Phoenix Fashion, Inc. v. Yakoub N. Saadia
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket24-3286
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
24-3286-cv
Phoenix Fashion, Inc. v. Yakoub N. Saadia, et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in
the City of New York, on the 17th day of November, two thousand twenty-six.
PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE,
DENNY CHIN,
MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN,
Circuit Judges.
_________________________________________________
PHOENIX FASHION, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 24-3286-cv
YAKOUB N. SAADIA, AKA YAKOUV SAADIA, AKA YAKAOUB
SAADIA, AKA YAKOUV SAABIA, AKA JACK SAADIA,
Defendant-Appellant,
SAADIA GROUP, LLC, NEW YORK & COMPANY STORES,
INC., FASHION TO FIGURE ECOMM LLC, LORD & TAYLOR
ECOMM LLC, NY AND CO ECOMM LLC, LETOTE ECOMM
LLC, AQUATALIA ECOMM LLC, FASHION TO FIGURE IP
LLC, RTW RETAILWINDS ACQUISITION LLC, LORD &
TAYLOR ACQUISITIONS LLC, LORD & TAYLOR IP
LLC, LETOTE IP LLC, AQUATALIA IP LLC, 501 JERSEY
AVENUE LLC, BROOK WAREHOUSING AND DISTRIBUTION
LLC, 1735 JERSEY AVENUE PROPERTY LLC, SAADIA
DISTRIBUTION LLC, STONY BATTERY RD PROPERTY
OWNER LLC, 1000 STONEY BATTERY ROAD LLC,
Defendants.
_________________________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: BRIAN D. GRAIFMAN, Borah, Goldstein,
Nahins & Goidel, P.C., New York, NY
(Betty J. Levine, Hallstrom, Klein &
Ward LLP, Irvine, California, on the
brief).
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: SAADIA SHAPIRO, Shapiro & Associates,
PLLC, New York, New York.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Liman, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the December 3, 2024, judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
Defendant-Appellant Yakoub N. Saadia ("Saadia") appeals from the
district court's default judgment entered against him in the amount of $5,293,539.98 in
favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Phoenix Fashion, Inc. ("Phoenix"). We assume the parties'
familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, which
we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
Phoenix sued Saadia and several related entities, claiming, inter alia, that
they breached a forbearance agreement and related guaranty by failing to pay for
2
purchased goods. Although the defendants were served, they did not timely answer
the complaint, and the Clerk of Court issued certificates of default against them. Upon
stipulation of the parties, the district court set aside the certificates of default and
ordered the defendants to file an answer. When the defendants failed to do so,
however, new certificates of default were issued. The district court later granted
defendants' motion to set aside this second set of certificates of default. Phoenix
subsequently amended its complaint to add more defendants. 1 After the defendants
were served with and failed to answer the amended complaint, Phoenix obtained
certificates of default and moved for a default judgment against all the defendants. This
was the third time some of the defendants, including Saadia, had defaulted in the
action.
Four of these defendants -- Saadia and three of the companies
(collectively, the "Moving Defendants") -- moved to set aside the certificates of default
pursuant to Rule 55(c). The district court held a conference and decided to vacate the
default against those four defendants on one condition: that they post a bond within
eleven days for an uncontested amount of $3,022,209.00. The Moving Defendants,
however, failed to post a bond or request an extension. Consequently, the district court
denied their motion to set aside the third default.
1 Saadia was the only individual defendant. Phoenix alleged that the other nineteen
defendants, all LLCs or corporations, were alter egos of Saadia.
3
The district court then turned to Phoenix's motion for a default judgment
against all defendants. Though the motion was unopposed, the district court permitted
the defendants to be heard at a conference before ruling. Defense counsel appeared, but
only on behalf of Saadia, and he did not contest damages or request an inquest. The
district court granted in part and denied in part Phoenix's motion for a default
judgment against all defendants, awarding Phoenix damages of $4,346.289.99 plus 9%
statutory prejudgment interest under New York law from the date of the defendants'
breaches. The costs Phoenix requested were denied without prejudice for lack of
documentation, but the district court later granted Phoenix's renewed motion for
attorneys' fees and costs of $188,494.93. Judgment was entered in the total amount of
$5,293,539.98. Only Saadia appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides a two-step procedure for an
entry of a default judgment against a party who fails to defend. First, when a defendant
"has failed to plead or otherwise defend," the clerk enters the party's default on the
docket. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a); see also City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645
F.3d 114, 128 (2d Cir. 2011) (entry of default formalizes that the defendant has admitted
liability to the plaintiff by failing to defend the action). Second, depending on the
circumstances, the clerk or the court will enter judgment in the appropriate amount of
4
damages. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); see also Mickalis, 645 F.3d at 128 (entry of a default
judgment terminates the litigation and awards the plaintiff appropriate relief).
"In an appeal from a default judgment, the court may review both the
interlocutory entry of default and the final judgment." Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10
F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1993). We review entries of defaults and default judgments for
abuse of discretion, as the district court "is in the best position to assess the individual
circumstances of a given case and to evaluate the credibility and good faith of the
parties." Id.
I. Discussion
A. Entry of Default
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Moving
Defendants' motion to vacate the entry of default. "[A] court may set aside an entry of
default for good cause." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). To determine whether a party has
established "good cause," courts weigh "(1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether
setting aside the default would prejudice the adversary; and (3) whether a meritorious
defense is presented." Enron Oil, 10 F.3d at 96.
The district court weighed these factors, as well as our preference for
resolving disputes on the merits. See id. at 95–96. Although the district court found the
Moving Defendants' default to have been negligent (not willful), it found that that
factor was outweighed by their failure to assert any meritorious defenses for the "vast
5
majority" of the damages sought, and by the risk of "undue prejudice" to Phoenix. The
Moving Defendants had demonstrated a pattern of delaying the action, during the
pendency of which another creditor obtained a preliminary injunction against them in
state court. The district court was reasonably concerned that further delay could cause
Phoenix to lose priority to other creditors or that Moving Defendants' assets could be
dissipated. Based on its weighing of these factors, the district court decided to
conditionally vacate the default upon the Moving Defendants' posting of a bond.
Given the circumstances of this case -- namely, the Moving Defendants'
prior delays and the risk that further delay would render Phoenix unable to collect on
an eventual judgment for the uncontested damages -- the district court did not abuse its
discretion by conditioning vacatur on the posting of a bond. See Powerserve Int'l, Inc. v.
Lavi, 239 F.3d 508, 515 (2d Cir. 2001) (district court may impose a reasonable condition
when vacating an entry of default to avoid undue prejudice to the opposing party).
The bond amount was also reasonable, considering it was only for
uncontested damages. Uncontested damages, which was $3,022,209.00, i.e.,
$1,324,080.99 (approximately 30%) less than Phoenix's claimed damages of
$4,346,289.99. And when the Moving Defendants failed to post the bond, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to vacate, as its concerns about
undue prejudice to Phoenix had not been ameliorated. See id.
6
B. Entry of Default Judgment
None of the defendants opposed Phoenix's motion for a default judgment
below. And though the district court still gave the defendants an opportunity to be
heard at a conference before ruling on the motion, Saadia failed to make the arguments
he now raises on appeal. Saadia's only response to the district court was that he
"[didn't] have the money for the bond." App'x at 1223. Accordingly, "we decline to
consider [his new arguments] in light of the well-established general rule that a court of
appeals will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal." Otal Invs. Ltd. v.
M/V CLARY, 673 F.3d 108, 120 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120-
21 (1976); Virgilio v. City of N.Y., 407 F.3d 105, 116 (2d Cir. 2005)). The district court did
not abuse its discretion in entering the default judgment against Saadia.
II. Referral to Grievance Panel
Finally, we must address a separate matter concerning the conduct of
Saadia's counsel, Attorney Shapiro. None of the cases cited in the standard of review
section of counsel's brief exist. On thirteen occasions, Saadia relied on the following
nonexistent cases: XYZ Corp. v. ABC Inc., 987 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2022); Doe v. Smith, 456
F.3d 789 (2d Cir. 2021); Smith v. Jones, 789 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 2021). Although Phoenix
raised this issue in its opposition brief, Saadia did not address or acknowledge it in his
reply brief. At oral argument, Saadia's counsel did not have an explanation for
including fabricated citations in his brief.
7
All attorneys appearing before this court are required to "read, and
thereby confirm the existence and validity of, the legal authorities on which they rely."
Park v. Kim, 91 F.4th 610, 615 (2d Cir. 2024). An attorney's "attempt to persuade a court
or oppose an adversary by relying on fake opinions is an abuse of the adversary
system." Id. (quoting Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)).
By citing nonexistent authority, it appears that Attorney Shapiro
presented false statements of law to this Court and failed to make the requisite inquiry
into the validity of his arguments. See Park, 91 F.4th at 615. We therefore REFER
Attorney Shapiro to the Court's Grievance Panel pursuant to Local Rule 46.2 for further
investigation, and for consideration of a referral to the Committee on Admissions and
Grievances. See 2d Cir. R. 46.2.
* * *
We have considered Saadia's remaining arguments and find them to be
without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
8