Palladino v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket25-1490
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
25-1490
Palladino v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO
A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 18th day of November, two thousand twenty-six.
PRESENT:
PIERRE N. LEVAL,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
JOHN PALLADINO, GARIB KARAPETYAN,
STEVE PALLADINO, JOHN NYPL,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 25-1490
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., JPMORGAN CHASE
BANK N.A., BANK OF AMERICA
CORPORATION, BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,
CITIGROUP, INC., CITIBANK, N.A., (NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION), WELLS FARGO & COMPANY,
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., U.S. BANCORP,
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, PNC
FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC., DBA PNC
BANK, N.A., PNC BANK, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL
CORPORATION, CAPITAL ONE F.S.B, CAPITAL
ONE BANK (USA), NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
(COBNA), CAPITAL ONE, N.A., (CONA),
BANK OF THE WEST, VISA, INC., VISA U.S.A.
INC., (VISA U.S.A.), VISA INTERNATIONAL
SERVICE ASSOCIATION, MASTERCARD
INCORPORATED,
Defendants-Appellees.
_____________________________________
For Plaintiffs-Appellants: JOSEPH M. ALIOTO, Alioto Law Firm, San
Francisco, CA.
For Defendants-Appellees BORIS BERSHTEYN (Lara A. Flath, Kamali P.
JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Willett, on the brief), Skadden, Arps, Slate,
JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.: Meagher & Flom LLP, New York, NY.
For Defendants-Appellees Bank of Michael B. Miller, Morrison & Foerster,
America Corporation, Bank of New York, NY; Natalie Fleming Nolen,
America, National Association, and Morrison & Foerster, Washington, DC.
Bank of America. N.A.:
For Defendants-Appellees Benjamin R. Nagin, Tom A. Paskowitz,
Citigroup Inc. and Citibank, N.A.: Sidley Austin LLP, New York, NY.
For Defendants-Appellees Wells Amy N. Vegari, William F. Cavanaugh, Jr.,
Fargo & Company and Wells Fargo Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP, New
Bank, N.A.: York, NY.
For Defendants-Appellees U.S. Kara F. Kennedy, Alston & Bird LLP,
Bankcorp and U.S. Bank National Atlanta, GA.
Association:
For Defendants-Appellees PNC Michelle Ann Mantine, Reed Smith LLP,
Financial Services Group, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA.
PNC, and PNC Bank, National
Association:
For Defendants-Appellees Capital Abby F. Rudzin, Andrew J. Frackman,
One Financial Corporation, Capital O’Melveny & Myers LLP, New York, NY.
One, F.S.B., Capital One Bank
(USA), National Association and
Capital One National Association:
For Defendants-Appellees BMO Elizabeth P. Papez, Gibson Dunn &
Harris Bank N.A., successor-in- Crutcher LLP, New York, NY; Rachel S.
interest to Bank of the West: Brass, Julian W. Kleinbrodt, Gibson Dunn
& Crutcher LLP, San Francisco, CA.
For Defendants-Appellees Visa Anne P. Davis, Matthew Eisenstein,
Inc., Visa U.S.A. Inc., and Visa Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP,
International Service Association: Washington, DC; Robert J. Vizas, Arnold &
Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, San Francisco,
CA.
For Defendant-Appellee William Michael, Brette Tannenbaum,
Mastercard Incorporated: Nina Kovalenko, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison LLP, New York, NY.
Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York (Margo K. Brodie, Chief Judge).
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UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the December 30, 2024 order 1 of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
John Palladino, Garib Karapetyan, Steve Palladino, and John Nypl
(“Plaintiffs”), on behalf of themselves and a putative class of similarly situated
Mastercard and Visa cardholders, appeal from the district court’s order dismissing
their claims against various banks and payment card services providers
(“Defendants”) under California’s Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16720
et seq. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants conspired to fix the interchange fees
charged in processing credit and debit card transactions. The district court
dismissed their claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and
12(c) for failure to plead antitrust standing. We assume the parties’ familiarity
with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we
refer only as necessary to explain our decision.
1 The district court did not enter judgment in a separate document, as required by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 58(a). That oversight, however, “does not affect the validity of an appeal from
[the district court’s] order.” Fed R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(B). Where no separate document has been
filed, we consider judgment entered after “150 days have run from the entry in the civil docket”
of the order at issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B); see Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2006).
Here, Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on June 10, 2025, which is within 30 days of the expiration
of the 150-day period.
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I. Plaintiffs Failed to State a Claim for Relief Under the Cartwright Act. 2
On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in concluding that
they failed to allege an antitrust injury, as required to establish antitrust standing
under the Cartwright Act. According to Plaintiffs, the fact that they “are
consumers of the issuing banks’ price-fixed debit and credit card products” is
enough to show that they suffered a cognizable injury under California’s antitrust
laws. Palladino Br. at 20. We disagree.
“We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or
a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), accepting as true the
factual allegations in the complaint and drawing all inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor.” Biro v. Conde Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 2015). To survive either
motion, a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “And ‘a
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads’ facts sufficient to ‘allow the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
2Although Plaintiffs originally filed suit in California state court, that action was removed to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California and then transferred by the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
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misconduct alleged.’” Mueller v. Deutsche Bank AG, 185 F.4th 307, 312 (2d Cir. 2026)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (alterations adopted).
Although the Cartwright Act provides a private right of action to anyone
injured by “combinations or agreements [that] restrain trade or competition or
which fix or control prices,” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. County of Stanislaus, 69 Cal. Rptr.
2d 329, 332 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted), “[a]ntitrust law has long
recognized that defendants [that] may have violated a provision of the antitrust
statutes are not liable to every person [that] can persuade a jury that he has
suffered a loss in some manner that might conceivably be traced to the conduct of
the defendants,” In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litig., 833 F.3d 151, 157 (2d
Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). To assert a violation of the
Cartwright Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has “antitrust standing.” Ahn
v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 310 Cal. Rptr. 3d 595, 602 (Ct. App. 2023).
To establish antitrust standing, a plaintiff must show that he has suffered an
“injury of the type [that] the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows
from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.” Id. at 604 (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Generally, only those that are participants in the defendants’
market can be said to have suffered antitrust injury.” Aluminum Warehousing, 833
6
F.3d at 158; see Vinci v. Waste Mgmt., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 337, 339 (Ct. App. 1995)
(explaining that a plaintiff must demonstrate that he is a “consumer” or
“competitor” in the restrained market).
Here, Plaintiffs have not identified a cognizable injury. Although they claim
that they are the “direct purchasers” of payment card transactions and are
therefore harmed by Defendants’ allegedly anticompetitive interchange fees,
App’x at 62, cardholders do not directly pay interchange fees. When a consumer
uses a credit or debit card to make a purchase, the merchant’s bank – commonly
referred to as the acquiring bank – “pay[s] the merchant the funds owed on the
transaction” in exchange for a “discount fee” charged to the merchant. United
States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 188 (2d Cir. 2016). In turn, the consumer’s
bank – typically referred to as the card-issuing bank – “provides funds to the
acquiring bank as payment to [the] merchant for the cardholder’s purchase” in
exchange for an “interchange fee” charged to the acquiring bank. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Salveson v. JPMorgan
Chase & Co., 663 F. App’x 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2025) (“The cardholder has not directly
paid the interchange fee, but rather has only paid the full price for the item or
service it has purchased.”). Because interchange fees are “paid by the acquirer to
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the issuer,” Am. Express, 838 F.3d at 188, the district court correctly determined
that Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that they suffered a direct injury
attributable to anticompetitive interchange fees.
Plaintiffs alternatively contend that they are harmed as “indirect
purchasers” because merchants pass on interchange fees to consumers by charging
“inflated prices.” App’x at 69. But these purported injuries occur in a market that
is separate from the market for general purpose card network services, which is
where the allegedly inflated interchange fees are assessed. In the market for
general purpose card network services, Visa and Mastercard – which “provide the
infrastructure and mechanisms through which general purpose card transactions
are conducted” – sell their services to card-issuers and merchants. United States v.
Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Ordinary consumers do not participate in that market, and using a
clever label – “indirect purchasers” – cannot obscure the fact that Plaintiffs have
not suffered “an injury within the area of the economy that is endangered by a
breakdown of competitive conditions.” Kolling v. Dow Jones & Co., 187 Cal. Rptr.
797, 807 (App. Ct. 1982).
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Finally, Plaintiffs assert that their injuries are “inextricably intertwined”
with the injuries Defendants sought to inflict in the market for general purpose
card network services. Palladino Br. at 37. Although a plaintiff typically must
demonstrate that he participates in the restrained market to establish antitrust
standing, federal antitrust law recognizes a “narrow exception . . . for parties
whose injuries are inextricably intertwined with the injuries of market
participants.” Aluminum Warehousing, 833 F.3d at 158 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “[T]o assess the plausibility of a putative plaintiff’s claim to antitrust
injury as being inextricably intertwined with the injuries the defendants ultimately
sought to inflict,” we “ask whether the plaintiff was manipulated or utilized by
defendant as a fulcrum, conduit[,] or market force to injure competitors or
participants in the relevant product and geographical markets.” Id. at 161 (internal
quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted).
Here, Plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that they have been used as a
“conduit” to injure market participants or that their injuries are “essential to the
success of [Defendants’] anticompetitive scheme.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). According to Plaintiffs, their injuries are inextricably intertwined with
the injuries of market participants because “there would be no interchange fee” if
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Plaintiffs did not use Defendants’ payment cards. Palladino Br. at 43. But
Plaintiffs do not explain whether they have been injured at all, much less how their
purported injuries are anything more than a “byproduct” of Defendants’ alleged
anticompetitive behavior. Aluminum Warehousing, 833 F.3d at 162. We therefore
agree with the district court that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that they have
antitrust standing to pursue these claims. 3
II. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Plaintiffs
Leave to Amend the Complaint a Second Time.
Plaintiffs finally assert that the district court abused its discretion in denying
their request to amend their complaint a second time pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15. Plaintiffs contend that the district court should have granted
them leave to amend their complaint to add allegations supporting their claims
that the merchants have entered into a conspiracy with Defendants and that
Plaintiffs pay inflated prices as a result of the conspiracy. We are unpersuaded.
In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion for leave to amend, “we
apply a deferential, abuse of discretion standard of review.” Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 574
3Because we find that Plaintiffs have not suffered an antitrust injury, we need not consider
whether they are efficient enforcers of the Cartwright Act, as would also be required for Plaintiffs
to establish antitrust standing. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters
(AGC), 459 U.S. 519, 538–46 (1983); Schwab Short-Term Bond Mkt. Fund v. Lloyds Banking Grp., 22
F.4th 103, 120 (2d Cir. 2021) (“California law substantially incorporates the AGC factors.” (citing
Vinci, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 338–39)).
10
F.3d 820, 822 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although “the
usual practice upon granting a motion to dismiss [is] to allow leave to replead,”
Cortec Indus. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991), a district court may
deny a request to replead if “the proposed amendments would be futile,” Williams
v. Citigroup, Inc., 659 F.3d 208, 214 (2d Cir. 2011).
Because the allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ proposed second amended
complaint are merely conclusory and would not have cured the defects in their
first amended complaint, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion
in denying leave to amend a second time.
* * *
We have considered Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and find them to be
without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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