Edson v. Airbnb Payments, Inc.

Filed 10/30/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE JAMIE EDSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, A174267, A174839 v. AIRBNB PAYMENTS, INC., et al., (City & County of San Francisco Super. Ct. No. CGC-23-604821) Defendants and Respondents. Jamie Edson sued Airbnb Payments, Inc. (API) and Airbnb, Inc. (Airbnb) (collectively, defendants) for violations of the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.; UCL), premised on her assertion that defendants unlawfully and unfairly operate as escrow agents in violation of California’s Escrow Law (Fin. Code, § 17000 et seq.; undesignated statutory references are to this code). The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer to Edson’s third amended complaint without leave to amend on the basis that Edson failed to plead facts sufficient to establish defendants operated as escrow holders and, therefore, did not state causes of action under the UCL. We agree and affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND General Background Airbnb is a technology company that operates an online marketplace connecting “hosts,” who offer services such as short-term accommodations and activities, with “guests,” who seek to book those services. API is a 1 subsidiary of Airbnb that serves as its payment processor, handling the depositing, holding, and delivery of funds between guests and hosts. As of 2025, Airbnb had over 150 million active monthly users. Airbnb’s users—i.e., hosts and guests—are referred to as “members.” Members must agree to Airbnb’s terms of service (TOS) and payments terms of service (PTOS) (collectively, Terms) to use the platform. When a guest reserves a service on Airbnb, he or she generally pays at least a portion of the cost to API upon booking, which holds the money until the activity or accommodation takes place. For accommodation bookings, API generally releases the funds to hosts 24 hours after the time of check-in. The PTOS provides that API may combine and invest money paid by guests prior to disbursing those funds to hosts and that API will retain any interest earned on those investments. Neither Airbnb nor API holds itself out as an escrow agent or escrow company. Under the Terms, defendants disclaim acting as an agent in any way for any party except that API serves as a payment collection agent for hosts for the sole purpose of accepting and processing guest payments on the hosts’ behalf. Edson used Airbnb as a guest to rent property from a host for personal use. She sued defendants under the UCL for failing to comply with the Escrow Law, including by retaining the interest earned by investing guests’ payments, and the court granted defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings. After Edson disclaimed any private cause of action and limited her claim to one for public injunctive relief, the court lifted the stay and the following proceedings ensued. The Complaint In the operative third amended complaint (complaint), Edson asserted four causes of action seeking public injunctive relief, all related to her 2 contention that defendants acted as unlawful escrow agents and conducted activities that violate California’s Escrow Law. Specifically, the complaint alleged: (1) violation of the UCL by unlawful conduct for violating the Escrow Law; (2) violation of the UCL by unfair conduct for failing to comply with escrow obligations; (3) violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.; CLRA); and (4) unjust enrichment. The complaint’s central focus was Edson’s assertion that the PTOS unlawfully states defendants will retain interest earned by investing funds held in the period between being deposited by guests and disbursed to hosts on the basis that defendants are in actuality escrow holders, who are prohibited by law from receiving interest on funds deposited into escrow. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 1737, subd. (j).) She averred defendants therefore effectuate a “systematic conversion of . . . consumers’ money by way of an unlawful interest-income-siphoning scheme.” The complaint sought injunctive relief requiring defendants to become licensed escrow agents, revise the Terms, and pay interest earned on guests’ payments to either guests or hosts. Relevant Terms Edson attached as exhibits to the complaint the Terms in effect when this case commenced in 2023, as well as updated 2025 versions that were substantially similar for all relevant purposes. The TOS states reservations made on Airbnb are contracts entered into directly between hosts and guests and that Airbnb is not a party to those contracts. It expressly provides that “Airbnb is not acting as an agent in any capacity for any Member, except as specified in the [PTOS].” The PTOS, in turn, states that hosts agree to appoint API as the host’s “payment collection agent solely for the limited purpose of accepting and 3 processing funds from Guests purchasing Host Services on the Host’s behalf.” In addition, “[e]ach Guest acknowledges and agrees that, notwithstanding the fact that [API] is not a party to the agreement between [the guest] and the Host(s) . . . , [API] acts as each Host’s payment collection agent for the limited purpose of accepting payments from [the guest] on behalf of the Host(s).” API disclaims “any duties or obligations as agent for each Host except to the extent expressly set forth in [the PTOS], and any additional duties or obligations as may be implied by law are, to the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, expressly excluded.” API generally charges guests the total price for a reservation when the host accepts a guest’s booking request, but it may provide the option to pay only a portion of the cost upon booking and pay the remainder at a later time, prior to check-in, subject to a schedule of payments detailed during checkout. Each host agrees that “payment made by a Guest through [API] shall be considered the same as a payment made directly to the Host.” Under the section titled “Handling of Funds,” the PTOS states API may combine amounts it collects from guests and invest those funds “as permitted under applicable laws.” Central to Edson’s claims, API “will retain any interest it earns on those investments.” API generally initiates payouts to hosts for reserved bookings 24 hours after a guest’s scheduled check-in time for accommodations or 24 hours after the start time for an activity. All reservations are subject to various rules and policies, including cancellation policies set by the host. There are numerous provisions governing refunds and cancellations of bookings, which can occur for various reasons and may be initiated by guests, hosts, or by Airbnb itself. If a guest cancels a reservation, the amount paid to hosts is determined by the cancellation policy for that specific reservation, as set by the host. If a host 4 cancels a reservation, API will hold the funds for up to 72 hours while guests are given the option to receive a refund, apply the funds toward a new booking with a different host, or, in some instances, receive a credit in lieu of a cash refund. If Airbnb cancels a booking, any amount collected by API will be refunded to guests in accordance with the refund policy. Trial Court’s Ruling on Demurrer Defendants demurred to the complaint. In July 2025, after briefing and a hearing, the court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. As an initial matter, the court found Edson improperly added the third and fourth causes of action, alleging a violation of the CLRA and unjust enrichment, without leave of court. Edson does not challenge that ruling on appeal. The court concluded the two remaining claims for violations of the UCL failed to state a cause of action. Specifically, because the Terms state API is the disclosed agent of the host, and that a payment made by a guest through API is considered the same as a payment made directly to the host, the complaint failed to allege defendants acted as a neutral third-party escrow holder. The court entered judgment for defendants and Edson appealed. 1 DISCUSSION Edson avers the court erred by concluding the complaint failed to allege the transactions at issue—guest payments for reservations collected by API and held until being disbursed to hosts 24 hours after check-in—constitute escrow transactions under California law. We are not persuaded. 1 Edson filed notices of appeal from both the order and the judgment. The appeals were consolidated by order dated February 24, 2026. 5 I. Standard of Review Our standard of review on appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer is well settled. We review the order de novo, independently examining the operative complaint to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action as a matter of law. (Mathews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768; Amiodarone Cases (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 1091, 1100.) “ ‘ “ ‘ “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.” [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.]’ ” [Citation.] We likewise accept facts that are reasonably implied or may be inferred from the complaint’s express allegations.’ ” (Amiodarone Cases, at p. 1100.) On appeal, the burden is on the plaintiff to show he or she pled facts sufficient to establish each element of each cause of action and, therefore, the demurrer was erroneously sustained as a matter of law. (Amiodarone Cases, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1100–1101.) Where, as here, the demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, the plaintiff must prove there is a “ ‘reasonable possibility’ ” that amendment could cure any defect in the complaint. (King v. CompPartners, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1039, 1050.) II. The Complaint Failed To Allege Sufficient Facts To State Causes of Action for Violations of the UCL This appeal turns on whether Edson has shown the complaint alleged facts sufficient to establish her UCL claims, as she does not challenge the court’s ruling as to her CLRA and unjust enrichment claims. 6  The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200; In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 311 [“ ‘[T]here are three varieties of unfair competition: practices which are unlawful, unfair or fraudulent.’ ”].) The case before us focuses on the first two prongs as Edson asserts defendants are (1) unlawfully and (2) unfairly acting as escrow agents when accepting, holding, and disbursing guest payments. “A business practice is ‘unfair,’ ‘when it offends an established public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.’ ” (Community Assisting Recovery, Inc. v. Aegis Security Ins. Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 886, 894, 891; see id. at pp. 894–895 [whether a business practice is unfair is a question of fact, while unlawfulness is a question of law].) An order of dismissal at the demurrer stage will be affirmed where the complaint fails to allege facts showing that a business practice is, as relevant here, either unfair or unlawful. (Id. at p. 895.) Therefore, Edson must demonstrate she pled facts establishing defendants illegally or unfairly acted as escrow agents within the meaning of California’s Escrow Law, or that she could cure any defect by amendment. Edson has not done so. A. Applicable Escrow Law Principles “ ‘An escrow involves the deposit of documents and/or money with a third party to be delivered on the occurrence of some condition.’ ” (Summit Financial Holdings, Ltd. v. Continental Lawyers Title Co. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 705, 711 (Summit).) The Escrow Law was enacted in 1951 to regulate the “recently emerged business of escrow deposit undertaken by independent escrow agents in California,” as distinct from individuals and entities that served as escrow 7 holders as part of other businesses subject to their own regulation by the state, such as banks, real estate brokers, title insurance companies, underwriters, and attorneys. (Escrow Institute of Cal. v. Pierno (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 361, 366–367; see 2 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2026) §§ 6:3, 6:4 (Miller & Starr).) It serves to protect the public from “unfair, fraudulent[,] and incompetent service” by these independent escrow agents, subjecting them to regulation under the Financial Code by the Department of Financial Protection and Innovation. (Escrow Institute of Cal., at pp. 366–367; see § 17002.) Escrow is defined as “any transaction in which one person, for the purpose of effecting the sale, transfer, encumbering, or leasing of real or personal property to another person, delivers any written instrument, money, evidence of title to real or personal property, or other thing of value to a third person [the escrow holder] to be held by that third person until the happening of a specified event or the performance of a prescribed condition, when it is then to be delivered by that third person to a grantee, grantor, promisee, promisor, obligee, obligor, bailee, bailor, or any agent or employee of any of the latter.” (§ 17003, subd. (a).) Such specified events or conditions are laid out in escrow instructions, which are usually provided to the escrow holder around the time the money and/or documents are deposited and which tell the escrow holder to hold the deposited items until certain conditions are satisfied, at which point the escrow holder must deliver the items. (Miller & Starr, supra, § 6:21.) Escrow can include transactions by internet escrow companies or agents that receive escrows for deposit or delivery over the internet. (§§ 17003, subd. (b), 17004.5.) Though the prototypical escrow transaction involves transfers of real estate, escrows can be used for the transfer of any 8 real or personal property and are “routinely opened, for example, for the transfer of liquor licenses, the delivery of securities, disbursement of viatical settlements, bulk sales, and the purchase and sale of mobile homes.” (Miller & Starr, supra, § 6:1, fns. omitted.) A key characteristic of an escrow transaction is that the escrow holder is an agent and fiduciary of all parties to the escrow. (Summit, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 711; Virtanen v. O’Connell (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 688, 703.) The escrow holder’s fiduciary duties involve strictly and faithfully complying with the instructions of the parties and the agency created by the escrow is “limited to the obligation of the escrow holder to carry out the instructions of each of the parties to the escrow.” (Summit, at p. 711.) Another key characteristic of an escrow transaction is that one party may not unilaterally rescind the agreement, as “[o]nce there is a binding and enforceable contract between the parties, the deposit into escrow becomes irrevocable, and neither party can withdraw the deposited items before the escrow conditions are satisfied”—at least not without the consent of the other party. (Miller & Starr, supra, §§ 6:31, 6:30.) If an escrow exists, the escrow agent must maintain funds received as part of an escrow transaction in a separate account and may not commingle them with other funds or the agents’ own funds. (§ 17409, subd. (a); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 1737, subd. (a).) Additionally, interest earned on escrow funds shall not belong to the escrow agent and instead must be paid to the principal who deposited the money in escrow, unless the escrow instructions clearly name another recipient (other than the escrow agent). (§ 17410, subd. (a); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 1737, subd. (j).) In no case may such interest be considered an asset of the escrow agent, even if the escrow instructions provide otherwise. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 1737, subd. (j).) 9  With these principles in mind, we turn to Edson’s challenge to the court’s ruling. B. Analysis Edson’s contention that the transactions at issue in her complaint between guests, defendants, and hosts qualify as escrow transactions within the meaning of the Escrow Law is unavailing. The premise of her claim is that the “governing contract” between guests, hosts, and defendants is made up of the Terms and the listing for the accommodation, which she asserts serve as the escrow instructions. She contends that these instructions in turn require API to hold the money until the various conditions are met—according to Edson, such conditions include guests and hosts complying with the Terms as well as the guest “checking into the booking without any cancellation and finding the property as advertised in the Listing and otherwise suitable.” Upon satisfaction of these purported conditions, API then delivers the money to hosts. The fatal flaw with her argument, however, is that she failed to allege any facts demonstrating that any of the parties to these transactions have any expectation, belief, or intention that defendants will act as escrow holders consistent with the Escrow Law and abide by the associated regulations. Edson did not even allege that she believed or intended that, by making a payment for an accommodation, she was depositing her money into an escrow, entering into an agency and fiduciary relationship with defendants, or entitling herself to any interest earned by investing the money prior to disbursing the funds to the hosts 24 hours after check-in. Indeed, the Terms that Edson and all other guests (as well as hosts) agree to expressly disclaim any such possibility. They explicitly state defendants act as an agent solely for the hosts and solely for the limited 10 purpose of accepting and processing payments from guests. This very limited agency is contrary to the legal structure of escrows, in which the escrow holder is both agent and fiduciary to all parties. (Summit, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 711.) Additionally, and crucially, the complaint did not allege that Edson or any other parties to the transactions intend for the reservations to be irrevocable and subject to recission only if agreed upon by all parties, which is a hallmark of escrow transactions. (See Miller & Starr, supra, §§ 6:30, 6:31.) To the contrary, there are numerous provisions in the Terms that envision unilateral cancellations by either guests, hosts, or defendants themselves. This is fundamentally inconsistent with an escrow transaction. For example, the Terms provide that guests are entitled to cancel their reservations as long as they are consistent with the hosts’ cancellation policy, and hosts can unilaterally cancel a booking without the consent of the guests, after which a guest is given the option to apply the funds toward a new booking or receive a refund or credit. Clearly, the reservations are not irrevocable. Further, the Terms also explain that, if Airbnb cancels a booking, guests will have their money refunded in accordance with the refund policy. We are aware of no escrow transaction in which the escrow holder may itself cancel the transaction and return the money to the depositor on its own terms. Of course, that would run afoul of the escrow holder’s agency and fiduciary obligations to faithfully and strictly execute the escrow instructions. (See Summit, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 711.) There is good reason for such cancellation policies that do not require the consent of all parties. We can think of numerous reasons why a guest may want to cancel a booking and get his or her money back, or why a host 11 might need to use the listed property during the reserved time. However, we need not conjure up such possibilities; it is enough that, when making a reservation on Airbnb, guests and hosts plainly understand that they are not entering into an irrevocable contract subject to the strict regulations of the Escrow Law. 2 We also note that, if we were to accept Edson’s argument that defendants are acting as escrow agents, despite no party expecting or agreeing to enter into an official escrow transaction, the repercussions could be far-reaching. There are countless analogous situations that would be implicated, including any of the online booking sites that match a seller with a buyer and take a monetary deposit that is disbursed upon execution of the sale. For instance, a travel booking site that lists a hotel or rental car could be viewed as an escrow transaction. The Escrow Law was not intended to sweep so broadly. Edson’s attempt to liken this case to Pasternak v. Boutris (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 907 is without merit. In that case, a licensed escrow company 2 Edson’s effort at oral argument to raise new caselaw in support of her claim that defendants may not validly waive their responsibility for violations of the Escrow Law and related regulations is misplaced—on top of being belated and unfair to defendants (see People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 990 [“ ‘Obvious reasons of fairness militate against consideration of an issue raised initially’ at oral argument.”]). As we have explained, defendants are not acting as escrow agents or fiduciaries, contrary to the cases Edson cited. (Cf. Neubauer v. Goldfarb (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 47, 55– 57 [waiver of corporate directors’ and majority shareholders’ fiduciary duties to minority shareholders in private close corporations is against public policy]; Cohen v. Kite Hill Community Assn. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 642, 654– 655 [exculpatory clause did not relieve homeowners association from liability for breach of its fiduciary duties as it occupied particularly elevated position of trust]; Akin v. Business Title Corp. (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 153, 155–157, 159 [waiver of liability invalid where party seeking exculpation is an escrow company].) 12 agreed to serve as escrow holder for another business purporting to engage in viatical settlements (which involve payment to a terminally ill person in exchange for being named as beneficiary of his or her life insurance policy) that were subject to express escrow agreements as well as escrow instructions, but the program for funding and implementing the settlements was in actuality fraudulent. (Id. at pp. 911–912.) The court concluded the depositing of money into the escrow accounts constituted escrow transactions under section 17003 even though the underlying agreements were fraudulent as the depositors contemplated that the escrow company would deliver that money upon the occurrence of certain conditions. (Pasternak, at pp. 919– 920.) Here, by contrast, there was no party holding itself out as an escrow company or agent, no escrow agreement, no escrow instructions, and no depositor contemplating the completion of an escrow transaction in the facts alleged in the complaint. Plainly, Pasternak does not aid Edson. Moreover, Edson’s reliance on the legislative history and text of the Escrow Law—in particular, amendments to the law in 1999 and 2000 by Assembly Bill No. 583 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 583) and Assembly Bill No. 333 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333)—is misplaced. 3 For instance, Edson notes that Assembly Bill 583 added the definition of “internet escrow agent” to the Escrow Law in 1999. (Stats. 1999, ch. 441, 3 We grant Edson’s unopposed December 22, 2025 request for judicial notice of two portions of the legislative history of Assembly Bills 583 and 333 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a)). On our own motion, we take judicial notice of other portions of the legislative history of those bills (see Gananian v. Wagstaffe (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1541, fn. 9), specifically the committee and floor analyses, as well as the enrolled bill reports as “instructive on matters of legislative intent.” (Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 934, fn. 19.) 13 § 2.) That bill’s sponsor, the state agency that regulated escrow agents under the Escrow Law (then called the Department of Corporations), indicated that the purpose of the amendment was “to keep pace with the new ways of conducting escrow business that ha[d] evolved as a result of electronic commerce and electronic technological advances” as “ ‘the Internet escrow business [was] emerging and greatly varie[d] from the traditional escrow business.’ ” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 583 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 14, 1999, p. 3.) For example, emerging internet escrow transactions involved personal property being sold for much less than in traditional escrow transactions and averaged thousands of transactions a month. (Id. at pp. 3– 4.) However, a closer examination of Assembly Bill 583 demonstrates it was meant to expand the Escrow Law to account for the emergence of companies that were explicitly engaged in the business of escrows offered over the internet, rather than an effort to force internet companies in general to register as escrow agents. For example, an enrolled bill report explained that the sponsor was concerned with new companies that were offering escrow services online and that the amendment “[w]ould ensure that consumers who avail themselves of escrow services for personal property transactions over the internet” had the same level of protections as other escrow consumers. (Dept. of Corporations, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 583 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) prepared for Governor Davis (Aug. 30, 1999) pp. 6, 1, italics added.) A typical transaction the bill was meant to address was described as follows. “A seller plans to use the internet to advertise . . . a Furby for $200. When the seller goes online the seller would notice an ad for escrow services. 14 If the seller clicks the ad, a description of the escrow services by the escrow company would be provided. If the seller decides to avail himself/herself of the use of this service, the seller could then proceed with the instructions on the screen to eventually form an agreement with the escrow company. . . . If both seller and buyer eventually agree to use the escrow company and agree to consummate the sale, the buyer would then deliver the purchase price . . . to the escrow company. Once the funds clear, the escrow company would hold the funds and notify the seller. The seller would then mail the Furby . . . [and] [t]he buyer would then have a few days to inspect the Furby and to contact the escrow company of its acceptance,” at which point the escrow company transfers the funds to the seller. (Dept. of Corporations, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 583 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) prepared for Governor Davis (Aug. 30, 1999) pp. 1–2.) Assembly Bill 583 thus expressly contemplated expanding the Escrow Law to include companies that were holding themselves out as escrow agents on the internet in order to regulate those companies. Contrary to Edson’s assertion, this typical transaction is not “essentially identical” to transactions facilitated by defendants because, as already explained, defendants do not hold themselves out as or agree to act as escrow agents. Similarly, Assembly Bill 333, which further expanded the definition of escrow transactions to account for internet transactions and payments, was meant to address a competitive disadvantage for “ ‘good actors’ ”—namely, internet escrow companies that asked for a state license—compared to online companies that operated unlicensed. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 333 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 7, 2000, pp. 1, 3.) This does not evince any intent by the 15 Legislature to sweep the type of transactions at issue in this case into the Escrow Law. In sum, as the complaint failed to allege facts demonstrating that defendants acted as escrow agents in violation of the Escrow Law, Edson has not met her burden to plead a cause of action under the UCL for unlawful business conduct. She has also failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action for an unfair business practice under the UCL. Whatever guests may understandably feel about defendants’ retaining the interest earned by investing their payments, Edson has not alleged facts showing that such a practice offends public policy or is “ ‘immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.’ ” (Community Assisting Recovery, Inc. v. Aegis Security Ins. Co., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 894.) Finally, Edson does not argue that she can cure these defects in the complaint through amendment, and we find it is not reasonably possible that amendment could cure the defects as Edson’s UCL claims are premised on a fundamental misapplication of the Escrow Law. (See King v. CompPartners, Inc., supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1050.) Accordingly, the court did not err by sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.4 4 We need not, and do not, reach the parties’ arguments as to the trial court’s suggestion that Edson lacked standing to bring her claims. The court did not expressly rule on that issue. Instead, it stated it was “not convinced that [Edson] has standing to bring a UCL claim or that the Financial Code contemplates a private right of action,” noting Edson had not alleged that she relied on defendants’ status as an escrow agent, had any beliefs regarding their status as escrow holders, or expected to be paid interest when booking the reservation. But the dismissal of the action was in no way predicated on a finding that Edson lacked standing, and our affirmance likewise does not necessitate a ruling on the issue. 16  DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are awarded costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).) PETROU, J. WE CONCUR: FUJISAKI, Acting P. J. RODRÍGUEZ, J. A174267, A174839 / Edson v. Airbnb Payments, Inc. et al. 17 Trial Court: San Francisco City and County Superior Court Trial Judge: Hon. Charles F. Haines Counsel: Zimmerman Reed, Nare Kupelian, Zain Shirazi, Caleb Marker and Hart L. Robinovitch, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, Michael J. Mongan and Nitisha Baronia, for Defendants and Respondents. 18