Full Opinion

Filed 11/17/26 Diamond Quality Builders v. Sasaki CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN DIAMOND QUALITY B351001 BUILDERS, INC., (Los Angeles County Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 19TRCV00489) v. MARBO SASAKI, as Trustee, etc., Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Gary Y. Tanaka, Judge. Affirmed. The Law Office of Yossi Noudel; Yossi Noudel; Fernald & Zaffos and Clay R. Wilkinson for Plaintiff and Appellant. Aaronson & Aaronson, Arthur Aaronson for Defendant and Respondent. ______________________________ Diamond Quality Builders, Inc. (Diamond) appeals from a judgment dismissing its action against Marbo Sasaki (Marbo), as successor trustee of the Sayo Sasaki Trust, based on Diamond’s failure to bring the case to trial within five years pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310.1 On appeal, Diamond contends the trial court erred in granting Marbo’s motion to dismiss because the court did not exclude from the five-year period the time in which under section 583.340, subdivision (c), it was impossible, impractical, or futile to bring the action to trial following the death of the original defendant, Sayo Sasaki (Sayo). The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Diamond delayed filing and serving a motion to substitute Marbo as the successor in interest (successor) to Sayo for over three years after Sayo’s death, instead opposing Marbo’s motion to intervene in the action, moving to strike Sayo’s answer and enter a default based on her death, and then filing a proper motion under section 377.41 for substitution of Marbo but failing to serve Marbo or his attorney. By the time Diamond successfully substituted Marbo as the successor to Sayo, six years had passed since the complaint was filed. Further, Diamond did not meet its burden to show it fell within any of the exceptions to the five-year rule under section 583.340. We affirm. 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 A. The Agreement, Mechanic’s Lien, and Lawsuit In early April 2019 Diamond entered into a series of written agreements with Sayo for over $230,000 in improvement and construction services for her home in Torrance, California (the property). On or about April 24, 2019, Diamond filed and recorded a mechanic’s lien against the property, claiming Sayo failed to pay Diamond over $150,000 for work it had completed. On June 3, 2019 Diamond filed a complaint against Sayo alleging eight causes of action, including for foreclosure on Diamond’s mechanic’s lien.3 Sayo, representing herself, filed an answer denying the allegations and asserting multiple affirmative defenses, including that she was a disabled, infirm woman in her 90’s who primarily spoke Japanese and did not understand the agreements with Diamond that she had signed. On December 18, 2019 Ronald Hirano filed a substitution of counsel to represent Sayo. During 2020 and 2021, Diamond served discovery on Sayo, followed by two discovery motions. On January 25, 2021 the court set a hearing on Diamond’s discovery motions, ordered the parties to a mandatory settlement conference, and set a trial date for March 29, 2022. On February 14, 2022 Sayo filed a motion for 2 The factual background is based on the complaint and undisputed facts in the motions and declarations filed in connection with the motion to dismiss. 3 Diamond also alleged causes of action for breach of contract, services rendered, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, open book account, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation, which Diamond later dismissed. 3 leave to file a compulsory cross-complaint for breach of contract, elder abuse, and unfair business practices based on her alleged discovery of Diamond’s performance of improper work on the property that damaged the property and required significant repairs. Sayo asserted she could not have discovered the facts earlier because she was 96 years old, was incapacitated, had limited income to hire counsel, and was assisted by her son Marbo, who was also disabled. Sayo set the motion for a hearing on March 14, 2022. B. Sayo’s Death and Marbo’s Motion To Intervene On March 2, 2022 Sayo died, and on March 9 Hirano filed a notice of Sayo’s death. The trial court vacated the trial date and ordered the parties to meet and confer on a “stipulation on representation/successor of deceased defendant [Sayo].” On September 20 the court held a status conference and set a further status conference for December 14 to address how the case would proceed in light of Sayo’s death. On October 4, 2022 Marbo, represented by Arthur Aaronson, filed a motion for leave to intervene as the successor trustee of Sayo’s trust on the basis the property was in Sayo’s trust and, as successor trustee of the trust, Marbo had “an interest in the subject property . . . and [was] so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede [the trust’s] ability to protect that interest.” Marbo stated in his supporting declaration that he was the trustee of the Sayo Sasaki Trust, the trust owned the property, and there was no pending probate proceeding because Sayo’s only property at death was the property that she had transferred to the trust during her lifetime. Marbo attached a copy of the signed and notarized declaration of 4 trust (naming Marbo as the successor trustee), the recorded deed of trust for the property, and Sayo’s death certificate. Diamond opposed Marbo’s motion, citing the procedure under section 377.41 for substituting in a successor or personal representative for a defendant who dies during litigation. In addition, Marbo had not met the requirements for intervention. On November 9, 2022 the trial court denied Marbo’s motion to intervene without prejudice to the filing of a motion under section 377.41. The court explained, “[T]here is a specific procedural mechanism in place when a party against whom an action or proceeding was commenced dies. Pursuant to [section 377.41], the Court, upon motion after that party’s death, must allow the pending action or proceeding against the decedent that does not abate to be continued against the decedent’s personal representative or against the decedent’s successor.” The court relieved Hirano as counsel for Sayo. C. Diamond’s Motion To Strike and Request for Default Judgment On February 28, 2023 Diamond filed a request to dismiss all causes of action in its complaint except the sixth cause of action for foreclosure on the mechanic’s lien. Diamond stated it made the request pursuant to Probate Code section 9391 and was “expressly waiv[ing] all recourse against other property in the estate of Defendant Sayo Sasaki.”4 The clerk entered the 4 Probate Code section 9391 states, in relevant part, “[T]he holder of a . . . lien on property in the decedent’s estate . . . may commence an action to enforce the lien against the property that is subject to the lien, without first filing a claim [in probate 5 dismissal the same day. On April 4 the court held a status conference to discuss Diamond’s prosecution of the action; at Diamond’s request, the court continued the status conference to September 18, 2023. On August 21, 2023 Diamond filed a motion to strike Sayo’s answer and enter a default. Citing Code of Civil Procedure section 377.41 and Probate Code section 9391, Diamond argued that because there was no open probate proceeding for Sayo’s estate and the estate had not hired an attorney to defend the action, the trial court should strike Sayo’s answer and enter a default on the remaining cause of action to foreclose on the mechanic’s lien.5 On October 17, 2023 the trial court denied Diamond’s motion, stating: “[A]s clearly delineated in Section 377.41, the proper motion would have been to move to continue against the decedent’s personal representative or successor in interest. However, no such motion was presented by [Diamond]. Instead, [Diamond] merely provided grounds, pursuant to Probate Code Section 9391, regarding [its] contention that [Diamond] was not required to follow [the requirements of the Probate Code] to court], . . . if in the complaint the holder of the lien expressly waives all recourse against other property in the estate . . . . The personal representative shall have the authority to seek to enjoin any action of the lienholder to enforce a lien against property that is subject to the lien.” 5 Diamond’s attorney, Yossi Noudel, declared that he talked to Hirano before filing the motion to enter Sayo’s default, who stated he had no authority in the action, but Noudel did not call Marbo’s attorney until the day of the filing, and Noudel had not heard back. 6 continue this action against the personal representative or successor in interest because the only claim remaining against [Sayo] is the one for Foreclosure of Mechanic’s Lien. Thus, had [Diamond] brought a motion under Section 377.41 the Court, pursuant to this authority, may have allowed [Diamond] to proceed against the personal representative or successor in interest.” The Court noted that based on Marbo’s motion to intervene, he “appear[ed] to be, perhaps, the potential successor in interest” and “is, in fact, apparently represented by counsel because [Marbo’s] motion was filed by an attorney, and not as a pro per.” The court set a further status conference for January 24, 2024. D. Diamond’s Section 377.41 Motion for Substitution At the January 24, 2024 status conference, Diamond’s attorney stated he intended to file a motion under section 377.41 to proceed against Sayo’s personal representative; the trial court set the hearing for March 25. Diamond served Marbo’s attorney with the minute order setting the March 25 hearing date. At Diamond’s request, the court continued the hearing to May 7. On May 6 Diamond filed its motion under section 377.41 to continue the action against Marbo, as Sayo’s successor. Diamond mailed a copy of the motion to Marbo at the address for the property; Diamond did not serve Marbo’s attorney. On May 7 the court granted Diamond’s second request for a continuance, setting the hearing on the motion for June 18. Diamond refiled its motion on May 29, 2024 and again only mailed a copy of the motion to the property address. On June 18, after Marbo did not appear, the trial court ordered Diamond to serve Marbo in person. Diamond requested two further 7 continuances, which the court granted, setting the hearing for October 21. On October 10 Noudel filed a declaration explaining that “attempts were made” to serve Marbo at the property, but they were unsuccessful. Noudel stated he personally attempted to serve Marbo and observed him inside the house, but Marbo “refused to open the door.” Noudel therefore left the motion papers on the doorstep.6 On October 21 the court denied Diamond’s motion for substitution without prejudice because Diamond failed to serve either Marbo or his attorney. At an April 8, 2025 case management conference (initially continued at Diamond’s request), the trial court ordered Diamond to refile and serve its motion. On April 9 Diamond refiled the motion and set it for hearing on June 3. This time Diamond served Marbo’s attorney. At the June 3, 2025 hearing, the court granted Diamond’s motion under section 377.41 to continue the action against Marbo as Sayo’s successor. E. Marbo’s Motion To Dismiss On June 27, 2025 Marbo, as successor trustee of Sayo’s trust, filed a motion to dismiss the case pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 583.310 and 583.360 and Civil Code section 8462, based on Diamond’s failure to bring its action (filed on June 3, 2019) to trial for over six years. Marbo argued Diamond was required to bring its action to trial by June 3, 2024 6 Noudel did not provide any details on who made the initial attempts or how he knew Marbo was the person inside the house. In Marbo’s subsequent motion to dismiss, he submitted evidence showing that, following a hospital stay, he was living at an acute care facility from September 22, 2024 until he was transferred back to the hospital on January 8, 2025. 8 (five years) or, taking into account a six-month COVID-19 extension, by December 3, 2024. In the motion, supported by Aaronson’s declaration, Marbo argued he would be prejudiced by allowing the case to proceed because Sayo had died over three years ago, making it difficult to obtain evidence on the merits, and Marbo, who lived at a post-acute care center, was very sick and had never been served. In its opposition, Diamond argued that under section 583.340, subdivision (c), it was “impossible, impracticable, or futile” to bring the action to trial within five years because it could not proceed against any defendant until the court granted its motion under section 377.41. Diamond stated (incorrectly) “that a party’s death in itself is not enough to toll the 5-year [r]ule,” but “the facts of the case in conjunction with [Sayo’s] death are enough.” Diamond asserted it was reasonably diligent in prosecuting the action because it attempted to proceed in rem against the property following Sayo’s death and to substitute Marbo in for Sayo, but “it took time—in large part because Marbo evaded service.” Further, the trial court improperly refused to strike Sayo’s answer and enter a default to allow Diamond to judicially foreclose on its lien. The trial court held a hearing on Marbo’s motion to dismiss, and on September 9, 2025 the court granted the motion. The court determined Diamond failed to show “it was impossible, impractical, or futile to bring this matter to trial by December 2, 2014” and Diamond had sufficient opportunity from the time it was informed of Sayo’s death on March 9, 2022 to pursue the proper defendant, but Diamond’s “inability to do so resulted from [Diamond’s] own lack of diligence, as well as [Diamond’s] own inability to pursue the proper procedural mechanisms to 9 prosecute the action against the proper party.” The court reasoned, “the motion was continued pursuant to the request of [Diamond] twice, and the motion was denied without prejudice prior to [Diamond] eventually obtaining the order that it sought.” Finally, recognizing the principle favoring disposition of a case on its merits and taking into account whether the interests of justice would be served by a dismissal, the court could not “ignore the fact that [Diamond] has not provided competent facts to meet the factors required to show impossibility, impracticality, and futility.” On September 18, 2025 the trial court entered a judgment ordering removal and expungement of Diamond’s mechanic’s lien on the property and dismissing the action with prejudice. Diamond timely appealed. DISCUSSION A. The Five-year Rule Under Section 583.310 Under section 583.310, “[a]n action shall be brought to trial within five years after the action is commenced against the defendant.”7 Section 583.340 excludes from the five-year period the time during which any of the following conditions existed: “(a) The jurisdiction of the court to try the action was 7 In addition, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Judicial Council issued Emergency Rule 10(a) in 2020, which extended the five-year period to bring an action to trial by six months for “all civil actions filed on or before April 6, 2020.” (See Oswald v. Landmark Builders, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 240, 246.) This extension applies in this case because the complaint was filed on June 3, 2019. 10 suspended. [¶] (b) Prosecution or trial of the action was stayed or enjoined. [¶] (c) Bringing the action to trial, for any other reason, was impossible, impracticable, or futile.” If a case is not brought to trial within the five-year statutory period and one of the foregoing exceptions does not apply, dismissal is “mandatory” upon a motion of the defendant or on the court’s own motion. (§ 583.360, subds. (a) & (b); Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1081, 1090 (Gaines).) We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision whether an exception applies to mandatory dismissal for failure to bring an action to trial within five years. (Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1100 & fn. 8.) But where “we are called to determine whether the trial court properly interpreted section 583.310, section 583.340 . . . , or some other question of law, . . . we review the trial court’s interpretation de novo.” (Tanguilig v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 313, 324.) B. Diamond Forfeited Any Contention That Sayo’s Death Tolled the Five-year Period Under Section 583.340, Subdivision (a) 1. Suspension of jurisdiction based on defendant’s death When a defendant dies, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the defendant and has no power to act with respect to the defendant until the decedent’s personal representative or successor has been substituted in the action. (Pham v. Wagner Litho Mach. Co. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 966, 972-973 (Pham); Herring v. Peterson (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 608, 612 (Herring) [“upon the defendant’s death the court is deprived of jurisdiction to try the case in its status quo”]; Wills v. Williams (1975) 11 47 Cal.App.3d 941, 945 (Wills) [“on [defendant’s] death, jurisdiction of the court was suspended until an executor or administrator was appointed”];8 see Grappo v. McMills (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1007 [a court acts in “excess of jurisdiction” when it renders judgment after a defendant dies but before the defendant’s executor or administrator is appointed].) Accordingly, following the death of a defendant, under section 583.340, subdivision (a), the five-year period in which a case must be brought to trial is tolled on the basis “[t]he jurisdiction of the court to try the action was suspended.” (See Pham, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 974 [reversing order granting motion to dismiss under five-year rule because the trial court did not exclude the three years between the death of the plaintiff and the substitution of her representative]; Herring, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d at p. 612 [reversing judgment of dismissal based on plaintiff’s failure to bring case to trial within five years because trial court lost jurisdiction over defendant after her death, observing “the court could have allowed the action to continue against her personal representative or her insurer, but it could take no action without someone to defend the case”]; Wills, supra, 47 Cal.App.3d at pp. 946-947 [reversing dismissal of action because five-year period to bring case to trial was tolled 8 Pham, Herring, and Wills were decided under former section 583, subdivision (f), which provided: “The time during which the defendant was not amenable to the process of the court and the time during which the jurisdiction of the court to try the action is suspended shall not be included in computing the time period [5 years] specified in any subdivision of this section.” When the Legislature repealed former section 583, the language tolling the five-year rule based on the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction was codified in section 583.340, subdivision (a). 12 following defendant’s death until plaintiff elected to proceed against insurer].)9 2. Diamond forfeited any contention section 583.340, subdivision (a), applied Diamond could have opposed Marbo’s motion to dismiss based on tolling under section 583.430, subdivision (a), but it forfeited this contention by failing to make this argument in the trial court. (See Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 591-592 [appellant forfeited her contention on appeal that an exception to the five-year rule under section 583.340 precluded dismissal of her cross-complaint where she failed to raise the exception in the trial court]; see also Bitner v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1065 [“Having failed to raise or develop this issue in the trial court, plaintiffs cannot raise the issue for the first time on appeal.”]; Professional Collection Consultants v. Lauron (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 958, 972 [“‘“Appellate courts are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider.”’”].) 9 The Supreme Court in Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 759, fn. 14, cited Wills, Herring, and Pham approvingly in interpreting an analogous statute (requiring service of a complaint within three years of filing), observing that the court in Wills, supra, 47 Cal.App.3d at page 946 “concluded that the statutory five-year period did not include the time following the death of the defendant during which his estate was not probated and no personal representative had been appointed, because the court’s jurisdiction was suspended during that time.” 13 Marbo argued in his motion to dismiss that dismissal was mandated where more than five years had elapsed since Diamond filed its complaint and none of the three exceptions to the five- year rule under section 583.340 applied. As part of his argument, Marbo listed the three exceptions and argued that Sayo’s death did not extend the five-year period. In its opposition, Diamond did not address the exceptions to the five-year rule under either subdivision (a) (when “[t]he jurisdiction of the court to try the action was suspended”) or subdivision (b) (when “[p]rosecution or trial of the action was stayed or enjoined”). Instead, Diamond argued that under subdivision (c), it was impractical and impossible to bring the case to trial, and Diamond had been reasonably diligent in its efforts to bring the case to trial, including its efforts to strike Sayo’s answer and proceed in rem against the property, and to serve Marbo with Diamond’s initial motion under section 377.41. Diamond also conceded that “while Marbo is correct that a party’s death in itself is not enough to toll the 5-Year Rule, the facts of this case in conjunction with Ms. Sasaki’s death are enough.” By failing to argue in the trial court that the exception under section 583.340, subdivision (a) applied (instead conceding Sayo’s death had no effect on the five- year rule), Diamond deprived Marbo of the opportunity to respond to the argument and the court the opportunity to address the exception. Diamond doubly forfeited this contention by failing to present an argument under section 583.430, subdivision (a), in its opening (or reply) brief. (See Doe v. McLaughlin (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 640, 653 [“An appellant abandons an issue by failing to raise it in the opening brief.”]; Swain v. LaserAway Medical Group, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 59, 72 [“‘“‘Issues not 14 raised in an appellant’s brief are [forfeited] or abandoned.’”’”].) Instead, Diamond again argued it should have been allowed to proceed in rem against the property, and the trial court abused its discretion in finding the exception under subdivision (c) did not apply. In response to our request for additional briefing,10 Diamond argued in its supplemental brief that it had not forfeited the argument that subdivision (a) applied because a challenge to the trial court’s lack of fundamental jurisdiction cannot be forfeited; the administration of justice militates against forfeiture, and under section 583.130, “the policy favoring trial or other disposition of an action on the merits are generally to be preferred over the policy that requires dismissal for failure to proceed with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of an action.” Diamond’s arguments are unavailing. First, this appeal does not implicate the trial court’s fundamental jurisdiction to hear a case. Rather, the central question is whether the court abused its discretion in finding no statutory exception to the rule requiring dismissal applied. 10 We requested the parties file supplemental briefing on two issues: (1) whether the trial court’s jurisdiction was suspended from the date of Sayo’s death to the date her successor in interest was appointed, and if so, whether that time period was excluded from the five-year calculation under section 583.340, subdivision (a); and (2) whether Diamond forfeited the argument that under section 583.340, subdivision (a), the time during which the court lacked jurisdiction should be excluded in computing the time within which the action must be brought to trial. Both parties filed supplemental briefs. 15 Diamond’s failure to argue application of the statutory exception under section 583.340, subdivision (a), to the five-year rule is not subject to the general rule that a claim based on a lack of fundamental jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. (See Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 339.) Second, the general policy favoring trial on the merits (§ 583.130) does not apply here, where the delay was caused by Diamond’s gamesmanship and repeated attempts to obtain a judgment on its foreclosure cause of action without addressing the merits. For example, as early as October 2022 Marbo presented evidence in his motion to intervene that he was Sayo’s successor by attaching a copy of Sayo’s trust documents naming him as successor and showing that the trust was the owner of the property. Moreover, Diamond acknowledged in its opposition that a section 377.41 motion was the proper mechanism for substituting a successor. The trial court affirmed this was the correct procedure in denying Marbo’s motion. Yet instead of filing a section 377.41 motion, Diamond filed a motion to strike Sayo’s answer and secure a default against the property without adjudication of the foreclosure cause of action (or opportunity to address Marbo’s proposed cross-complaint). Finally, despite having served Marbo’s attorney on multiple occasions, Diamond failed to serve Marbo or his attorney with its section 377.41 motion for almost a year, simply mailing its moving papers to the property and later leaving a copy on the doorstep (while Marbo was in an acute care facility). The policy favoring trial on the merits does not reward such gamesmanship. 16 C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Determining Diamond Failed To Show It Was Impossible, Impracticable, or Futile To Bring the Case to Trial “Under 583.340(c), the trial court must determine what is impossible, impracticable, or futile ‘in light of all the circumstances in the individual case, including the acts and conduct of the parties and the nature of the proceedings themselves. [Citations.] The critical factor in applying these exceptions to a given factual situation is whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in prosecuting his or her case.’ [Citations.] . . . A plaintiff’s reasonable diligence alone does not preclude involuntary dismissal; it is simply one factor for assessing the existing exceptions of impossibility, impracticability, or futility. [Citation.] . . . Determining whether the subdivision (c) exception applies requires a fact-sensitive inquiry and depends ‘on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.’” (Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 730-731 (Bruns); accord, Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 438.) The plaintiff bears the burden to prove circumstances that justify application of section 583.340, subdivision (c)’s exception. (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 731.) “To avoid dismissal . . . , a plaintiff must prove (1) a circumstance establishing impossibility, impracticability, or futility, (2) a causal connection between the circumstance and the failure to move the case to trial within the five-year period, and (3) that [the plaintiff] was reasonably diligent in prosecuting [the] case at all stages in the proceedings.” (Tanguilig v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th 17 at p. 323; accord, Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1101.) “Reasonable diligence places on a plaintiff the affirmative duty to make every reasonable effort to bring a case to trial within five years, even during the last month of its statutory life.” (Baccus v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1532.) “‘“[I]mpracticability and futility” involve a determination of “‘excessive and unreasonable difficulty or expense,’” in light of all the circumstances of a particular case.’” (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 731.) As the Supreme Court in Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at page 1102 explained, “‘there must be “a period of impossibility, impracticability or futility, over which plaintiff had no control,”’ because the statute is designed to prevent avoidable delay.” Further, “[i]t is well established that ‘“‘[e]very period of time during which the plaintiff does not have it within his power to bring the case to trial is not to be excluded in making the computation.’ [Citation.]”’ ‘“Time consumed by the delay caused by ordinary incidents of proceedings, like disposition of demurrer, amendment of pleadings, and the normal time of waiting for a place on the court’s calendar [is] not within the contemplation”’” of section 583.340, subdivision (c). (Id. at p. 1101.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Diamond did not meet its burden to show the section 583.340, subdivision (c), exception applied. Diamond contends it acted diligently but could not promptly bring the case to trial following Sayo’s death because the court erroneously (1) vacated the trial date, (2) denied Diamond’s motion to strike Sayo’s answer and proceed in rem against the property, and (3) required Diamond to file a section 377.41 motion and serve the motion on Marbo or his attorney, even though Marbo “evaded service.” However, notwithstanding the court’s guidance that the proper procedure 18 following Sayo’s death was to file a motion under section 377.41 to substitute Sayo’s successor, for the next two years Diamond did everything in its power to avoid litigating its remaining claim on the merits. As discussed, Diamond opposed Marbo’s motion to intervene and attempted to strike Sayo’s answer so that it could obtain a default to foreclose on the mechanic’s lien without litigating the action on the merits (or the potential cross-claims Sayo asserted) despite the presence of a successor to Sayo who could defend against the action. It was not until March 6, 2024 that Diamond filed its first section 377.41 motion, and Diamond took another year to properly serve Marbo’s attorney with the motion. Diamond argues Marbo avoided service, but Diamond mailed the motion to Sayo’s property (where Marbo did not reside), then left the motion papers on the doorstep. Accordingly, Diamond cannot rely on the section 583.340, subdivision (c), exception intended to account for unavoidable delays outside of a party’s control. (See Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1102.) Diamond contends the trial court erred by requiring it to file a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.41 instead of allowing Diamond to proceed in rem against the property (without a representative for Sayo) under Probate Code section 9391. As discussed, however, Probate Code section 9391 simply allows a lienholder to commence an action to enforce a lien against a deceased property owner without first filing a claim in probate court. The section does not address how the lienholder should serve parties with an interest in the property or how to substitute a representative of a deceased property owner as the defendant. Moreover, Probate Code section 9391 contemplates service on a decedent’s personal representative by granting the 19 representative of the decedent the authority “to enjoin any action of the lienholder to enforce a lien” against the property. Diamond also relies on La Fetra v. Gleason (1894) 101 Cal. 246, 248, but La Fetra addressed a different question—what service of process on a nonresident property owner was required in a foreclosure action? The court held that out-of-state personal service was sufficient because the action was in rem. (Id. at pp. 248-249.) Diamond cites language in La Fetra that “[i]n a proceeding strictly in rem personal service is not necessary,” but this statement was in the context of service of a nonresident with property in the state, and the court noted a state may require notice “to persons claiming interests in the property.” (Id. at p. 248; see Ridgway v. Salrin (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 50, 55 [“personal service of the [out-of-state] owner . . . within the state is not required to confer jurisdiction” for in rem proceeding].) Neither La Fetra nor Ridgway held a lienholder may proceed in rem to foreclose on a lien without substituting a representative of the property owner after her death or providing notice to the representative. To the contrary, a party who files an action to foreclose on a mechanic’s lien must comply with the procedural and service requirements for any civil action. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 413.10 et seq. [requiring service of summons on a person “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute”]; Withington v. Shay (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 68, 73 [“The rules relating to civil actions generally apply to proceedings for the foreclosure of mechanics’ liens,” unless a statutory provision governing mechanics’ liens provides otherwise].) Diamond cites no authority for its proposition that section 377.41’s procedure for continuing a pending action after a defendant’s death does not apply to an in rem action. Absent 20 notice and substitution of a representative for a deceased property owner, the representative would have no opportunity to litigate the validity of the claimed obligation and to contest foreclosure. Diamond also argues the trial court should not have placed the burden on Diamond to file a section 377.41 motion. But section 377.41 does not specify which party may (or must) file the motion. Moreover, it was Diamond’s burden to bring the case to trial within five years of filing its complaint and to “call to the attention of the court the necessity for setting the trial” within the five-year time frame, which Diamond failed to do. (See Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 434; Massey v. Bank of America (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 29, 33.) Diamond’s reliance on Holland v. Dave Altman’s R.V. Center (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 477 is misplaced. In Holland, the Court of Appeal reversed dismissal of the action under the five- year rule after finding the trial court proceedings were stayed during an appeal from an order quashing service. (Id. at p. 479) Diamond argues the trial court’s orders vacating the trial date and denying its motion to enter Sayo’s default likewise cut off Diamond’s ability to proceed to trial. They did not. As discussed, Diamond had ample time to substitute Sayo’s successor but elected not to timely litigate its claim on the merits. 21 DISPOSITION The September 18, 2025 judgment is affirmed. Marbo Sasaki is entitled to recover his costs on appeal. FEUER, J. We concur: MARTINEZ, P. J. STONE, J. 22