The Pennsylvania State University v. Teamsters Local Union No. 8
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket904 C.D. 2025
JudgeWallace
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
The Pennsylvania State University, :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 904 C.D. 2025
: Submitted: September 14, 2026
Teamsters Local Union No. 8 :
BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
HONORABLE STELLA M. TSAI, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: November 16, 2026
The Pennsylvania State University (Employer) appeals from the June 13, 2025
order of the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County (Common Pleas) that denied
Employer’s “Petition to Set Aside Arbitration Award (Award)” (Petition) issued by
Arbitrator Jared N. Kasher (the Arbitrator). At issue is Employer’s dispute with
Teamsters Local Union No. 8 (Union) over whether Employer violated the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) by terminating Justin Donnelly (Grievant) from
employment, following Employer’s issuance of three active warning letters to
Grievant, all relating to his failure to record work hours. On appeal, Employer
argues Common Pleas erred in refusing to vacate the Award because the Arbitrator
exceeded his authority under the CBA, and the Award is not rationally derived from
the CBA. After review, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
The facts, as found by the Arbitrator, are as follows and are not in dispute.1
Employer and Union are parties to a CBA, which governs the wages, hours and
working conditions of Employer’s regular technical service employees. Reproduced
Record (R.R.) at 2a. On August 30, 2023, Employer issued Grievant, a Union
member who worked for Employer as a videographer, a third active warning letter
for failing to record his work hours. Id. at 3a, 6a. Grievant received the first two
warning letters in July 2023 and August 2023 based upon his failure to record his
work hours. Id. at 4a. Pursuant to the CBA, which provides that “[a]n employee
with three (3) active warning letters will be discharged[,]” Employer terminated
Grievant’s employment on August 30, 2023, in tandem with the issuance of the third
warning letter. Id. at 4a, 6a; see also CBA § 6.2(c)2.
Thereafter, the Union filed a grievance alleging Employer did not have just
cause to issue a third active warning letter to Grievant. R.R. at 2a. When the parties
could not resolve the matter through the grievance procedure, they proceeded to
arbitration. Id.
In his Award, the Arbitrator concluded that although Employer had just cause
to issue the third active warning letter, Employer did not have just cause to terminate
Grievant’s employment. Id. at 12a (“Accordingly, this Arbitrator finds that while
1
An “arbitrator is authorized to make findings of fact to inform his interpretation of
the CBA.” Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Millcreek Twp. Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 210 A.3d 993,
1006 (Pa. 2019). “An arbitrator’s findings of fact are not reviewable on appeal, and as long as he
has arguably construed or applied the collective bargaining agreement, an appellate court may not
second-guess his findings of fact or interpretation.” Coatesville Area Sch. Dist. v. Coatesville Area
Tchrs.’ Ass’n/Pa. State Educ. Ass’n, 978 A.2d 413, 415 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).
2
Pertinently, this subsection also provides “[a] warning letter is active for a twelve (12) month
period following the date of issue.”
2
[Employer] had cause to issue the third active warning letter, imposing the industrial
death penalty for this oversight was overly harsh and not consistent with the tenets
of just cause.”). To reach this conclusion, the Arbitrator relied upon, among other
things, the Union’s following arguments:
The Union highlights that under past practice, employees who simply
neglected to submit hours were never disciplined. [The Union
President’s] unrebutted testimony indicates such lapses were routinely
corrected administratively.
The Union also cites . . . [a prior 2024 discharge grievance between the
parties] as support that a third warning letter does not equate to
automatic discharge. In that matter, [the arbitrator] found that the third
warning issued to the grievant was valid based on proven misconduct.
However, the [E]mployer’s decision to proceed directly to discharge
fell short of just cause because the [E]mployer had not complied with
the CBA’s requirement to obtain prior approvals before termination.
Although the defect in the [prior] grievance was procedural, the
decision also emphasizes a broader principle: An employer must show
that both substantive and procedural elements of just cause are
satisfied before imposing discharge on the basis of a third warning
letter. Thus, following [the arbitrator’s] rationale, just cause requires
assessing whether immediate discharge is warranted under all
circumstances. In other words, a final warning alone should not be
treated as an automatic trigger for termination; [Employer] must still
show that the nature of the misconduct or repeated violation is serious
enough to merit discharge, rather than simply relying on a “three
strikes” rule.
Id. at 11a-12a (emphasis in original).
Ultimately, the Arbitrator determined “[t]he abrupt escalation from
administrative correction to discharge for a missed time entry is at odds with prior
practice.” Id. at 12a. Accordingly, the Arbitrator reduced Grievant’s discharge to a
30-day unpaid suspension, and reinstated Grievant to his prior position with seniority
and made whole from the date of reinstatement, offset by any interim earnings. Id.
3
Thereafter, Employer filed its Petition with Common Pleas, arguing the
Arbitrator’s Award was not rationally derived from the CBA, and in turn, must be
set aside. Id. at 14a-25a. Common Pleas denied Employer’s Petition and affirmed
the Award. Id. at 368a-74a. Common Pleas summarized the parties’ arguments as
follows:
[Employer] argues that the Arbitrator read into the [CBA] a just cause
requirement for discharge that [Employer] argues does not [exist].
Instead, [Employer] argues that the Arbitrator, upon a finding that just
cause supported each warning letter, should then be bound by the plain
language of the [CBA] that provides that “an employee with three (3)
active warning letters will be discharged.” See CBA, § 6.2(c).
Conversely, the Union argues that Section 8.11 of the CBA[3] gives the
Arbitrator latitude to – “in a discharge case . . . if he finds that the
discharge was not proper” – impose a less severe penalty upon a finding
that the penalty originally imposed was too severe.
Id. at 373a (emphasis in original).
In rejecting Employer’s argument, Common Pleas opined it must uphold the
Arbitrator’s Award where it “draws its essence” from the CBA, explaining:
[T]he Arbitrator found that each of the three warning letters was
supported by just cause; accordingly, pursuant to Section 6.2(c) of the
CBA, an employee with three warning letters will be discharged;
however, pursuant to Section 8.11 of the CBA, the arbitrator has
authority to impose a less severe penalty “in a discharge case . . . if he
finds that the discharge was not proper.” Although this [c]ourt may
3
Section 8.11 provides:
In a discharge case, the arbitrator shall have the authority to sustain the discharge,
or if he finds that the discharge was not proper, he shall have the authority to order
reinstatement and compensation for time lost in whole or in part, or to find that the
penalty imposed upon the employee was too severe and award a less severe penalty.
R.R. at 119a.
4
have found differently if it was in the position of the [A]rbitrator, the
Award by [the Arbitrator] has a logical foundation in the CBA, which
plainly provides that an arbitrator may impose a less severe penalty in
a discharge case if the arbitrator finds that discharge was not proper.
Id. at 374a (emphasis in original). Common Pleas concluded “[t]he [c]ourt does not
find a logical inconsistency in the Arbitrator’s finding that each of the three
disciplines (warning letters) were supported by just cause, but that the discharge
resulting therefrom was not proper and should be adjusted pursuant to his powers
under Section 8.11.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Employer now appeals Common Pleas’ decision to this Court. On appeal,
Employer questions whether “Common Pleas err[ed] in refusing to vacate the Award
even though the Arbitrator exceeded his authority under the terms of the . . . [parties’
CBA] when he found that [Employer] did not have just cause to discharge [Grievant]
despite finding that [Employer] had just cause to issue a third warning letter and
there were no procedural deficiencies in the discharge?” Employer’s Br. at 3.
In response, the Union argues “[t]he CBA contains no exception to the just
cause requirement . . . for discharges resulting from an employee’s receipt of three
active warning letters, nor have the parties ever agreed upon any such exception.”
Union’s Br. at 2. Additionally, the Union contends Section 8.11, applicable “[i]n a
discharge case,” authorized the Arbitrator to reduce the discharge to a 30-day
suspension, and Section 8.11 “includes no exception to the arbitrator’s authority in
discharge cases resulting from three warning letters.” Id. at 2-3. Overall, the Union
maintains the Award is rationally derived from the parties’ CBA and was properly
affirmed by Common Pleas. Id. at 4.
DISCUSSION
It is well settled that our role in reviewing an arbitrator’s interpretation of the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement is one of deference. State Sys. of Higher
5
Educ. (Cheyney Univ.) v. State Coll. Univ. Pro. Ass’n (PSEA-NEA), 743 A.2d 405,
413 (Pa. 1999). Our standard of review of labor arbitration awards under the Public
Employe Relations Act (PERA)4 is the “essence test.” Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist. v.
Cent. Dauphin Educ. Ass’n, 767 A.2d 16, 18-19 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). In Cheyney
University, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained:
Pursuant to the essence test as stated today, a reviewing court will
conduct a two-prong analysis. First, the court shall determine if the
issue as properly defined is within the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. Second, if the issue is embraced by the agreement, and thus,
appropriately before the arbitrator, the arbitrator’s award will be upheld
if the arbitrator’s interpretation can rationally be derived from the
collective bargaining agreement. That is to say, a court will only vacate
an arbitrator’s award where the award indisputably and genuinely is
without foundation in, or fails to logically flow from, the collective
bargaining agreement.
743 A.2d at 413. It is not for this Court to apply its own interpretation of a collective
bargaining agreement because a reviewing court’s differing interpretation is
“insufficient justification for vacating an award.” Id. at 411. Moreover, in these
cases, we do not inquire into whether an arbitrator’s decision is reasonable or even
manifestly unreasonable. Id. at 412-13. Instead, the question we address is whether
the award may in any way be rationally derived from the agreement between the
parties. Id. at 413.
In interpreting a collective bargaining agreement, it is the arbitrator who must
determine the factual question of the parties’ intent. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist. v.
Williamsport Educ. Ass’n, 686 A.2d 885, 887 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). “[A] claim that
the arbitrator has incorrectly interpreted such intent is not cognizable on appeal . . .
[so] long as the arbitrator’s conclusion can reasonably be drawn from the
4
Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101–1101.2301.
6
evidence[.]” Id. (citation omitted). In Danville Area School District v. Danville
Area Education Association, PSEA/NEA, the Supreme Court explained:
As to this question, when discerning the intent of the parties, the
arbitrator is not confined to the express terms of the collective
bargaining agreement. Our court has stated that an arbitrator’s award
may draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement if the
arbitrator’s “interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the
agreement, viewed in light of its language, its context, and any other
indicia of the parties’ intention.” [Cheyney Univ.], 743 A.2d at 411,
citing, Community College of Beaver County, 375 A.2d at 1275
(citations omitted).
754 A.2d 1255, 1260 (Pa. 2000).
Additionally, an arbitrator may use evidence of past practice to discover the
parties’ intent in the following instances:
(1) to clarify ambiguous language; (2) to implement contract
language which sets forth only a general rule; (3) to modify or amend
apparently unambiguous language which has arguably been waived by
the parties; and (4) to create or prove a separate, enforceable condition
of employment which cannot be derived from the express language of
the agreement.
Dep’t of Corr. v. Pa. State Corr. Officers Ass’n, 38 A.3d 975, 981 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2011) (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. Allegheny Cnty. Prison Emp. Indep. Union, 381
A.2d 849, 852 (Pa. 1977)).
As correctly observed by Common Pleas, the first prong of the essence test,
specifically, whether the issue is “within the terms of the CBA,” is undisputed in this
matter. R.R. at 370a. Rather, the parties disagree regarding the second prong,
namely, whether the Award “can be rationally derived from the CBA.” Employer
emphasizes the negotiated language of Section 6.2(c) of the CBA, which provides,
“[a]n employee with three (3) active warnings will be discharged.” Employer’s Br.
7
at 9-10. Employer argues Common Pleas vitiated this language, “in contravention
of well established principles of contract interpretation,” by “[i]nterpreting [Section]
8.11 as empowering an arbitrator to reverse a discharge decision despite finding just
cause to issue a third warning letter[.]” Id. at 10. Employer contends “[h]ad the
parties intended to require just cause to discharge upon a third active warning letter,
they would have done so explicitly.” Id. at 15.
In response, the Union asserts Employer “offers no new arguments to this
Honorable Court that have not already been considered [by the Arbitrator and
Common Pleas], and correctly, denied.” Union’s Br. at 16. The Union emphasizes
even a grievant receiving three warning letters is entitled to the grievance procedure
outlined in Article 8 of the CBA, which includes Section 8.11. Id. at 12 (citing CBA,
§ 8.1, “all disputes concerning the operation or interpretation of [the CBA] shall be
settled in accordance with the grievance procedure.”) (emphasis added in Br.). The
Union specifically counters, “[i]ronically, though, [Employer’s] position, if
accepted, would indeed render Section 8.11 entirely inapplicable in all matters
involving third active warning letter discharges. As such, [Employer’s] argument,
if accepted, would result in the very outcome it falsely claims has resulted from [the
Arbitrator’s] Award.” Id. at 16.
Here, as Common Pleas rightly pointed out in its Opinion, the Award “‘draws
its essence’ from the CBA.” R.R. at 374a. Common Pleas reached this conclusion
based upon the Arbitrator’s finding that Grievant received three warning letters, each
supported by just cause, which necessitated discharge under Section 6.2(c);
however, Section 8.11 empowered the Arbitrator, in a discharge case, to impose a
less severe penalty “if he finds that the discharge was not proper.” Id. Thus, because
8
the Arbitrator’s decision rationally drew its essence from the CBA, we conclude
Common Pleas did not err in this regard. Cheyney Univ., 743 A.2d at 412.
Although Employer now argues this holding nullifies the “three-strikes”
language of Section 6.2, we agree with the Union that the adoption of Employer’s
analysis would likewise invalidate an arbitrator’s discretion to impose lesser
sanctions in discharge cases under Section 8.11. Additionally, as the Union
contends, Employer’s “three-strikes” analysis disregards that recipients of three
written warnings may still file a grievance under Article 8 of the CBA. As part of
the grievance process, nothing within Section 8.11 expressly limits an arbitrator
from imposing lesser sanctions in discharges resulting from a third active warning
letter. Thus, Employer’s argument is without merit.
Finally, Employer criticizes the Arbitrator’s consideration of the prior 2024
discharge grievance because in that case, unlike here, Employer had not procedurally
complied with the CBA’s requirement to obtain administrative approvals prior to
termination. Employer’s Br. at 13 n.2. Thus, Employer faults the Arbitrator’s
consideration of past practice evidence based upon a factual distinction, rather than
any legal error. However, as previously discussed, the Arbitrator ultimately based
his decision on the language of the CBA, particularly the requirements for just cause.
Subsequently, the Arbitrator noted “[t]he abrupt escalation from administrative
correction to discharge for a missed time entry is at odds with prior practice.” R.R.
at 36a. Any discussion of past practice simply confirmed his construction of the
CBA, and the Arbitrator acknowledged the procedural nuance. Moreover, Employer
does not dispute that the law allows an arbitrator to consider past practice evidence
to determine the parties’ intent. See Dep’t of Corr., 38 A.3d at 981. Thus,
9
Employer’s argument that the Arbitrator impermissibly considered the past practice
evidence must fail.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Common Pleas did not err when it declined to vacate the
Arbitrator’s Award and affirmed the Arbitrator’s decision that the Award is
rationally derived from the parties’ CBA. Given our deferential standard of review,
we affirm Common Pleas’ decision affirming the Award.
______________________________
STACY WALLACE, Judge
10
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
The Pennsylvania State University, :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 904 C.D. 2025
:
Teamsters Local Union No. 8 :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 16th day of November 2026, the June 13, 2025 order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Centre County is AFFIRMED.
______________________________
STACY WALLACE, Judge