Celious v. Engel CA2/8

Filed 11/10/26 Celious v. Engel CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT AARON CELIOUS, B345501 (Consol. w/B348972) Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22SMCV00915) v. ROBIN ENGEL et al., Defendants and Respondents. APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Edward B. Moreton, Jr., Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. Aaron Celious, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Law Office of Shanen R. Prout and Shanen R. Prout for Defendant and Respondent Robin Engel. Hogan Zappaterreno, John V. Hogan, and Cassandra Zappaterreno for Defendant and Respondent Ernesto Morales. _________________________________  INTRODUCTION This is plaintiff Aaron Celious’s second appeal arising out of the City of Los Angeles’s (City) solicitation of public contracts for two projects funded by the City. Celious is an independent contractor for a company that submitted unsuccessful contract proposals for those projects. Defendants Robin Engel and Ernesto Morales are executives for two companies that were awarded the contracts. In this consolidated appeal, Celious challenges the trial court’s orders granting Engel’s and Morales’s motions for judgment on the pleadings, Morales’s motion for monetary sanctions against Celious, and Morales’s motion to deem Celious a vexatious litigant. Celious contends that the trial court erred when it found he failed to state a cause of action against Engel and Morales for intentional interference with prospective economic relations (tortious interference). Celious also contends that the trial court should have granted him leave to file an amended complaint asserting causes of action for fraud and negligent misrepresentation against Engel and Morales based on the same conduct giving rise to his tortious interference claim. In addition, Celious argues that the trial court erred when it deemed him a vexatious litigant and awarded Morales monetary sanctions. We reverse a prefiling order that the trial court issued without providing Celious notice or the opportunity to be heard. We otherwise affirm. BACKGROUND 1. The public contracts Maroon Society Inc. (Maroon Society) provides “data compilation, analysis, planning, and strategic consulting services for government agencies to improve program administration, and 2 policy development.” Almost all of Maroon Society’s revenue comes from government contracts procured through competitive bidding procedures. Celious is one of Maroon Society’s independent contractors. He “holds a Commission Agreement with Maroon Society to prepare bids, proposals, and all tasks related to procuring new contracts” for the company. Maroon Society pays Celious a commission of 25% of the total value of contracts that are awarded to the company. Engel is the chief executive officer (CEO) of Star Insights, LLC, and Morales is the CEO of North Star Alliances LLC (North Star), both of which are consulting companies. In 2021, the City issued a request for proposals for professional assistance to facilitate the “ ‘implementation of the outreach efforts necessary to maximize public input on the redrawing of’ ” the Los Angeles Unified School District’s school board member district boundaries (LAUSD Project). Later that year, the City issued a request for proposals for assistance in developing “a five-year strategic plan for the Los Angeles Civil, Human Rights and Equity Department” (CHRED project). The City awarded the contract for the LAUSD Project to North Star and the contract for the CHRED Project to Star Insights. Maroon Society submitted unsuccessful bids for both projects. 2. Celious’s lawsuit In September 2023, after the City denied his protests to the contract awards, Celious filed the operative second amended complaint against the City and several individual defendants who worked for the City (individual City defendants), Engel, and Morales. Against Engel and Morales, Celious asserted causes of 3 action for tortious interference, negligent interference with prospective economic relations, and violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.). The gravamen of Celious’s lawsuit is that North Star and Star Insights were awarded contracts for the LAUSD and CHRED projects, respectively, even though they did not “complete the bidding requirements” for the projects’ requests for proposals and “misrepresented their qualifications to gain an unfair competitive advantage over” Celious. With respect to his tortious interference claim, Celious alleged the following facts. Celious and Maroon Society shared an economic relationship based on their commission agreement, and Maroon Society and the City shared an economic relationship that was created when Celious prepared the company’s contract proposals for the LAUSD and CHRED projects. Engel and Morales were aware of both economic relationships. With the intent to disrupt those relationships, Engel and Morales made false and fraudulent statements that violated laws and regulations governing the procurement of public contracts. Those statements disrupted Celious’s economic relationship with Maroon Society and Maroon Society’s economic relationship with the City, causing both Celious and Maroon Society to suffer economic damages. After the trial court sustained demurrers to the second amended complaint that were filed by the City, the individual City defendants, and Engel and Morales, it apparently dismissed all but Celious’s claims for tortious interference against Engel and Morales. 4  2.1. Motions seeking leave to amend, judgment on the pleadings, and monetary sanctions On July 25, 2024, Celious filed a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint that he claimed added or altered legal theories against Engel and Morales that were based on facts he already pled in his prior complaints. Morales and Engel opposed Celious’s motion, arguing, among other things, that the proposed third amended complaint improperly sought to contradict allegations from Celious’s prior pleadings and add new allegations that were known to Celious when he filed his original complaint. Morales and Engel also argued that Celious’s declaration supporting his motion failed to explain when he discovered the facts supporting the new allegations in his proposed complaint. In late August 2024, the court denied Celious’s motion because he failed to explain why he could not have alleged the new facts or added Morales and Engel to his existing fraud causes of action in his prior pleadings. On September 3, 2024, Celious filed a second motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. Morales and Engel opposed Celious’s second motion for leave to amend. Among other things, Morales argued that Celious was trying to deceive the trial court by failing to highlight or underline in his proposed third amended complaint new factual allegations that were not included in his second amended complaint. Morales also argued that Celious failed again to explain in his supporting declaration why he did not include the new factual allegations in his prior pleadings. Less than a week after Morales and Engel filed their oppositions, Celious withdrew his second motion for leave to amend. 5  On September 30, 2024, Celious filed a motion for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). Celious sought relief from the trial court’s order denying his July 25, 2024 motion for leave to amend, arguing his failure to file an adequate supporting declaration was the result of his excusable neglect in failing to comprehend the procedural requirements for seeking leave to file an amended complaint. Celious attached to his motion for relief a new motion for leave to amend and a new proposed third amended complaint. Morales and Engel opposed Celious’s motion for relief. The court denied Celious’s motion for relief, explaining that Celious’s ignorance of the requirements for seeking leave to file an amended complaint did not constitute grounds for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). On October 24, 2024, Celious filed a “renewed” motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. Morales and Engel opposed Celious’s renewed motion. Morales argued that Celious’s renewed motion continued to fail to explain why Celious could not allege any of his new facts in his prior pleadings. Morales also argued that the proposed third amended complaint attached to Celious’s renewed motion was a sham pleading because it included allegations that directly contradicted allegations included in Celious’s previous verified pleadings, such as allegations concerning when Maroon Society formed an economic relationship with the City. On November 12, 2024, Morales and Engel filed motions for judgment on the pleadings against Celious’s second amended complaint. The record on appeal does not include copies of either motion. 6  On November 13, 2024, Celious filed a second renewed motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. On November 18, 2024, Morales filed a motion for monetary sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 (Section 128.5), seeking over $24,000 in attorney fees and other expenses, arguing Celious engaged in bad faith tactics by repeatedly filing and withdrawing frivolous motions for leave to file a third amended complaint. Celious opposed the sanctions motion on the grounds that he acted in good faith in seeking leave to file a third amended complaint and that Morales was not prejudiced by any of his actions. That same day, Celious withdrew his first renewed motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. On December 11, 2024, the trial court denied Celious’s second renewed motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. The court found that Celious had access to all the “new” evidence that he claimed supported his renewed motion (and his prior motions seeking leave to amend) before he filed his lawsuit. Accordingly, the court found that Celious failed to provide a “ ‘satisfactory explanation for [his] previous failure to present the allegedly new or different evidence.’ ” Also on December 11, 2024, the trial court granted without leave to amend Engel’s and Morales’s motions for judgment on the pleadings. Relying on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt South, Inc. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 505 (Roy Allan), the court found that Celious could not allege the first element of his tortious interference claim. Specifically, the court found that Celious could not allege the existence of a prospective economic relationship between Maroon Society and the City arising out of 7 the company’s decision to bid on contracts for the LAUSD and CHRED projects, because the competitive bidding process for such public contracts is too speculative. Thus, the court explained, even if Engel and Morales did not allegedly misrepresent their companies’ qualifications while bidding on those contracts, there was no guarantee that the City would have awarded the contracts to Maroon Society. On December 17, 2024, the trial court granted in part and denied in part Morales’s motion for sanctions. The court denied the motion to the extent it sought sanctions based on Celious’s repeated filing of unsuccessful motions for leave to file a third amended complaint because Morales failed to comply with Section 128.5’s 21-day safe harbor provision. The trial court granted Morales’s motion, however, to the extent it sought sanctions based on Celious’s tactic of withdrawing two of his motions seeking leave to file a third amended complaint. The court found that Celious’s conduct “constitute[d] bad faith tactics, designed to take unfair advantage of his opposing party and solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” The court explained, “[Celious] withdrew his motions so he could delay the Court’s ruling on the merits of the motions in the hopes he could artfully plead around the arguments Morales asserted in his oppositions. [Celious] waited to see what Morales’ oppositions said before deciding to take the motions off calendar, and he did this not once, but twice. This is clear evidence that [Celious] acted in subjective bad faith. Sanctioning [Celious] is the only way to control the burdensome and unnecessary legal tactics [he] has engaged in in the last several months with respect to filing repeated, substantially identical motions requesting leave to file a TAC.” 8  On December 27, 2024, Celious filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s ruling on Morales’s sanctions motion. The trial court denied Celious’s reconsideration motion. On January 7, 2025, the trial court entered judgment dismissing Celious’s claims against Engel and Morales. Celious appealed from the judgment and the trial court’s sanctions order. 2.2. Vexatious litigant proceedings On February 11, 2025, Morales filed a motion to deem Celious a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure section 391, subdivisions (b)(2) and (b)(3). Morales also asked the trial court to issue a prefiling order under section 391.7, subdivision (a). Morales’s motion was based on Celious repeatedly filing and withdrawing motions seeking leave to file a third amended complaint after the trial court denied his first motion for leave to amend and his failed attempt at seeking reconsideration of the trial court’s sanctions order. On April 7, 2025, the trial court granted Morales’s vexatious litigant motion. The court found that Celious qualified as a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure section 391, subdivision (b)(3), because he repeatedly filed and withdrew unmeritorious motions seeking leave to file a third amended complaint, all of which were either frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. The court directed Morales to prepare a proposed order. On May 12, 2025, the trial court signed a proposed order deeming Celious a vexatious litigant and requiring him to pay a $10,000 security bond for any future motions he filed in this lawsuit. The court struck through two paragraphs in the proposed order that would have required Celious to pay prefiling 9 bonds for any appeals he pursued related to this case and any new litigation. On June 6, 2025, the trial court issued a new prefiling order requiring Celious to pay a $50,000 bond before filing any further motions below, and a $50,000 bond for each appeal he pursued in this case. Celious appealed from the order declaring him a vexatious litigant and the prefiling order. We consolidated Celious’s appeals from the sanctions order, the judgment dismissing his claims against Engel and Morales, and the vexatious litigant orders. DISCUSSION 1. The motions for judgment on the pleadings Celious argues that the trial court erred when it granted Morales’s and Engel’s motions for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing his claim against defendants for tortious interference. At the very least, Celious contends, the court should have granted him leave to add claims against defendants for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Both of Celious’s arguments lack merit. 1.1. Standard of review The trial court may grant judgment on the pleadings when the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).) A motion for judgment on the pleadings operates like a demurrer and is subject to the same de novo standard of review. (Kapsimallis v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 667, 672.) We must accept as true all properly pleaded material facts but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Ibid.) We may consider matters that are subject to judicial notice. (Ibid.) 10  We review a court’s refusal to grant leave to amend for abuse of discretion. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The trial court abuses its discretion if there is a reasonable possibility that the complaint’s defects can be cured by amendment. (Ibid.) The plaintiff carries the burden of showing an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) 1.2. Celious failed to state a claim for tortious interference A claim for tortious interference has five elements: (1) the existence of an economic relationship between the plaintiff and a third party that contains the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of that relationship; (3) the defendant commits intentionally wrongful acts that are designed to disrupt that relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm proximately caused by the defendant’s action. (Roy Allan, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 512.) In Roy Allan, the California Supreme Court addressed when, if ever, a disappointed bidder for a public works contract can establish the first element of a tortious interference claim— i.e., the existence of the requisite economic relationship with the public entity that solicited bids for the contract. (Roy Allan, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 512–522.) There, two asphalt companies that unsuccessfully bid on a series of public contracts sued a third asphalt company that was awarded the contracts. (Id. at p. 510.) The plaintiffs alleged that they submitted the second lowest bids for several of the contracts that were awarded to the defendant, and that they would have been awarded those contracts but for the defendant’s wrongful conduct during the bidding process. (Id. at pp. 509–510.) The Supreme Court held that under the 11 circumstances of that case, the plaintiffs had “ ‘at most a hope for an economic relationship [with the public entity] and a desire for future benefit,’ ” which was too speculative to support a tortious interference claim. (Id. at p. 517.) The Court explained that tortious interference “ ‘traditionally has not protected speculative expectancies’ [citation], usually because ‘ “there is no sufficient degree of certainty that the plaintiff ever would have received the anticipated benefits.” ’ ” (Roy Allan, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 518, italics omitted.) The Court noted that in two of its prior decisions, it held that the tort “lies ‘ “when a contract would, with certainty, have been consummated but for the conduct of the tortfeasor” ’ [(Buckaloo v. Johnson (1975) 14 Cal.3d 815, 823, fn. 6)],” or where there is “ ‘at least the reasonable probability of an expectancy to establish a cause of action for interference with prospective economic advantage’ [(Youst v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64, 71–72)].” (Roy Allan, at p. 518.) The Court explained that the second standard “ ‘is especially appropriate to evaluate a lost economic expectancy where the facts involve a competitive contest of one kind or another. To require less of a showing would open the proverbial floodgates to a surge of litigation based on alleged missed opportunities to win various types of contests, despite the speculative outcome of many of them.’ ” (Ibid.) The Court then observed that bidding for public works contracts is an “inherently speculative” process. (Roy Allan, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 518–519.) A public entity typically can reject all bids for a project, and a proposed contractor often has no way to know whether it is the lowest responsible bidder or otherwise the most qualified bidder for the project due to the 12 secretive nature of the bidding process. (Id. at p. 519.) A public entity typically retains discretion to reject other qualified bids if it does not ultimately form a contract with the lowest bidder, further decreasing any certainty the second-most qualified bidder may have in receiving a public contract but for lowest bidder’s wrongful conduct. (Ibid.) In addition, the public entity’s evaluation of whether a bidder is most qualified to receive a contract is a “ ‘complex matter dependent, often, on information received outside the bidding process and requiring, in many cases, an application of subtle judgment.’ ” (Ibid.) All these circumstances, the Court reasoned, “counsel against extending a tortious interference claim to the bid process for these public works contracts.” (Id. at p. 520.) Here, Celious alleged that by bidding for public contracts for the LAUSD and CHRED projects, Maroon Society established an economic relationship with the City that carried the probability of future economic benefit. Engel and Morales tortiously interfered with that relationship by fraudulently misrepresenting the qualifications and experience of their respective companies, with the intent to gain an unfair advantage over Maroon Society. But for that tortious interference, the City would have awarded Maroon Society contracts for the two projects. These allegations are virtually identical to those that the Supreme Court rejected in Roy Allan. They therefore cannot support a claim for tortious interference against Engel and Morales. Celious argues that this case is distinguishable from Roy Allan because the bidding processes for the LAUSD and CHRED projects were different from the bidding process at issue in that case. Celious claims that unlike in Roy Allan, the bidding 13 processes in this case did not utilize a lowest-responsible bidder system. Instead, the City evaluated contract proposals on multiple criteria, including price, “firm experience, personnel and proposal responsiveness,” as well as the firm’s “ ‘familiarity with the City … political challenges, budget priorities, … policy goals,’ and staff qualifications.” Celious argues that these differences matter because proposed contractors for the LAUSD and CHRED projects were not on equal footing, and a contractor’s prior experience working with the City was a factor used in the evaluation process. We disagree. To be sure, the bidding processes at issue in this case and the one at issue in Roy Allan may not be identical. But they share critical similarities. For instance, like in Roy Allan, the City’s requests for contract proposals for the LAUSD and CHRED projects were simply requests for proposals from interested contractors. (Roy Allan, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 517.) The bidding processes in this case were competitive and speculative, as they did not guarantee anyone would receive a contract if certain criteria were met. Indeed, like the public entity in Roy Allan, the City was free to reject all bids for the LAUSD and CHRED projects, regardless of how well qualified a bid may have been. (See id. at p. 519.) In addition, the bidding processes in this case required the City to analyze a bidder’s qualifications based on range of criteria, which requires the “ ‘application of subtle judgment.’ ” (Ibid.) All these factors demonstrate how speculative Maroon Society’s chances were of establishing a beneficial economic relationship with the City through its bids for the LAUSD and CHRED projects, even without any alleged wrongful interference from defendants’ companies during the bidding processes for 14 those projects. In other words, Maroon Society had “ ‘at most a hope for an economic relationship [with the City] and a desire for future benefit,’ ” which is insufficient to establish the requisite economic relationship to support a tortious interference claim. (Roy Allan, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 517.) Finally, Celious argues that we should reverse the trial court’s decision because he alleged the existence of a sufficiently beneficial economic relationship between himself and Maroon Society. Celious alleged that a relationship existed by virtue of his commission agreement with the company, and defendants tortiously interfered with that relationship through their allegedly fraudulent conduct during the bidding processes for the LAUSD and CHRED projects. This theory is dependent, however, on the success of the theory that we just rejected. Celious did not allege any facts to suggest defendants directly interfered with his relationship with Maroon Society. Rather, for Celious to establish a tortious interference claim against defendants based on his relationship with Maroon Society, he necessarily needs to establish that defendants tortiously interfered with Maroon Society’s relationship with the City. As we just explained, however, Celious cannot establish the latter form of tortious interference under Ray Allan. It necessarily follows, then, that Celious also cannot establish that defendants tortiously interfered with his relationship with Maroon Society based on any alleged wrongdoing in the bidding process for the LAUSD and CHRED projects. In short, the trial court correctly found that Celious failed to state a claim for tortious interference. 15  1.3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Celious leave to amend or add new claims Celious next contends that the trial court should have granted him leave to file a third amended complaint. He argues that he should have been allowed to add claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation against Engel and Morales, arising out of the allegedly false statements they made during the bidding process for the LAUSD and CHRED projects. As we explain, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Celious leave to add new claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. As we outlined above, Celious made numerous unsuccessful attempts below to file a third amended complaint. Although Celious asserts that the trial court erred each time it denied his attempts to file an amended complaint, he ultimately seeks leave to add new claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation against Engel and Morales based on their alleged interference with Celious’s economic relationship with Maroon Society and Maroon Society’s prospective contractual relationship with the City. Because we conclude that Celious should not have been granted leave to add such claims, we need not address the merits of the trial court’s rulings on each of Celious’s motions seeking leave to file a third amended complaint. Celious’s proposed fraud claims allege that: (1) Engel and Morales knowingly made false statements to the City about their companies’ qualifications during the bidding process for the LAUSD and CHRED projects; (2) Engel and Morales intended to deceive the City’s proposal reviewers and induce those reviewers to rely on those statements when evaluating their companies’ 16 contract proposals; and (3) Celious was harmed by those false statements because he did not receive a commission from Maroon Society, “which he would have received had [the company] been awarded the contract[s].” To state a claim for fraud, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant knowingly made false statements with the intent to deceive the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff reasonably relied on those statements to his or her detriment. (See Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) Celious’s proposed fraud claims do not allege that Engel or Morales made any false statements to Celious or Maroon Society, that Engel or Morales intended to deceive Celious or Maroon Society, or that Celious or Maroon Society relied on any false statements made by Engel or Morales. Instead, both proposed fraud claims arise entirely out of allegations that Engel and Morales intended to deceive the City and that the City relied on those statements when it awarded contracts to defendants’ companies. Celious’s proposed allegations, therefore, do not support a claim for fraud against Engel and Morales. Celious’s proposed negligent misrepresentation claim is based on the same facts as his proposed fraud claims, with the addition of allegations that Celious and Maroon Society reasonably relied on the assumption that Engel and Morales would provide truthful information about their companies during the bidding process. The elements of a claim for negligent misrepresentation are (1) the misrepresentation of a past or existing material fact, (2) without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, (3) with intent to induce another’s reliance on the fact misrepresented, (4) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, and (5) resulting damage. (Borman v. Brown 17 (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1060.) To state such a claim, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant intended to induce the plaintiff’s reliance on the false statement. (Tindell v. Murphy (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1252–1254 (Tindell.) It is not sufficient to allege only that the defendant intended to induce a third party’s reliance. (Ibid.) Celious alleges that Engel and Morales made the alleged false statements supporting his negligent misrepresentation claim with the intent to induce the City’s reliance on them. He does not allege that defendants intended to induce his or Maroon Society’s reliance on any false statements. Celious’s proposed allegations, therefore, do not support a claim for negligent misrepresentation against Engel and Morales. (See Tindell, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1252–1254.) In short, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Celious leave to file a third amended complaint that added claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation against Morales and Engel. 2. The sanctions motion Celious next argues that the trial court erred when it awarded Morales over $17,000 in monetary sanctions after finding Celious engaged in bad-faith litigation tactics when he repeatedly withdrew his motions seeking leave to file a third amended complaint. We disagree. 2.1. Applicable law and standard of review Section 128.5 allows a trial court to impose reasonable attorney fees as sanctions for bad faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. (§ 128.5, subd. (a); Zarate v. McDaniel (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 484, 488 (Zarate).) Conduct is frivolous if it is totally and completely 18 without merit or undertaken for the sole purpose of harassing the opposing party. (Brubaker v. Strum (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 497, 511.) This standard is met where “ ‘ “any reasonable attorney would agree that the motion was totally devoid of merit.” ’ ” (Ibid.) A finding of bad faith does not require a determination that the sanctioned party acted with an evil motive. (West Coast Development v. Reed (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 693, 702.) Conduct that is technically authorized by rule or statute may be found to have been done in bad faith if it “go[es] beyond that which is by any standard appropriate under the circumstances.” (Ibid.) Thus, parties may be sanctioned for conduct that, even if technically correct on legal grounds, “unreasonably or unnecessarily injures the opposing counsel or party.” (Ibid.) We generally review a trial court’s order awarding sanctions under Section 128.5 for abuse of discretion. (Wallis v. PHL Associates, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 882, 893.) 2.2. The safe harbor provision does not apply to Celious repeatedly withdrawing his motions seeking leave to file a third amended complaint Celious contends that the trial court should have denied Morales’s motion for sanctions because Morales did not comply with Section 128.5’s safe harbor provision as it applies to Celious repeatedly withdrawing his motions seeking leave to file an amended complaint. This argument lacks merit. Section 128.5 includes a safe harbor provision for the making or opposing of a motion or other document that can be withdrawn. (See § 128.5, subd. (f)(1)(B).) It states that where the challenged action or tactic is the making or opposing of a written motion that “can be withdrawn or appropriately corrected,” a 19 motion for sanctions cannot be filed with the court unless the challenged action has not been withdrawn or corrected “21 days after service of the [sanctions] motion or [within] any other period as the court may prescribe.” (Ibid., italics added.) We independently review questions of statutory interpretation. (Zarate, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 489.) The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so that we can effectuate the law’s purpose. (Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Structured Asset Sales, LLC (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 596, 604–605.) “If a statute is clear and unambiguous, the obvious meaning must ordinarily be accepted.” (Ibid.) The language of Section 128.5’s safe harbor provision is clear and unambiguous. It applies to the filing or opposing of a motion, pleading, or other document that can be withdrawn. (See § 128.5, subd. (f)(1)(B).) But the filing or opposing of motions, pleadings, or other documents that can be withdrawn is not the only type of litigation conduct that can give rise to sanctions under Section 128.5. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sahafzadeh- Taeb & Taeb (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 124, 147 (Taeb).) Here, the conduct supporting the trial court’s award of sanctions was Celious’s tactic of repeatedly withdrawing his motions seeking leave to file an amended complaint. The act of withdrawing a filing is not itself the filing of a motion or other document that can be withdrawn. Although Celious argues that the safe harbor provision could have been used to give him time to cease withdrawing his motions, Section 128.5 does not require moving parties to give litigants time to cease engaging in every type of problematic conduct. It only requires a safe harbor period for the filing or opposing of motions or other documents that can be withdrawn. The safe harbor provision, therefore, does not 20 apply to Celious’s tactic of repeatedly withdrawing his motions seeking leave to amend. (See Taeb, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 147.) Celious cites no authority that supports a contrary conclusion. We reject Celious’s assertion that by repeatedly withdrawing his motions seeking leave to file an amended complaint, he engaged in conduct that the safe harbor provision encourages, and to punish him for such conduct undermines the purpose of Section 128.5. The trial court found that Celious repeatedly withdrew his motions in bad faith and as a gamesmanship tactic, through which he sought to gain an unfair pleading advantage over Morales and to delay the trial court proceedings. Such tactics fall squarely within the conduct that Section 128.5 is intended to curb. (Levy v. Blum (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 625, 635.) 2.3. The sanctions order articulates the trial court’s ruling with sufficient particularity Celious next argues that the sanctions order must be reversed because the record does not contain a “particularized, evidence-based showing of subjective bad faith.” He argues that the trial court failed to identify any specific tactical revisions to his proposed third amended complaints or his motions seeking leave to amend that were facilitated by him withdrawing two of his motions seeking leave to amend. This argument lacks merit. An order imposing sanctions must be “in writing and shall recite in detail the action or tactic or circumstances justifying the order.” (§ 128.5, subd. (c).) Thus, before imposing sanctions, the court “must (a) state specific circumstances giving rise to the award of attorney fees and (b) articulate with particularity the basis for finding the sanctioned party’s conduct reflected tactics 21 or actions performed in bad faith and that were frivolous or designed to harass or cause unnecessary delay.” (Childs v. PaineWebber Incorporated (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 982, 996 (Childs).) “[N]o more is required than a written factual recital, with reasonable specificity, of the circumstances that led the trial court to find the conduct before it sanctionable under the relevant code section.” (Ibid.) “This means the court’s written order should be more informative than a mere recitation of the words of the statute.” (Ibid.) Here, the trial court’s written sanctions order satisfies Section 128.5, subdivision (c)’s requirements because it states the specific circumstances giving rise to the award of sanctions and articulates with particularity the basis for its findings that Celious’s conduct supports such an award. (See Childs, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 996.) The order recites in detail the procedural history surrounding Celious’s numerous motions seeking leave to file a third amended complaint. The order provides a timeline detailing when Celious filed or withdrew each motion, when Morales opposed Celious’s motions, and when the court ruled on each motion that was not withdrawn. The order also describes the grounds for each of Celious’s motion, the grounds for each of Morales’s oppositions, and the grounds for each of the court’s rulings. The order also explains why the court found that Celious acted in bad faith and with the intent to delay the proceedings below when he withdrew two of those motions. Celious cites no authority supporting the proposition that the court needed to provide more detail about the basis for its sanctions order. 22  2.4. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s sanctions order Celious next argues that insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s sanctions order. We disagree. After the trial court denied his first motion seeking leave to file a third amended complaint, Celious filed four additional motions, all of which sought essentially the same relief, and none of which cured the defects that the trial court identified in his first motion. Of those four additional motions, Celious withdrew two of them after Morales filed oppositions pointing out why those motions failed to address the defects undermining Celious’s previous motions. After withdrawing those two motions, however, Celious did not cure the defects in his prior motions that Morales and the trial court previously identified. Instead, Celious continued to file meritless motions seeking the same relief that the trial court repeatedly denied. On this record, it was more than reasonable for the trial court to find that Celious’s “repeated withdrawals constitute bad faith tactics, designed to take unfair