Wynnefield Brothers Intl. v. Franchise Tax Bd. CA1/4
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketA174794
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/20/26 Wynnefield Brothers Intl. v. Franchise Tax Bd. CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
WYNNEFIELD BROTHERS
INTERNATIONAL, LLC,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A174794
v. (San Francisco City &
FRANCHISE TAX BOARD et County
al., Super. Ct. No. CGC-25-
624073)
Defendants and
Respondents.
Wynnefield Brothers International, LLC (Wynnefield) sued the
Franchise Tax Board (FTB) and Malia Cohen, Joe Stephenshaw,
Ted Gaines, and Selvi Stanislaus seeking a writ of mandate and
judicial declaration that a tax regulation is invalid. Wynnefield
appeals after the trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer
without leave to amend because Wynnefield’s suit was barred by
article XIII, section 32 of the California Constitution (section 32),
which states that “[n]o legal or equitable process shall issue”
against the State or its officers “to prevent or enjoin the collection
of any tax” and the FTB is presently relying on the challenged
regulation in an audit of Wynnefield’s taxes owed for 2021. The
trial court’s ruling is consistent with a long line of authority
preventing suits like Wynnefield’s, including California Dept. of
Tax & Fee Administration v. Superior Court (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 922 (Kintner). Wynnefield’s attempts to
distinguish Kintner are not persuasive, so we shall affirm.
BACKGROUND
Wynnefield timely filed its 2021 California income tax
return. Because Wynnefield operated in multiple states, to
calculate its income tax liability it had to assign to California a
portion of its total income. The FTB is auditing Wynnefield’s
return. It has preliminarily taken the position that Wynnefield
categorically should have excluded from its total income
calculation certain transactions that took place outside of
California, based on Code of California Regulations, title 18,
section 25137(c)(1)(A) (the Regulation). Excluding this out-of-
state income would reduce Wynnefield’s total income without
affecting its California income, thereby making the California-
apportioned share of income larger and resulting in a larger
California tax liability.
In April 2025, Wynnefield filed a complaint for declaratory
relief and petition for writ of mandate. It sought a declaration
that the Regulation was null and void on its face and as applied
to Wynnefield’s out-of-state transactions. Wynnefield also sought
a writ of mandate directing defendants to set aside the
Regulation.
Defendants demurred, arguing, as relevant here, that
Wynnefield’s suit was barred by section 32, which prohibits
challenges to the legality of a tax until after the taxpayer has
paid the tax and requested a refund. The trial court agreed,
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and entered
judgment for defendants.
DISCUSSION
“On appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after
sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, the standard of
review is well settled. We give the complaint a reasonable
interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their
context. [Citation.] Further, we treat the demurrer as admitting
all material facts properly pleaded, but do not assume the truth
of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citations.]
When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the
complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
[Citation.] And when it is sustained without leave to amend, we
decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect
can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has
abused its discretion and we reverse.” (City of Dinuba v. County
of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 865.) Our review is de novo.
(Stone v. Alameda Health System (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1040, 1052.)
Section 32 states, “No legal or equitable process shall issue
in any proceeding in any court against this State or any officer
thereof to prevent or enjoin the collection of any tax. After
payment of a tax claimed to be illegal, an action may be
maintained to recover the tax paid, with interest, in such manner
as may be provided by the Legislature.” “By barring any ‘legal or
equitable process’ until ‘[a]fter payment of [the] tax claimed to be
illegal,’ section 32 erects what is commonly known as the ‘ “pay
first, litigate later” ’ rule [citation], or more colorfully known as
the ‘pay up or shut up’ rule [citation]. Although its location
within the California Constitution has changed from time to
time, the language now contained in section 32 has been a part of
the Constitution since at least 1913. [Citations.] Our Legislature
has also cut and pasted the key parts of section 32’s language
into various statutes. [Citations.]
“Section 32 has been a bedrock principle of tax law for over
a century because the public policy it effectuates is fundamental
to the continued operation of our state. ‘[M]oney is the lifeblood
of modern government.’ [Citation.] By requiring taxpayers to
pay disputed taxes up front (rather than allowing taxpayers to
withhold the payment of taxes until disputes over taxation are
resolved in litigation), section 32 ensures that the blood of the
body politic keeps pumping because it ‘ensure[s] that the state
may continue to collect tax revenue during litigation,’ thereby
‘avoid[ing] unnecessary disruption of public services
. . . dependent on that revenue’ and the attendant ‘ “ ‘serious
detriment to the public.’ ” ’ [Citations.]
“Although section 32’s plain language purports to preclude
only ‘legal or equitable process . . . to prevent or enjoin the
collection of any tax’ until ‘[a]fter payment of [the disputed] tax’
[citation], ‘ “a taxpayer may not circumvent [section 32’s]
restraints on prepayment tax litigation by seeking only
declaratory relief” ’ when the ‘ “net result” ’ or ‘ “effect” ’ of
granting that declaratory relief is to absolve the taxpayer of
liability for the disputed tax. [Citations.] Because adjudication
of such declaratory relief claims would be binding on the state in
any further proceedings regarding the taxpayer’s liability
[citations], the judgment resolving such claims would effectively
prevent or enjoin the state from collecting the disputed tax.
Thus, as our Supreme Court has noted time and again,
declaratory relief claims that have the ‘net result’ or ‘effect’ — by
virtue of collateral estoppel — of resolving a disputed tax claim
are subject to section 32’s ‘pay first, litigate later’ rule.” (Kintner,
supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 930–931.)
Wynnefield’s suit relies on Government Code section 11350,
which states in subdivision (a), “Any interested person may
obtain a judicial declaration as to the validity of any regulation or
order of repeal by bringing an action for declaratory relief in the
superior court in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure.”
Kintner held that declaratory relief claims pursuant to this
statute by taxpayers with outstanding tax assessments are still
subject to section 32 for three reasons: first, because Government
Code section 11350 as a statute is subordinate to section 32 as a
constitutional provision; second, because Government Code
section 11350’s purpose of providing a forum for testing the
validity of regulations does not justify exempting tax challenges
from section 32, since taxpayers already have administrative and
judicial fora for challenging tax regulations; and third, because
our Supreme Court “strongly suggested” in Woosley v. State of
California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 758, 785, fn. 20, that Government
Code section 11350 is strictly construed in tax cases. (Kintner,
supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 933–934.) Kintner further reasoned
that Government Code section 11350 could peaceably coexist with
section 32, since the statute could allow challenges to non-tax
regulations or challenges to tax regulations by persons with “no
outstanding tax assessments, such as persons who are not the
taxpayer [citation] or . . . persons who are taxpayers facing tax
assessments in the future [citations].” (Id. at p. 933; but see State
Water Resources Control Bd. v. Superior Court (2025) 115
Cal.App.5th 734, 775, fn. 11 [questioning whether Kintner’s
examples of proper applications of Gov. Code, § 11350 properly
state the law].)
Wynnefield tries to distinguish Kintner in two ways,
neither of which is persuasive. First, it contends it comes within
the exception Kintner recognized for persons without outstanding
tax assessments, presumably because so far as the record shows,
the FTB has not finished its audit of Wynnefield’s 2021 return.
But Wynnefield’s is not the type of challenge Kintner had in
mind. (See State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Superior Court,
supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at pp. 774–775 [rejecting argument that
§ 32 prohibits suits only when a taxpayer faces an outstanding
tax assessment].) Wynnefield is not challenging the Regulation
in advance of assessments based on future activity. Its challenge
would affect an existing tax dispute, not a prospective one.
Declaring the Regulation invalid would be binding on the state in
its audit of Wynnefield, which would prevent the state from
relying on it to calculate and assess Wynnefield’s tax liability. As
Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1987)
44 Cal.3d 208, 213 explained, “Section 32 broadly limits in the
first instance the power of the courts to intervene in tax collection
matters; it does not merely make unavailable a particular remedy
or preclude actions challenging the ultimate validity of a tax
assessment. [Citation.] The section applies if the prepayment
judicial determination sought would impede tax collection.”
Second, Wynnefield argues that declaring the Regulation
invalid would not absolve Wynnefield of any tax liability or
prejudice the FTB at all. In Wynnefield’s view, if its suit were
successful it would merely remove the categorical rule embodied
in the Regulation and force the FTB to apportion Wynnefield’s
tax liability under a case-by-case standard.1 But proceeding
under a case-by-case standard rather than a categorical rule
would, at a minimum, make the FTB’s task harder or more time
consuming, which would impede tax collection. (See State Bd. of
Equalization v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 633, 639 [“ ‘ “Any
delay in the proceedings of the officer, upon whom the duty is
devolved of collecting the taxes, may derange the operations of
government, and thereby cause serious detriment to the
public.” ’ ”].) This is evident as a matter of common sense: If
Wynnefield’s suit did not strengthen its hand and prejudice the
FTB in relation to the ongoing audit, Wynnefield would not be
bringing it.
1 We deny Wynnefield’s July 23, 2026, request for judicial
notice of materials related to the validity of the Regulation
because they are unnecessary to our resolution of this appeal.
(County of San Diego v. State of California (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 580, 613, fn. 29.)
Apart from trying to distinguish Kintner, Wynnefield also
relies on Pacific Motor Transport Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization
(1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 230, 233–237, which allowed a challenge to
a tax regulation under the predecessor to Government Code
section 11350. Pacific Motor is distinguishable. It dealt with a
statutory prepayment rule and tried to reconcile that statute
with the predecessor to Government Code section 11350. (Id. at
pp. 234–235.) It did not deal with section 32, which takes
precedence as a constitutional provision over any statute. Also,
as Kintner, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at page 935, noted, there is no
indication that the plaintiff in Pacific Motor was subject to an
unpaid tax assessment or any other preparatory step. (Pacific
Motor, at pp. 234 [prayer for relief asked for declaration that
plaintiffs could “by suitable modification of their operations”
come within the favorable ambit of the regulation and the tax
liability that would result], 236 [other relief sought in complaint
not available because it would interfere with assessment and
collection of taxes].) Honeywell, Inc. v. State Board of
Equalization (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 907, 911–914, on which
Wynnefield also relies, expressed significant doubts about the
viability of a suit challenging the validity of a tax regulation to a
completed taxable transaction. It only entertained a challenge
because Pacific Motor “casts some doubt” on the rule that
declaratory relief is not appropriate when a taxpayer has already
completed a transaction. (Honeywell, at p. 914.) Honeywell
therefore lends Wynnefield no more assistance than Pacific Motor
itself.2
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BROWN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, J.
JACKSON, J.
Wynnefield Bros. Intl., LLC, v. FTB (A174794)
2 Like Kintner, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at page 926, to the
extent Pacific Motor is not distinguishable, we disagree with it,
and, by extension, with Honeywell.
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
district, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.