Nikita J. Griffin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc.
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket24-13699
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-13699
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
NIKITA J. GRIFFIN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
MERRILL LYNCH PIERCE FENNER & SMITH INC.,
Respondent-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:24-cv-02726-LMM
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Nikita Griffin appeals the district court’s dismissal of his pe-
tition to vacate an arbitration award under 9 U.S.C. § 10. The dis-
trict court found that the petition was not timely filed or served
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-13699
within 90 days of the arbitration award, see 9 U.S.C. § 12, and that,
even if it was timely, Griffin failed to allege sufficient grounds for
vacatur of the arbitration award. After careful review, we affirm
the district court’s latter ruling on the merits without reaching
whether Griffin’s petition was timely.
I.
In March 2022, Griffin initiated an arbitration against Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (“Merrill”), with the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), alleging that Merrill
caused him damages by placing restrictions on his account because
of day-trading violations. In October 2023, a FINRA arbitration
panel issued an award denying all of Griffin’s claims.
In December 2023, Griffin filed a “Notice of Appeal” of the
arbitration award under 9 U.S.C. § 10, which was construed as a
petition to vacate under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The
filing alleged “prejudice and misconduct toward the Petitioner,”
but did not elaborate on Griffin’s reasons for seeking relief.
Merrill answered the petition, asserting insufficient service
of process and arguing that the petition failed on the merits. Merrill
asserted that service was improper because Griffin had served the
petition on “Merrill’s counsel in the underlying arbitration,” and
because the summons did not include a copy of the petition. Ac-
cording to Merrill, the “attempted service is ineffective because [ar-
bitration counsel] is not authorized to accept service on behalf of
Merrill.”
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24-13699 Opinion of the Court 3
The district court agreed with Merrill that service was im-
proper, and it ordered Griffin to effect proper service on Merrill by
January 12, 2024. In a series of orders, the court directed Griffin to
serve the attorney representing Merrill “in this action, not the attor-
ney representing [Merrill] in the underlying arbitration,” and to
submit proof of service. The district court ultimately dismissed
Griffin’s petition without prejudice for insufficient service of pro-
cess and failure to follow court orders.
Griffin did not timely appeal. Instead, in June 2024, Griffin
moved to reopen the case, arguing that he had complied with the
court’s orders but the servicing documents were mishandled and
not delivered until May 2024. The district court denied the motion,
and no appeal was taken.
Soon after, on June 21, 2024, Griffin refiled his petition to
vacate the arbitration award in federal district court. Answering in
opposition, Merrill argued that Griffin had failed to comply with
the 90-day statutory period for seeking judicial review, see 9 U.S.C.
§ 12, and that he had otherwise failed to set forth grounds in his
petition for vacating the arbitration decision.
The district court dismissed Griffin’s petition. The court
found that it was untimely filed more than three months after the
arbitration award was issued. The court further stated that, even
if the petition had been timely, it would still dismiss the petition
because Griffin fell “well short of establishing any of the grounds
for vacatur set forth in Section 10 of the FAA.”
II.
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-13699
In reviewing the denial of a motion to vacate an arbitration
award, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error
and its legal conclusions de novo. Bamberger Rosenheim, Ltd. v. OA
Dev., Inc., 862 F.3d 1284, 1286 (11th Cir. 2017). We review for abuse
of discretion a dismissal for failure to comply with the rules of court
or court orders. Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d
1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005).
“Under the FAA, federal courts have limited authority to va-
cate or modify an arbitration award.” Gherardi v. Citigroup Global
Markets Inc., 975 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th Cir. 2020). Vacatur of an
arbitration award is allowed “only in very unusual circumstances,
and those very unusual circumstances are described in the statute.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted). In particular, the FAA provides for
vacatur of an arbitration award when (1) “the award was procured
by corruption, fraud, or undue means”; (2) “there was evident par-
tiality or corruption in the arbitrators”; (3) “the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct,” such as unreasonably refusing to postpone
the hearing or to hear relevant evidence, “or of any other misbe-
havior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced”; and
(4) “the arbitrators exceeded their powers.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(4).
A party seeking vacatur must establish one of these four grounds
and cannot rely on “extra-statutory grounds for vacatur.” Frazier
v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1323–24 (11th Cir. 2010).
On appeal, Griffin contends that he adequately served Mer-
rill’s counsel in the first action, that the court should have reopened
the first action after Griffin filed proof of service. He also argues
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24-13699 Opinion of the Court 5
that the court in the second action erred in concluding that he
missed the 90-day window to seek relief under § 12, given his
timely first petition. See 9 U.S.C. § 12 (“Notice of a motion to va-
cate, modify, or correct an award must be served upon the adverse
party or his attorney within three months after the award is filed or
delivered.”).
Ultimately, though, we need not and do not consider these
issues of timeliness and proper service. 1 In dismissing Griffin’s sec-
ond petition, the court stated in the alternative that, even if Grif-
fin’s petition had been timely, it would still dismiss the petition be-
cause it fell “well short of establishing any of the grounds for vaca-
tur set forth in Section 10 of the FAA.”
Griffin’s initial briefing, even liberally construed, does not
address this alternative ruling. And “[w]hile we read briefs filed by
pro se litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se liti-
gant are deemed abandoned.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874
(11th Cir. 2008). Although Griffin addresses this issue in his reply
brief, “we do not address arguments raised for the first time in a
pro se litigant’s reply brief.” Id.
In any case, even assuming this issue had not been aban-
doned, Griffin has not shown that the district court erred in dis-
missing his petition for failure to establish grounds for vacatur un-
der § 10. A party seeking to vacate an arbitration award “may not
1 The 90-day period under 9 U.S.C. § 12 is not jurisdictional. NuVasive, Inc. v.
Absolute Med., LLC, 71 F.4th 861, 875 (11th Cir. 2023).
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-13699
proceed by merely objecting to the results of the arbitration.” O.R.
Sec., Inc. v. Prof’l Planning Assocs., Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 747 (11th Cir.
1988). Rather, the moving party has “the burden to set forth suffi-
cient grounds to vacate the arbitration award in his moving pa-
pers.” Id. “[J]udicial review of the arbitration process . . . is nar-
rowly limited,” as we noted above, and motions to vacate “may be
decided on the papers without oral testimony.” Booth v. Hume
Publ’g, Inc., 902 F.2d 925, 932 (11th Cir. 1990).
Griffin’s petition invoked § 10 and vaguely alleged that the
arbitration award should be vacated because of “prejudice and mis-
conduct.” But neither the petition nor any of Griffin’s other filings,
either in the district court on or appeal, discloses any factual sup-
port for these claims. For instance, there are no allegations that the
arbitrator “refus[ed] to postpone the hearing” or “refus[ed] to hear
evidence,” nor does Griffin identify what “misconduct” occurred
or how he was prejudiced. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). Griffin also cites
§ 10(a)(2), but he does not identify any “partiality or corruption” on
the part of any arbitrator. See id. § 10(a)(2); see Scott v. Prudential
Sec., Inc., 141 F.3d 1007, 1015 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The assertion of
partiality . . . must be direct, definite and capable of demonstration
rather than remote, uncertain and speculative.”) (quotation marks
omitted).
Because Griffin failed “to set forth sufficient grounds to va-
cate the arbitration award in his moving papers,” and he has iden-
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24-13699 Opinion of the Court 7
tified no such grounds on appeal, we affirm the district court’s dis-
missal of his request to vacate the arbitration award under § 10.
O.R. Sec., 857 F.2d at 746 n.3, 747; see Booth, 902 F.2d at 932.
AFFIRMED.