Full Opinion

****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Con- necticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be repro- duced and distributed without the express written per- mission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** A. GALLO AND COMPANY ET AL. v. COMMISSIONER OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ET AL. (SC 18764) Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh and Vertefeuille, Js. Argued January 2—officially released August 20, 2013 Michael K. Skold, assistant attorney general, with whom were Robert W. Clark, special counsel, and, on the brief, George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appel- lants (defendants). James K. Robertson, Jr., with whom, on the brief, were David S. Hardy and Sherwin M. Yoder, for the appellees (named plaintiff et al.). Patricia A. Millett, pro hac vice, with whom was Garrett S. Flynn, for the appellees (plaintiff Adirondack Beverages Corporation et al.). R. Bradley Morris filed a brief for the New England Legal Foundation as amicus curiae. Opinion ZARELLA, J. The original plaintiffs,1 twelve beer and soft drink distributors doing business in Connecticut, brought this action against the named defendant, the Commissioner of Environmental Protection (commis- sioner),2 seeking a declaratory judgment and damages for the alleged, retroactive taking of their property under certain provisions of Public Acts 2009, No. 09-1, § 15 (P.A. 09-1), in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution, and arti- cle first, § 11, of the constitution of Connecticut. The property in question consists of unclaimed beverage container deposits (unclaimed deposits), the disposi- tion of which was considered by the state legislature in 2008, and again in 2009, when Connecticut was facing a significant budget deficit. State legislation signed into law on January 15, 2009, and made applicable for a period of four months prior to its effective date,3 pro- vided that all unclaimed deposits accruing during the designated four month period, which previously had been retained by the plaintiffs, henceforth must be paid to the state. See P.A. 09-1, § 15, codified at General Statutes (Supp. 2010) § 22a-245a (d). The plaintiffs do not challenge the state’s right to the unclaimed deposits from the effective date onward. Instead, they claim that application of the provision to the four month period prior to that date was an unconstitutional taking because they had a vested property interest in the unclaimed deposits. The commissioner responds that the legislation did not effect an unconstitutional taking because they did not have a vested property interest in the unclaimed deposits. The commissioner now appeals from the judgment of the trial court awarding damages and attorney’s fees to the original plaintiffs and damages to the intervening plaintiffs following the trial court’s granting of the original plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and denial of the commissioner’s motion for summary judgment. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. The parties stipulated to the following facts,4 which the trial court set forth in its memorandum of decision. ‘‘[The] [c]ommissioner . . . and the [Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)] are charged with administering and enforcing . . . General Statutes § 22a-243 et seq., as amended by [Public Acts, Spec. Sess., November, 2008, No. 08-1 (Spec. Sess. P.A. 08- 1), and P.A. 09-1], and [the commissioner] is responsible for depositing the payment appropriated thereby in the state’s general fund. *** ‘‘[Public Acts 1978, No. 78-16], effective January 1, 1980, codified [at] . . . § 22a-243 et seq., is commonly known as the ‘bottle bill.’ In an effort to reduce litter and solid waste levels, the bottle bill established a system of beverage container recycling to be administered, in part, by Connecticut’s beer and soft drink distributors such as the plaintiffs. The bottle bill required the plain- tiffs to pay a five cent refund value upon the return of empty beer or soft drink containers of the kind, size and brand sold by the distributor. ‘‘Under the provisions of the bottle bill and Connecti- cut’s long-standing and highly regulated three tier alco- holic beverage distribution system (distributor— retailer—consumer), the basic mechanics of the return and refund process function as follows: ‘‘a. Beverage distributors such as the plaintiff[s] ‘initi- ate,’ or charge and collect, a five cent refund value on each container sold to a retailer; ‘‘b. Retailers pay the five cent refund value on each container purchased from the distributor, and, in turn, charge and collect a five cent refund value from the end-purchaser/consumer of the beverage; ‘‘c. If a consumer returns the empty container to the retailer (or a redemption center), the retailer (or redemption center) is required to pay the consumer a refund of five cents; and ‘‘d. The retailer (or redemption center), in turn, will return the empty container to the distributor of the product, who must reimburse the retailer (or redemp- tion center) five cents. ‘‘The plaintiffs also incur costs and expense adminis- tering portions of the bottle bill, including: ‘‘a. Paying a one and [one]-half cent statutory han- dling fee to the retailer (or redemption center) for each empty beer container returned. In the case of soft drinks, the statutory handling fee for the return of empty containers is two cents; ‘‘b. Transporting empty containers from the retailer back to the distributor; ‘‘c. Providing dedicated space for processing returns; ‘‘d. Making arrangements for the processing and recycling of the empty containers; and ‘‘e. Incurring the costs of labor, overhead and insur- ance necessary to perform these functions and to com- ply with the mandates of the bottle bill. ‘‘After paying the refund value and the handling fee, the distributors own the returned containers, which are recyclable materials, and may dispose of them as they choose. Distributors may sell returns to third parties. The costs of performing the tasks described in the pre- ceding paragraph are born[e] by . . . Connecticut bev- erage distributors like the plaintiffs. ‘‘Under the bottle bill, distributors do not hold refund values in a manner that makes them identifiable to a specific container or a specific consumer. The plaintiffs have a statutory obligation to pay retailers five cents when presented with an empty container of the kind, size and brand sold by the plaintiffs, regardless of when the container was actually sold to a retailer or con- sumer. The bottle bill does not refer to the amounts paid by a distributor to retailers upon the return of an empty container of the kind, size and brand sold by the distributor as a ‘deposit.’ Instead, the bottle bill defines such payments as ‘refund values.’ ‘‘On November 25, 2008, the legislature passed [the 2008 act], entitled ‘An Act Concerning Deficit Mitiga- tion.’ [The 2008 act] . . . required each of the plaintiff distributors to ‘open a special interest-bearing account at a Connecticut branch of a financial institution, as defined in [§] 45a-557a of the General Statutes, to the credit of the deposit initiator.’ . . . [The act] further provided that ‘[e]ach deposit initiator shall deposit in such account an amount equal to the refund values established pursuant to subsection (a) of [§] 22a-244 of the General Statutes, for each beverage container sold by such deposit initiator.’ . . . ‘[F]or any beverage con- tainer sold during the period from December 1, 2008, to December 31, 2008, inclusive, such deposit shall be made not later than January 5, 2009.’ . . . All interest, dividends and returns earned on the special account were required to be paid into such account, and such moneys were required to ‘be kept separate and apart from all other moneys in the possession [of] the deposit initiator.’ . . . Lastly, [the 2008 act] provided that ‘[a]ny reimbursement of the refund value for a redeemed beverage container shall be paid [from] the deposit initiator’s special account.’ . . . ‘‘One of the purposes of [the 2008 act] was to provide the state and [the] DEP with information concerning the container return rate and the amount of money representing the difference between refund values deposited and paid. The DEP published a document on its website entitled ‘Bottle Bill FAQ.’ On January 5, 2009, [the] DEP edited the webpage by changing the name of the person at [the] DEP to whom public inquiries could be made about the subject matter of the webpage. The updated information provided in pertinent part: ‘‘ ‘Who gets the money from bottles that are not returned? ‘‘ ‘Called unclaimed deposits, these moneys accumu- late from containers that are either thrown away or recycled through curbside programs. These fund[s] are kept by the distributors.’ ‘‘Beginning on December 1, 2008, the plaintiffs began opening and funding accounts in accordance with the terms of [the 2008 act]. On or before March 15, 2009, the plaintiffs were required to submit reports on their account activity for the period December 1, 2008, through February 28, 2009, to the DEP in accordance with [the 2008 act]. ‘‘On January 15, 2009, the legislature passed, and the governor signed [the 2009 act], entitled ‘An Act Con- cerning Deficit Mitigation for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 2009.’ . . . [Section 15 of the 2009 act] . . . [was] ‘[e]ffective April 1, 2009, and applicable to periods commencing on or after December 1, 2008.’ [The act] require[d] the plaintiffs to pay to the DEP (for deposit in the state’s general fund), not later than April 30, 2009, the balances in the plaintiffs’ special accounts that [were] attributable to [the] period December 1, 2008, through March 31, 2009, and further require[d] additional quarterly payments from the special accounts on an ongoing basis. ‘‘In accordance with [the 2009 act], [twenty-four] dis- tributors submitted financial reports to [the] DEP for the period December 1, 2008, to February 28, 2009. Of the [twenty-four] companies that submitted financial reports for the period December 1, 2008, to February 28, 2009, [thirteen] provided information about the stat- utory ‘handling fees’ they incurred for that period. ‘‘The bottle bill does not require the plaintiffs to charge retailers a five cent refund value at the time of sale and neither expressly prohibits nor permits the plaintiffs to specifically itemize the five cent refund value on their invoices, and some distributors, including some of the plaintiffs, choose to incorporate this amount into the purchase price of beverages they sell to retailers without itemizing it. The bottle bill neither expressly prohibits nor permits the distributors from including the five cent refund value in the general reve- nues that they calculate on their financial statements. The plaintiffs have included said refund value amounts in their general revenues for accounting purposes. ‘‘The bottle bill neither expressly prohibits nor per- mits distributors from including the refund values they collect as revenues for purposes of calculating their income taxes. Nor does the bottle bill expressly prohibit or permit distributors [to deduct] redemption amounts they pay as expenses when calculating their income taxes. Under [the 2008 act], sums deposited in the spe- cial accounts are determined by a formula, i.e., number of containers sold [multiplied by five] cents. ‘‘Through March 31, 2009, the plaintiffs maintained in their names special, interest-bearing accounts at Con- necticut branches of financial institutions, as defined in [§] 45a-577, to the credit of the plaintiffs, and maintained transactional authority over the accounts. Pursuant to . . . [to the 2008 act], moneys deposited into the special accounts ‘shall be kept separate and apart from all other moneys in the possession of the deposit initiator’ and ‘[a]ny reimbursement of the refund value for a redeemed beverage container shall be paid from the deposit initiator’s special account.’ The bottle bill never dictated to the plaintiffs what amounts they may charge for their products.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) On April 16, 2009, the original plaintiffs brought an action in the trial court for declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking to prohibit the commissioner from enforcing the ‘‘retroactive’’ taking of the unclaimed deposits attributable to the period from December 1, 2008, through March 31, 2009. Following the trial court’s denial on May 5, 2009, of their motion for a temporary injunction, the original plaintiffs paid the unclaimed deposits, with accrued interest, to the state. The total amount of the payments was $2,058,651.67. Thereafter, on May 21, 2009, the original plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment in which they sought a declaration that the retroactive payment requirement of the 2009 act, and the commissioner’s enforcement thereof, was an unconstitutional taking of their property for which the state was required to pay just compensation. They also sought a return of the amounts they had paid to the state. On July 17, 2009, the commissioner filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs could not show that they had a vested property interest in the unclaimed deposits. In a memorandum of decision dated April 23, 2010, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The court concluded that the unclaimed deposits were the prop- erty of the plaintiffs, that their property interest in the unclaimed deposits was not affected by the passage of the 2008 act, that the 2009 act extinguished the plaintiffs’ right to the unclaimed deposits accruing after April 1, 2009, the effective date of § 15 of the 2009 act, and that the 2009 act’s ‘‘retroactive’’ provision requiring the plaintiffs to pay to the state any unclaimed deposits and accrued interest from December 1, 2008, through March 31, 2009, was a taking of their property without just compensation in violation of the federal and state constitutions. The trial court subsequently granted a motion to inter- vene filed by six additional beverage distributors doing business in Connecticut.5 After a hearing in damages, the court awarded the plaintiffs compensatory damages in the amount of $5,675,310.44, plus interest. It also awarded attorney’s fees to the original plaintiffs in the amount of $120,429.37. The commissioner appealed from the trial court’s judgment to the Appellate Court, and the original plaintiffs cross appealed. They later withdrew their cross appeal, and the commissioner’s appeal was transferred to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (b) and Practice Book § 65-4. On appeal, the commissioner contends that the trial court improperly determined that the retroactive provision of the 2009 act resulted in an unconstitutional taking of the plaintiffs’ property. It is well established that ‘‘[s]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . The scope of our appellate review depends upon the proper characterization of the rulings made by the trial court. . . . When . . . the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ugrin v. Cheshire, 307 Conn. 364, 389, 54 A.3d 532 (2012). We also exercise plenary review over claims that require the interpretation of a statute, as in the present case. See, e.g., Republican Party of Connecticut v. Merrill, 307 Conn. 470, 488, 55 A.3d 251 (2012). ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objec- tive is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpre- tive guidance to the legislative history and circum- stances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relation- ship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter . . . .’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 488–49. With respect to a statutory challenge on constitu- tional grounds, ‘‘[a] validly enacted statute carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality, [and] those who challenge its constitutionality must sustain the heavy burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . The court will indulge in every presumption in favor of the statute’s constitution- ality . . . . Therefore, [w]hen a question of constitu- tionality is raised, courts must approach it with caution, examine it with care, and sustain the legislation unless its invalidity is clear.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Pham v. Starkowski, 300 Conn. 412, 429–30, 16 A.3d 635 (2011). In other words, ‘‘we will search for an effective and constitutional construction that reason- ably accords with the legislature’s underlying intent.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bozrah v. Chmury- nski, 303 Conn. 676, 685 n.5, 36 A.3d 210 (2012). The constitutional provisions at issue in the present case are the fifth amendment to the United States con- stitution and article first, § 11, of the Connecticut consti- tution. The fifth amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part: ‘‘[P]rivate prop- erty [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.’’6 Article first, § 11, of the constitution of Connecticut provides: ‘‘The property of no person shall be taken for public use, without just compensa- tion therefor.’’ The commissioner claims that the takings clause does not apply in the present case because the plaintiffs did not have a vested property interest in the unclaimed deposits attributable to the period from December 1, 2008, through March 31, 2009. The commissioner con- tends that, as a result of the 2008 act, the plaintiffs were required to deposit the refund values, together with all interest, dividends and returns earned thereon, in special, segregated bank accounts beginning on Decem- ber 1, 2008, and that nothing in the 2008 act permitted the plaintiffs to withdraw the funds that were deposited in those accounts during, or at the end of, the reporting period for any purpose other than reimbursing retailers for the redeemed containers. Thus, the plaintiffs had no right to use or enjoy the funds deposited in the special accounts at any time in the future. According to the commissioner, the most the plaintiffs could possibly claim was a future, contingent interest in potential sur- pluses in the accounts, which, in turn, depended on the enactment of further legislation permitting them to withdraw the surplus funds and on their availability at the close of the reporting period. The plaintiffs respond that, although refund values were separately itemized at purchase, ‘‘all revenues gen- erated from the sale of beverages [were] the property of the plaintiffs, subject to the plaintiffs’ statutory obli- gation to pay refund values when presented with the empty containers.’’ They further argue that the regula- tory scheme has never required distributors and retail- ers to charge and collect deposits identifiable to a specific container or to a specific consumer and has never required distributors to charge deposits and hold them in trust for consumers, subject to redemption. Rather, for more than thirty years, distributors ‘‘comin- gled ‘refund values’ with their operating funds and treated container ‘deposits’ as income and container ‘refunds’ as expenses for both accounting and tax pur- poses.’’ The plaintiffs add that their new obligations under the 2008 act to deposit a specified portion of their revenue into the special accounts did not abrogate their property rights in that revenue because they were permitted to use the funds in the special accounts to pay the operating expenses associated with refunding the deposits. They also argue that they were responsible for the payment of taxes on the revenue deposited in the special accounts and accrued interest,7 and that there was no legislative direction concerning disposi- tion of the unclaimed deposits. Thus, the refund values were merely a component of the purchase price subject to the distributors’ statutory obligation to reimburse the retailers when the empty containers were returned. We agree with the commissioner. We begin by recognizing that ‘‘[m]oney is certainly property . . . .’’ Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U.S. 438, 443, 21 S. Ct. 906, 45 L. Ed. 1171 (1901). In order to state a claim under the takings clause, however, a plaintiff first must establish that he or she possesses a constitutionally protected interest in the disputed property. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000–1001, 104 S. Ct. 2862, 81 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1984); see also 184 Windsor Avenue, LLC v. State, 274 Conn. 302, 319, 875 A.2d 498 (2005) (‘‘[i]t is axiomatic that government action cannot constitute a taking when the aggrieved party does not have a property right in the affected property’’). Moreover, a party claiming a protected property right must have a ‘‘clear entitlement’’ to the property. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carr v. Bridgewater, 224 Conn. 44, 51, 616 A.2d 257 (1992). ‘‘Because the [c]onstitution protects rather than creates property interests, the existence of a property interest is determined by reference to existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156, 164, 118 S. Ct. 1925, 141 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1998); see also Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972) (‘‘Property interests, of course, are not created by the [c]onstitu- tion. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.’’); New England Estates, LLC v. Branford, 294 Conn. 817, 834– 35, 988 A.2d 229 (2010) (‘‘we look to the laws of our state to determine whether [the alleged] right . . . was a protected property interest under the takings clause’’). As a consequence, ‘‘[w]hether one’s interest or entitle- ment rises to the level of a protected property right depends upon the extent to which one has been made secure by [s]tate or [f]ederal law in its enjoyment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 184 Windsor Ave- nue, LLC v. State, supra, 319. For a property right to be considered vested, in contrast to one that is expec- tant or contingent, it must function as a present interest. See, e.g., Bryant v. Hackett, 118 Conn. 233, 241, 171 A.2d 664 (1934). We first consider whether the plaintiffs have estab- lished that they have a protected property interest in the refund values deposited in the special accounts following passage of the 2008 act, which made signifi- cant changes in the regulatory scheme beginning on December 1, 2008. The plaintiffs concede that the bottle bill law, in its original form and as amended by the 2008 act, did not grant them a property interest in the unclaimed deposits. We agree. Accordingly, insofar as ‘‘the existence of a property interest is determined by reference to existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law’’; (inter- nal quotation marks omitted) Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, supra, 524 U.S. 164; it is undisputed that none of the provisions in the regulatory scheme expressly supports the plaintiffs’ assertion that they have a property interest in the unclaimed deposits. We thus consider certain provisions of the regulatory scheme pertaining to the refund values, the amend- ments to the regulatory scheme enacted by the legisla- ture in 2008, and the legislative history of the 2008 and 2009 acts to determine whether they provide implicit support for the plaintiffs’ claim that the refund values are nothing more than a component of the purchase price in which they have a vested property interest. With respect to the provisions concerning refund val- ues, § 22a-244 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) (1) Every beverage container containing a carbonated beverage sold or offered for sale in this state, [with certain excep- tions], shall have a refund value. Such refund value shall not be less than five cents and shall be a uniform amount throughout the distribution process in this state. (2) Every beverage container containing a noncar- bonated beverage sold or offered for sale in this state shall have a refund value, [with certain exceptions] . . . . Such refund value shall not be less than five cents and shall be a uniform amount throughout the distribution process in this state. . . .’’ Section 22a-244 (b) further provides in relevant part: ‘‘Every beverage container sold or offered for sale in this state, that has a refund value . . . shall clearly indicate by embossing or by a stamp or by a label or other method securely affixed to the beverage container (1) either the refund value of the container or the words ‘return for deposit’ or ‘return for refund’ or other words as approved by the [state] . . . .’’ There is nothing in these provisions suggesting that the distributors have a property interest in the refund values attached to the beverage containers covered by the regulatory scheme. Rather, use of the terms ‘‘refund,’’ ‘‘return for deposit,’’ and ‘‘return for refund’’ in the foregoing provisions indicates that the refund values are to be paid to consumers upon return of the empty containers. With respect to the 2008 act, regardless of the status of the refund values before passage of the act, which we are not asked to determine, it is undisputed that the act established strict controls over management of the funds charged and collected by the distributors pursuant to the regulatory scheme. Although the act, which was signed into law by the governor on Novem- ber 25, 2008, did not contain a provision directing the state to collect the unclaimed deposits, it contained a provision requiring each ‘‘deposit initiator,’’ which it defined as ‘‘the first distributor to collect the deposit on a beverage container sold to any person within this state’’;8 Spec. Sess. P.A. 08-1, § 10; to (1) ‘‘open a special interest-bearing account at a Connecticut branch of a financial institution . . . to the credit of the deposit initiator,’’ (2) ‘‘deposit into such account an amount equal to the refund value established pursuant to sub- section (a) of [§] 22a-244 . . . for each beverage con- tainer sold by such deposit initiator,’’ (3) pay directly into such account ‘‘[a]ll interest, dividends and returns earned on the special account,’’ (4) keep moneys in the special account ‘‘separate and apart from all other moneys in the possession of the deposit initiator,’’ and (5) pay ‘‘[a]ny reimbursement of the refund value for a redeemed beverage container’’ as well as ‘‘all service charges and overdraft charges on the account . . . .’’ Spec. Sess. P.A. 08-1, § 11, codified at General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 22a-245 (a) through (c). In addition, the 2008 act required that any reimbursement by the deposit initiator must be paid to the retailer in the manner prescribed by the policies and procedures adopted by the commissioner in establishing an accounting system for that purpose, and that each deposit initiator must submit detailed reports to the commissioner on a quarterly basis describing activity in the special account during the reporting period, including the balance in the account at the beginning and the close of the quarter for which the report was prepared.9 Spec. Sess. P.A. 08-1, codified at General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 22a-245a (b) and (c). The 2008 act further provided that the state treasurer could exam- ine the accounts and records maintained by the deposit initiator pursuant to the act at any time, and that the attorney general could institute an action or proceeding to enforce any requirement of the act or corresponding regulation adopted to implement its provisions. Spec. Sess. P.A. 08-1, codified at General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 22a-245a (d) and (e). As previously stated, the 2008 act contained no provision allowing distributors to withdraw funds from the special accounts for any purpose other than to reimburse retailers for the redeemed beverage containers in an amount equal to the refund value and to pay service and overdraft charges on the special accounts. Accordingly, there is no suggestion in the 2008 act that the funds placed in the special accounts were merely a component of the purchase price in which the distributors had a vested property interest. The 2008 act specifically refers to the funds as ‘‘deposit[s]’’ collected on the beverage contain- ers, which, in the absence of a provision pertaining to the disposition of the unclaimed deposits at the end of a reporting period, remained available to reimburse retailers should the empty containers be returned. See Bryant v. Hackett, supra, 118 Conn. 241 (property inter- est is vested interest if it functions as present interest). Moreover, insofar as the statutory scheme may be deemed ambiguous because of its silence on the ques- tion of ownership, there is no implied support in the legislative history of the 2008 and 2009 acts for the plaintiffs’ claim that they had a vested property interest in the unclaimed deposits. Instead, there is support for the opposite conclusion. The legislature enacted the bottle bill amendments in response to a plan put for- ward by Governor M. Jodi Rell on October 21, 2008. See 51 H.R. Proc., Pt. 23, November 24, 2008 Spec. Sess., pp. 7411–12, remarks of Representative Denise Merrill; M. Rell, Deficit Mitigation Plan for Fiscal Year 2008– 2009 (October 21, 2008) pp. 2–16; see also House Bill No. 7601, November 24, 2008 Spec. Sess. In her plan, Governor Rell proposed modifications and revenue adjustments to the state budget for the fiscal year 2008– 2009 in order to address the anticipated general fund budget deficit for that year. See M. Rell, supra, pp. 7–16. One of the revenue initiatives in Governor Rell’s plan that required legislative approval was the collection of unclaimed deposits beginning on December 1, 2008, which were expected to yield $13.8 million in fiscal year 2008–2009 and $24.4 million in fiscal year 2009–2010. Id., p. 7; see also 51 H.R. Proc., supra, pp. 7412, 7417, remarks of Representatives Merrill and Cameron C. Sta- ples. As Representative Staples explained during a spe- cial session of the General Assembly that was convened on November 24, 2008, to consider Governor Rell’s plan, one of the difficulties in determining whether the unclaimed deposits should be collected by the state was that there was no way of measuring how much revenue the unclaimed deposits would yield. 51 H.R. Proc., supra, p. 7417. Representative Staples observed that estimates prepared by the Office of Fiscal Analysis were merely guesses based on out-of-state receipts, there having been no registered records in Connecticut of the uncollected deposits. Id. Accordingly, the 2008 act established a reporting system to obtain such infor- mation, which would be available to the legislature by March 15, 2009, in time to evaluate for the 2009 legisla- tive session how much revenue was being collected by the distributors and ‘‘whether or not [the state] ought to recapture some or all of the revenue on an ongoing basis.’’ Id., pp. 7417–18, remarks of Representative Staples. Although the legislature did not enact a provision in 2008 allowing the state to collect the unclaimed depos- its, the legislative history of the 2008 act strongly sup- ports the view that the legislature did not consider such deposits to be the property of the distributors and thus unavailable for collection by the state. Various members of the Senate repeatedly referred to the unclaimed deposits as ‘‘escheats.’’ 51 S. Proc., Pt. 20, November 24, 2008 Spec. Sess., pp. 6214, 6218, 6221–22, 6228, 6235. The term ‘‘escheat’’ is defined as ‘‘the preferable right of the state to an estate left vacant, and without there being any one in existence able to make claim thereto.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990); see also The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th Ed. 2011) (defining ‘‘escheat’’ as ‘‘[r]eversion of property to the state in the absence of legal heirs or claimants’’). The term thus describes property to which no other person or entity has any legal claim. See, e.g., Pavlick v. Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 141 Conn. 471, 482, 107 A.2d 262 (1954) (‘‘[i]t is fundamental that escheat to the state operates only when there is no person who can take title’’). Although we are not required to decide whether the unclaimed deposits are escheats, it is nonetheless clear that the legislature, by characterizing such deposits as escheats, viewed them as property abandoned by the unidentified consumers, or, at the very least, as property that did not belong to the distributors. Indeed, the concept of escheats, which requires that no claim has been made to the property in question, could not have been intended to describe the unclaimed deposits as property abandoned by the distributors because the distributors who placed the funds in the special accounts asserted their right to the unclaimed deposits and were therefore identifiable. The legislature thus put the public on notice that it did not recognize a property interest in the distributors to the unclaimed deposits, that the state most likely would collect such deposits in the very near future, and that the only reason it was not ready to do so at that time was because it did not know exactly how much revenue the unclaimed deposits would generate. This under- standing was expressed again when the legislature reconsidered disposition of the unclaimed deposits sev- eral weeks later in the legislative session that com- menced in January, 2009. Having failed to close the budget gap in the November 24, 2008 special session and feeling the weight of the continuing budget crisis, the legislature revisited the issue of whether the state should collect the unclaimed deposits on January 14, 2009, and passed a bill on that date10 requiring distributors to pay to the state the out- standing balance in the special accounts attributable to the period from December 1, 2008, to March 31, 2009, and thereafter. See House Bill No. 5095, 2009 Sess. The effective date of § 15 of the 2009 act was April 1, 2009. The provision was identical to a proposed amendment to the 2008 act that had been rejected by the Senate; see House Bill No. 7601, Senate Amendment A, Novem- ber 24, 2008 Spec. Sess.; 51 S. Proc., supra, pp. 6215–39; and members of the legislature continued to refer to the unclaimed deposits as escheats. 52 H.R. Proc., Pt. 2, 2009 Sess., p. 322, remarks of Representative Staples (referring specifically to ‘‘the bottle deposit amounts’’ as ‘‘escheats’’); see also 52 S. Proc., Pt. 2, 2009 Sess., p. 426; 52 H.R. Proc., supra, pp. 320–21. Similarly, in discussing whether the state should collect all or only a part of the unclaimed deposits, Representative Staples stated that it was the legislature’s intent to make ‘‘sure that we’re keeping whatever revenue is rightfully ours and paying the actual costs of the entities involved in implementing the recycling bill.’’ 52 H.R. Proc., supra, p. 321. Accordingly, there is no indication in the legislative history that the distributors previously had a property interest in the unclaimed deposits. The plaintiffs argue that information in the fact sheet published on the DEP website after passage of the 2008 act,11 which noted that the unclaimed deposits ‘‘are kept by the distributors,’’ is evidence that they had a property interest in the deposits. We disagree. The fact sheet did not refer to the unclaimed deposits as the property of the distributors, nor did its use of the word ‘‘kept’’ suggest that they were the property of the distributors. The word ‘‘keep’’ means ‘‘[t]o have or retain in one’s power or possession; not to lose or part with; to pre- serve or retain’’; Black’s Law Dictionary, supra; but possession in that sense, without more, is not equivalent to ownership of, or to having legal or rightful title to, the unclaimed deposits. Accordingly, the fact sheet sheds no light on whether the plaintiffs had a property interest in the unclaimed deposits following passage of the 2008 act. The plaintiffs further argue that it is uncontested that they had a vested property interest in the unclaimed deposits before passage of the 2008 act and that the act did nothing to divest them of that revenue. We disagree. The commissioner’s decision not to address the status of the funds before passage of the act does not mean that the issue would have been uncontested if the commissioner had addressed it. Moreover, the commissioner did not need to discuss that issue because it had nothing to do with the issue in dispute. The issue before this court is whether the state’s collec- tion of the unclaimed deposits accruing during the four month period prior to the effective date of the 2009 act resulted in an unconstitutional taking of the plaintiffs’ property, which does not require consideration of whether the unclaimed deposits were the plaintiffs’ property prior to passage of the 2008 act in November, 2008. Furthermore, even if the plaintiffs arguably had a property interest in the unclaimed depo