Full Opinion

Filed 11/20/26 Wynnefield Brothers Intl. v. Franchise Tax Bd. CA1/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR WYNNEFIELD BROTHERS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, Plaintiff and Appellant, A174794 v. (San Francisco City & FRANCHISE TAX BOARD et County al., Super. Ct. No. CGC-25- 624073) Defendants and Respondents. Wynnefield Brothers International, LLC (Wynnefield) sued the Franchise Tax Board (FTB) and Malia Cohen, Joe Stephenshaw, Ted Gaines, and Selvi Stanislaus seeking a writ of mandate and judicial declaration that a tax regulation is invalid. Wynnefield appeals after the trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend because Wynnefield’s suit was barred by article XIII, section 32 of the California Constitution (section 32), which states that “[n]o legal or equitable process shall issue” against the State or its officers “to prevent or enjoin the collection of any tax” and the FTB is presently relying on the challenged regulation in an audit of Wynnefield’s taxes owed for 2021. The trial court’s ruling is consistent with a long line of authority preventing suits like Wynnefield’s, including California Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration v. Superior Court (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 922 (Kintner). Wynnefield’s attempts to distinguish Kintner are not persuasive, so we shall affirm. BACKGROUND Wynnefield timely filed its 2021 California income tax return. Because Wynnefield operated in multiple states, to calculate its income tax liability it had to assign to California a portion of its total income. The FTB is auditing Wynnefield’s return. It has preliminarily taken the position that Wynnefield categorically should have excluded from its total income calculation certain transactions that took place outside of California, based on Code of California Regulations, title 18, section 25137(c)(1)(A) (the Regulation). Excluding this out-of- state income would reduce Wynnefield’s total income without affecting its California income, thereby making the California- apportioned share of income larger and resulting in a larger California tax liability. In April 2025, Wynnefield filed a complaint for declaratory relief and petition for writ of mandate. It sought a declaration that the Regulation was null and void on its face and as applied to Wynnefield’s out-of-state transactions. Wynnefield also sought a writ of mandate directing defendants to set aside the Regulation. Defendants demurred, arguing, as relevant here, that Wynnefield’s suit was barred by section 32, which prohibits challenges to the legality of a tax until after the taxpayer has paid the tax and requested a refund. The trial court agreed, sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and entered judgment for defendants. DISCUSSION “On appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, the standard of review is well settled. We give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.] Further, we treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citations.] When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.] And when it is sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse.” (City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 865.) Our review is de novo. (Stone v. Alameda Health System (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1040, 1052.) Section 32 states, “No legal or equitable process shall issue in any proceeding in any court against this State or any officer thereof to prevent or enjoin the collection of any tax. After payment of a tax claimed to be illegal, an action may be maintained to recover the tax paid, with interest, in such manner as may be provided by the Legislature.” “By barring any ‘legal or equitable process’ until ‘[a]fter payment of [the] tax claimed to be illegal,’ section 32 erects what is commonly known as the ‘ “pay first, litigate later” ’ rule [citation], or more colorfully known as the ‘pay up or shut up’ rule [citation]. Although its location within the California Constitution has changed from time to time, the language now contained in section 32 has been a part of the Constitution since at least 1913. [Citations.] Our Legislature has also cut and pasted the key parts of section 32’s language into various statutes. [Citations.] “Section 32 has been a bedrock principle of tax law for over a century because the public policy it effectuates is fundamental to the continued operation of our state. ‘[M]oney is the lifeblood of modern government.’ [Citation.] By requiring taxpayers to pay disputed taxes up front (rather than allowing taxpayers to withhold the payment of taxes until disputes over taxation are resolved in litigation), section 32 ensures that the blood of the body politic keeps pumping because it ‘ensure[s] that the state may continue to collect tax revenue during litigation,’ thereby ‘avoid[ing] unnecessary disruption of public services . . . dependent on that revenue’ and the attendant ‘ “ ‘serious detriment to the public.’ ” ’ [Citations.] “Although section 32’s plain language purports to preclude only ‘legal or equitable process . . . to prevent or enjoin the collection of any tax’ until ‘[a]fter payment of [the disputed] tax’ [citation], ‘ “a taxpayer may not circumvent [section 32’s] restraints on prepayment tax litigation by seeking only declaratory relief” ’ when the ‘ “net result” ’ or ‘ “effect” ’ of granting that declaratory relief is to absolve the taxpayer of liability for the disputed tax. [Citations.] Because adjudication of such declaratory relief claims would be binding on the state in any further proceedings regarding the taxpayer’s liability [citations], the judgment resolving such claims would effectively prevent or enjoin the state from collecting the disputed tax. Thus, as our Supreme Court has noted time and again, declaratory relief claims that have the ‘net result’ or ‘effect’ — by virtue of collateral estoppel — of resolving a disputed tax claim are subject to section 32’s ‘pay first, litigate later’ rule.” (Kintner, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 930–931.) Wynnefield’s suit relies on Government Code section 11350, which states in subdivision (a), “Any interested person may obtain a judicial declaration as to the validity of any regulation or order of repeal by bringing an action for declaratory relief in the superior court in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure.” Kintner held that declaratory relief claims pursuant to this statute by taxpayers with outstanding tax assessments are still subject to section 32 for three reasons: first, because Government Code section 11350 as a statute is subordinate to section 32 as a constitutional provision; second, because Government Code section 11350’s purpose of providing a forum for testing the validity of regulations does not justify exempting tax challenges from section 32, since taxpayers already have administrative and judicial fora for challenging tax regulations; and third, because our Supreme Court “strongly suggested” in Woosley v. State of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 758, 785, fn. 20, that Government Code section 11350 is strictly construed in tax cases. (Kintner, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 933–934.) Kintner further reasoned that Government Code section 11350 could peaceably coexist with section 32, since the statute could allow challenges to non-tax regulations or challenges to tax regulations by persons with “no outstanding tax assessments, such as persons who are not the taxpayer [citation] or . . . persons who are taxpayers facing tax assessments in the future [citations].” (Id. at p. 933; but see State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Superior Court (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 734, 775, fn. 11 [questioning whether Kintner’s examples of proper applications of Gov. Code, § 11350 properly state the law].) Wynnefield tries to distinguish Kintner in two ways, neither of which is persuasive. First, it contends it comes within the exception Kintner recognized for persons without outstanding tax assessments, presumably because so far as the record shows, the FTB has not finished its audit of Wynnefield’s 2021 return. But Wynnefield’s is not the type of challenge Kintner had in mind. (See State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at pp. 774–775 [rejecting argument that § 32 prohibits suits only when a taxpayer faces an outstanding tax assessment].) Wynnefield is not challenging the Regulation in advance of assessments based on future activity. Its challenge would affect an existing tax dispute, not a prospective one. Declaring the Regulation invalid would be binding on the state in its audit of Wynnefield, which would prevent the state from relying on it to calculate and assess Wynnefield’s tax liability. As Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1987) 44 Cal.3d 208, 213 explained, “Section 32 broadly limits in the first instance the power of the courts to intervene in tax collection matters; it does not merely make unavailable a particular remedy or preclude actions challenging the ultimate validity of a tax assessment. [Citation.] The section applies if the prepayment judicial determination sought would impede tax collection.” Second, Wynnefield argues that declaring the Regulation invalid would not absolve Wynnefield of any tax liability or prejudice the FTB at all. In Wynnefield’s view, if its suit were successful it would merely remove the categorical rule embodied in the Regulation and force the FTB to apportion Wynnefield’s tax liability under a case-by-case standard.1 But proceeding under a case-by-case standard rather than a categorical rule would, at a minimum, make the FTB’s task harder or more time consuming, which would impede tax collection. (See State Bd. of Equalization v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 633, 639 [“ ‘ “Any delay in the proceedings of the officer, upon whom the duty is devolved of collecting the taxes, may derange the operations of government, and thereby cause serious detriment to the public.” ’ ”].) This is evident as a matter of common sense: If Wynnefield’s suit did not strengthen its hand and prejudice the FTB in relation to the ongoing audit, Wynnefield would not be bringing it. 1 We deny Wynnefield’s July 23, 2026, request for judicial notice of materials related to the validity of the Regulation because they are unnecessary to our resolution of this appeal. (County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 613, fn. 29.) Apart from trying to distinguish Kintner, Wynnefield also relies on Pacific Motor Transport Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 230, 233–237, which allowed a challenge to a tax regulation under the predecessor to Government Code section 11350. Pacific Motor is distinguishable. It dealt with a statutory prepayment rule and tried to reconcile that statute with the predecessor to Government Code section 11350. (Id. at pp. 234–235.) It did not deal with section 32, which takes precedence as a constitutional provision over any statute. Also, as Kintner, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at page 935, noted, there is no indication that the plaintiff in Pacific Motor was subject to an unpaid tax assessment or any other preparatory step. (Pacific Motor, at pp. 234 [prayer for relief asked for declaration that plaintiffs could “by suitable modification of their operations” come within the favorable ambit of the regulation and the tax liability that would result], 236 [other relief sought in complaint not available because it would interfere with assessment and collection of taxes].) Honeywell, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 907, 911–914, on which Wynnefield also relies, expressed significant doubts about the viability of a suit challenging the validity of a tax regulation to a completed taxable transaction. It only entertained a challenge because Pacific Motor “casts some doubt” on the rule that declaratory relief is not appropriate when a taxpayer has already completed a transaction. (Honeywell, at p. 914.) Honeywell therefore lends Wynnefield no more assistance than Pacific Motor itself.2 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. BROWN, P. J. WE CONCUR: STREETER, J. JACKSON, J. Wynnefield Bros. Intl., LLC, v. FTB (A174794) 2 Like Kintner, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at page 926, to the extent Pacific Motor is not distinguishable, we disagree with it, and, by extension, with Honeywell.  Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate district, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.