Full Opinion

Filed 11/20/26 Franklin v. Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Inv. CA4/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE MONICA FRANKLIN, Plaintiff and Appellant, G064886 v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2020- 01152736) MARCUS & MILLICHAP REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT SERVICES, OPINION INC., Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, R. Shawn Nelson, Judge. Affirmed. Bohm Wildish & Matsen, James G. Bohm, Joanne P. Freeman and Samuel Hopkins for Plaintiff and Appellant. Pettit Kohn Ingrassia Lutz & Dolin, Damian M. Dolin and Annie F. Fraser for Defendant and Respondent. Plaintiff Monica Franklin purchased commercial real estate in Ohio. She subsequently sued defendant Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Services, Inc. (Marcus & Millichap), the seller’s broker, for misrepresentation and concealment. The court granted Marcus & Millichap’s nonsuit motion after Franklin completed her case-in-chief at trial and dismissed Franklin’s claims with prejudice. Franklin raises four contentions on appeal. First, she argues the court erred by granting the nonsuit motion. Second, she claims the court erred by applying Ohio law to the standard of care that Marcus & Millichap owed to her. Third, she asserts the court erred by not allowing her expert to testify about a national standard of care. Finally, she argues the court erred by excluding certain e-mails from evidence. We find no reversible error and affirm the judgment. STATEMENT OF FACTS I. FRANKLIN’S PURCHASE OF COMMERCIAL PROPERTY IN OHIO In August 2017, Franklin, a California resident who had never invested in commercial real estate, purchased commercial property in Ohio (the Property). Dustin Javitch was a real estate agent in Ohio for Marcus & Millichap. He acted as an agent on behalf of Marcus & Millichap and represented the sellers of the Property. At the time of Franklin’s purchase, Sleep Outfitters of Ohio, LLC (Sleep Outfitters), a mattress store, was leasing the Property. Sleep Outfitters’ parent company, Innovative Mattress Solutions, LLC (Innovative Mattress), was guarantor of the lease. 2 After closing, Franklin assumed the lease, and Sleep Outfitters became her tenant. For more than a year, Sleep Outfitters paid its rent on time. In November 2018, a consulting company sent a letter to Franklin informing her that Innovative Mattress was undergoing a corporate restructuring, which included closing unprofitable locations. The consulting company stated Sleep Outfitters’ sales were low and requested a reduction in rent. Franklin did not accept the proposed rent reduction. A couple of weeks later, Franklin’s counsel sent a notice of default to Sleep Outfitters and Innovative Mattress for nonpayment of rent. In December 2018, Franklin evicted Sleep Outfitters. In January 2019, Innovative Mattress filed for bankruptcy. Franklin filed a claim in bankruptcy court and received around $30,000. In 2020, she sold the Property for significantly less than she had paid for it. II. THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT In 2022, Franklin filed the operative first amended complaint against Marcus & Millichap and others who are not parties to this appeal. The complaint alleged two causes of action against Marcus & Millichap: (1) misrepresentation (breach of duty by seller’s agent); and (2) fraudulent concealment. Among other things, the complaint alleged Javitch from Marcus & Millichap made false statements and concealed material facts about Sleep Outfitters and Innovative Mattress. He purportedly misrepresented that Sleep Outfitters was “financially strong” and had “good financials” along with a “strong guarantor.” The complaint further alleged: “Marcus & Millichap 3 failed to disclose known material facts that affect the value of the Property including: that the tenant/guarantor had ‘lower’ credit/lacked credit; that the [P]roperty did not have a strong guarantor; that several entities that had reviewed the tenant financials had decided not to purchase the [P]roperty; and that at least one entity that was considering purchasing the [P]roperty had banks pass on a loan due to lack of credit and knowledge of the tenant.” III. TRIAL, NONSUIT, AND JUDGMENT In September 2024, the case proceeded to a jury trial. After Franklin rested her case-in-chief, Marcus & Millichap moved for nonsuit. Marcus & Millichap argued there was no evidence it made any misrepresentations or failed to disclose material facts. Marcus & Millichap added there was no evidence Sleep Outfitters or Innovative Mattress had bad financials at the time of the sale or that Javitch knew they were in financial distress. After hearing argument from the parties, the court granted the motion. The court explained: “[T]here is just no direct evidence of actual knowledge and misrepresentation. The best evidence is really strained and requires a lot of interpretation to get to any inference that somehow this would be actionable.” The court accordingly dismissed Franklin’s claims against Marcus & Millichap with prejudice. In October 2024, the court entered judgment in Marcus & Millichap’s favor. Franklin timely appealed. 4 DISCUSSION1 I. THE COURT DID NOT ERR BY GRANTING THE NONSUIT MOTION Franklin argues the court erred by granting the nonsuit motion. She asserts substantial evidence supported an inference that Marcus & Millichap made material misrepresentations or omissions or failed to meet the applicable standard of care. We disagree. A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review To establish a claim for intentional misrepresentation, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant made a false representation of material fact; (2) the defendant knew the representation was false or recklessly made the representation without regard for its truth; (3) the defendant intended the plaintiff rely on the representation; (4) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the representation; and (5) the plaintiff suffered damages. (Manderville v. PCG&S Group, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1498; CACI No. 1900.) To establish a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant made a false representation of material fact; (2) the defendant did not have reasonable grounds for believing the representation to be true; (3) the defendant intended the plaintiff rely on the representation; (4) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the representation; and (5) the plaintiff suffered damages. (Borman v. Brown (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1060; CACI No. 1903.) 1 Franklin requests we take judicial notice of the transcript of Kristin Rosan’s expert deposition. We deny Franklin’s request because it does not appear that the entire deposition was before the trial court. The deposition transcript is also unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal. 5 “[B]ecause a seller’s agent has no fiduciary relationship with a buyer, the courts have strictly limited the scope of an agent’s disclosure duties under a fraudulent concealment theory.” (Peake v. Underwood (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 428, 444.) If a seller’s real estate agent “knows of facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property which are known or accessible only to him and also knows that such facts are not known to, or within the reach of the diligent attention and observation of the buyer, the [seller’s real estate agent] is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer.” (Holmes v. Summer (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1518–1519.)2 We review an order granting nonsuit de novo. (Applied Medical Distribution Corp. v. Jarrells (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 556, 593.) “‘A defendant is entitled to a nonsuit if the trial court determines that, as a matter of law, the evidence presented by plaintiff is insufficient to permit a jury to find in [the plaintiff’s] favor. [Citation.] “In determining whether plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient, the court may not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses. Instead, the evidence most favorable to plaintiff must be accepted as true and conflicting evidence must be disregarded. The court must give ‘to the plaintiff[’s] evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled, . . . indulging every legitimate inference which may be drawn from the evidence in plaintiff[’s] favor.’” [Citation.] A mere “scintilla of evidence” does not create a conflict for the jury’s resolution; “there must be substantial evidence to create the necessary conflict.”’” (Ibid.) 2 In addition to California law, the parties reference Ohio law. Because the trial court generally applied California law and the parties primarily rely on California law, we need not address the requirements of a misrepresentation or concealment under Ohio law. 6 B. The Challenged Statements Here, Franklin contends Javitch made several misrepresentations that misled her to believe Sleep Outfitters and Innovative Mattress were financially strong. We address each purported misrepresentation below. 1. The July 31, 2017 Telephone Call During a July 31, 2017 telephone call, Javitch told Franklin that “she need not worry, that the tenant was a ‘very strong company’, and that she should be happy with them.”3 Franklin argues the statement is actionable because Javitch had no knowledge as to the creditworthiness of Sleep Outfitters or Innovative Mattress. We are not persuaded. There is no evidence that this was intentional or negligent misrepresentation. There was evidence Javitch’s clients, the sellers, told him that Sleep Outfitters was a good tenant and had good financials. The sellers were developers who had built around 10 to 15 locations for Sleep Outfitters stores. These circumstances gave Javitch reasonable grounds to believe his statement was accurate. There also was no evidence Javitch knew or should have known his statement was false. Before closing, Javitch had no information indicating Sleep Outfitters or Innovative Mattress would stop paying rent or go bankrupt. Based on this record, Franklin did not present sufficient evidence to establish Javitch made an actionable misrepresentation during the July 31, 2017 telephone call. 3 Franklin initially testified that Javitch said, “[It] was a very strong company.” She later testified that Javitch said, the financial condition of the guarantor “was strong.” 7 2. The Statement Comparing Sleep Outfitters with PLS Franklin next claims Javitch told her agent that “he had a client reviewing both the PLS (another property Franklin was also considering) and the Sleep Outfitters’ [f]inancials, and that the Sleep Outfitters’ [f]inancials were stronger than the PLS financials.” But Franklin points to no evidence suggesting this statement was false—i.e., Sleep Outfitters’ financials were not stronger than the PLS financials. She accordingly has not presented sufficient evidence of an actionable misrepresentation. 3. The June 30, 2017 E-mail On June 30, 2017, Franklin’s agent sent an e-mail to her, which stated in pertinent part: “The seller’s broker [Javitch] said that if the lender won’t do that [give financials] then he will make a call to the real estate rep at Sleep Outfitters and thinks there is a good probability you will get information that will make you comfortable. [¶] The company is not going to give you anything in writing because frankly, they don’t have to. That being said, they do have a good relationship with the developer/seller and they will do as much as they are allowed to do by the company ownership to make you comfortable. [¶] The seller indicates the company has good financials and his broker [Javitch] has had conversations with people within the company indicating the same. I know this doesn’t mean much because they are selling the property but it’s encouraging. The broker, Dustin, is a very reasonable guy and after several conversations with him I feel like he’s a good broker and wouldn’t lie.” (Italics added.) Franklin suggests this e-mail shows Javitch made a misrepresentation because he never talked to anyone at Sleep Outfitters or Innovative Mattress. Not so. The e-mail was written by Franklin’s agent, and 8 it does not attribute a specific representation to Javitch. Instead, the e-mail states the seller (not Javitch) indicated “the company has good financials.” It is unclear if the seller or Javitch told Franklin’s agent that Javitch had “conversations with people within the company indicating the same.” Regardless, Franklin’s agent testified he was referring to the sellers when he said Javitch had “conversations with people within the company.” (Italics added.) He was not referring to Sleep Outfitters or Innovative Mattress. Javitch likewise testified he never told Franklin’s agent that he communicated with Sleep Outfitters or Innovative Mattress about their financial condition. In short, the e-mail identifies no misrepresentation made by Javitch or Marcus & Millichap. 4. The June 21, 2017 E-mail In a June 21, 2017 e-mail to Franklin’s agent, Javitch stated: “The tenant/guarantor operates over 175 mattress stores throughout six states and has plans for 25 new store openings in the coming 18 months.” Franklin argues this statement fell below the standard of care required of brokers because Javitch did not verify its accuracy. To the contrary, Javitch testified he obtained information about the number of stores “from their [company] website.” Franklin points to no law suggesting Javitch was required to do any further investigation. She also points to no evidence indicating the statement was false, that Javitch knew it was false, or that he lacked reasonable grounds to believe it was true. Based on our de novo review, there was insufficient evidence of a false statement, or insufficient evidence that Javitch knew his statements were false or lacked reasonable grounds to believe they were true. The court therefore did not err by granting the nonsuit motion. 9 C. Concealment Franklin next argues a jury could infer Javitch knew or suspected Sleep Outfitters and Innovative Mattress were not financially strong but failed to disclose this information. As discussed post, she identifies no evidence supporting this contention. First, Franklin claims Javitch knew three prior prospective purchasers did not purchase the Property after they received “financials.” She suggests Javitch had an affirmative duty to disclose this information. But Franklin interprets the evidence more broadly than warranted. A prior prospective purchaser made an offer on a portfolio of properties, which included the Property. Javitch believed this purchaser had received the “financials.” He also believed Innovative Mattress provided “their financials” to other prospective purchasers. None of this evidence suggests the prospective purchasers refused to purchase the Property because of the financial information they received. There also was no evidence the financial information provided to those prospective purchasers was somehow unfavorable. Second, Franklin points to a July 13, 2017 e-mail from Javitch to a loan broker. The loan broker asked if Javitch had any “Sleep Outfitter comps.” Javitch responded: “Honestly, I’ve got none. The guarantor, [Innovative Mattress] operates as the parent company to Sleep Outfitters, Mattress King and Mattress Warehouse. Most of the properties are located as part of strip centers and in general, the single standing locations rarely trade hands. We used a lot of Mattress Firm comps and discounted these slightly due to the lower credit and size of [Innovative Mattress] however the rents of this property along with the other [Innovative Mattress] stores we’re selling 10 are far below other Mattress F[irm] properties. In addition, this location is top tier.” (Italics added.) Relying on the above e-mail, Franklin argues Javitch was required to disclose to her that Innovative Mattress’ comparables were discounted due to its lower credit and size. Once again, Franklin misconstrues the evidence. The e-mail simply compares Sleep Outfitters to a larger competitor. Indeed, Javitch testified Mattress Firm was larger and had “thousands of locations.” When Javitch said “‘lower credit,’” he “was simply saying lower credit compared to Mattress Firm.” This comparison does not mean Sleep Outfitters or Innovative Mattress had poor credit or that Javitch knew they were financially weak when Franklin purchased the Property. (Padgett v. Phariss (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1284 [trial court properly granted summary judgment where party “failed to show the [real estate] agents were in possession of facts about the value of the property, other than by speculating they must have known more than they said”].) Finally, Franklin insists Javitch misled her by telling her she could not obtain any financials and that financials could only be provided to a lender. Relying on a July 11, 2017 e-mail, Franklin claims Javitch knew the seller of the Property and prior prospective purchasers had received the financials but failed to disclose this information to her. She concludes a jury could infer Javitch withheld the financials because they reflected poorly on Sleep Outfitters’ or Innovative Mattress’ financial condition. The evidence does not support this contention. Although Javitch knew others had received the financials, this does not mean he concealed anything from Franklin. As the trial court properly explained: “Other people got something that [Franklin] didn’t. . . . But that’s not misleading. In fact, the opposite occurred. 11 [Franklin was] told [she] wouldn’t get [the financials] and didn’t. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] There [also] is no allegation . . . Javitch was going out giving information to people.” For these reasons, Franklin has not identified any evidence establishing that Javitch or Marcus & Millichap failed to disclose “‘facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the [P]roperty which [were] known or accessible only to’” them. (Holmes v. Summer, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1518.) Instead, she offers, at most, speculation that Javitch must have known Sleep Outfitters and Innovative Mattress were not financially strong. The court accordingly did not err by granting the nonsuit motion. (RSB Vineyards, LLC v. Orsi (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1089, 1098 [“‘“[o]nly where the circumstances are such that the defendant ‘must have known’ and not ‘should have known’ will an inference of actual knowledge be permitted”’”]; Assilzadeh v. California Federal Bank (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 399, 410 [“[t]he seller or his or her agent must have actual knowledge in order to be liable for failing to disclose a material fact”].) II. ANY ERROR IN APPLYING AN OHIO STANDARD OF CARE WAS HARMLESS Franklin next contends the court incorrectly applied Ohio law rather than California law to the standard of care that Marcus & Millichap owed to her. She further argues the court’s application of Ohio law was inconsistent with its prior rulings on a summary judgment motion and a motion in limine. Even assuming California law governs the standard of care, Franklin presented insufficient evidence to establish key elements of her claims. Any error was accordingly harmless. 12 A. Relevant Background On summary judgment, the court held Marcus & Millichap failed to demonstrate that Ohio law should be applied. Although the purchase and sale agreement contained an Ohio choice-of-law provision, the court emphasized Marcus & Millichap was not a party to the agreement or a third- party beneficiary. Marcus & Millichap later filed a motion in limine to preclude Franklin’s expert witness from testifying about Marcus & Millichap or Javitch. Marcus & Millichap argued Franklin’s claims did not trigger a standard of care analysis and, in any event, the expert was not qualified to testify about an Ohio standard of care. The court denied the motion in limine and noted there was “a significant amount of discussion about standards in Ohio and otherwise.” The court indicated it would generally apply California law to the case. But the court explained that a real estate broker who is licensed in Ohio would not be held to California licensing standards. The court stated: “[A]s far as their personal knowledge or their requirements to know anything about California law, I don’t have any basis to suggest that they are required to know that, nor should they be expected to know that, nor will there be any jury instruction that says that they’re required to live by California licensing standards. That is not a thing of trial.” During the testimony of Franklin’s expert witness, Franklin’s counsel asked: “So based on your general understanding of the standard of care nationally . . . in your opinion, did the Marcus & Millichap Defendants fall below the standard of care in their dealings with [Franklin], the buyer of the [P]roperty?” The court sustained a lacking foundation objection. The court explained the expert was not qualified to give an opinion on Marcus & 13 Millichap because the expert had not conducted any transactions in Ohio. The court also noted there did not appear to be evidence of a “national board that sets basic standards that everyone follows.” B. Harmless Error Even assuming, arguendo, that California law supplies the governing standard of care, application of that standard would not change the result of the nonsuit motion. As noted previously, Franklin did not present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find an actionable misrepresentation, the required scienter, or concealment of material facts. Any error regarding the applicable standard of care was therefore harmless. We need not address the parties’ choice-of-law arguments. III. ANY ERROR IN EXCLUDING EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS HARMLESS Franklin claims the court erred by not allowing her expert to testify about a national standard of care. Once again, any potential error was harmless. A. Relevant Background Franklin’s expert acted as a broker in “hundreds . . . maybe thousands of” commercial real estate transactions, including 50 to 100 transactions outside of California. He also had acquired 17 commercial shopping centers from Chicago to the West Coast. At trial, Franklin’s counsel asked Franklin’s expert if he was “familiar with what the standard of care obligates a seller’s broker to do with respect to a buyer on a national level as opposed to just a California level.” The expert responded: “I think so.” The expert later testified he was familiar with the national standard of care that applies to a seller’s real estate broker. 14 Franklin’s counsel questioned: “So based on your general understanding of the standard of care nationally . . . in your opinion, did the Marcus & Millichap Defendants fall below the standard of care in their dealings with [Franklin], the buyer of the [P]roperty?” The court sustained a lacking foundation objection. The court explained the expert had not conducted any transactions in Ohio. The court further noted there did not appear to be evidence of a “national board that sets basic standards that everyone follows.” The court added: “If there was some specific organization, licensing, that was just universally understood to have an overlay with ethics, at least as applied to brokers nationwide, so be it. [¶] I’m not suggesting that there is. I just want you to understand that’s why I’m a little concerned with him opining as to Marcus & Millichap or anyone in Ohio.” B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review An expert witness may testify as an expert if the witness “has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates.” (Evid. Code, § 720, subd. (a).)4 His or her testimony also must be “[b]ased on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates . . . .” (§ 801, subd. (b).) We review a trial court’s decision to exclude expert testimony for abuse of discretion. (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773.) 4 All further statutory references are to the Evidence Code. 15 C. Harmless Error Even assuming the court erred by excluding the expert’s testimony on whether Marcus & Millichap’s actions fell below a national standard of care, Franklin does not offer an adequate claim of prejudice. “The erroneous exclusion of evidence is grounds for reversal only if ‘in light of the entire record, it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’” (Richard v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1263, 1280.) As noted previously, Franklin’s evidence was insufficient to permit a jury to find an actionable misrepresentation, the required scienter, or concealment of material facts. Admitting expert testimony on the national standard of care would not have changed the result of the nonsuit motion. IV. THE COURT DID NOT ERR BY EXCLUDING CERTAIN E-MAILS FROM EVIDENCE Finally, Franklin contends the court erred by excluding evidence of an e-mail thread, which concerned a prior prospective purchaser and two banks. According to Franklin, the e-mails fell within the party admission or state of mind exceptions to the hearsay rule. (§§ 1220, 1222, 1250.) She also argues the e-mails were probative of Javitch’s knowledge of Sleep Outfitters’ or Innovative Mattress’ financial weakness. The court did not err by excluding the e-mails under section 352. A. Relevant Background At trial, the court held the following e-mail thread was inadmissible pursuant to section 352. On June 2, 2017, a broker sent an e- mail to Javitch, stating: “Talked to Mike today on this. They are mulling it over but nothing on the financials was overly compelling to him and more 16 importantly, he has put the deal in front of two banks he would use and both have passed based on the lack of credit and knowledge on the company. That said, it is not a pass, but something that based on that feedback he needs to dig in more and get comfortable on at those CAP rate levels. I don’t anticipate this happening in the immediate term–it sounds like they have a lot going on over there and it’s a small shop–most of it is fee-based development work they are doing. I will bring it up again with him next week–if there is anything else in the meantime you know or hear of that is overly compelling, pls let me know.” (Italics added.) Javitch then asked: “Can you ask which financials they ended up receiving? 2015 or 2016?” (Italics added.) The broker responded: “I did based on what we discussed and he was at home when he called and didn’t know.” Franklin’s counsel argued the e-mail thread was relevant to Javitch’s state of mind because he was told two banks previously passed on the deal. In finding the e-mail thread was inadmissible, the court emphasized there was no evidence Sleep Outfitters or Innovative Mattress had poor financials in 2016 or early 2017. Franklin’s counsel conceded this point. After Franklin’s counsel acknowledged there was no direct evidence Javitch knew the financials were poor or that he had a duty to become knowledgeable, the court added: “So how . . . does this ultimately become relevant if we never tie it in? The best is there is an inference that something is possible.” The court concluded: “I can’t allow them to kind of savor hearsay evidence that leads them to nowhere, but just complete speculation.” 17 B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Section 352 provides for the exclusion of evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (§ 352.) We review a trial court’s decision concerning the admissibility of evidence under section 352 for an abuse of discretion. (Evans v. Hood Corp. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1044–1045.) C. No Abuse of Discretion Here, the court did not abuse its discretion. Franklin suggests the e-mails are probative of Javitch’s actual or implied knowledge of Sleep Outfitters’ or Innovative Mattress’ financial weakness. Any such inference is attenuated. A jury would have to infer Sleep Outfitters and Innovative Mattress had financial problems from the reactions of an unknown buyer and two unidentified banks as reported by an unknown broker. The broker commented that “nothing on the financials was overly compelling” and two banks passed “based on the lack of credit and knowledge on the company.” These statements do not identify a particular financial deficiency or prove that Javitch understood them to mean Sleep Outfitters and Innovative Mattress had poor financials. Javitch’s question about which financials were received also does not establish what he knew about the financials. The court could reasonably conclude the e-mails’ limited probative value was substantially outweighed by the probability that they would confuse the issues and result in an undue consumption of time. The jury may have treated the e-mails as substantive evidence of poor financials. Admitting the e-mails could also consume undue time by necessitating evidence as to who 18 the prior prospective purchaser was, what properties were involved, and why the banks passed on financing. In short, the court’s decision to exclude the evidence was not “‘arbitrary, capricious[, or] patently absurd.’” (Evans v. Hood Corp., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1045.) Because the court did not abuse its discretion, we need not reach the parties’ arguments regarding prejudicial error. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Marcus & Millichap shall recover its costs incurred on appeal. SERVINO, J. WE CONCUR: MOORE, ACTING P. J. DELANEY, J. 19