Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. 191 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-25-471 Opinion Delivered: November 19, 2026 JONATHAN BURNETT APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 60CV-25-4147] G&T ENTERPRISES OF NLR, LLC, D/B/A A-1 RECOVERY OF NLR HONORABLE TIMOTHY DAVIS APPELLEE FOX, JUDGE REVERSED AND DISMISSED. KAREN R. BAKER, Chief Justice Appellant Jonathan Burnett appeals the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s order denying his motion to dismiss a complaint filed by appellee G&T Enterprises of NLR, LLC, d/b/a A-1 Recovery of NLR (A-1). On appeal, Burnett argues that the circuit court erred by not granting his motion to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity and statutory immunity. We reverse and dismiss. On April 17, 2025, A-1 filed its complaint for tortious interference of a contract against Burnett, who is the director of the Arkansas Towing and Recovery Board (Board), in his individual capacity; Steve’s Auto Center of Conway, Inc., d/b/a Steve’s Towing & Recovery (Steve’s Auto); and Tracy and Steven Gafner, who own and manage Steve’s Auto. A-1 and Steve’s Auto are competitors, both providing towing and recovery services to the public. According to the complaint, in April 2022, Wal-Mart Store #0005 (Wal-Mart) in Conway contracted with A-1 to remove vehicles that had been left abandoned or illegally parked. A-1 posted signs in Wal-Mart’s parking lot warning visitors that vehicles could not be left overnight and that abandoned vehicles would be towed. According to A-1, it had a collaborative relationship with Wal-Mart and its managers, and A-1 towed 191 vehicles from Wal-Mart in 2022; 148 in 2023; and 136 in 2024. On January 7, 2025, a Wal-Mart manager informed A-1 that it could no longer use A-1 for towing services and that it was going to start using Steve’s Auto. A-1 alleged that Burnett and his wife have a close personal and professional business relationship with the Gafners. Burnett frequently discussed complaints filed against other competing towing companies pending before the Board and other Board business with the Gafners. In addition, Burnett frequently seeks advice from Tracy Gafner about complaints received by the Board against competing towing companies and has shared information about other competing towing companies received during the Board’s investigations with the Gafners. Burnett has actively solicited information from the Gafners about other competing towing companies, which he used to later prosecute those companies with complaints pending before the Board. A-1 further alleged that the Gafners attended two Board meetings via Zoom and were in communication with Burnett throughout. On numerous occasions, the Gafners made derogatory and/or threatening comments about A- 1 and other competing towing companies. Burnett has commented frequently to the Gafners and others that A-1 should be shut down. Additionally, Burnett and his investigator made derogatory and/or defamatory comments about A-1 to other towing companies. 2 Burnett called or visited Steve’s Auto to discuss pending legislation with the Gafners and that Burnett promised Tracy Gafner that she would be appointed to the Board. A-1 further alleged that on or about December 7, 2024, Burnett approached Ryan Peters, a manager at Wal-Mart, and advised him that Wal-Mart needed to stop doing business with A-1. Burnett told Peters that “he would subpoena him and other Wal-Mart managers to court where Ryan would be forced to show every tow slip signed for A-1 to remove vehicles from the Wal-Mart parking lot.” A-1 alleged that Burnett’s statements to Peters were intentionally misleading and false and were made with the intent to coerce Peters to terminate the existing contractual relationship with A-1 and use Steve’s Auto instead. A-1 alleged that on or about January 6, 2025, Wal-Mart ceased using A-1’s services, and upon Burnett’s insistence, Wal-Mart signed a new contract with Steve’s Auto. On the same day, A-1 alleged that a “sting operation” had occurred. According to the complaint, an A-1 tow operator responded to a call that there were three 18-wheelers parked illegally near Hobby Lobby. The Gafners, having dinner nearby, informed Burnett that an A-1 wrecker was near the Hobby Lobby parking lot. Burnett contacted the Conway Police Department to assist him with confronting the A-1 tow operator. Burnett told the responding officer, Derek Vickers, that he was surveilling A-1’s tow operator and wanted the Conway Police Department to standby to “keep the peace.” Officer Vickers’s incident report was attached to the complaint. According to Officer Vickers’s report, Burnett stated that he had received multiple complaints in the past few days about A-1 illegally towing vehicles. Based on the report, while Burnett was conducting his investigation, he asked the 3 driver if he had a signed private-property tow sheet. The driver responded that he had. However, Officer Vickers heard Burnett tell the driver that he had been watching them and did not witness anyone sign paperwork. The driver eventually provided Burnett with a blank private-property tow sheet. Burnett then demanded that the driver release the semi- truck and leave. The complaint further alleged that during the sting, Burnett commented that he “had been holding twelve complaints against A-1.” A-1 asserted that, as the director of the board, Burnett knew about A-1’s contractual relationship with Wal-Mart. Burnett and the Gafners committed tortious interference of a contract when they conspired to coerce Wal-Mart managers to terminate the contractual relationship with A-1 and instead use Steve’s Auto for Wal-Mart’s towing needs. A-1 alleged Burnett’s actions exceeded the scope of his official duties, were unethical and highly improper in his position, and violated the Board’s own policies and procedures regarding conflicts of interest and professional conduct. As a direct result of Burnett’s and the Gafners’ interference with A-1’s contract with Wal-Mart, A-1 has suffered and will continue to suffer damages, including damages for lost profits and/or loss of past and future revenues, and ongoing harm to its reputation. A-1 sought compensatory damages and reserved the right to request punitive damages. Attached to A-1’s complaint was the affidavit of Alecia Allen, an employee of Steve’s Auto from August 2024 to February 2025. According to Allen, she overheard Steve Gafner state that Burnett told him that the Board had over twenty complaints against A-1. Burnett indicated that he intended to bring all twenty complaints against A-1 in a single Board hearing and that he was intentionally holding these complaints to “pile on” when A-1 came 4 before the Board. Allen overheard Tracy telling a State Trooper that Burnett performed a sting operation on A-1. In this same conversation, Tracy told the Trooper that Burnett approached a Wal-Mart manager and told him that he needed to stop doing business with A-1 because he was investigating A-1 for illegal towing and grand theft auto. Allen stated that while Burnett “did not outright state that he told Wal-Mart to sign Steve’s Auto Center he strongly encouraged the manager to sign a contract with Steve’s Auto Center instead of A-1.” Allen also heard Steve mention that Burnett stated that the manager admitted receiving “kickbacks” from every tow by A-1. On May 28, 2025, Steve’s Auto and the Gafners filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of A-1’s failure to state a claim. On June 5, 2025, Burnett filed his separate motion to dismiss asserting that he is entitled to sovereign and statutory immunity. With regard to sovereign immunity, Burnett argued that the claims against him must be dismissed because the State is the real party in interest. As to statutory immunity, Burnett argued that he was entitled to immunity as an employee of a state agency because A-1 failed to state facts showing a malicious act outside the scope of his employment and that A-1 did not allege a violation of clearly established principles of law. On July 22, 2025, the circuit court entered orders denying Steve’s Auto’s, the Gafners’ and Burnett’s motions to dismiss. On July 30, Burnett filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 2(a)(10) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure–Civil, which permits an interlocutory appeal from an “order denying a motion to dismiss or for summary 5 judgment based on the defense of sovereign immunity or the immunity of a government official.”1 When reviewing the denial of the motion to dismiss under Rule 2(a)(10), we treat the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Banks v. Jones, 2019 Ark. 204, 575 S.W.3d 111. All reasonable inferences are resolved in favor of the complaint and the pleadings are liberally construed. Id. Because our rules require fact pleading, the complaint must state facts to entitle the pleader to relief. Id. Mere conclusions will not suffice. Id. We review a motion to dismiss for abuse of discretion. Id. But whether a party is immune from suit is purely a question of law and is reviewed de novo. Id. I. Statutory Immunity Burnett argues that he was entitled to statutory immunity in his individual capacity as an employee of the State. Officers and employees of the State of Arkansas are immune from liability and from suit, except to the extent that they may be covered by liability insurance, for damages for acts or omissions, other than malicious acts or omissions, occurring within the course and scope of their employment. Ark. Code Ann. § 19-10- 305(a).2 When determining whether officers and employees of the State are entitled to statutory immunity, we have traditionally been guided by the standard used for qualified- immunity claims in federal civil-rights actions. Ark. State Med. Bd. v. Byers, 2017 Ark. 213, 1 The Gafners and Steve’s Auto are not parties to this appeal. 2 This statute has been recodified as Ark. Code Ann. § 25-44-305 by Act 419 of 2025, §§ 1, 305, but was not effective until August 5, 2025. 6 at 5, 521 S.W.3d 459, 463. Generally, an official is immune from suit if his or her actions did not violate clearly established principles of law of which a reasonable person would have knowledge. Id. To stave off summary judgment on qualified immunity, a civil-rights plaintiff must assert a constitutional violation, demonstrate that the constitutional right is clearly established, and raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the official would have known that the conduct violated that clearly established right. Id. Burnett argues that he is entitled to statutory immunity in his individual capacity as an employee of the State because (1) the acts alleged by A-1 in its complaint are not malicious; (2) they were committed in the course and scope of his employment; and (3) he did not violate a clearly established principle of law of which a reasonable person would have knowledge. We first consider whether Burnett’s alleged actions were malicious. In defining malice, we have explained, “It is true that in law malice is not necessarily personal hate. It is rather an intent and disposition to do a wrongful act greatly injurious to another.” Satterfield v. Rebsamen Ford, Inc., 253 Ark. 181, 185, 485 S.W.2d 192, 195 (1972); see also Stine v. Sanders, 66 Ark. App. 49, 987 S.W.2d 289 (1999). Malice is also defined as “the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse, with an intent to inflict an injury or under circumstances that the law will imply an evil intent . . . . A conscious violation of the law . . . which operates to the prejudice of another person. A condition of the mind showing a heart . . . fatally bent on mischief.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 956–57 (6th ed. 1990). Fuqua v. Flowers, 341 Ark. 901, 905–06, 20 S.W.3d 388, 391 (2000). Here, A-1 alleged that Burnett has a close personal and professional relationship with the Gafners; Burnett frequently discusses complaints filed against other competing towing companies pending before the Board and other Board business with the Gafners; Burnett 7 frequently seeks advice from Tracy Gafner about complaints received by the Board against competing towing companies and shares information about other competing towing companies received during the Board’s investigations with the Gafners; Burnett comments frequently to the Gafners and others that A-1 should be shut down; Burnett and his investigator make derogatory and/or defamatory comments about A-1 to other towing companies; Burnett discussed pending legislation with the Gafners; Burnett promised Tracy Gafner that she would be appointed to the Board; Burnett approached one of the Wal-Mart managers , Ryan Peters, and advised him that Wal-Mart needed to stop doing business with A-1; Burnett told Peters that “he would subpoena him and other Wal-Mart managers to court where Ryan would be forced to show every tow slip signed for A-1 to remove vehicles from the Wal-Mart parking lot”; Burnett’s statements to Peters were intentionally misleading, false, and were made with the intent to coerce Peters to terminate the existing contractual relationship with A-1 and use Steve’s Auto instead; on or about January 6, 2025, Wal-Mart ceased using A-1’s services, and upon Burnett’s insistence, Wal-Mart signed a new contract with Steve’s Auto. On the same day, Burnett performed a “sting operation” on a tow that A-1 was conducting. Burnett argues that the above allegations do not demonstrate malice because his conduct was justified and within the law. As to A-1’s assertion that Burnett exceeded his authority with regard to his subpoena power, it is true that the Board does have subpoena power pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 27-50-1215. As Burnett points out, A-1 admitted that complaints had been made to the Board regarding its tows from the Wal-Mart location. Additionally, through Allen’s affidavit, it was alleged that the Wal-Mart manager admitted 8 receiving “kickbacks” from every tow by A-1. Further, the nonconsensual-towing statute requires that towing operators receive a signed statement from a property owner before effecting a tow. Ark. Code Ann. § 27-50-1101(a)(1)(C) (Repl. 2022). However, as evidenced by Officer Vickers’s report, A-1 failed to conduct a lawful tow in accordance with the nonconsensual-towing statute during the January 6, 2025 “sting operation.” Based on these concerns, A-1 was under investigation by the Board. As such, Burnett’s communications with Wal-Mart were officially motivated, and he had a duty to protect customers and prevent further violations of the law. It is Burnett’s position that his responsibility is to enforce compliance with the towing statutes and that it was within his authority to advise Wal-Mart to cease doing business with A-1. We agree. Specifically, as director of the board, Burnett is charged with investigating and enforcing the statutes and rules regarding towing vehicles, including consumer complaints and violations of the rules promulgated by the Board. See Ark. Code Ann. § 27-50-1203(g) (Supp. 2025). Given our discussion above, we hold that A-1 failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that Burnett’s actions gave rise to “a conscious violation of the law” or that Burnett committed wrongful acts without just cause or excuse. Fuqua, supra. Because A-1 failed to demonstrate malice, our analysis ends here, and we need not consider whether Burnett’s conduct was within the course and scope of his employment or whether A-1’s allegations support a violation of clearly established principles of law of which a reasonable person would have knowledge. 9 Therefore, we hold that Burnett is entitled to statutory immunity and we reverse and dismiss.3 Reversed and dismissed. Special Justices KEVIN CRASS and BRIAN LESTER join. WOMACK, J., concurs without opinion. WEBB and BRONNI, JJ., not participating. 3 Burnett also argues that he is entitled to sovereign immunity because the State is the real party in interest. Burnett cites Ark. Code Ann. § 21-9-203(a) which governs State payment authority for damages. We disagree with Burnett’s position. We have explained that state officials sued in their individual capacities “do not enjoy the immunity granted to the State under article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution.” Harris v. Hutchinson, 2020 Ark. 3, at 9, 591 S.W.3d 778, 783. Because A-1’s action is solely against Burnett as an individual, the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply. 10