Franklin v. Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Inv. CA4/3
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketG064886
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/20/26 Franklin v. Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Inv. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
MONICA FRANKLIN,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G064886
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2020-
01152736)
MARCUS & MILLICHAP REAL
ESTATE INVESTMENT SERVICES, OPINION
INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
R. Shawn Nelson, Judge. Affirmed.
Bohm Wildish & Matsen, James G. Bohm, Joanne P. Freeman
and Samuel Hopkins for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Pettit Kohn Ingrassia Lutz & Dolin, Damian M. Dolin and Annie
F. Fraser for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Monica Franklin purchased commercial real estate in
Ohio. She subsequently sued defendant Marcus & Millichap Real Estate
Investment Services, Inc. (Marcus & Millichap), the seller’s broker, for
misrepresentation and concealment. The court granted Marcus & Millichap’s
nonsuit motion after Franklin completed her case-in-chief at trial and
dismissed Franklin’s claims with prejudice.
Franklin raises four contentions on appeal. First, she argues the
court erred by granting the nonsuit motion. Second, she claims the court
erred by applying Ohio law to the standard of care that Marcus & Millichap
owed to her. Third, she asserts the court erred by not allowing her expert to
testify about a national standard of care. Finally, she argues the court erred
by excluding certain e-mails from evidence.
We find no reversible error and affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.
FRANKLIN’S PURCHASE OF COMMERCIAL PROPERTY IN OHIO
In August 2017, Franklin, a California resident who had never
invested in commercial real estate, purchased commercial property in Ohio
(the Property). Dustin Javitch was a real estate agent in Ohio for Marcus &
Millichap. He acted as an agent on behalf of Marcus & Millichap and
represented the sellers of the Property.
At the time of Franklin’s purchase, Sleep Outfitters of Ohio, LLC
(Sleep Outfitters), a mattress store, was leasing the Property. Sleep
Outfitters’ parent company, Innovative Mattress Solutions, LLC (Innovative
Mattress), was guarantor of the lease.
2
After closing, Franklin assumed the lease, and Sleep Outfitters
became her tenant. For more than a year, Sleep Outfitters paid its rent on
time.
In November 2018, a consulting company sent a letter to
Franklin informing her that Innovative Mattress was undergoing a corporate
restructuring, which included closing unprofitable locations. The consulting
company stated Sleep Outfitters’ sales were low and requested a reduction in
rent. Franklin did not accept the proposed rent reduction.
A couple of weeks later, Franklin’s counsel sent a notice of
default to Sleep Outfitters and Innovative Mattress for nonpayment of rent.
In December 2018, Franklin evicted Sleep Outfitters.
In January 2019, Innovative Mattress filed for bankruptcy.
Franklin filed a claim in bankruptcy court and received around $30,000. In
2020, she sold the Property for significantly less than she had paid for it.
II.
THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
In 2022, Franklin filed the operative first amended complaint
against Marcus & Millichap and others who are not parties to this appeal.
The complaint alleged two causes of action against Marcus & Millichap:
(1) misrepresentation (breach of duty by seller’s agent); and (2) fraudulent
concealment.
Among other things, the complaint alleged Javitch from Marcus
& Millichap made false statements and concealed material facts about Sleep
Outfitters and Innovative Mattress. He purportedly misrepresented that
Sleep Outfitters was “financially strong” and had “good financials” along with
a “strong guarantor.” The complaint further alleged: “Marcus & Millichap
3
failed to disclose known material facts that affect the value of the Property
including: that the tenant/guarantor had ‘lower’ credit/lacked credit; that the
[P]roperty did not have a strong guarantor; that several entities that had
reviewed the tenant financials had decided not to purchase the [P]roperty;
and that at least one entity that was considering purchasing the [P]roperty
had banks pass on a loan due to lack of credit and knowledge of the tenant.”
III.
TRIAL, NONSUIT, AND JUDGMENT
In September 2024, the case proceeded to a jury trial. After
Franklin rested her case-in-chief, Marcus & Millichap moved for nonsuit.
Marcus & Millichap argued there was no evidence it made any
misrepresentations or failed to disclose material facts. Marcus & Millichap
added there was no evidence Sleep Outfitters or Innovative Mattress had bad
financials at the time of the sale or that Javitch knew they were in financial
distress.
After hearing argument from the parties, the court granted the
motion. The court explained: “[T]here is just no direct evidence of actual
knowledge and misrepresentation. The best evidence is really strained and
requires a lot of interpretation to get to any inference that somehow this
would be actionable.” The court accordingly dismissed Franklin’s claims
against Marcus & Millichap with prejudice.
In October 2024, the court entered judgment in Marcus &
Millichap’s favor. Franklin timely appealed.
4
DISCUSSION1
I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR BY GRANTING THE NONSUIT MOTION
Franklin argues the court erred by granting the nonsuit motion.
She asserts substantial evidence supported an inference that Marcus &
Millichap made material misrepresentations or omissions or failed to meet
the applicable standard of care. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
To establish a claim for intentional misrepresentation, a plaintiff
must prove: (1) the defendant made a false representation of material fact;
(2) the defendant knew the representation was false or recklessly made the
representation without regard for its truth; (3) the defendant intended the
plaintiff rely on the representation; (4) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the
representation; and (5) the plaintiff suffered damages. (Manderville v.
PCG&S Group, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1498; CACI No. 1900.)
To establish a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff
must prove: (1) the defendant made a false representation of material fact;
(2) the defendant did not have reasonable grounds for believing the
representation to be true; (3) the defendant intended the plaintiff rely on the
representation; (4) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the representation; and
(5) the plaintiff suffered damages. (Borman v. Brown (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th
1048, 1060; CACI No. 1903.)
1
Franklin requests we take judicial notice of the transcript of
Kristin Rosan’s expert deposition. We deny Franklin’s request because it does
not appear that the entire deposition was before the trial court. The
deposition transcript is also unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal.
5
“[B]ecause a seller’s agent has no fiduciary relationship with a
buyer, the courts have strictly limited the scope of an agent’s disclosure
duties under a fraudulent concealment theory.” (Peake v. Underwood (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 428, 444.) If a seller’s real estate agent “knows of facts
materially affecting the value or desirability of the property which are known
or accessible only to him and also knows that such facts are not known to, or
within the reach of the diligent attention and observation of the buyer, the
[seller’s real estate agent] is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer.”
(Holmes v. Summer (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1518–1519.)2
We review an order granting nonsuit de novo. (Applied Medical
Distribution Corp. v. Jarrells (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 556, 593.) “‘A defendant
is entitled to a nonsuit if the trial court determines that, as a matter of law,
the evidence presented by plaintiff is insufficient to permit a jury to find in
[the plaintiff’s] favor. [Citation.] “In determining whether plaintiff’s evidence
is sufficient, the court may not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility
of witnesses. Instead, the evidence most favorable to plaintiff must be
accepted as true and conflicting evidence must be disregarded. The court
must give ‘to the plaintiff[’s] evidence all the value to which it is legally
entitled, . . . indulging every legitimate inference which may be drawn from
the evidence in plaintiff[’s] favor.’” [Citation.] A mere “scintilla of evidence”
does not create a conflict for the jury’s resolution; “there must be substantial
evidence to create the necessary conflict.”’” (Ibid.)
2
In addition to California law, the parties reference Ohio law.
Because the trial court generally applied California law and the parties
primarily rely on California law, we need not address the requirements of a
misrepresentation or concealment under Ohio law.
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B. The Challenged Statements
Here, Franklin contends Javitch made several
misrepresentations that misled her to believe Sleep Outfitters and Innovative
Mattress were financially strong. We address each purported
misrepresentation below.
1. The July 31, 2017 Telephone Call
During a July 31, 2017 telephone call, Javitch told Franklin that
“she need not worry, that the tenant was a ‘very strong company’, and that
she should be happy with them.”3 Franklin argues the statement is
actionable because Javitch had no knowledge as to the creditworthiness of
Sleep Outfitters or Innovative Mattress. We are not persuaded.
There is no evidence that this was intentional or negligent
misrepresentation. There was evidence Javitch’s clients, the sellers, told him
that Sleep Outfitters was a good tenant and had good financials. The sellers
were developers who had built around 10 to 15 locations for Sleep Outfitters
stores. These circumstances gave Javitch reasonable grounds to believe his
statement was accurate. There also was no evidence Javitch knew or should
have known his statement was false. Before closing, Javitch had no
information indicating Sleep Outfitters or Innovative Mattress would stop
paying rent or go bankrupt. Based on this record, Franklin did not present
sufficient evidence to establish Javitch made an actionable misrepresentation
during the July 31, 2017 telephone call.
3
Franklin initially testified that Javitch said, “[It] was a very
strong company.” She later testified that Javitch said, the financial condition
of the guarantor “was strong.”
7
2. The Statement Comparing Sleep Outfitters with PLS
Franklin next claims Javitch told her agent that “he had a client
reviewing both the PLS (another property Franklin was also considering) and
the Sleep Outfitters’ [f]inancials, and that the Sleep Outfitters’ [f]inancials
were stronger than the PLS financials.” But Franklin points to no evidence
suggesting this statement was false—i.e., Sleep Outfitters’ financials were
not stronger than the PLS financials. She accordingly has not presented
sufficient evidence of an actionable misrepresentation.
3. The June 30, 2017 E-mail
On June 30, 2017, Franklin’s agent sent an e-mail to her, which
stated in pertinent part: “The seller’s broker [Javitch] said that if the lender
won’t do that [give financials] then he will make a call to the real estate rep
at Sleep Outfitters and thinks there is a good probability you will get
information that will make you comfortable. [¶] The company is not going to
give you anything in writing because frankly, they don’t have to. That being
said, they do have a good relationship with the developer/seller and they will
do as much as they are allowed to do by the company ownership to make you
comfortable. [¶] The seller indicates the company has good financials and his
broker [Javitch] has had conversations with people within the company
indicating the same. I know this doesn’t mean much because they are selling
the property but it’s encouraging. The broker, Dustin, is a very reasonable
guy and after several conversations with him I feel like he’s a good broker
and wouldn’t lie.” (Italics added.)
Franklin suggests this e-mail shows Javitch made a
misrepresentation because he never talked to anyone at Sleep Outfitters or
Innovative Mattress. Not so. The e-mail was written by Franklin’s agent, and
8
it does not attribute a specific representation to Javitch. Instead, the e-mail
states the seller (not Javitch) indicated “the company has good financials.” It
is unclear if the seller or Javitch told Franklin’s agent that Javitch had
“conversations with people within the company indicating the same.”
Regardless, Franklin’s agent testified he was referring to the sellers when he
said Javitch had “conversations with people within the company.” (Italics
added.) He was not referring to Sleep Outfitters or Innovative Mattress.
Javitch likewise testified he never told Franklin’s agent that he
communicated with Sleep Outfitters or Innovative Mattress about their
financial condition. In short, the e-mail identifies no misrepresentation made
by Javitch or Marcus & Millichap.
4. The June 21, 2017 E-mail
In a June 21, 2017 e-mail to Franklin’s agent, Javitch stated:
“The tenant/guarantor operates over 175 mattress stores throughout six
states and has plans for 25 new store openings in the coming 18 months.”
Franklin argues this statement fell below the standard of care required of
brokers because Javitch did not verify its accuracy. To the contrary, Javitch
testified he obtained information about the number of stores “from their
[company] website.” Franklin points to no law suggesting Javitch was
required to do any further investigation. She also points to no evidence
indicating the statement was false, that Javitch knew it was false, or that he
lacked reasonable grounds to believe it was true.
Based on our de novo review, there was insufficient evidence of a
false statement, or insufficient evidence that Javitch knew his statements
were false or lacked reasonable grounds to believe they were true. The court
therefore did not err by granting the nonsuit motion.
9
C. Concealment
Franklin next argues a jury could infer Javitch knew or
suspected Sleep Outfitters and Innovative Mattress were not financially
strong but failed to disclose this information. As discussed post, she identifies
no evidence supporting this contention.
First, Franklin claims Javitch knew three prior prospective
purchasers did not purchase the Property after they received “financials.” She
suggests Javitch had an affirmative duty to disclose this information. But
Franklin interprets the evidence more broadly than warranted. A prior
prospective purchaser made an offer on a portfolio of properties, which
included the Property. Javitch believed this purchaser had received the
“financials.” He also believed Innovative Mattress provided “their financials”
to other prospective purchasers. None of this evidence suggests the
prospective purchasers refused to purchase the Property because of the
financial information they received. There also was no evidence the financial
information provided to those prospective purchasers was somehow
unfavorable.
Second, Franklin points to a July 13, 2017 e-mail from Javitch to
a loan broker. The loan broker asked if Javitch had any “Sleep Outfitter
comps.” Javitch responded: “Honestly, I’ve got none. The guarantor,
[Innovative Mattress] operates as the parent company to Sleep Outfitters,
Mattress King and Mattress Warehouse. Most of the properties are located as
part of strip centers and in general, the single standing locations rarely trade
hands. We used a lot of Mattress Firm comps and discounted these slightly
due to the lower credit and size of [Innovative Mattress] however the rents of
this property along with the other [Innovative Mattress] stores we’re selling
10
are far below other Mattress F[irm] properties. In addition, this location is
top tier.” (Italics added.)
Relying on the above e-mail, Franklin argues Javitch was
required to disclose to her that Innovative Mattress’ comparables were
discounted due to its lower credit and size. Once again, Franklin
misconstrues the evidence. The e-mail simply compares Sleep Outfitters to a
larger competitor. Indeed, Javitch testified Mattress Firm was larger and had
“thousands of locations.” When Javitch said “‘lower credit,’” he “was simply
saying lower credit compared to Mattress Firm.” This comparison does not
mean Sleep Outfitters or Innovative Mattress had poor credit or that Javitch
knew they were financially weak when Franklin purchased the Property.
(Padgett v. Phariss (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1284 [trial court properly
granted summary judgment where party “failed to show the [real estate]
agents were in possession of facts about the value of the property, other than
by speculating they must have known more than they said”].)
Finally, Franklin insists Javitch misled her by telling her she
could not obtain any financials and that financials could only be provided to a
lender. Relying on a July 11, 2017 e-mail, Franklin claims Javitch knew the
seller of the Property and prior prospective purchasers had received the
financials but failed to disclose this information to her. She concludes a jury
could infer Javitch withheld the financials because they reflected poorly on
Sleep Outfitters’ or Innovative Mattress’ financial condition. The evidence
does not support this contention. Although Javitch knew others had received
the financials, this does not mean he concealed anything from Franklin. As
the trial court properly explained: “Other people got something that
[Franklin] didn’t. . . . But that’s not misleading. In fact, the opposite occurred.
11
[Franklin was] told [she] wouldn’t get [the financials] and didn’t. . . . [¶] . . .
[¶] There [also] is no allegation . . . Javitch was going out giving information
to people.”
For these reasons, Franklin has not identified any evidence
establishing that Javitch or Marcus & Millichap failed to disclose “‘facts
materially affecting the value or desirability of the [P]roperty which [were]
known or accessible only to’” them. (Holmes v. Summer, supra,
188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1518.) Instead, she offers, at most, speculation that
Javitch must have known Sleep Outfitters and Innovative Mattress were not
financially strong. The court accordingly did not err by granting the nonsuit
motion. (RSB Vineyards, LLC v. Orsi (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1089, 1098
[“‘“[o]nly where the circumstances are such that the defendant ‘must have
known’ and not ‘should have known’ will an inference of actual knowledge be
permitted”’”]; Assilzadeh v. California Federal Bank (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th
399, 410 [“[t]he seller or his or her agent must have actual knowledge in
order to be liable for failing to disclose a material fact”].)
II.
ANY ERROR IN APPLYING AN OHIO STANDARD OF CARE WAS HARMLESS
Franklin next contends the court incorrectly applied Ohio law
rather than California law to the standard of care that Marcus & Millichap
owed to her. She further argues the court’s application of Ohio law was
inconsistent with its prior rulings on a summary judgment motion and a
motion in limine. Even assuming California law governs the standard of care,
Franklin presented insufficient evidence to establish key elements of her
claims. Any error was accordingly harmless.
12
A. Relevant Background
On summary judgment, the court held Marcus & Millichap failed
to demonstrate that Ohio law should be applied. Although the purchase and
sale agreement contained an Ohio choice-of-law provision, the court
emphasized Marcus & Millichap was not a party to the agreement or a third-
party beneficiary.
Marcus & Millichap later filed a motion in limine to preclude
Franklin’s expert witness from testifying about Marcus & Millichap or
Javitch. Marcus & Millichap argued Franklin’s claims did not trigger a
standard of care analysis and, in any event, the expert was not qualified to
testify about an Ohio standard of care. The court denied the motion in limine
and noted there was “a significant amount of discussion about standards in
Ohio and otherwise.” The court indicated it would generally apply California
law to the case. But the court explained that a real estate broker who is
licensed in Ohio would not be held to California licensing standards. The
court stated: “[A]s far as their personal knowledge or their requirements to
know anything about California law, I don’t have any basis to suggest that
they are required to know that, nor should they be expected to know that, nor
will there be any jury instruction that says that they’re required to live by
California licensing standards. That is not a thing of trial.”
During the testimony of Franklin’s expert witness, Franklin’s
counsel asked: “So based on your general understanding of the standard of
care nationally . . . in your opinion, did the Marcus & Millichap Defendants
fall below the standard of care in their dealings with [Franklin], the buyer of
the [P]roperty?” The court sustained a lacking foundation objection. The court
explained the expert was not qualified to give an opinion on Marcus &
13
Millichap because the expert had not conducted any transactions in Ohio.
The court also noted there did not appear to be evidence of a “national board
that sets basic standards that everyone follows.”
B. Harmless Error
Even assuming, arguendo, that California law supplies the
governing standard of care, application of that standard would not change
the result of the nonsuit motion. As noted previously, Franklin did not
present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find an actionable
misrepresentation, the required scienter, or concealment of material facts.
Any error regarding the applicable standard of care was therefore harmless.
We need not address the parties’ choice-of-law arguments.
III.
ANY ERROR IN EXCLUDING EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS HARMLESS
Franklin claims the court erred by not allowing her expert to
testify about a national standard of care. Once again, any potential error was
harmless.
A. Relevant Background
Franklin’s expert acted as a broker in “hundreds . . . maybe
thousands of” commercial real estate transactions, including 50 to 100
transactions outside of California. He also had acquired 17 commercial
shopping centers from Chicago to the West Coast.
At trial, Franklin’s counsel asked Franklin’s expert if he was
“familiar with what the standard of care obligates a seller’s broker to do with
respect to a buyer on a national level as opposed to just a California level.”
The expert responded: “I think so.” The expert later testified he was familiar
with the national standard of care that applies to a seller’s real estate broker.
14
Franklin’s counsel questioned: “So based on your general
understanding of the standard of care nationally . . . in your opinion, did the
Marcus & Millichap Defendants fall below the standard of care in their
dealings with [Franklin], the buyer of the [P]roperty?” The court sustained a
lacking foundation objection. The court explained the expert had not
conducted any transactions in Ohio. The court further noted there did not
appear to be evidence of a “national board that sets basic standards that
everyone follows.” The court added: “If there was some specific organization,
licensing, that was just universally understood to have an overlay with
ethics, at least as applied to brokers nationwide, so be it. [¶] I’m not
suggesting that there is. I just want you to understand that’s why I’m a little
concerned with him opining as to Marcus & Millichap or anyone in Ohio.”
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
An expert witness may testify as an expert if the witness “has
special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to
qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates.” (Evid.
Code, § 720, subd. (a).)4 His or her testimony also must be “[b]ased on matter
(including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education)
perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him at or
before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that
reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the
subject to which his testimony relates . . . .” (§ 801, subd. (b).)
We review a trial court’s decision to exclude expert testimony for
abuse of discretion. (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern
California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773.)
4
All further statutory references are to the Evidence Code.
15
C. Harmless Error
Even assuming the court erred by excluding the expert’s
testimony on whether Marcus & Millichap’s actions fell below a national
standard of care, Franklin does not offer an adequate claim of prejudice. “The
erroneous exclusion of evidence is grounds for reversal only if ‘in light of the
entire record, it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the
appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’”
(Richard v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1263, 1280.)
As noted previously, Franklin’s evidence was insufficient to permit a jury to
find an actionable misrepresentation, the required scienter, or concealment of
material facts. Admitting expert testimony on the national standard of care
would not have changed the result of the nonsuit motion.
IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR BY EXCLUDING CERTAIN E-MAILS FROM EVIDENCE
Finally, Franklin contends the court erred by excluding evidence
of an e-mail thread, which concerned a prior prospective purchaser and two
banks. According to Franklin, the e-mails fell within the party admission or
state of mind exceptions to the hearsay rule. (§§ 1220, 1222, 1250.) She also
argues the e-mails were probative of Javitch’s knowledge of Sleep Outfitters’
or Innovative Mattress’ financial weakness. The court did not err by
excluding the e-mails under section 352.
A. Relevant Background
At trial, the court held the following e-mail thread was
inadmissible pursuant to section 352. On June 2, 2017, a broker sent an e-
mail to Javitch, stating: “Talked to Mike today on this. They are mulling it
over but nothing on the financials was overly compelling to him and more
16
importantly, he has put the deal in front of two banks he would use and both
have passed based on the lack of credit and knowledge on the company. That
said, it is not a pass, but something that based on that feedback he needs to
dig in more and get comfortable on at those CAP rate levels. I don’t anticipate
this happening in the immediate term–it sounds like they have a lot going on
over there and it’s a small shop–most of it is fee-based development work
they are doing. I will bring it up again with him next week–if there is
anything else in the meantime you know or hear of that is overly compelling,
pls let me know.” (Italics added.) Javitch then asked: “Can you ask which
financials they ended up receiving? 2015 or 2016?” (Italics added.) The broker
responded: “I did based on what we discussed and he was at home when he
called and didn’t know.”
Franklin’s counsel argued the e-mail thread was relevant to
Javitch’s state of mind because he was told two banks previously passed on
the deal.
In finding the e-mail thread was inadmissible, the court
emphasized there was no evidence Sleep Outfitters or Innovative Mattress
had poor financials in 2016 or early 2017. Franklin’s counsel conceded this
point. After Franklin’s counsel acknowledged there was no direct evidence
Javitch knew the financials were poor or that he had a duty to become
knowledgeable, the court added: “So how . . . does this ultimately become
relevant if we never tie it in? The best is there is an inference that something
is possible.” The court concluded: “I can’t allow them to kind of savor hearsay
evidence that leads them to nowhere, but just complete speculation.”
17
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 352 provides for the exclusion of evidence “if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of
undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (§ 352.)
We review a trial court’s decision concerning the admissibility of evidence
under section 352 for an abuse of discretion. (Evans v. Hood Corp. (2016)
5 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1044–1045.)
C. No Abuse of Discretion
Here, the court did not abuse its discretion. Franklin suggests the
e-mails are probative of Javitch’s actual or implied knowledge of Sleep
Outfitters’ or Innovative Mattress’ financial weakness. Any such inference is
attenuated. A jury would have to infer Sleep Outfitters and Innovative
Mattress had financial problems from the reactions of an unknown buyer and
two unidentified banks as reported by an unknown broker. The broker
commented that “nothing on the financials was overly compelling” and two
banks passed “based on the lack of credit and knowledge on the company.”
These statements do not identify a particular financial deficiency or prove
that Javitch understood them to mean Sleep Outfitters and Innovative
Mattress had poor financials. Javitch’s question about which financials were
received also does not establish what he knew about the financials. The court
could reasonably conclude the e-mails’ limited probative value was
substantially outweighed by the probability that they would confuse the
issues and result in an undue consumption of time. The jury may have
treated the e-mails as substantive evidence of poor financials. Admitting the
e-mails could also consume undue time by necessitating evidence as to who
18
the prior prospective purchaser was, what properties were involved, and why
the banks passed on financing.
In short, the court’s decision to exclude the evidence was not
“‘arbitrary, capricious[, or] patently absurd.’” (Evans v. Hood Corp., supra,
5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1045.) Because the court did not abuse its discretion, we
need not reach the parties’ arguments regarding prejudicial error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Marcus & Millichap shall recover its
costs incurred on appeal.
SERVINO, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
DELANEY, J.
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