State v. Acordia, Inc.

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be repro- duced and distributed without the express written per- mission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ******************************************************  STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ACORDIA, INC. (SC 18756) Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, Harper and Vertefeuille, Js.* Argued September 18, 2012—officially released August 27, 2013 Alan L. Kildow, pro hac vice, with whom were Mitch- ell R. Harris and, on the brief, Sonya R. Braunschweig, pro hac vice, for the appellant (defendant). Matthew J. Budzik, assistant attorney general, with whom were George W. O’Connell and Kirsten S.P. Rig- ney, assistant attorneys general, and, on the brief, George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellee (plaintiff).  Opinion VERTEFEUILLE, J. The plaintiff, the state of Con- necticut, brought this action against the defendant, Acordia, Inc., pursuant to General Statutes § 42-110m, alleging that the defendant’s failure to disclose to its clients certain contingent commission agreements that it had entered into with insurance companies violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA); General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.; and the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA). General Stat- utes § 38a-815 et seq. Following a court trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that the defendant’s actions violated both CUTPA and CUIPA. The defendant appeals1 from the judgment of the trial court, claiming that the court improperly relied on its conclusion that the defendant had breached a fiduciary duty owed to its clients to determine that the defendant violated CUIPA. General Statutes § 38a-816 (1) and (2).2 The defendant further contends that if this court concludes that the trial court improperly con- cluded that the defendant violated CUIPA, the CUTPA violation cannot stand. We agree with the defendant that the trial court improperly concluded that the defen- dant violated CUIPA. We further conclude that, in the absence of a CUIPA violation, the CUTPA claim must fail in the context of the present case. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.3 The trial court found the following pertinent facts. During the relevant time period between 1999 and 2002, the defendant, an independent insurance broker head- quartered in Chicago, Illinois, offered its clients insur- ance products from multiple insurance companies. The defendant operated a decentralized organization with 75 to 100 local offices throughout the United States. The local offices, each of which was a separate corpo- rate entity, employed approximately 1000 producers. Producers are the individuals in the industry who have direct contact with clients, cultivate personal relation- ships with them and assist them in selecting insurance policies that best meet the clients’ needs. The defendant sold insurance only through these local offices and pro- ducers. Although the defendant did not maintain a local office in Connecticut, it solicited customers in Connect- icut and sold and serviced insurance products to Con- necticut consumers through its offices in New Jersey, New York and Massachusetts, among other states. Insurance companies sell their products in one of two ways, either directly or through an agent or broker. Brokers may be either ‘‘captive’’ or ‘‘independent.’’ A captive broker offers products only from a particular insurance company. By contrast, an independent bro- ker, such as the defendant, offers its clients a choice of policies from multiple insurance companies. Inde- pendent brokers are compensated for their services either by a fee charged directly to the consumer or by a commission, the cost of which is included in the premium. In 1999, the defendant proposed a three year program to the twenty insurance companies with which it placed the most business; the program was called the ‘‘millen- nium partnership program’’ (program). Insurers who chose to participate in the program (participating insur- ers) agreed to pay on a quarterly basis 1 percent of the total value of the premiums that the defendant placed with that company, in addition to any commission already paid to the defendant. In exchange for this pay- ment, Charles Ruoff, the defendant’s chief marketing officer, represented to prospective participants that participating insurers would be given ‘‘priority status’’ and would ‘‘have the opportunity under the [program] to quote more business through [the defendant] to [the defendant’s] clients and sell more insurance.’’ Ruoff also told prospective participants that producers at the local offices would be informed of their priority status. Five insurers agreed to participate in the program: The Travelers Indemnity Company, The Hartford Fire Insur- ance Company, Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company and Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company. Subsequently, Kevin Con- boy, the defendant’s east regional director, instructed executive management that the participating insurers ‘‘should be given preferential consideration on new and renewal placements.’’ The defendant’s clients were never informed of the existence of the program. Four Connecticut consumers who were clients of the defendant testified at trial that they had never heard of the program. They also testified that they relied on their broker—in each instance a producer employed by one of the defendant’s subsidiar- ies—to provide them with independent and unbiased advice regarding the purchase of insurance coverage. Despite Ruoff’s assurances to the participating insur- ers, the plaintiff failed to prove at trial that producers in fact had been informed of the program. Of the four producers who testified at trial, three had never heard of the program or of the contingent commissions, and the fourth testified only that he ‘‘may have heard about it.’’ Additionally, the plaintiff failed to prove that any of the producers steered their clients toward participating insurers or did anything other than act in the clients’ best interests in assisting them to obtain insurance. Moreover, the court found that the plaintiff failed to prove that any clients suffered any individual monetary harm from the failure to disclose the program, and, instead found that clients paid the same insurance pre- miums that they would have paid if the program had not existed.4 In 2006, at the request of the Commissioner of Con- sumer Protection for the state of Connecticut, pursuant to § 42-110m (a),5 the plaintiff brought this action.6 After trial, the court, having concluded that the defendant had breached a fiduciary duty owed to its clients and that this breach violated both CUTPA and CUIPA, ren- dered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and ordered only that the defendant ‘‘account for nondisclosed [program] based commissions for products purchased by consum- ers in the state of Connecticut.’’ The court denied the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. See footnote 6 of this opinion. The court subsequently denied the plain- tiff’s motion seeking an articulation of the scope of the ordered accounting. This appeal followed. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly incorporated the concept of fiduciary duty into its analy- sis of whether the defendant had violated CUIPA and rested its conclusion that the defendant had violated CUIPA solely on its finding of a violation of fiduciary duty. Furthermore, the defendant argues, the lack of a CUIPA violation is fatal to the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim. The plaintiff responds that the court did not predicate its conclusion that the defendant violated CUIPA on any fiduciary duty owed by the defendant to its clients. Rather, the plaintiff contends, the defendant mischarac- terizes the rationale of the trial court in so arguing. Additionally, the plaintiff claims that its CUTPA claim does not stand or fall with the CUIPA violation because a CUIPA violation is not a necessary predicate to the conclusion that an insurer violated CUTPA. We agree with the defendant that the court improperly relied on the concept of fiduciary duty in concluding that the defendant violated CUIPA. We further conclude that, in the absence of a valid CUIPA claim in the present case, the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim must fail. I The defendant challenges the trial court’s conclusion that it violated CUIPA on the basis that in doing so, the court improperly determined that breach of a fiduciary duty constitutes a violation of CUIPA. The plaintiff asserts that the defendant mischaracterizes the ratio- nale of the trial court, which the plaintiff reads as identi- fying and ruling on two independent claims: a claim that the defendant violated CUTPA by breaching its fiduciary duty to disclose a conflict of interest to its clients, and a claim that the defendant violated CUIPA by engaging in conduct that was misleading or decep- tive. Although the trial court’s memorandum of decision is not entirely clear as to the basis for its conclusion that the defendant violated CUIPA, we believe that the defendant’s reading of the decision is more accurate. We therefore agree that the court improperly predicated its conclusion that the defendant violated CUIPA on the court’s determination that the defendant had breached a fiduciary duty owed to its clients. This issue presents a question of law, over which our review is plenary. See Fisher v. Big Y Foods, Inc., 298 Conn. 414, 423–24, 3 A.3d 919 (2010) (‘‘[T]he scope of our appellate review depends [on] the proper character- ization of the rulings made by the trial court. To the extent that the trial court has made findings of fact, our review is limited to deciding whether such findings were clearly erroneous. When, however, the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]). In order to resolve the dispute between the parties as to the proper understanding of the rationale of the trial court as it pertains to the court’s conclusion that the defendant violated CUIPA, we examine in detail the court’s discussion of fiduciary duty. The court intro- duced the principle of fiduciary duty in the course of its consideration of the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim, and began that analysis by observing that ‘‘a violation of CUTPA may be established by showing . . . a practice amounting to a violation of public policy.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Daddona v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 209 Conn. 243, 254, 550 A.2d 1061 (1988). To make the required showing, the court noted, a litigant must show that the challenged practice ‘‘without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or other- wise . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cheshire Mortgage Service, Inc. v. Montes, 223 Conn. 80, 105–106, 612 A.2d 1130 (1992). The court then turned to the common law for the source of the public policy violation, setting forth principles of agency and fidu- ciary duty. The court concluded that the defendant owed a fiduciary duty to its clients, based on its findings that the defendant had held itself out to clients as inde- pendent, sought to establish a relationship of trust and confidence with clients, and encouraged clients to expect that the defendant would act in their best inter- ests. The court next concluded that the defendant breached that fiduciary duty by failing to disclose the existence of the program to its clients. The court rea- soned that the program created a conflict of interest for the defendant between the incentive created by the program to direct clients toward products offered by the participating insurers and the duty that the defen- dant owed to the clients to make recommendations solely based on the clients’ best interests, consistent with the relationships of trust and confidence estab- lished between producers and clients. In light of the existence of a fiduciary duty, the court concluded that the failure to disclose the conflict of interest amounted to a betrayal of the trust and confidence that the clients placed in the defendant. Accordingly, the court con- cluded that the defendant’s failure to disclose that con- flict of interest ‘‘violated Connecticut’s public policy of respecting fiduciary obligations as that policy existed in 1999–2002’’ and that by doing so the defendant had ‘‘engaged in conduct prohibited under CUTPA.’’ The trial court next considered the defendant’s claim that even if the court concluded that the defendant’s conduct constituted a breach of fiduciary duty in viola- tion of public policy, the plaintiff could not prevail in its CUTPA claim, because it had failed to prove that the defendant’s conduct violated CUIPA. The court explained its interpretation of this court’s holding in Mead v. Burns, 199 Conn. 651, 509 A.2d 11 (1986), namely, that when a party seeks to hold a defendant in the insurance industry liable under CUTPA, that party bears the burden ‘‘to prove that the CUTPA claim is also a CUIPA violation.’’ Having concluded that the plaintiff had established its CUTPA claim—that the defendant’s conduct violated CUTPA because it vio- lated the state’s public policy requiring adherence to fiduciary duty—the court turned to the question of whether that violation also violated CUIPA. The court then stated in a conclusory manner that the defendant’s ‘‘nondisclosure of the existence of the [program] to its customers was ‘deceptive or misleading’ as those terms are used in CUIPA.’’ The only analysis supporting that conclusion is the court’s discussion of the defendant’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty and its statement that the plaintiff bore the burden to prove that the CUTPA violation—a violation of the public policy requiring adherence to fiduciary duty—was also a CUIPA viola- tion. Our reading of the trial court’s decision, therefore, is that the court predicated its conclusion that the defen- dant violated CUIPA on its determination that the defen- dant breached a fiduciary duty owed to its clients. We now turn to the defendant’s substantive claim, that is, whether the trial court properly relied on the common-law principle of fiduciary duty to conclude that the defendant’s actions violated CUIPA. Put another way, we must examine whether the court prop- erly looked beyond the confines of CUIPA itself and relied on the common law to conclude that the defen- dant’s actions constituted an unfair insurance practice. To the extent that this question requires us to consider whether the legislature intended CUIPA to serve as the comprehensive and exclusive means of identifying unfair insurance practices, it involves a question of stat- utory interpretation. ‘‘The process of statutory interpre- tation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply. . . . When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamen- tal objective is to ascertain and give effect to the appar- ent intent of the legislature. . . . [General Statutes] § 1- 2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the mean- ing of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and unam- biguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter . . . . A statute is ambiguous if, when read in context, it is susceptible to more than one rea- sonable interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Hartford/Windsor Healthcare Properties, LLC v. Hartford, 298 Conn. 191, 197–98, 3 A.3d 56 (2010). We begin with the language of CUIPA. Section 38a- 815 provides in relevant part: ‘‘No person shall engage in this state in any trade practice which is defined in section 38a-816 as, or determined pursuant to sections 38a-817 and 38a-818 to be, an unfair method of competi- tion or an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance . . . . The [Insurance] [C]om- missioner shall have power to examine the affairs of every person engaged in the business of insurance in this state in order to determine whether such person has been or is engaged in any unfair method of competi- tion or in any unfair or deceptive act or practice prohib- ited by sections 38a-815 to 38a-819, inclusive. . . .’’ Section 38a-815 thus identifies two different ways in which a practice may be determined to be an unfair insurance practice in violation of CUIPA: the practice may fall under one of the defined unfair insurance prac- tices in § 38a-816, or the Insurance Commissioner (com- missioner) may determine, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 38a-817 and 38a-818, that the practice constitutes ‘‘an unfair method of competition or an unfair or decep- tive act or practice in the business of insurance . . . .’’ General Statutes § 38a-815. The next provision of the statutory scheme identifies certain practices that ‘‘are defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts or prac- tices in the business of insurance . . . .’’ General Stat- utes § 38a-816; see footnote 2 of this opinion. The twenty-two subdivisions now codified in § 38a-816 list a broad array of different practices. To illustrate the breadth of that list, we observe in brief summary that those practices include misrepresentations and false advertising of insurance policies; false advertising gen- erally; defamation; boycotts; coercion and intimidation; false financial statements; unfair claim settlement prac- tices; failure to maintain complaint handling proce- dures; misrepresentation in insurance applications; any violation of General Statutes §§ 38a-358, 38a-446, 38a- 447, 38a-488, 38a-825, 38a-826, 38a-828, 38a-829, 38a-465 to 38a-465q, 38a-478 or 42-260; denial of reimbursement on the basis of race, color or creed, or unfair discrimina- tion against licensed practitioners of the healing arts; coercion of debtors; discrimination in provision of insurance on the basis of physical disability, mental retardation, blindness, exposure to diethylstilbestrol, genetic information, or being a victim of family violence; failure to pay a health care provider within defined time periods; when a motor vehicle has been declared to be a total constructive loss, failure to pay one of certain defined amounts under an automobile insurance policy; and, with respect to a managed care organization, fail- ure to establish a confidential procedure for medical record information. It is important to observe that, in addition to setting forth a broad array of practices, § 38a-816 defines each listed practice in specific detail. For example, § 38a- 816 (1), which addresses misrepresentations and false advertising of insurance policies, includes ‘‘[m]aking, issuing or circulating, or causing to be made, issued or circulated, any estimate, illustration, circular or state- ment, sales presentation, omission or comparison which: (A) [m]isrepresents the benefits, advantages, conditions or terms of any insurance policy; (B) misrep- resents the dividends or share of the surplus to be received, on any insurance policy; (C) makes any false or misleading statements as to the dividends or share of surplus previously paid on any insurance policy; (D) is misleading or is a misrepresentation as to the finan- cial condition of any person, or as to the legal reserve system upon which any life insurer operates; (E) uses any name or title of any insurance policy or class of insurance policies misrepresenting the true nature thereof; (F) is a misrepresentation, including, but not limited to, an intentional misquote of a premium rate, for the purpose of inducing or tending to induce to the purchase, lapse, forfeiture, exchange, conversion or surrender of any insurance policy; (G) is a misrepre- sentation for the purpose of effecting a pledge or assign- ment of or effecting a loan against any insurance policy; or (H) misrepresents any insurance policy as being shares of stock.’’ This subdivision thus carefully delin- eates the specific means of dissemination that come within the definition of ‘‘[m]isrepresentations and false advertising’’ and specifies the types of representations that can qualify as misleading under the statute, provid- ing a very detailed description of which types of prac- tices the legislature intended to include under the category of ‘‘[m]isrepresentations and false advertising of insurance policies.’’ General Statutes § 38a-816 (1). The itemization of different types of unfair insurance practices in § 38a-816 is significant. We have stated that ‘‘[u]nless there is evidence to the contrary, statutory itemization indicates that the legislature intended the list to be exclusive.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgeport Hospital v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 232 Conn. 91, 101, 653 A.2d 782 (1995). In addition, § 38a-816 is not merely a list, it expressly identifies itself as a definitional statute. The introductory sentence of that statute provides that ‘‘[t]he following are defined’’ as unfair insurance prac- tices. General Statutes § 38a-816. By framing the list as a definitional one, the legislature already constrained the discretion of courts to look to other sources in finding a particular insurance practice to be ‘‘unfair’’ in violation of CUIPA. ‘‘When legislation contains a spe- cific definition, the courts are bound to accept that definition.’’ International Business Machines Corp. v. Brown, 167 Conn. 123, 134, 355 A.2d 236 (1974). This stands in sharp contrast to a list that recites that the category ‘‘includes’’ the following, thereby suggesting that items not listed might also come within the category. Section 38a-816 does not, however, expressly provide that the list is intended to be exclusive, and, as we already have observed, § 38a-815 provides that the com- missioner may determine, pursuant to §§ 38a-817 and 38a-818, that a particular practice constitutes an unfair insurance practice in violation of CUIPA. Both sections suggest that the commissioner has the authority to recognize a violation of CUIPA notwithstanding the fail- ure of the particular practice at issue to conform to any of the defined practices in § 38a-816. Sections 38a-817 and 38a-818 authorize the commis- sioner to conduct a hearing to determine whether a party has engaged in an unfair or deceptive insurance practice in violation of CUIPA. Both sections recognize the commissioner’s authority to determine that the practice at issue violates CUIPA, notwithstanding the failure of the practice to come within one of the defined practices listed in § 38a-816. The commissioner may proceed under § 38a-817 (a) ‘‘[w]henever the commis- sioner has reason to believe that any such person has been engaged or is engaging in violation of sections 38a-815 to 38a-819, inclusive, in any unfair method of competition or any unfair or deceptive act or practice defined in section 38a-816, and that a proceeding by the commissioner in respect thereto would be in the interest of the public . . . .’’ Following the hearing, if the commissioner determines that the practice is an unfair or deceptive insurance practice in violation of CUIPA, but is not one of the defined practices in § 38a- 816, the commissioner may issue a cease and desist order. If the commissioner determines that the practice is one of the defined practices in § 38a-816, the commis- sioner may order additional penalties and remedies. General Statutes § 38a-817 (b). Section 38a-818, the companion provision to § 38a- 817, authorizes the commissioner to conduct a hearing ‘‘in the same manner as the hearings provided for in section 38a-817,’’ ‘‘[w]henever the commissioner has reason to believe that any person engaged in the busi- ness of insurance is engaging in this state in any method of competition or in any act or practice in the conduct of such business which is not defined in section 38a- 816, that such method of competition is unfair or that such act or practice is unfair or deceptive and that a proceeding by him in respect thereto would be to the interest of the public . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Gen- eral Statutes § 38a-818. If the commissioner determines that the practice violates General Statutes §§ 38a-815 to 38a-819, inclusive, he may file a petition in Superior Court seeking an order enjoining or restraining the per- son from engaging in the practice at issue. General Statutes § 38a-818. Sections 38a-817 and 38a-818, read together with §§ 38a-815 and 38a-816, suggest that the legislature intended to provide in § 38a-816 a comprehensive list of insurance practices that are unfair or deceptive in violation of CUIPA, but that it recognized the need to authorize the commissioner to act in the event that a person is engaging in a practice that had not yet been defined expressly as an unfair insurance practice in § 38a-816, but that could possibly, following a hearing conducted by the commissioner, be determined to con- stitute an unfair or deceptive insurance practice. It is also significant that the statutory scheme confers upon the commissioner different levels of authority to act, depending on whether the commissioner has reason to believe that the person is engaging in a practice that violates § 38a-816, and, subsequently, whether the com- missioner determines that said practice violates § 38a- 816. The existence of a violation of § 38a-816 is the standard by which the commissioner’s authority to investigate, and subsequently, to order further proce- dures, remedies or penalties, is statutorily determined. It is also significant that nowhere in §§ 38a-815 to 38a- 819, inclusive, is the Superior Court authorized to act in the absence of a violation of § 38a-816, unless the commissioner first has made the requisite finding that a person or entity has violated CUIPA by engaging in an unfair or deceptive insurance practice that is not defined in § 38a-816. There is nothing in the record of the present case that reveals that the commissioner initiated any proceedings against the defendant pursuant to the authority estab- lished in §§ 38a-817 and 38a-818, which, accordingly, are not at issue in the present case. The question we must address, therefore, is whether the legislature intended § 38a-816 to preclude the courts from determining that a party engaged in an unfair insurance practice in violation of CUIPA based on legal authority other than § 38a-816, specifically, the common law. With respect to that question, although the statutory lan- guage strongly suggests an answer in the affirmative, we cannot say that the language is plain and unambiguous. Accordingly, we turn to the origin and history of the statutory scheme of CUIPA for further guidance. CUIPA was enacted in 1955 and was based on a model insur- ance trade practices act promulgated by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners in 1947. Mead v. Burns, supra, 199 Conn. 659. The impetus behind both the promulgation of the model act and the subsequent enactment of CUIPA was ‘‘to preempt federal regula- tion.’’ Id. During the floor debate of House Bill No. 978, Representative J. Frederick Bitzer explained that there was a need to have a statute that set forth in detail the powers of the commissioner with respect to unfair trade practices in the insurance industry, noting that doing so would ‘‘bar the Federal Trade Commission from entering into the field of supervising [this area] which properly belongs to the [I]nsurance [C]ommissioner.’’ 6 H.R. Proc., Pt. 2, 1955 Sess., p. 1037; see also Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Insurance, 1955 Sess., p. 37, remarks of W. Ellery Allyn (‘‘[t]he reason this bill is in is because of the Federal Trade Commis- sion’s indication that they will move in on certain mat- ters if they are not regulated by the [s]tate’’). From the outset, therefore, the legislative intent in passing CUIPA was to occupy the field with regard to unfair trade practices in the insurance industry. The legislature’s intent to define comprehensively unfair insurance practices in this state is further evi- denced by subsequent amendments to CUIPA. Number 73-73 of the 1973 Public Acts enacted the most signifi- cant revisions to CUIPA. Testifying before the Insur- ance Committee regarding the proposed changes, the Insurance Commissioner at the time, Paul B. Altermatt, explained that the changes ‘‘more fully [spell] out what constitutes an unfair [insurance] practice’’ and consid- erably modernized the existing statutory scheme. Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Insurance and Real Estate, 1973 Sess., p. 46. Describing the nature of some of the specific revisions, he explained that ‘‘unfair claims settlement practices for instance . . . are now spelled out in detail . . . .’’ Id. Altermatt elaborated that the revised provisions set forth in greater detail ‘‘precisely what is an unfair practice and what isn’t as regards claims, and claims settlement practices.’’ Id. In discussion on the Senate floor, Senator P. Edmund Power stated that the purpose of the revisions were to ‘‘enable the [I]nsurance [C]ommissioner to more effec- tively carry out his responsibility of protecting our Con- necticut citizens.’’ 16 S. Proc., Pt. 3, 1973 Sess., p. 1214. Senator Power’s remarks reveal not only that the legisla- ture intended to set out specifically the types of actions that constitute unfair insurance practices in a highly detailed manner, but also that the legislature viewed accomplishing that task as essential to the underlying purpose of CUIPA: enabling the commissioner to better protect consumers. The many subsequent amendments incorporating additional practices as violative of CUIPA demonstrate an ongoing legislative effort to keep the list of prohibited practices as current as possible and provide further evidence of the legislature’s intent to provide in CUIPA a comprehensive list of unfair insur- ance practices. See, e.g., Public Acts 1980, No. 80-259 (adding refusal to insure because of physical disability or mental retardation); Public Acts 1984, No. 84-189 (adding denial of insurance based on individual’s expo- sure to diethylstilbestrol); Public Acts 1986, No. 86-70 (adding refusal to insure or otherwise discriminating against individual based on blindness); Public Acts 1986, No. 86-407 (adding failure to pay claim within forty-five days of receipt of proof of loss); Public Acts 1995, No. 95-193 (adding refusal to insure individual because individual is victim of family violence); Public Acts 1997, No. 97-95 (refusal to insure individual on basis of genetic information). The legislative history of CUIPA, therefore, demonstrates that the legislature intended to occupy the field of defining unfair insurance practices, thereby precluding courts from incorporating common-law principles as a basis for finding an unfair insurance practice. Accordingly, we conclude that the common-law prin- ciple of fiduciary duty cannot provide the foundation for a CUIPA violation. Section 38a-816 specifically enu- merates, in its twenty-two subdivisions, those practices that are defined as unfair insurance practices in this state. None of those subdivisions identifies breach of fiduciary duty as an unfair insurance practice, or other- wise suggests that a breach of fiduciary duty can give rise to an unfair insurance practice. Because there is no statutory basis for concluding that breach of fidu- ciary duty constitutes a violation of CUIPA, we con- clude that the trial court improperly incorporated this common-law concept into its CUIPA analysis by relying on its determination that the defendant had violated the fiduciary duty it owed to its clients to conclude that the defendant violated CUIPA. II We next address the defendant’s claim that, in the absence of a CUIPA violation, the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim must fail. The defendant contends that pursuant to our decision in Mead v. Burns, supra, 199 Conn. 651, conduct in the insurance industry may constitute a CUTPA violation only if the conduct also violates CUIPA. The plaintiff responds that Mead applies only to CUTPA claims that are established through CUIPA, and its CUTPA claim is premised not on a CUIPA viola- tion, but on the plaintiff’s violation of the public policy requiring adherence to one’s fiduciary duties. We con- clude that the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim was barred by Mead because conduct by an insurance broker or insur- ance company that is related to the business of provid- ing insurance can violate CUTPA only if it violates CUIPA,7 and a CUTPA claim in this context cannot be based on breach of a common-law duty. In Mead, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant insurance company had refused in bad faith to settle his claim without conducting a reasonable investigation, in violation of both CUIPA and CUTPA. Id., 653–54. This court concluded that the trial court properly had struck the plaintiff’s CUIPA claim because CUIPA requires ‘‘a showing of more than a single act of insurance miscon- duct.’’ Id., 659. Addressing the question of whether the trial court properly had struck the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim, the court observed that General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 38-62 (d), which is now § 38a-817 (d), pro- vides: ‘‘No order of the commissioner under sections 38- 60 to 38-64 [now sections 38a-815 to 38a-819], inclusive, shall relieve or absolve any person affected by such order from any liability under any other laws of this state.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 661. In addition, CUTPA provides: ‘‘No person shall engage in . . . unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.’’ General Statutes § 42-110b (a); Mead v. Burns, supra, 199 Conn. 661–62. Finally, CUTPA provides: ‘‘Nothing in this chapter shall apply to: (1) Transactions or actions otherwise permitted under law as administered by any regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of the state or of the United States . . . .’’ General Statutes § 42-110c (a); Mead v. Burns, supra, 662. This court concluded that, ‘‘[i]n combination, these statutory provisions do indicate that the legislature elected to subject insurance practices to multiple rather than to singular regulatory supervision.’’ Mead v. Burns, supra, 662. Having concluded that ‘‘it is possible to state a cause of action under CUTPA for a violation of CUIPA’’; id., 663; this court addressed the following question: ‘‘Under what circumstances, if any, may [insurance related] conduct that does not violate CUIPA constitute an unfair act or practice under CUTPA?’’ (Emphasis added.) Id. In support of his claim that ‘‘conduct not specifically prohibited by CUIPA may nonetheless offend the public policy of that [act] and therefore may be actionable under CUTPA’’; id., 664; the plaintiff relied on this court’s decisions in Conaway v. Prestia, 191 Conn. 484, 464 A.2d 847 (1983), and Griswold v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 186 Conn. 507, 442 A.2d 920 (1982). Mead v. Burns, supra, 199 Conn. 662–65. In Conaway, the plaintiff tenants claimed that the defendant landlord had violated certain statutes requiring landlords to obtain certificates of occupancy for each rental unit. Conaway v. Prestia, supra, 486–87. The plaintiffs fur- ther claimed that this failure to comply with the statutes violated CUTPA. Id., 487–88. The trial court concluded that the defendant had violated CUTPA by collecting rents from the plaintiffs without having complied with the statutory requirement for certificates of occupancy. Id., 488. On appeal, this court adopted for the first time ‘‘the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the [F]ederal [T]rade [C]ommission for determining when a practice is unfair: (1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers [(competitors or other businessmen)].8 [Id.], 492–93 . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) McLaughlin Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 192 Conn. 558, 567–68, 473 A.2d 1185 (1984). This court concluded in Conaway that ‘‘the defendants’ actions of receiving the rent, while not specifically prohibited pursuant to [the relevant housing statutes], unquestionably offended the public policy, as embodied by these statutes, of insuring minimum standards of housing safety and habitability . . . [and] amounted to unfair acts or practices within the meaning of § 42-110b.’’ Conaway v. Prestia, supra, 493. In Griswold v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., supra, 186 Conn. 508–509, the plaintiffs brought a claim that the defendant insurance company had refused to pay cer- tain insurance policy benefits to which they were enti- tled. They further claimed that the defendant’s conduct violated both CUTPA and CUIPA. Id., 518–20. The defen- dant contended that the claim was barred because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative rem- edies under CUIPA. Id., 518. This court concluded that, because the applicable revision of CUIPA did not ‘‘authorize the commissioner to award damages to an aggrieved person nor [did] he have the authority to determine a private right to damages . . . the plaintiffs had no practical or adequate administrative remedy which would require exhaustion.’’ Id., 520. Accordingly, this court concluded that the plaintiffs were ‘‘entitled to maintain a private right of action for monetary damages [pursuant to § 42-110b] for