indemnity, and contribution against Northeast Pilots, but denied the motion as to the contract-based claims. Codan Forsikring A/S, 2025 WL 2405584, at *1. The court 3 Bogus answered Codan's first amended complaint on November 6, 2024. On September 3, 2025, the district court granted the parties' joint motion to stay the litigation pending this interlocutory appeal. - 4 - explained that "the inability of an association to supervise or control a pilot's decision-making while navigating a vessel precludes vicarious liability" and Codan's allegations fall short of plausibly pleading Northeast Pilots' control over the manner of Bogus's navigation. Id. at *3. This timely appeal followed. Pilots are specialized mariners who use their local knowledge to navigate vessels entering or exiting ports. Foreign vessels of at least 350 gross tons must hire a commissioned pilot to enter or exit Massachusetts's four shoreline districts. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 103, §§ 1, 21. Massachusetts law establishes pilot commissioners for each district who "formulate rules and regulations for pilotage" "subject to the approval of the trustees of [the Boston Marine Society]" and "grant commissions as pilots . . . to such persons as they consider competent."4 Id. §§ 2, 3. Massachusetts also authorizes commissioners to investigate complaints against pilots and discipline pilots for "misconduct, carelessness or neglect of duty." Id. § 3. Northeast Pilots plays no role in the appointment of pilot commissioners, who are "appointed by the governor, with 4 The Boston Marine Society is a charitable organization composed of active and retired ship masters whose mission is "ensuring the safety of navigation in the Waters of the Commonwealth and financially supporting members and their families in times of need." Our Modern Missions, The Boston Marine Society, https://www.bostonmarinesociety.org/copy-of-about-3 (last visited Sept. 18, 2026) [https://perma.cc/ZR4Z-KY6K]. - 5 - the advice and consent of the [governor's] council, for terms of three years." Id. § 2. Northeast Pilots' brief notes that "[i]t is undisputed that Northeast Pilots plays no role in the commissioning and licensing of individual pilots, which is instead left wholly to the pilot commissioners." Codan's brief concedes that "the District Court was correct that the Massachusetts Pilot Commissioner exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the propriety of Bogus's pilot commission." Massachusetts law also defines the duties of pilots. A pilot is "liable for all damages accruing from his negligence, unskillfulness or unfaithfulness," id. § 18, and pilots in the relevant district "shall at all times perform their duties in a professional and workmanlike manner, exercising reasonable care under the circumstances, attentive and faithful to their duties, and exercising unimpaired judgment," 995 Mass. Code Regs. § 4.18(1). A pilot also must maintain a bond "conditioned on the faithful performance of the duties of his office and the payment of all damages accruing from his negligence, unskillfulness or unfaithfulness." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 103, § 6. Massachusetts law provides certain requirements for pilot associations such as Northeast Pilots. All pilots in the relevant district must "remain members in good standing of Northeast Marine Pilots as a condition of performing pilotage - 6 - services." 995 Mass. Code Regs. § 4.19(1).5 The regulations impose strict duties on the pilots, but not Northeast Pilots, as to the navigation of vessels in the district. See id. § 4.18. Northeast Pilots must provide "[p]ilot boat services for pilots affiliated with" the organization and staff a dispatch office "at all times." Id. § 4.19(2). Northeast Pilots also must dispatch compulsory pilots according to a fixed rotation that assigns the first eligible pilot on a roster. Id. § 4.19(4). Commissioned pilots may not perform compulsory pilot services in the relevant district, nor may vessels hire compulsory pilots, outside of Northeast Pilots' dispatch procedures. Id. §§ 4.19(3)-(5). II. We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo. Lowe v. Mills, 68 F.4th 706, 713 (1st Cir. 2023) (citations omitted). We take all well-pleaded facts as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Id. "Because only well-pleaded facts are taken as true, however, we need not accept a complainant's unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law, nor must we credit bald assertions or subjective characterizations." Wescott v. Stanfill, 171 F.4th 534, 540 (1st Cir. 2026) (citation modified). Dismissal is appropriate when the 5 Massachusetts provides an exemption for certain "Commissioned Transit Pilots" that is not relevant here. See 995 Mass. Code Regs. § 4.19(10). - 7 - complaint fails "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Lowe, 68 F.4th at 713 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). III. Federal maritime law applies to torts on navigable waters with "a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." Transamerica Premier Ins. Co. v. Ober, 107 F.3d 925, 929 n.5 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Carey v. Bahama Cruise Lines, 864 F.2d 201, 207 (1st Cir. 1988)). The parties do not dispute that federal maritime law applies here.6 6 The parties did not brief how admiralty law interacts with state law here. Cf. Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC, 601 U.S. 65, 70 (2024) ("[T]he scope of application of state law in maritime cases is one of the most perplexing issues in the law." (citation omitted)). Federal courts may apply state law in maritime cases "[w]hen no established rule exists, and when the federal courts decline to create a new rule." Id. (citing Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 320-21 (1955)). State law also "may supplement federal maritime law so long as it is 'consistent with federal maritime principles and policies.'" Cunningham v. Dir., Off. Of Workers' Comp. Programs, 377 F.3d 98, 108 n.11 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Yamaha Motor Corp., USA v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 214-15 & n.13 (1996)). The interplay between federal maritime law and state law is further complicated for pilotage because states "have had full power to regulate pilotage of certain kinds of vessels since 1789." Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 559 (1947); see also 46 U.S.C. § 8501(a) ("Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, pilots in the bays, rivers, harbors, and ports of the United States shall be regulated only in conformity with the laws of the States."). We conclude only that under federal maritime law, we may look to local law and regulations to determine who controls pilots. - 8 -  The parties dispute the proper legal standard for whether Bogus's alleged torts can be attributed to Northeast Pilots. Northeast Pilots argues that a pilot association is not liable under federal maritime law for pilot members' torts while navigating vessels unless the association can control the pilots' navigation. Codan initially conceded at oral argument that it must plausibly allege such control by Northeast Pilots over Bogus but during rebuttal appeared to recant this concession and instead fell back on an argument in its briefing: that the general common law of agency's multi-factor test for distinguishing employees and independent contractors applies, and that it has plausibly alleged that Bogus was Northeast Pilots' employee. Under this test, Codan contends that, by virtue of Bogus being Northeast Pilots' employee, Northeast Pilots exercises the control relevant for vicarious liability to attach. The district court concluded that, under federal maritime law, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a pilot association has "control over the manner of [a pilot's] navigation" for vicarious liability to attach. Codan Forsikring A/S, 2025 WL 2405584, at *3. Yet on appeal, Codan fails to develop a persuasive argument as to why the district court erred and why the proper test for adjudicating the vicarious liability of a pilot association instead should be the general common law of agency's multi-factor test, rather than the specific test that federal - 9 - maritime law has developed when assessing the vicarious liability of pilot associations. To be sure, "[f]ederal maritime law embraces the principles of agency," CEH, Inc. v. F/V Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694, 704 (1st Cir. 1995) (citation modified), and "imposes vicarious liability upon employers for the wrongful acts committed by employees while acting in the course of their employment," Stoot v. D & D Catering Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1197, 1199 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987) (citations omitted). Parties are not generally "liable for the negligence of an independent contractor." Becker v. Poling Transp. Corp., 356 F.3d 381, 388 (2d Cir. 2004), as modified (Feb. 27, 2004) (citations omitted) (applying agency principles in admiralty suit). Courts typically consider several non-exhaustive factors to determine whether a person is an employee or independent contractor under the general common law of agency. See Lopez v. Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 69, 83-84 (1st Cir. 2009).7 7 The Supreme Court has identified under the common law factors including: "the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished[;] . . . the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party." - 10 -  That said, the Supreme Court's decision in Guy v. Donald, 203 U.S. 399 (1906), guides how federal maritime agency principles apply in the specific context of pilot associations. There, the Supreme Court held that members of the Virginia Pilot Association were not liable under federal maritime law for the negligence of a member pilot for his piloting decisions. Id. at 408. The Court started from the general principle that one is not liable for another's torts "when he could not select, could not control, and could not discharge the guilty man." Id. at 406. The Virginia Pilot Association was a "voluntary, unincorporated association" that dispatched members to vessels, collected pilotage fees, maintained common facilities, and distributed net profits to pilots. Id. at 404. Virginia's regulations "tacitly assume[d] that every pilot [wa]s a member of the association." Id. at 405. Virginia otherwise limited the association's power. The state granted a board of commissioners "full authority" to regulate pilots and resolve controversies between pilots. Id. at 404. With the exception of minor fines, the board of commissioners controlled "[a]ll punishment and suspension" and "substantially the whole Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992) (citing, inter alia, Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2) (1958)) (applying common law factors in an ERISA action). Codan argues that it has plausibly alleged Bogus is Northeast Pilots' employee under those factors because, inter alia, Northeast Pilots is in the business of providing pilotage services, Bogus could not choose or refuse assignments from Northeast Pilots, and vessels contract with and pay Northeast Pilots rather than Bogus. - 11 - government of the association." Id. at 405. The Virginia Pilot Association thus lacked the power to select or discharge its members. See id. at 407. The association also "could not control or direct [pilots] in the performance of their duties as pilots." Id. Most importantly, even if all other members directed a pilot to change direction, he would as "sole master of his course . . . owe no duty to obey" and "be as free as before to do what he thought best." Id.; see also Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1955) (noting in an admiralty contract dispute, without citing Guy, that "[p]ilots hold a unique position in the maritime world" and "[u]nder law and custom they have an independence wholly incompatible with the general obligations of obedience normally owed by an employee to his employer"). District courts applying Guy have consistently rejected vicarious liability negligence claims against pilot associations where the associations lacked control over the pilot's performance of his navigational duties. See, e.g., In re J.W. Westcott Co., 333 F. Supp. 2d 604, 606 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (pilot association not liable for member's negligent navigation unless it can "control the pilot's actions while discharging his professional duties onboard the vessel"). In doing so, several courts have looked to state law to determine who controls pilots. See, e.g., Port of Seattle v. M/V Maria Rubicon, 404 F. Supp. 302, 304 (W.D. Wash. 1975) (pilot association not liable for members' actions in the - 12 - performance of their navigational duties where state regulatory body had "broad and exclusive powers to regulate and control the professional behavior of Washington pilots"); General v. Pilots' Ass'n for Bay & River Del., 254 F. Supp. 447, 450 (D. Del. 1966) (pilot association not liable for member's torts where it was "powerless to control members in the performance of their profession as pilots" under Delaware and Pennsylvania law); see also 1-VII Benedict on Admiralty § 112 (discussing when federal courts have looked to state law to create or apply a federal maritime law rule). Two circuits have reached similar conclusions. In The Manchioneal, 243 F. 801 (2d Cir. 1917), the Second Circuit considered a pilot association that did "nothing more" than pay common expenses and distribute earnings to members. Id. at 806-07. The Second Circuit held that the case was indistinguishable from Guy and the pilot association there was not vicariously liable under federal maritime law for a pilot member's navigational decisions. See id. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Dampskibsselskabet Atalanta A/S v. United States, 31 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1929), considered a pilot association that owned and operated boats for pilots, assigned pilots on a regular rotation, and collected and distributed fees. See id. at 961-62. The association had "no control over the licensing of pilots," who were "appointed by the Governor of Louisiana after an examination - 13 - by a board of examiners." Id. at 961. Invoking Guy, the Fifth Circuit held that the pilot association came within "the general rule" exempting "pilots' associations from liability for negligence of their members in performing their duties as pilots" where "the association exercises no control over the manner in which those duties are to be performed." Id. at 962. Here, Massachusetts's regulatory scheme does not provide any inference that Northeast Pilots has any degree of control over pilots' performance of their navigational duties. By law, Northeast Pilots must provide "boat services" and a "dispatch office" to dispatch pilots according to a "single common rotation" that assigns the first eligible pilot at the top of the list. 995 Mass. Code Regs. § 4.19(2)-(4). Massachusetts's regulations do not provide that Northeast Pilots will act, supervise, or have any say over the pilot's navigation choices. See id. By contrast, Massachusetts imposes navigational duties on and authorizes damages against pilots for "negligence, unskillfulness or unfaithfulness." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 103, § 18; see also 995 Mass. Code Regs. § 4.18.8 Notably, Massachusetts also requires a pilot, 8 Indeed, pilot associations are not granted certain powers that are granted to pilot commissioners to "formulate rules and regulations for pilotage" "subject to the approval of the trustees of [the Boston Marine Society]," "grant commissions as pilots . . . to such persons as they consider competent," and "receive, hear and determine complaints by and against pilots." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 103, § 3. Pilot commissioners are not the defendants here and there is no claim they failed to perform their duties and caused - 14 - but not a pilot association, to maintain a bond "conditioned on the faithful performance of the duties of his office and the payment of all damages accruing from his negligence, unskillfulness or unfaithfulness." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 103, § 6; cf. General, 254 F. Supp. at 450 (relying in part on pilot bond requirement to conclude that "the individual pilot is answerable only to himself"). Accordingly, Massachusetts's regulatory scheme does not undermine pilots' navigational independence under admiralty law.9 See Bisso, 349 U.S. at 94 (describing customary rule that "no employer, no person can tell [pilots] how to perform their pilotage duties"). Codan misunderstands the relevance of the comprehensive regulatory scheme. To be clear, there is nothing in Massachusetts's statutes and regulations that would expressly bar a pilot association from taking other steps that hypothetically might lead to plausible inferences that it exercised sufficient control over member pilots' performance of their navigational duties. Rather, Codan's complaint must be read against the the allision. As our discussion makes clear, we reject Codan's contention 9 that the regulatory scheme is immaterial because Massachusetts also regulates other licensed professionals like lawyers and healthcare providers, and courts routinely hold law firms and hospitals vicariously liable for employees' torts. Codan's attempt to draw such analogies fails because pilotage "is a unique institution and must be judged as such." Kotch, 330 U.S. at 557. - 15 - backdrop of the regulatory scheme which, consistent with pilots' historic and traditional independence under maritime and admiralty law, imposes duties on pilots alone as to the navigation of vessels and defines limited administrative functions for Northeast Pilots. Against that backdrop, Codan must allege more than bald assertions or unsupported conclusions to create a plausible inference that Northeast Pilots exercised control over Bogus's performance of his navigational duties. Codan's complaint fails to do so. Codan's complaint amply describes Bogus's navigational duties. Notably, Codan alleges that Bogus "operated the Vessel on his own" and was thus solely in control of the vessel. As for Northeast Pilots, the complaint is mostly silent. Absent are any allegations that Northeast Pilots communicates with, trains, or in any way directs pilots in their performance of their navigational duties. Instead, the complaint alleges only that Northeast Pilots staffs a dispatch office, maintains equipment for pilots, and issues invoices and collects payments. Codan also emphasizes that Bogus cannot refuse assignments from Northeast Pilots, and that Hays had to secure a pilot through Northeast Pilots. As in Guy and Dampskibsselskabet, assigning pilots to vessels and collecting fees do not equate to controlling a pilot's performance of his navigational duties. See Guy, 203 U.S. at 404, 407-08 (members of pilot association took "turns in boarding vessels" and pilot association collected and - 16 - distributed pilotage fees and maintained office); Dampskibsselskabet Atalanta A/S, 31 F.2d at 961-62 (pilot association owned and operated boats for pilots, collected and distributed pilotage fees, paid common expenses, and assigned pilots in a "regular order"). Codan's complaint also alleges that "Northeast Pilots was required to apportion compulsory state pilotage work among its Commissioned Pilots, so that all Commissioned Pilots perform a reasonable and equitable share of the pilotage duties." But the complaint includes no allegation whatsoever that Northeast Pilots controls those assignments based on a pilot's navigational performance.10 Codan's allegations about Bogus's employment status also do not lead to a plausible inference that Northeast Pilots exercises control over Bogus's performance of his navigational 10 Moreover, we note that Massachusetts's regulatory scheme requires that "[a]ll commissioned" pilots in the relevant district "shall be enrolled in a single common rotation" for compulsory pilotage assignments and that a pilot service request "shall be assigned to the pilot whose name stands closest to the top of such list (or roster), and whom is legally permitted to serve as pilot upon such vessel pending assignment." 995 Mass. Code Regs. § 4.19(4). The regulations specify geographic and vessel restrictions for certain pilot commissions, see id. § 4.17, and further provide that a "pilot who is closest to the top of the list that was unable to legally perform such pilotage service shall remain at the top of the list (or roster)," id. § 4.19(4). Given that it is not clear that Massachusetts law even authorizes Northeast Pilots to exercise control over compulsory pilotage assignments based on pilots' navigational performance, it is especially telling that Codan's complaint includes no allegation in that regard. - 17 - duties. Codan alleges that Bogus is an "employee" of Northeast Pilots and that Northeast Pilots manages a "roster of marine pilots, to include a schedule of its marine pilots' vacation time and/or medical leave." We acknowledge that most of the cases applying Guy do not directly address an allegation that a pilot was an employee of the pilot association. Still, we read Guy and its progeny to require more than an allegation of an employment relationship for vicarious liability to attach in the specific context of pilotage. Whatever a pilot's employment relationship with a pilot association, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the pilot association exercises control over the pilot's performance of his navigational duties. Codan does not explain on appeal why, based on the mere allegation that Northeast Pilots employed Bogus, Northeast Pilots exercised such control over Bogus. Perhaps recognizing this problem, Codan appears to argue that the absence of allegations in its complaint about Northeast Pilots' exercise of navigational control over Bogus does not matter because Northeast Pilots delegated "nearly absolute" navigational control to Bogus. But Codan's argument assumes that merely because of Bogus's alleged employment relationship with Northeast Pilots, Northeast Pilots had control over Bogus's navigation in the first place. In the specific maritime context of pilotage, we cannot make such an assumption. - 18 -  Further, the cases that Codan cites that recognized vicarious liability when a pilot acted pursuant to an employment-like relationship are distinguishable. One case involved a municipality that directly employed pilots and controlled their navigational performance. See Societa Per Azioni De Navigazione Italia v. City of Los Angeles, 645 P.2d 102, 104-05, 110 (Cal. 1982) ("The City hires, fires, trains, supervises, and pays these pilots who are civil service employees."). Two other cases involved a municipality that used a contractor to supply pilots to vessels. See City of Long Beach v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 223 F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1955); Nat'l Dev. Co. v. City of Long Beach, 187 F. Supp. 109, 113-14 (S.D. Cal. 1960). Those decisions did not cite Guy or directly address any argument about pilot associations' vicarious liability. See Am. President Lines, Ltd., 223 F.2d at 858 n.7 (noting that "[n]o issue has been made on appeal as to whether" the private company that furnished pilots to the municipality or its proprietor "would be liable for [the pilot's] negligence"). All three cases thus do not support that a pilot association, simply by employing a pilot, can be held vicariously liable for that pilot's negligence in exercising his navigational duties. Next, Codan alleges that Bogus must remain a member in "good standing" of Northeast Pilots "as a condition of performing pilotage services." 995 Mass. Code Regs. § 4.19(1). But Codan - 19 - does not allege anything connecting that requirement to navigational control. Codan therefore does not plausibly allege that Northeast Pilots controlled Bogus's performance of his navigational duties merely because of his membership status. Codan's remaining allegations about Northeast Pilots' corporate form are also insufficient. Codan stresses that Northeast Pilots is a non-voluntary, incorporated entity and Bogus is a part-owner and shareholder, but Codan does not allege how that permits an inference that Northeast Pilots controlled Bogus's piloting decisions. Northeast Pilots' incorporated status also does not allow us to plausibly infer that pilots have ceded to Northeast Pilots the navigational independence that pilots have long enjoyed under federal maritime law. Codan finally argues that the district court erred because Guy and its progeny are distinguishable on three grounds. Codan notes that: (1) Guy addressed vicarious liability against a pilot association's members rather than the association itself; (2) unlike the association in Guy, Northeast Pilots is a mandatory, for-profit, incorporated business for which Bogus is an owner-shareholder and through which Bogus conducts all of his compulsory pilotage; and (3) cases applying Guy dismissed actions against pilot associations only "after a fact intensive inquiry following discovery." - 20 -  Codan's distinctions fail. As to the first, Codan misreads Guy, and the authorities cited above apply to the pilot association itself. While Guy involved a lawsuit against a pilot association's members, the Court analyzed the association's power to control pilots. See Guy, 203 U.S. at 407 (noting that "the Virginia Pilot Association" could not "select," "discharge," or "control or direct [its members] in the performance of their duties as pilots"). Second, we decline to limit Guy's holding to unincorporated, voluntary pilot associations. To the contrary, in Guy itself the Supreme Court cautioned against "being led by a technical definition to apply a certain name, and then to deduce consequences which have no relation to the grounds on which the name was applied." Id. at 405-06; see also, e.g., Dampskibsselskabet Atalanta A/S, 31 F.2d at 961-62 (pilot association comprised of pro rata owners not vicariously liable for members' torts); In re China Union Lines, Ltd., 342 F. Supp. 426, 431 (E.D. La. 1971) (principles from Guy apply "whether or not the nature of their association be characterized a corporation or a partnership"); In re Lloyd's Leasing Ltd., 764 F. Supp. 1114, 1139 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (incorporated pilot association not liable for member pilots' torts "in the rendition of their professional services"). If Codan is contending only that an entity's corporate form is relevant to Guy's inquiry, we agree. As we have explained, - 21 - however, Codan's allegations about Northeast Pilots' corporate form do not by themselves permit a plausible inference that Northeast Pilots can control Bogus's performance of his navigational duties. Third, Codan "must state a plausible claim before [it] can invoke a right to discovery." Parker v. Landry, 935 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2019). Codan fails to do so, and Codan cannot avoid dismissal by requesting discovery to which it is not entitled. Cf. Port of Seattle, 404 F. Supp. at 304 (district court likely was "unduly indulgent" in authorizing discovery where Washington's pilot commissioners had "broad and exclusive powers to regulate and control the professional behavior of Washington pilots"). IV. We affirm the district court's partial grant of Northeast Pilots' motion to dismiss. - 22 -