Pittsburgh Logistics Systems v. Nelmapius, K.

J-A16020-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 PITTSBURGH LOGISTICS SYSTEM, INC : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : KEGAN NELMAPIUS : : : No. 1354 WDA 2025 APPEAL OF: ARL LOGISTICS, LLC, ARL : TRANSPORT, LLC AND MANAGING : INTERNAL ACTIVITIES, INC. : Appeal from the Order Entered October 15, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at No(s): M.S.25-001971 BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: October 29, 2026 Appellants, ARL Logistics, LLC, ARL Transport, LLC, and Managing Internal Activities, Inc. (collectively “ARL”), appeal from the order entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which denied ARL’s motion to quash subpoenas and ARL’s request for a protective order. We affirm. The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. ARL and Appellees, Pittsburgh Logistics System, Inc. (“PLS”), are third-party logistics brokers, and are direct competitors.1 In Florida, PLS filed suit against ____________________________________________ 1 Third-party logistics brokers buy truckload capacity from carriers and then sell that truckload capacity to shippers, earning a profit on the margin they obtain between the buy-side and the sell-side of those transactions. Because much of the companies’ business comes from customer and shipment data and information, PLS requires its employees to sign employment agreements that include non-compete, non-solicitation, and confidentiality provisions. J-A16020-26 Kevin Nelmapius, a prior employee of PLS who now works for ARL. See Pittsburgh Logistics Systems v. Nelmapius, Case No. 2023-CA-010739, Fourth Judicial Circuit, Duval County, Florida (“Duval County Case”). PLS asserted claims of breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets, alleging that Nelmapius used confidential and trade secret information he learned while employed at PLS to develop business with his former PLS customers after he joined ARL. In a separate litigation in Butler County, Pennsylvania, PLS filed suit against ARL and a prior PLS employee, Jordan Reber, alleging that ARL engaged in a plan to hire PLS employees and use their insider knowledge of PLS’s customer and shipment data and information to help grow ARL’s third- party logistics division. See Pittsburgh Logistics Systems, Inc. v. ARL Transport, LLC and ARL Logistics, LLC, A.D. No. 18-11039 (“Butler County Case”). On August 26, 2025, PLS filed a praecipe in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, seeking issuance of subpoenas under the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, (“UIDDA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5331-5337, for records from ARL (a third-party to the Florida litigation) as part of discovery in the Duval County Case in Florida.2 ____________________________________________ 2 Under the UIDDA, in order to issue a subpoena on a third party in Pennsylvania, the party seeking the subpoena must submit the foreign subpoena to a prothonotary in the jurisdiction in which the subject of the (Footnote Continued Next Page) -2- J-A16020-26 On August 29, 2025, PLS filed an amended praecipe with attached subpoenas seeking documents and communication from ARL limited to the period from October 1, 2018 through September 30, 2023 concerning: (1) sales by Nelmapius to four specific customers, (2) communication between Nelmapius and U-Haul representatives, (3) the transaction between Nelmapius and U-Haul representatives, (4) ARL’s compensation for Nelmapius from his transaction with U-Haul, (5) documents sent to, drafted by, created by or involving Nelmapius that discuss or relate to PLS, its agreement with Nelmapius, or the terms “confidentiality,” “non-compete,” and “non-solicit,” and (6) customer lists and similar sales reports created or used by Nelmapius referencing the specified four customers. On September 17, 2025, ARL filed a motion to quash the subpoenas but later withdrew this motion on September 29, 2025. On September 19, 2025, PLS filed a certificate prerequisite to serving ____________________________________________ subpoena resides. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5335. The prothonotary shall then issue the subpoena upon the person to whom the foreign subpoena is directed. See id. In Allegheny County in particular, the local civil and family rules provide that to obtain an Allegheny County subpoena, based on a subpoena issued from a foreign jurisdiction, pursuant to the UIDDA, a person shall submit to the Department of Court Records the foreign subpoena, the filing fee, and a request for issuance of a subpoena that contains the jurisdiction in which the subpoena was issued, and the names and address of each attorney and all unrepresented parties for the matter in the foreign jurisdiction. See Allegheny Cty.Civ.Fam.R. 234.2. The requested Allegheny County subpoena must incorporate the terms and must be served in compliance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. -3- J-A16020-26 subpoenas, in which PLS certified that it had served Nelmapius with notice of its intent to serve subpoenas upon third-party ARL. PLS served ARL with the subpoenas on September 23, 2025; however, the subpoenas were initially served without Attachment A, the list of requested documents. On September 30, 2025, ARL moved to quash the subpoenas and/or for a protective order, asserting that the subpoenas (1) were facially defective under Pa.R.C.P. 4009.26 for failing to include the Attachment A, (2) were overly broad and unduly burdensome, (3) required production of information protected by a mutually agreed Confidentiality Agreement in the Butler County Case, and (4) interfered with an ongoing discovery dispute concerning electronically stored information (“ESI”) in the Butler County Case. ARL’s petition for a protective order asserted that materials sought were confidential and contained trade secrets. PLS responded to ARL’s motion to quash, insisting that 1) it had cured the defective service by re-serving the subpoenas on or about October 1, 2025 with Attachment A, 2) the Confidentiality Agreement in the Butler County Case did not prohibit ARL from complying with the subpoenas, 3) the Duval County Case was separate from the Butler County Case and a discovery dispute therein should not limit the discovery PLS could obtain in the Duval County Case, 4) the subpoenas had reasonable limits on time, scope, and subject matter, and 5) ARL had not met its burden for a protective order under Rule 4012(a)(9) because it did not identify or describe any potential trade secret -4- J-A16020-26 or confidential information that would fall under the rule. The court heard argument and, on October 14, 2025, issued an order denying ARL’s motion to quash and for a protective order. ARL timely appealed.3 ARL raises the following issues on appeal: 1. The trial court erred in denying ARL’s Motion to Quash and/or Request for Protective Order where the subpoenas in question: a. sought confidential information; b. the subpoenas were overbroad and unduly burdensome and did not provide adequate time to review potentially responsive documents where PLS’s Pennsylvania counsel knew based on the [Butler County Case] that the documents requested required a review of over 80,000 documents that contain confidential information; ____________________________________________ 3 On November 3, 2025, PLS filed with this Court a motion to quash the appeal as an unappealable collateral order. On December 11, 2025, this Court denied the motion to quash without prejudice to PLS’s right to renew the issue before the merits panel. PLS renewed its request to quash in its appellee’s brief. Upon review, we note that while ARL claims its appeal satisfies the collateral order doctrine, based on the procedural posture of this case, which, in Allegheny County is limited to the domestication of foreign subpoenas under the UIDDA, we conclude that the appeal before us is properly taken from a final order. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Foster Poultry Farms, 335 A.3d 377, 382 (Pa.Super. 2025) (considering appeal taken from final order granting motion to quash subpoenas in domestication of foreign subpoena action under UIDDA). In other words, while there is ongoing litigation in the Duval County Case (and in the separate matter in the Butler County Case), the only litigation in Allegheny County concerns the propriety of the trial court’s denial of ARL’s motion to quash the subpoenas issued in Allegheny County and the denial of ARL’s motion for a protective order. There is no further litigation ongoing in Allegheny County at this juncture which would render the order on appeal non-final for purposes of appellate review. Thus, we deny PLS’s request to quash the appeal on the grounds alleged. -5- J-A16020-26 c. were an end-run around a Confidentiality Agreement in [the Butler County Case] between ARL and [PLS] involving trade secret and confidential information claims where the Confidentiality Agreement precluded counsel for PLS in [the Butler County Case] from sharing documents obtained in discovery with PLS counsel in [the Duval County Case] absent a court order; d. PLS and ARL were involved in a discovery dispute in the [Butler County Case] over the improper production to PLS of ESI documents that were not responsive to two ESI Court Orders in the [Butler County Case] that had not yet been resolved and PLS had been required to provide its correspondence with the entity charged with performing ESI collection for in camera review; e. facially defective because they failed to include the referenced Attachment A and as such were different from the Notice of Intent to Serve the Subpoena. (ARL’s Brief at 14). In its first and third issues on appeal,4 ARL argues that the court erred in denying its motion to quash and request for a protective order because the information sought in the subpoenas was confidential trade secrets. Specifically, ARL claims that the information was confidential because it ____________________________________________ 4 ARL’s first issue concerns the trial court’s denial of the motion for a protective order based on the alleged confidentiality of the information sought as established by the Confidentiality Agreement in the Butler County Case. The third issue also concerns whether disclosure of the information was precluded by the Confidentiality Agreement. As these issues are related, we address them together. Furthermore, we note that if we were to evaluate ARL’s third issue independently, we could deem the issue waived for failure to include any citation to pertinent legal authority or discussion thereof. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101, 2119(a). -6- J-A16020-26 contained financial and other types of records. ARL suggests that PLS was seeking information for use in the Duval County Case that it had learned about from counsel in the ongoing Butler County Case. ARL argues that the information sought was subject to the Confidentiality Agreement in the Butler County Case, and PLS’s attempt to obtain the information in this Duval County Case was an attempt to work around the Confidentiality Agreement to obtain the information. ARL relies on the language of the Confidentiality Agreement in the Butler County Case to establish the material’s confidentiality,5 as well as Rule of Civil Procedure 4012, concerning protective orders, to support its claim that the information subject to the subpoenas constitutes trade secret information, which should not be disclosed. Specifically, ARL argues that the documents requested contain data concerning revenue generated by Nelmapius and ARL customers and commissions paid to Nelmapius. ARL asserts that the ____________________________________________ 5 The Confidentiality Agreement in the Butler County Case defines “Confidential Information” as: all Discovery Material, and all information contained therein containing: (i) trade secrets or other confidential research, development, financial, or commercial information, including, but without limitation, customer information, carrier network information, employee training materials, and non-public personal information relating to any current or former employee of PLS or ARL Transport LLC and ARL Logistics LLC. (Motion to Quash, 9/17/25, at Exhibit 6 ¶ 3, Confidentiality Agreement, Butler County Case). -7- J-A16020-26 documents sought are intertwined with email correspondences and information for other ARL employees whose information was not requested, and therefore, must be separated or redacted. ARL explains that because the information sought would fall under the Confidentiality Agreement in the Butler County Case, ARL did not need to provide additional information concerning secrecy value or competitive value of the information. (See ARL’s Brief at 33). Accordingly, ARL contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a protective order and motion to quash the subpoenas on this ground. We disagree. This Court has explained our well-settled standard of review of discovery matters as follows, “Generally, on review of an order concerning discovery, an appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard.” Crum v. Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 907 A.2d 578, 585 (Pa.Super. 2006). See also Rogers v. Thomas, 291 A.3d 865, 887 n.26 (Pa.Super. 2023) (stating: “the standard of review regarding a motion to quash a subpoena is whether the trial court abused its discretion”); Saint Luke’s Hosp. of Bethlehem v. Vivian, 99 A.3d 534, 540 (Pa.Super. 2014) (applying abuse of discretion standard of review to order denying motion for protective order). “However, if the issues an appellant raises are purely questions of law, this Court’s standard of review is de novo, and its scope plenary.” Miller v. Shutt, 312 A.3d 326, 331 (Pa.Super. 2024) (citing Rogers, supra). Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4012 governs motions for -8- J-A16020-26 protective orders, and provides: Rule 4012. Protective Orders (a) Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery or deposition is sought, and for good cause shown, the court may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense[.] Pa.R.C.P. 4012(a). “The discoverability of trade secrets is ‘uniquely within the discretion of the trial judge,’ and the court’s ruling will not be reversed ‘unless [it is] deemed to represent an abuse of discretion.’” Animal Legal Def. Fund, supra at 382 (quoting Rohm & Haas Co. v. Lin, 992 A.2d 132, 143 (Pa.Super. 2010), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1093, 132 S.Ct. 852, 181 L.Ed.2d 550 (2011)). Rule of Civil Procedure 4012(a)(9) governs protective orders. It allows the court to enter an order as justice requires, upon motion and “for good cause shown,” to protect against “unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense,” including the disclosure of a trade secret. Pa.R.Civ.P. 4012(a)(9); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5336 (incorporating the Rules of Civil Procedure relating to subpoenas to foreign subpoenas). The court may determine “whether disclosure is to be allowed, if protection is to be afforded, and the form of such protection[.]” Crum[, supra at 586]. Id. at 382. This Court has defined a trade secret as: any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a -9- J-A16020-26 formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers. Rohm & Haas Co., [supra] at 143 n.4 (citation omitted); see also Rest. (Second) of Torts § 757, comment b; Felmlee v. Lockett, 466 Pa. 1, 351 A.2d 273, 277 (1976). The court must consider the following factors to determine whether certain information is a trade secret: 1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; 2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his business; 3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; 4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors; 5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the information; and 6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. Crum, [supra] at 585. Once the moving party establishes that the information sought is a trade secret, the burden shifts to the party seeking discovery “to demonstrate that production of the trade secret is relevant and necessary, and that the necessity outweighs the harm of disclosure.” Id. at 587. Id. at 382. Notably, “[a]lthough trade secrets are afforded protection under the law, ‘there is no absolute privilege or unconditional bar as to disclosure of such matters.”’ Crum, supra at 585 (quoting George v. Schirra, 814 A.2d 202, 204 (Pa.Super. 2002)). Furthermore, [w]hether a subpoena shall be enforced rests in the judicial discretion of the court. We will not disturb a discretionary ruling of a lower court unless the record demonstrates an abuse of the court’s discretion. So long as there is evidence which supports the lower court’s decision, it will be affirmed. - 10 - J-A16020-26 We may not substitute our judgment of the evidence for that of the lower court. Branham v. Rohm & Haas Co., 19 A.3d 1094, 1103 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 615 Pa. 771, 42 A.3d 289 (2012) (citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion is more than just an error in judgment and, on appeal, the trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. (citation omitted). Instantly, the trial court explained its denial of ARL’s motion for a protective order as follows: [The trial court] denied [ARL’s] request for a protective order because it failed to establish that the requested information constituted trade secrets or confidential information under Pa.R.C.P. 4012. “[F]or good cause shown,” a court may enter an order to protect a party “from unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense,” which includes confidential information or trade secrets. Pa.R.C.P. 4012(a)(9). The burden rests on the moving party to meet this good-cause burden. Animal Legal Def. Fund[, supra at 382]. While a trade secret “may be ... a list of customers,” a court must evaluate the following factors in its determination: the extent to which the information is known outside and within the business, the measures taken to guard its secrecy, the information’s competitive value, the effort or money expended to develop it, and the ease with which others may acquire it. Id. Here, ARL offered only conclusory statements that “justice requires” a protective order and that disclosure would prejudice Nelmapius. [ARL’s] Mot. to [Q]uash ¶¶ 47-48. ARL offered no evidence regarding secrecy value, competitive value, development efforts, or the difficulty of acquiring information. Without any factual basis to support the governing factors, ARL failed to meet its burden to show - 11 - J-A16020-26 good cause. (Trial Court Opinion at 5-6). The court further stated: ARL argued that complying with the subpoena would violate the Confidentiality Agreement in the [Butler County Case]— this [c]ourt also disagreed. Nothing in the Confidentiality Agreement prohibits ARL from producing its own records. As to any records not in ARL’s sole custody and possession, the agreement contains explicit procedures for designating such information as confidential and restricting its use. ARL’s Resp. to Mot. to Quash, Ex. 2 ¶ 15. Therefore, ARL may not simply assert that all responsive records are confidential without engaging in the agreement’s vetting process. Because the Confidentiality Agreement continues to apply where appropriate, the subpoena does not override its protections. (Id. at 5) (some capitalization provided). On this record, we cannot say that the trial court erred or abused its discretion in denying ARL’s motion for a protective order and motion to quash based on ARL’s claim that the information sought was confidential trade secrets. See Rogers, supra; St. Luke’s Hosp., supra. As this Court has explained, a party seeking a protective order has the burden of proving that the information sought is a trade secret. See Animal Legal Def. Fund, supra. When the party has established that the information sought is a trade secret, the burden shifts to the party seeking the information to demonstrate that production is relevant and necessary, and that the necessity outweighs the harm of disclosure. See id. As the trial court noted, ARL’s attempt to simply rely on the Confidentiality Agreement in a separate matter to establish the information’s confidentiality, instead of developing an argument with - 12 - J-A16020-26 respect to each individual factor for the trial court to consider, did not meet ARL’s burden. Id. To the extent that it addresses the factors on appeal, ARL suggests that the requested information contains detailed financial spreadsheets that show revenue generated, and that the spreadsheets contain customers and revenue for clients and customers that are not included in PLS’s subpoenas. (See ARL’s Brief at 31-32). Nevertheless, ARL does not address whether: 1) the information is known outside of the business; 2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his business; 3) the extent of measures taken by ARL to guard the secrecy of the information; 4) the value of the information to ARL and to its competitors; 5) the amount of effort or money expended by ARL in developing the information; and 6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. See Crum, supra. Consequently, ARL has failed to meet its burden that the information sought is a trade secret, and we decline to formulate ARL’s argument for it. See Animal Legal Def. Fund, supra. As such, the burden did not shift to the party seeking discovery, PLS, to demonstrate that the information sought is relevant and necessary, and that the need for disclosure outweighs the harm. See Crum, supra. Aside from its potential classification as trade secrets, which ARL failed to prove, ARL asserts no other privilege or legal ground requiring quashal of the subpoenas or issuance of a protective order. Accordingly, we conclude that ARL’s first - 13 - J-A16020-26 and third issues merit no relief. In its second issue, ARL asserts that the trial court erred in denying its motion to quash the subpoenas as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and failing to provide adequate time to review the potentially responsive documents. ARL relies on Rule of Civil Procedure 4011, which provides that no discovery shall be permitted which would cause unreasonable burden or expense. ARL asserts that the requests which sought “all documents” on each item were not subject to any meaningful limitations. ARL insists that it needed more than the allocated 20 days to review the documents subject to request and suggests that the requested information could entail over 80,000 documents.6 As such, ARL insists that the trial court erred in denying the motion to quash the subpoenas. We disagree. Initially, we note that “appellate briefs must conform in all material respects to the briefing requirements set forth in the Rules.” Hollinger v. Dietrich, No. 740 MDA 2025, ___ A.3d ___, ___ (Pa.Super. filed June 23, 2026) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 2101). “Where an appellant fails to properly raise or develop issues on appeal, or where a brief is wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a court will not consider the merits of the claims raised on appeal.” Id. It is well settled that “[t]his Court will not act as ____________________________________________ 6 ARL reaches this figure based on an ESI search in the Butler County Case that returned over 80,000 document hits related to Nelmapius, including over 69,000 hits relevant to Nelmapius and U-Haul. (See ARL’s Brief at 35). - 14 - J-A16020-26 counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 631 Pa. 719, 110 A.3d 998 (2014). Here, aside from boilerplate citations concerning quashing subpoenas generally, ARL has failed to include pertinent citations to legal authority in support of its specific argument that the court abused its discretion in not quashing the subpoenas as overbroad or overburdensome. As such, we deem this issue waived. See Hollinger, supra; Pa.R.A.P. 2101, 2119(a). Moreover, even if the claim had not been waived, ARL would not be entitled to relief. Motions for challenging a subpoena are governed by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 234.4(b), which states that “[a] motion to quash a subpoena ... may be filed by a party, by the person served or by any other person with sufficient interest. After hearing, the court may make an order to protect a party, witness or other person from unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense.” Pa.R.C.P. 234.4(b). Here, the trial court explained: ARL contended that the subpoena lacked reasonable limits as to time, scope, and subject matter—[the trial court] disagreed. The amended subpoena expressly narrowed the time periods, limited the request to documents involving Nelmapius, and included defined search parameters by listing specific customers, issues, and search terms. [(See PLS’s Amended Praecipe to Domesticate Foreign Subpoena 8/29/25)]. These limitations effectively cured ARL’s alleged overbreadth and undue burden. - 15 - J-A16020-26 (Trial Court Opinion at 4). Upon review, we conclude that, even if not waived, ARL did not establish that the court abused its discretion when it found that the subpoenas were not overly broad or overly burdensome. Here, ARL did not assert that it did not have the records sought or that it had to modify the manner in which it kept the data to respond to the subpoenas. Although ARL implied that reviewing the material to be turned over and removing any unrelated information, e.g., spreadsheet entries concerning unrelated employee sales, was overburdensome, it offered no authority in support of this suggestion. Moreover, as the court noted, the subpoenas were limited in scope to documents involving Nelmapius and specific customers, during a specific time period. We decline to disturb the trial court’s discretionary ruling. See Animal Legal Def. Fund, supra. ARL’s second issue merits no relief. In its fourth issue on appeal, ARL contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion to quash because of an ongoing discovery dispute in the Butler County Case involving ESI. Specifically, ARL asserts that PLS received improperly disclosed documents during discovery in the Butler County Case and claims that the information sought in the instant subpoenas was part of that ongoing discovery dispute. ARL claims that the attorneys in the Butler County Case received information from ESI results that would be helpful to the attorneys involved in the Duval County Case, and suggested that PLS’s Duval County Case attorneys attempted to circumvent the Confidentiality - 16 - J-A16020-26 Agreement by subpoenaing the instant documents to obtain that information directly. As such, ARL insists that the subpoenas sought to circumvent the discovery dispute in the Butler County Case, and the trial court erred in denying its motion to quash the subpoenas. Initially, we note that ARL’s argument on this issue does not contain any citation to or discussion of pertinent authority and does not attempt to apply the facts of record to controlling authority. ARL’s conclusory argument section, lacking any citation to relevant case law, is woefully inadequate, and we decline to act as ARL’s counsel and develop its argument. See Hollinger, supra. Thus, ARL’s fourth issue is waived.7 Finally, in the fifth issue presented, ARL argues that the subpoenas should have been quashed because they were facially defective. Specifically, ARL argues that the subpoenas originally served failed to include the referenced Attachment A—the list of documents that PLS was seeking. ARL insists that because the originally served subpoenas did not have the attachment, they were not identical to the notice of intent to serve the ____________________________________________ 7 Further, as the trial court explained, “the [C]onfidentiality [A]greement in the [Butler County Case] continues to govern as applicable, protecting any information deemed to be protected after the appropriate vetting process.” (Trial Court Opinion at 6). “Moreover, the requested materials— communication about PLS, PLS customers, and Nelmapius’s work for ARL— are directly relevant to PLS’s claim in this action in Florida, where PLS claimed that Nelmapius used PLS’s confidential information to benefit ARL.” (Id.) On this record, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in declining to quash the subpoenas on this ground. - 17 - J-A16020-26 subpoenas, in violation of Rule of Civil Procedure 4009.22(a)(4). ARL also argues that the subpoenas violated Rule 4009.25, governing certificate prerequisite to service of subpoena, because the subpoenas served were not ultimately identical to the subpoenas attached to the notice of intent—again because the initially served subpoenas did not have Attachment A. ARL maintains that because the served subpoenas were not identical to the subpoenas attached to the notice of intent to serve, the subpoenas should have been quashed. We disagree. Under Pennsylvania law, after a party files a praecipe to domesticate a foreign subpoena, if that subpoena involves a third party, the party seeking production must then provide notice to the opposing party in the underlying matter that they intend to serve the third-party subpoena. Under Rule of Civil Procedure 4009.21, this written notice of intent to serve must be provided at least twenty days before the date of service of the subpoena on the third- party.8 Pa.R.C.P. 4009.21(a). The rule specifies that a copy of the subpoena proposed to be served shall be attached to the notice. Id. Rule 4009.21(b) specifically states that the “written notice shall not be given to the person named in the subpoena.” Pa.R.C.P. 4009.21(b). Rather, the notice of intent to serve serves as a means of notifying the opposing party of the intended ____________________________________________ 8 The note to Rule 4009.22 observes that “the twenty-day advance notice is for the benefit of the parties and not the person served. The twenty-day notice period may be waived and the certificate modified accordingly.” Pa.R.C.P. 4009.22(a), Note. - 18 - J-A16020-26 subpoena and providing that party an opportunity to file written objections. Once the party seeking production gives its notice of intent to serve, the party seeking production must then file a certificate prerequisite, which states that it served the notice of intent to serve subpoena and attaches a copy of the notice of intent to serve to the certificate. In the certificate, the party seeking production must also certify that the “subpoena which will be served is identical to the subpoena which is attached to the notice of intent to serve the subpoena.” Pa.R.C.P. 4009.22(a)(4). Thereafter, the “party seeking production may serve on the person named in the subpoena a copy of the subpoena only if it is identical to the subpoena attached to the notice of intent to serve.” Pa.R.C.P. 4009.22(a). Instantly, the party seeking production, PLS, fully complied with the requirements set forth in Rule 4009.21. On August 29, 2025, PLS served notice of its intent to serve subpoenas upon the opposing party in the action, Nelmapius. That notice included the subpoenas and attached thereto the list of documents sought set forth in Attachment A. Thereafter, on September 19, 2025, PLS filed a certificate prerequisite to service of a subpoena, in compliance with the requirements of Rule 4009.22. That certificate as well had a copy of the notice of intent to serve and a copy of the subpoenas themselves, which included Attachment A. On September 23, 2025, PLS served the third-party, ARL, with the subpoenas. However, those subpoenas inadvertently did not include the Attachment A. ARL filed its motion to quash - 19 - J-A16020-26 the subpoenas, citing the missing Attachment A, on September 30, 2025. It is undisputed that after being notified that the subpoenas did not include Attachment A, PLS promptly caused a copy of the subpoenas, along with Attachment A, to be served on ARL on or about October 1, 2025. Upon review of the certified record, we conclude that it is uncontested that PLS cured its initial error and served a copy of the subpoenas, along with Attachment A, on or about October 1, 2025. ARL has not claimed that these corrected subpoenas, which included the attachment, violated either Rule 4009.21 or 4009.22. Furthermore, ARL has not alleged that any prejudice resulted from PLS’s initial non-compliance. The record makes clear that PLS promptly corrected its error to substantially comply with the rules. Thus, we cannot say that the court erred in declining to quash the subpoenas on this ground. See Pa.R.C.P. 126(a) (stating that court at every stage of any such action or proceeding may disregard any error or defect of procedure which does not affect substantive rights of parties); Wormer v. Hilliker, 589 Pa. 256, 908 A.2d 269 (2006) (stating that, under substantial compliance, mere procedural misstep may be overlooked if defect does not prejudice rights of any party; for substantial compliance, party must make substantial attempt to conform to requirements of rules). Accordingly, we conclude ARL’s fifth issue merits no relief. Order affirmed. - 20 - J-A16020-26 DATE: 10/29/2026 - 21 -