Diamond Quality Builders v. Sasaki CA2/7
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketB351001
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/17/26 Diamond Quality Builders v. Sasaki CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
DIAMOND QUALITY B351001
BUILDERS, INC.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No.
19TRCV00489)
v.
MARBO SASAKI, as Trustee,
etc.,
Defendant and
Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gary Y. Tanaka, Judge. Affirmed.
The Law Office of Yossi Noudel; Yossi Noudel; Fernald &
Zaffos and Clay R. Wilkinson for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Aaronson & Aaronson, Arthur Aaronson for Defendant and
Respondent.
______________________________
Diamond Quality Builders, Inc. (Diamond) appeals from a
judgment dismissing its action against Marbo Sasaki (Marbo), as
successor trustee of the Sayo Sasaki Trust, based on Diamond’s
failure to bring the case to trial within five years pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310.1 On appeal, Diamond
contends the trial court erred in granting Marbo’s motion to
dismiss because the court did not exclude from the five-year
period the time in which under section 583.340, subdivision (c), it
was impossible, impractical, or futile to bring the action to trial
following the death of the original defendant, Sayo Sasaki (Sayo).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Diamond
delayed filing and serving a motion to substitute Marbo as the
successor in interest (successor) to Sayo for over three years after
Sayo’s death, instead opposing Marbo’s motion to intervene in the
action, moving to strike Sayo’s answer and enter a default based
on her death, and then filing a proper motion under
section 377.41 for substitution of Marbo but failing to serve
Marbo or his attorney. By the time Diamond successfully
substituted Marbo as the successor to Sayo, six years had passed
since the complaint was filed. Further, Diamond did not meet its
burden to show it fell within any of the exceptions to the five-year
rule under section 583.340. We affirm.
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. The Agreement, Mechanic’s Lien, and Lawsuit
In early April 2019 Diamond entered into a series of
written agreements with Sayo for over $230,000 in improvement
and construction services for her home in Torrance, California
(the property). On or about April 24, 2019, Diamond filed and
recorded a mechanic’s lien against the property, claiming Sayo
failed to pay Diamond over $150,000 for work it had completed.
On June 3, 2019 Diamond filed a complaint against Sayo
alleging eight causes of action, including for foreclosure on
Diamond’s mechanic’s lien.3 Sayo, representing herself, filed an
answer denying the allegations and asserting multiple
affirmative defenses, including that she was a disabled, infirm
woman in her 90’s who primarily spoke Japanese and did not
understand the agreements with Diamond that she had signed.
On December 18, 2019 Ronald Hirano filed a substitution of
counsel to represent Sayo.
During 2020 and 2021, Diamond served discovery on Sayo,
followed by two discovery motions. On January 25, 2021 the
court set a hearing on Diamond’s discovery motions, ordered the
parties to a mandatory settlement conference, and set a trial date
for March 29, 2022. On February 14, 2022 Sayo filed a motion for
2 The factual background is based on the complaint and
undisputed facts in the motions and declarations filed in
connection with the motion to dismiss.
3 Diamond also alleged causes of action for breach of
contract, services rendered, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit,
open book account, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent
misrepresentation, which Diamond later dismissed.
3
leave to file a compulsory cross-complaint for breach of contract,
elder abuse, and unfair business practices based on her alleged
discovery of Diamond’s performance of improper work on the
property that damaged the property and required significant
repairs. Sayo asserted she could not have discovered the facts
earlier because she was 96 years old, was incapacitated, had
limited income to hire counsel, and was assisted by her son
Marbo, who was also disabled. Sayo set the motion for a hearing
on March 14, 2022.
B. Sayo’s Death and Marbo’s Motion To Intervene
On March 2, 2022 Sayo died, and on March 9 Hirano filed a
notice of Sayo’s death. The trial court vacated the trial date and
ordered the parties to meet and confer on a “stipulation on
representation/successor of deceased defendant [Sayo].” On
September 20 the court held a status conference and set a further
status conference for December 14 to address how the case would
proceed in light of Sayo’s death.
On October 4, 2022 Marbo, represented by Arthur
Aaronson, filed a motion for leave to intervene as the successor
trustee of Sayo’s trust on the basis the property was in Sayo’s
trust and, as successor trustee of the trust, Marbo had “an
interest in the subject property . . . and [was] so situated that the
disposition of the action may impair or impede [the trust’s] ability
to protect that interest.” Marbo stated in his supporting
declaration that he was the trustee of the Sayo Sasaki Trust, the
trust owned the property, and there was no pending probate
proceeding because Sayo’s only property at death was the
property that she had transferred to the trust during her lifetime.
Marbo attached a copy of the signed and notarized declaration of
4
trust (naming Marbo as the successor trustee), the recorded deed
of trust for the property, and Sayo’s death certificate.
Diamond opposed Marbo’s motion, citing the procedure
under section 377.41 for substituting in a successor or personal
representative for a defendant who dies during litigation. In
addition, Marbo had not met the requirements for intervention.
On November 9, 2022 the trial court denied Marbo’s motion
to intervene without prejudice to the filing of a motion under
section 377.41. The court explained, “[T]here is a specific
procedural mechanism in place when a party against whom an
action or proceeding was commenced dies. Pursuant to
[section 377.41], the Court, upon motion after that party’s death,
must allow the pending action or proceeding against the decedent
that does not abate to be continued against the decedent’s
personal representative or against the decedent’s successor.” The
court relieved Hirano as counsel for Sayo.
C. Diamond’s Motion To Strike and Request for Default
Judgment
On February 28, 2023 Diamond filed a request to dismiss
all causes of action in its complaint except the sixth cause of
action for foreclosure on the mechanic’s lien. Diamond stated it
made the request pursuant to Probate Code section 9391 and was
“expressly waiv[ing] all recourse against other property in the
estate of Defendant Sayo Sasaki.”4 The clerk entered the
4 Probate Code section 9391 states, in relevant part, “[T]he
holder of a . . . lien on property in the decedent’s estate . . . may
commence an action to enforce the lien against the property that
is subject to the lien, without first filing a claim [in probate
5
dismissal the same day. On April 4 the court held a status
conference to discuss Diamond’s prosecution of the action; at
Diamond’s request, the court continued the status conference to
September 18, 2023.
On August 21, 2023 Diamond filed a motion to strike Sayo’s
answer and enter a default. Citing Code of Civil Procedure
section 377.41 and Probate Code section 9391, Diamond argued
that because there was no open probate proceeding for Sayo’s
estate and the estate had not hired an attorney to defend the
action, the trial court should strike Sayo’s answer and enter a
default on the remaining cause of action to foreclose on the
mechanic’s lien.5
On October 17, 2023 the trial court denied Diamond’s
motion, stating: “[A]s clearly delineated in Section 377.41, the
proper motion would have been to move to continue against the
decedent’s personal representative or successor in interest.
However, no such motion was presented by [Diamond]. Instead,
[Diamond] merely provided grounds, pursuant to Probate Code
Section 9391, regarding [its] contention that [Diamond] was not
required to follow [the requirements of the Probate Code] to
court], . . . if in the complaint the holder of the lien expressly
waives all recourse against other property in the estate . . . . The
personal representative shall have the authority to seek to enjoin
any action of the lienholder to enforce a lien against property that
is subject to the lien.”
5 Diamond’s attorney, Yossi Noudel, declared that he talked
to Hirano before filing the motion to enter Sayo’s default, who
stated he had no authority in the action, but Noudel did not call
Marbo’s attorney until the day of the filing, and Noudel had not
heard back.
6
continue this action against the personal representative or
successor in interest because the only claim remaining against
[Sayo] is the one for Foreclosure of Mechanic’s Lien. Thus, had
[Diamond] brought a motion under Section 377.41 the Court,
pursuant to this authority, may have allowed [Diamond] to
proceed against the personal representative or successor in
interest.” The Court noted that based on Marbo’s motion to
intervene, he “appear[ed] to be, perhaps, the potential successor
in interest” and “is, in fact, apparently represented by counsel
because [Marbo’s] motion was filed by an attorney, and not as a
pro per.” The court set a further status conference for
January 24, 2024.
D. Diamond’s Section 377.41 Motion for Substitution
At the January 24, 2024 status conference, Diamond’s
attorney stated he intended to file a motion under section 377.41
to proceed against Sayo’s personal representative; the trial court
set the hearing for March 25. Diamond served Marbo’s attorney
with the minute order setting the March 25 hearing date. At
Diamond’s request, the court continued the hearing to May 7. On
May 6 Diamond filed its motion under section 377.41 to continue
the action against Marbo, as Sayo’s successor. Diamond mailed a
copy of the motion to Marbo at the address for the property;
Diamond did not serve Marbo’s attorney. On May 7 the court
granted Diamond’s second request for a continuance, setting the
hearing on the motion for June 18.
Diamond refiled its motion on May 29, 2024 and again only
mailed a copy of the motion to the property address. On June 18,
after Marbo did not appear, the trial court ordered Diamond to
serve Marbo in person. Diamond requested two further
7
continuances, which the court granted, setting the hearing for
October 21. On October 10 Noudel filed a declaration explaining
that “attempts were made” to serve Marbo at the property, but
they were unsuccessful. Noudel stated he personally attempted
to serve Marbo and observed him inside the house, but Marbo
“refused to open the door.” Noudel therefore left the motion
papers on the doorstep.6 On October 21 the court denied
Diamond’s motion for substitution without prejudice because
Diamond failed to serve either Marbo or his attorney.
At an April 8, 2025 case management conference (initially
continued at Diamond’s request), the trial court ordered Diamond
to refile and serve its motion. On April 9 Diamond refiled the
motion and set it for hearing on June 3. This time Diamond
served Marbo’s attorney. At the June 3, 2025 hearing, the court
granted Diamond’s motion under section 377.41 to continue the
action against Marbo as Sayo’s successor.
E. Marbo’s Motion To Dismiss
On June 27, 2025 Marbo, as successor trustee of Sayo’s
trust, filed a motion to dismiss the case pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure sections 583.310 and 583.360 and Civil Code
section 8462, based on Diamond’s failure to bring its action (filed
on June 3, 2019) to trial for over six years. Marbo argued
Diamond was required to bring its action to trial by June 3, 2024
6 Noudel did not provide any details on who made the initial
attempts or how he knew Marbo was the person inside the house.
In Marbo’s subsequent motion to dismiss, he submitted evidence
showing that, following a hospital stay, he was living at an acute
care facility from September 22, 2024 until he was transferred
back to the hospital on January 8, 2025.
8
(five years) or, taking into account a six-month COVID-19
extension, by December 3, 2024. In the motion, supported by
Aaronson’s declaration, Marbo argued he would be prejudiced by
allowing the case to proceed because Sayo had died over three
years ago, making it difficult to obtain evidence on the merits,
and Marbo, who lived at a post-acute care center, was very sick
and had never been served.
In its opposition, Diamond argued that under
section 583.340, subdivision (c), it was “impossible, impracticable,
or futile” to bring the action to trial within five years because it
could not proceed against any defendant until the court granted
its motion under section 377.41. Diamond stated (incorrectly)
“that a party’s death in itself is not enough to toll the 5-year
[r]ule,” but “the facts of the case in conjunction with [Sayo’s]
death are enough.” Diamond asserted it was reasonably diligent
in prosecuting the action because it attempted to proceed in rem
against the property following Sayo’s death and to substitute
Marbo in for Sayo, but “it took time—in large part because Marbo
evaded service.” Further, the trial court improperly refused to
strike Sayo’s answer and enter a default to allow Diamond to
judicially foreclose on its lien.
The trial court held a hearing on Marbo’s motion to
dismiss, and on September 9, 2025 the court granted the motion.
The court determined Diamond failed to show “it was impossible,
impractical, or futile to bring this matter to trial by December 2,
2014” and Diamond had sufficient opportunity from the time it
was informed of Sayo’s death on March 9, 2022 to pursue the
proper defendant, but Diamond’s “inability to do so resulted from
[Diamond’s] own lack of diligence, as well as [Diamond’s] own
inability to pursue the proper procedural mechanisms to
9
prosecute the action against the proper party.” The court
reasoned, “the motion was continued pursuant to the request of
[Diamond] twice, and the motion was denied without prejudice
prior to [Diamond] eventually obtaining the order that it sought.”
Finally, recognizing the principle favoring disposition of a case on
its merits and taking into account whether the interests of justice
would be served by a dismissal, the court could not “ignore the
fact that [Diamond] has not provided competent facts to meet the
factors required to show impossibility, impracticality, and
futility.”
On September 18, 2025 the trial court entered a judgment
ordering removal and expungement of Diamond’s mechanic’s lien
on the property and dismissing the action with prejudice.
Diamond timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Five-year Rule Under Section 583.310
Under section 583.310, “[a]n action shall be brought to trial
within five years after the action is commenced against the
defendant.”7 Section 583.340 excludes from the five-year period
the time during which any of the following conditions existed:
“(a) The jurisdiction of the court to try the action was
7 In addition, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the
Judicial Council issued Emergency Rule 10(a) in 2020, which
extended the five-year period to bring an action to trial by six
months for “all civil actions filed on or before April 6, 2020.” (See
Oswald v. Landmark Builders, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 240,
246.) This extension applies in this case because the complaint
was filed on June 3, 2019.
10
suspended. [¶] (b) Prosecution or trial of the action was stayed
or enjoined. [¶] (c) Bringing the action to trial, for any other
reason, was impossible, impracticable, or futile.” If a case is not
brought to trial within the five-year statutory period and one of
the foregoing exceptions does not apply, dismissal is “mandatory”
upon a motion of the defendant or on the court’s own motion.
(§ 583.360, subds. (a) & (b); Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Ins.
Co. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1081, 1090 (Gaines).)
We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s
decision whether an exception applies to mandatory dismissal for
failure to bring an action to trial within five years. (Gaines,
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1100 & fn. 8.) But where “we are called to
determine whether the trial court properly interpreted
section 583.310, section 583.340 . . . , or some other question of
law, . . . we review the trial court’s interpretation de novo.”
(Tanguilig v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th
313, 324.)
B. Diamond Forfeited Any Contention That Sayo’s Death
Tolled the Five-year Period Under Section 583.340,
Subdivision (a)
1. Suspension of jurisdiction based on defendant’s death
When a defendant dies, the trial court loses jurisdiction
over the defendant and has no power to act with respect to the
defendant until the decedent’s personal representative or
successor has been substituted in the action. (Pham v. Wagner
Litho Mach. Co. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 966, 972-973 (Pham);
Herring v. Peterson (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 608, 612 (Herring)
[“upon the defendant’s death the court is deprived of jurisdiction
to try the case in its status quo”]; Wills v. Williams (1975)
11
47 Cal.App.3d 941, 945 (Wills) [“on [defendant’s] death,
jurisdiction of the court was suspended until an executor or
administrator was appointed”];8 see Grappo v. McMills (2017)
11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1007 [a court acts in “excess of jurisdiction”
when it renders judgment after a defendant dies but before the
defendant’s executor or administrator is appointed].)
Accordingly, following the death of a defendant, under
section 583.340, subdivision (a), the five-year period in which a
case must be brought to trial is tolled on the basis “[t]he
jurisdiction of the court to try the action was suspended.” (See
Pham, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 974 [reversing order granting
motion to dismiss under five-year rule because the trial court did
not exclude the three years between the death of the plaintiff and
the substitution of her representative]; Herring, supra,
116 Cal.App.3d at p. 612 [reversing judgment of dismissal based
on plaintiff’s failure to bring case to trial within five years
because trial court lost jurisdiction over defendant after her
death, observing “the court could have allowed the action to
continue against her personal representative or her insurer, but
it could take no action without someone to defend the case”];
Wills, supra, 47 Cal.App.3d at pp. 946-947 [reversing dismissal of
action because five-year period to bring case to trial was tolled
8 Pham, Herring, and Wills were decided under former
section 583, subdivision (f), which provided: “The time during
which the defendant was not amenable to the process of the court
and the time during which the jurisdiction of the court to try the
action is suspended shall not be included in computing the time
period [5 years] specified in any subdivision of this section.”
When the Legislature repealed former section 583, the language
tolling the five-year rule based on the trial court’s lack of
jurisdiction was codified in section 583.340, subdivision (a).
12
following defendant’s death until plaintiff elected to proceed
against insurer].)9
2. Diamond forfeited any contention section 583.340,
subdivision (a), applied
Diamond could have opposed Marbo’s motion to dismiss
based on tolling under section 583.430, subdivision (a), but it
forfeited this contention by failing to make this argument in the
trial court. (See Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580,
591-592 [appellant forfeited her contention on appeal that an
exception to the five-year rule under section 583.340 precluded
dismissal of her cross-complaint where she failed to raise the
exception in the trial court]; see also Bitner v. Department of
Corrections & Rehabilitation (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1065
[“Having failed to raise or develop this issue in the trial court,
plaintiffs cannot raise the issue for the first time on appeal.”];
Professional Collection Consultants v. Lauron (2017)
8 Cal.App.5th 958, 972 [“‘“Appellate courts are loath to reverse a
judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an
opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an
opportunity to consider.”’”].)
9 The Supreme Court in Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th
743, 759, fn. 14, cited Wills, Herring, and Pham approvingly in
interpreting an analogous statute (requiring service of a
complaint within three years of filing), observing that the court in
Wills, supra, 47 Cal.App.3d at page 946 “concluded that the
statutory five-year period did not include the time following the
death of the defendant during which his estate was not probated
and no personal representative had been appointed, because the
court’s jurisdiction was suspended during that time.”
13
Marbo argued in his motion to dismiss that dismissal was
mandated where more than five years had elapsed since Diamond
filed its complaint and none of the three exceptions to the five-
year rule under section 583.340 applied. As part of his argument,
Marbo listed the three exceptions and argued that Sayo’s death
did not extend the five-year period. In its opposition, Diamond
did not address the exceptions to the five-year rule under either
subdivision (a) (when “[t]he jurisdiction of the court to try the
action was suspended”) or subdivision (b) (when “[p]rosecution or
trial of the action was stayed or enjoined”). Instead, Diamond
argued that under subdivision (c), it was impractical and
impossible to bring the case to trial, and Diamond had been
reasonably diligent in its efforts to bring the case to trial,
including its efforts to strike Sayo’s answer and proceed in rem
against the property, and to serve Marbo with Diamond’s initial
motion under section 377.41. Diamond also conceded that “while
Marbo is correct that a party’s death in itself is not enough to toll
the 5-Year Rule, the facts of this case in conjunction with
Ms. Sasaki’s death are enough.” By failing to argue in the trial
court that the exception under section 583.340, subdivision (a)
applied (instead conceding Sayo’s death had no effect on the five-
year rule), Diamond deprived Marbo of the opportunity to
respond to the argument and the court the opportunity to address
the exception.
Diamond doubly forfeited this contention by failing to
present an argument under section 583.430, subdivision (a), in its
opening (or reply) brief. (See Doe v. McLaughlin (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 640, 653 [“An appellant abandons an issue by
failing to raise it in the opening brief.”]; Swain v. LaserAway
Medical Group, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 59, 72 [“‘“‘Issues not
14
raised in an appellant’s brief are [forfeited] or abandoned.’”’”].)
Instead, Diamond again argued it should have been allowed to
proceed in rem against the property, and the trial court abused
its discretion in finding the exception under subdivision (c) did
not apply.
In response to our request for additional briefing,10
Diamond argued in its supplemental brief that it had not
forfeited the argument that subdivision (a) applied because a
challenge to the trial court’s lack of fundamental jurisdiction
cannot be forfeited; the administration of justice militates against
forfeiture, and under section 583.130, “the policy favoring trial or
other disposition of an action on the merits are generally to be
preferred over the policy that requires dismissal for failure to
proceed with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of an
action.” Diamond’s arguments are unavailing.
First, this appeal does not implicate the trial court’s
fundamental jurisdiction to hear a case. Rather, the central
question is whether the court abused its discretion in finding no
statutory exception to the rule requiring dismissal applied.
10 We requested the parties file supplemental briefing on two
issues: (1) whether the trial court’s jurisdiction was suspended
from the date of Sayo’s death to the date her successor in interest
was appointed, and if so, whether that time period was excluded
from the five-year calculation under section 583.340,
subdivision (a); and (2) whether Diamond forfeited the argument
that under section 583.340, subdivision (a), the time during
which the court lacked jurisdiction should be excluded in
computing the time within which the action must be brought to
trial. Both parties filed supplemental briefs.
15
Diamond’s failure to argue application of the statutory
exception under section 583.340, subdivision (a), to the five-year
rule is not subject to the general rule that a claim based on a lack
of fundamental jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on
appeal. (See Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017)
2 Cal.5th 330, 339.)
Second, the general policy favoring trial on the merits
(§ 583.130) does not apply here, where the delay was caused by
Diamond’s gamesmanship and repeated attempts to obtain a
judgment on its foreclosure cause of action without addressing
the merits. For example, as early as October 2022 Marbo
presented evidence in his motion to intervene that he was Sayo’s
successor by attaching a copy of Sayo’s trust documents naming
him as successor and showing that the trust was the owner of the
property. Moreover, Diamond acknowledged in its opposition
that a section 377.41 motion was the proper mechanism for
substituting a successor. The trial court affirmed this was the
correct procedure in denying Marbo’s motion. Yet instead of
filing a section 377.41 motion, Diamond filed a motion to strike
Sayo’s answer and secure a default against the property without
adjudication of the foreclosure cause of action (or opportunity to
address Marbo’s proposed cross-complaint). Finally, despite
having served Marbo’s attorney on multiple occasions, Diamond
failed to serve Marbo or his attorney with its section 377.41
motion for almost a year, simply mailing its moving papers to the
property and later leaving a copy on the doorstep (while Marbo
was in an acute care facility). The policy favoring trial on the
merits does not reward such gamesmanship.
16
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Determining Diamond Failed To Show It Was Impossible,
Impracticable, or Futile To Bring the Case to Trial
“Under 583.340(c), the trial court must determine what is
impossible, impracticable, or futile ‘in light of all the
circumstances in the individual case, including the acts and
conduct of the parties and the nature of the proceedings
themselves. [Citations.] The critical factor in applying these
exceptions to a given factual situation is whether the plaintiff
exercised reasonable diligence in prosecuting his or her case.’
[Citations.] . . . A plaintiff’s reasonable diligence alone does not
preclude involuntary dismissal; it is simply one factor for
assessing the existing exceptions of impossibility,
impracticability, or futility. [Citation.] . . . Determining whether
the subdivision (c) exception applies requires a fact-sensitive
inquiry and depends ‘on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in
prosecuting the action and the plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable
diligence in overcoming those obstacles.’” (Bruns v. E-Commerce
Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 730-731 (Bruns); accord,
Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424,
438.)
The plaintiff bears the burden to prove circumstances that
justify application of section 583.340, subdivision (c)’s exception.
(Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 731.) “To avoid dismissal . . . , a
plaintiff must prove (1) a circumstance establishing impossibility,
impracticability, or futility, (2) a causal connection between the
circumstance and the failure to move the case to trial within the
five-year period, and (3) that [the plaintiff] was reasonably
diligent in prosecuting [the] case at all stages in the proceedings.”
(Tanguilig v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th
17
at p. 323; accord, Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1101.)
“Reasonable diligence places on a plaintiff the affirmative duty to
make every reasonable effort to bring a case to trial within five
years, even during the last month of its statutory life.” (Baccus v.
Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1532.)
“‘“[I]mpracticability and futility” involve a determination of
“‘excessive and unreasonable difficulty or expense,’” in light of all
the circumstances of a particular case.’” (Bruns, supra,
51 Cal.4th at p. 731.) As the Supreme Court in Gaines, supra,
62 Cal.4th at page 1102 explained, “‘there must be “a period of
impossibility, impracticability or futility, over which plaintiff had
no control,”’ because the statute is designed to prevent avoidable
delay.” Further, “[i]t is well established that ‘“‘[e]very period of
time during which the plaintiff does not have it within his power
to bring the case to trial is not to be excluded in making the
computation.’ [Citation.]”’ ‘“Time consumed by the delay caused
by ordinary incidents of proceedings, like disposition of demurrer,
amendment of pleadings, and the normal time of waiting for a
place on the court’s calendar [is] not within the contemplation”’”
of section 583.340, subdivision (c). (Id. at p. 1101.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
Diamond did not meet its burden to show the section 583.340,
subdivision (c), exception applied. Diamond contends it acted
diligently but could not promptly bring the case to trial following
Sayo’s death because the court erroneously (1) vacated the trial
date, (2) denied Diamond’s motion to strike Sayo’s answer and
proceed in rem against the property, and (3) required Diamond to
file a section 377.41 motion and serve the motion on Marbo or his
attorney, even though Marbo “evaded service.” However,
notwithstanding the court’s guidance that the proper procedure
18
following Sayo’s death was to file a motion under section 377.41
to substitute Sayo’s successor, for the next two years Diamond
did everything in its power to avoid litigating its remaining claim
on the merits. As discussed, Diamond opposed Marbo’s motion to
intervene and attempted to strike Sayo’s answer so that it could
obtain a default to foreclose on the mechanic’s lien without
litigating the action on the merits (or the potential cross-claims
Sayo asserted) despite the presence of a successor to Sayo who
could defend against the action. It was not until March 6, 2024
that Diamond filed its first section 377.41 motion, and Diamond
took another year to properly serve Marbo’s attorney with the
motion. Diamond argues Marbo avoided service, but Diamond
mailed the motion to Sayo’s property (where Marbo did not
reside), then left the motion papers on the doorstep. Accordingly,
Diamond cannot rely on the section 583.340, subdivision (c),
exception intended to account for unavoidable delays outside of a
party’s control. (See Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1102.)
Diamond contends the trial court erred by requiring it to
file a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.41 instead
of allowing Diamond to proceed in rem against the property
(without a representative for Sayo) under Probate Code
section 9391. As discussed, however, Probate Code section 9391
simply allows a lienholder to commence an action to enforce a
lien against a deceased property owner without first filing a claim
in probate court. The section does not address how the lienholder
should serve parties with an interest in the property or how to
substitute a representative of a deceased property owner as the
defendant. Moreover, Probate Code section 9391 contemplates
service on a decedent’s personal representative by granting the
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representative of the decedent the authority “to enjoin any action
of the lienholder to enforce a lien” against the property.
Diamond also relies on La Fetra v. Gleason (1894) 101 Cal.
246, 248, but La Fetra addressed a different question—what
service of process on a nonresident property owner was required
in a foreclosure action? The court held that out-of-state personal
service was sufficient because the action was in rem. (Id. at
pp. 248-249.) Diamond cites language in La Fetra that “[i]n a
proceeding strictly in rem personal service is not necessary,” but
this statement was in the context of service of a nonresident with
property in the state, and the court noted a state may require
notice “to persons claiming interests in the property.” (Id. at
p. 248; see Ridgway v. Salrin (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 50, 55
[“personal service of the [out-of-state] owner . . . within the state
is not required to confer jurisdiction” for in rem proceeding].)
Neither La Fetra nor Ridgway held a lienholder may proceed in
rem to foreclose on a lien without substituting a representative of
the property owner after her death or providing notice to the
representative.
To the contrary, a party who files an action to foreclose on a
mechanic’s lien must comply with the procedural and service
requirements for any civil action. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 413.10
et seq. [requiring service of summons on a person “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by statute”]; Withington v. Shay (1941)
47 Cal.App.2d 68, 73 [“The rules relating to civil actions generally
apply to proceedings for the foreclosure of mechanics’ liens,”
unless a statutory provision governing mechanics’ liens provides
otherwise].) Diamond cites no authority for its proposition that
section 377.41’s procedure for continuing a pending action after a
defendant’s death does not apply to an in rem action. Absent
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notice and substitution of a representative for a deceased
property owner, the representative would have no opportunity to
litigate the validity of the claimed obligation and to contest
foreclosure.
Diamond also argues the trial court should not have placed
the burden on Diamond to file a section 377.41 motion. But
section 377.41 does not specify which party may (or must) file the
motion. Moreover, it was Diamond’s burden to bring the case to
trial within five years of filing its complaint and to “call to the
attention of the court the necessity for setting the trial” within
the five-year time frame, which Diamond failed to do. (See
Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores, supra, 10 Cal.4th at
p. 434; Massey v. Bank of America (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 29, 33.)
Diamond’s reliance on Holland v. Dave Altman’s R.V.
Center (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 477 is misplaced. In Holland, the
Court of Appeal reversed dismissal of the action under the five-
year rule after finding the trial court proceedings were stayed
during an appeal from an order quashing service. (Id. at p. 479)
Diamond argues the trial court’s orders vacating the trial date
and denying its motion to enter Sayo’s default likewise cut off
Diamond’s ability to proceed to trial. They did not. As discussed,
Diamond had ample time to substitute Sayo’s successor but
elected not to timely litigate its claim on the merits.
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DISPOSITION
The September 18, 2025 judgment is affirmed. Marbo
Sasaki is entitled to recover his costs on appeal.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
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