Arkansas Attorney General Opinion No. 2026-100
CourtArkansas Attorney General Reports
Date FiledOctober 21, 2026
Docket2026-100
JudgeTIM GRIFFIN, Attorney General
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
TIM GRIFFIN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Opinion No. 2026-100
October 21, 2026
The Honorable David Ray
State Representative
137 Summit Valley Circle
Maumelle, Arkansas 72113
Dear Representative Ray:
I am writing in response to your request for an opinion regarding the regulation of data centers.
You state that Arkansas counties have been actively attempting to regulate data centers and
concerns have arisen regarding whether attempts to regulate data centers are consistent and in
compliance with applicable state and federal law.
Against this background, you ask the following questions:
1. Under the applicable state and federal law, what authority does a county with no zoning
ordinances in place have to regulate a proposed data center before a county construction
permit is issued?
Brief response: Under Arkansas law, a county that has not adopted zoning ordinances has
limited authority to regulate a proposed data center before issuing a
construction permit. It may not deny the permit on zoning or land-use
compatibility grounds because no zoning scheme exists under which the
proposed use can be prohibited or conditioned. But the county may
enforce otherwise valid ordinances and statutory requirements concerning
matters such as health and safety, flood-prone areas, subdivision
development, road access, setbacks, and applicable building
requirements.
2. Under the applicable state and federal law, what authority does a county with no zoning
ordinances in place have to regulate a data center after a county permit is issued and
construction has begun?
3. After a county with no zoning ordinances in place has issued a construction permit and
construction has begun, does said county have the authority to enact an ordinance changing
the requirements for the permit by imposing additional requirements for the permit,
BOB R. BROOKS JR. JUSTICE BUILDING
101 WEST CAPITOL AVENUE
LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72201
The Honorable David Ray
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-100
Page 2
increasing the standards to be met or fees to be paid, delaying construction, changing the
methods of construction, requiring reports, or increasing compliance expenses?
Brief response: In response to Questions 2 and 3, a county retains regulatory authority
after issuing a construction permit; however, in one case the Arkansas
Supreme Court held substantial reliance on a building permit equitably
estopped the county from revoking the building permit. A permit,
standing alone, does not create a contract or a vested right to remain
governed by the laws in effect when the permit issued. Thus, the permit
holder generally remains subject to later regulations lawfully enacted
under the government’s police power.
4. Under the applicable state and federal law, does a county with no zoning ordinances in
place have the authority to enact an ordinance to regulate a data center based upon the
amount of electricity or the amount of water it is expected to use, after the data center has
secured contracts for such services and the Public Service Commission and the particular
utility entities have approved such contracts?
Brief response: Public Service Commission (“PSC”) approval of utility-service contracts
does not foreclose otherwise lawful county regulation, but the county may
not override matters committed to the PSC by the General Assembly.
5. If a county with no zoning ordinances in place causes foreseeable damage to a data center
through an action that is later determined to be ultra vires on the part of the county, may
the county be held liable for such damages in state or federal court?
Brief response: Arkansas Code § 21‑9‑301 generally immunizes counties from tort
liability, including negligence claims, except to the extent the county has
applicable liability-insurance coverage. A finding that county action was
ultra vires does not itself create a damages remedy or overcome statutory
immunity. Rather, ultra vires claims are limited to prospective injunctive
relief, and monetary damages may be recovered only if immunity has been
waived through applicable insurance coverage.
6. After a county issues a construction permit upon the applicant’s satisfaction of all
conditions, and the applicant enters into contracts on the strength of that permit and begins
construction, does said county have the authority to enact an ordinance that retroactively
adds conditions to the permit and causes work to cease until new conditions are met?
Brief response: When a permit has been lawfully issued, the permit holder has entered
contracts and incurred liabilities in reliance on it, and construction has
begun, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that the permit holder may
acquire “a kind of property right” entitled to protection in some
circumstances. In Tankersley Bros. Industries, Inc. v. City of Fayetteville,
The Honorable David Ray
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-100
Page 3
the Arkansas Supreme Court explained that, after such reliance, a permit
generally may not be revoked without cause or in the absence of public
necessity. An ordinance that retroactively adds new permit conditions and
stops construction until those conditions are satisfied could therefore
operate as a material alteration or effective revocation of the permit and
might be subject to challenge under Tankersley.
DISCUSSION
Question 1: Under the applicable state and federal law, what authority does a county with no
zoning ordinances in place have to regulate a proposed data center before a county construction
permit is issued?
Under Arkansas law, a county that has not adopted zoning ordinances has limited authority to
regulate a proposed data center before issuing a construction permit.1 It may not deny the permit
on zoning or land-use compatibility grounds because no zoning scheme exists under which the
proposed use can be prohibited or conditioned.2 But the county may enforce otherwise valid
ordinances and statutory requirements concerning matters such as health and safety, flood-prone
areas, subdivision development, road access, setbacks, and applicable building requirements.3
The quorum court may also adopt generally applicable ordinances within authority granted by the
Arkansas Constitution and state law.4 That authority does not permit the county to impose ad hoc
zoning restrictions on a particular parcel or project without following the statutory zoning process.5
And the county may initiate that zoning process under A.C.A. §§ 14‑17‑203, ‑207, and ‑209.
1
Federal law does not appear to provide an independent source of county authority to regulate a proposed data center.
Rather, federal law may limit otherwise valid county regulation, such as through preemption in some circumstances.
See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
2
A.C.A. § 14‑17‑209(a), (c).
3
A.C.A. §§ 14‑17‑208, 14‑268‑104.
4
Ark. Const. amend. 55, § 1; A.C.A. § 14‑14‑801; Walker v. Washington County, 263 Ark. 317, 319, 564 S.W.2d
513, 514 (1978) (recognizing that a quorum court may exercise only those legislative powers authorized by the
Arkansas Constitution or by statute); Arkansas County v. Burris, 308 Ark. 490, 494, 825 S.W.2d 590, 592 (1992)
(invalidating a county ordinance that used an enforcement mechanism the General Assembly had not authorized).
5
Johnson v. Sunray Services, Inc., 306 Ark. 497, 509, 816 S.W.2d 582, 589 (1991) (upholding a county landfill-
location ordinance enacted under specific statutory authority despite the absence of a general zoning ordinance).
The Honorable David Ray
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-100
Page 4
If the proposed facility qualifies as a digital-asset mining business, additional statutory limits and
requirements apply under the Arkansas Data Centers Act and related provisions.6 Otherwise, the
county’s authority remains limited to powers independently granted by Arkansas law.7
Accordingly, before a construction permit issues, an unzoned county may enforce valid nonzoning
regulations that apply to the project and may adopt additional regulations within its lawful
authority. But it may not use the permit process to impose zoning restrictions that the county has
not adopted.
Question 2: Under the applicable state and federal law, what authority does a county with no
zoning ordinances in place have to regulate a data center after a county permit is issued and
construction has begun?
Question 3: After a county with no zoning ordinances in place has issued a construction permit
and construction has begun, does said county have the authority to enact an ordinance changing
the requirements for the permit by imposing additional requirements for the permit, increasing
the standards to be met or fees to be paid, delaying construction, changing the methods of
construction, requiring reports, or increasing compliance expenses?
In response to Questions 2 and 3, a county retains regulatory authority after issuing a construction
permit; however, in one case the Arkansas Supreme Court held that substantial reliance on a
building permit equitably estopped the county from revoking the building permit.8 A permit,
standing alone, does not create a contract or a vested right to remain governed by the laws in effect
when the permit issued.9 Thus, the permit holder generally remains subject to later regulations
lawfully enacted under the government’s police power.10
But in some circumstances, Arkansas courts may conclude permit holders have greater protection
when the permit holder has acted in good faith and materially relied on the permit.11 In Tankersley
Bros. Industries, Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized that a permit
could not be revoked arbitrarily after the holder had incurred material expenses, entered contracts,
and taken substantial steps in reliance on the permit. Whether revocation would be permitted under
6
A.C.A. §§ 14‑1‑601 to ‑606, 23‑119‑103, 23‑119‑105(f).
7
Ark. Const. amend. 55, § 1; A.C.A. § 14‑14‑801.
8
Tankersley Bros. Indus., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 227 Ark. 130, 135–36, 296 S.W.2d 412, 415 (1956) (recognizing
that substantial reliance on a permit may estop a municipality from later taking inconsistent action); Smith v. City of
Arkadelphia, 336 Ark. 42, 48–53, 984 S.W.2d 392, 395–98 (1999) (holding that permit holders generally remain
subject to subsequently enacted regulations adopted under the police power).
9
Smith, 336 Ark. at 49–50, 984 S.W.2d at 396; Tankersley, 227 Ark. at 135–36, 296 S.W.2d at 415.
10
Smith, 336 Ark. at 49–53, 984 S.W.2d at 396–98.
11
Tankersley, 227 Ark. at 135–36, 296 S.W.2d at 415.
The Honorable David Ray
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-100
Page 5
Tankersley would likely depend on the extent of the work on the particular data center and the
expenditures, obligations, and other actions undertaken in reliance on the permit.
Even substantial reliance does not necessarily exempt the project from later, valid regulation. In
Smith v. City of Arkadelphia, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the lawfulness of new
construction and safety requirements against a permit holder who had obtained permits and begun
site preparation before the new ordinance took effect.12 The court reasoned that the new
requirements regulated future construction without revoking the existing permits.13 Thus, a county
may impose later requirements within its lawful authority without necessarily withdrawing the
underlying approval. And Smith reiterated that “a city has the plenary authority to exercise its
police power to protect public health and safety which is founded on public necessity.”14
Any post-permit ordinance must remain consistent with state law and any controlling state
regulatory scheme.15 Accordingly, after construction begins, the county’s strongest regulatory
tools are valid police-power regulations, enforcement of lawful permit requirements, and nuisance-
abatement measures.16 The county’s ability to revoke or materially impair the permit itself may
become more limited if the permit holder establishes substantial, good-faith reliance on the
county’s approval.17
Question 4: Under the applicable state and federal law, does a county with no zoning ordinances
in place have the authority to enact an ordinance to regulate a data center based upon the
amount of electricity or the amount of water it is expected to use, after the data center has
secured contracts for such services and the Public Service Commission and the particular utility
entities have approved such contracts?
Public Service Commission (“PSC”) approval of utility-service contracts does not foreclose
otherwise lawful county regulation, but the county may not override matters committed to the PSC
by the General Assembly.
The PSC has exclusive jurisdiction over regulated electric-utility rates and broad authority over
utility service, including approval of special-rate contracts.18 The PSC may also establish standards
12
Smith, 336 Ark. at 46–53, 984 S.W.2d at 394–98.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 46–47, 984 S.W.2d at 394.
15
A.C.A. §§ 14‑14‑808, ‑809.
16
See A.C.A. §§ 14‑14‑801, ‑802, ‑804, 14‑17‑209; Smith, 336 Ark. at 49–53, 984 S.W.2d at 396–98.
17
Tankersley, 227 Ark. at 135–36, 296 S.W.2d at 415.
18
A.C.A. §§ 23‑2‑301, ‑304(a)(1)–(4), 23‑4‑201(a)(1), ‑1309(a)–(b).
The Honorable David Ray
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-100
Page 6
concerning the measurement of “quantity” and other conditions of utility service. 19 The PSC has
“sole and exclusive” jurisdiction over rates charged by regulated electric utilities.20 When the PSC
has approved a special-rate contract governing service to a particular customer, state law
specifically permits that contract to establish customer rates and other terms for recovering the
costs of strategic investments necessary to serve the customer.21 A county therefore may not
impose requirements that directly conflict with rates or service requirements lawfully established
by the PSC. But using anticipated electricity or water consumption to classify facilities or require
documentation of utility capacity does not necessarily regulate a utility service. If the proposed
ordinance determines permissible land uses, the county must comply with the county-zoning
statutes and adoption procedures.22
The same distinction applies to water, although some providers—including water authorities
organized under the Water Authority Act—are exempt from PSC jurisdiction.23 Cooling-system
restrictions, water-efficiency standards, and consumption-reporting requirements must rest on
county authority and comply with state law.
Accordingly, if the proposed ordinance is not a zoning measure but limits the electricity or water
a data center may receive or consume, the county must identify applicable county authority for
that restriction and comply with state law. To the extent the restriction directly conflicts with rates
or service requirements lawfully established by the PSC, the county may not substitute its own
utility-service determination for the Commission’s. A requirement’s effect on consumption does
not, by itself, establish a conflict with PSC authority. Instead, the inquiry is whether the
requirement conflicts with governing utility law or the rates, terms, or service obligations approved
by the Commission.
Question 5: If a county with no zoning ordinances in place causes foreseeable damage to a data
center through an action that is later determined to be ultra vires on the part of the county, may
the county be held liable for such damages in state or federal court?
Arkansas Code § 21‑9‑301 generally protects counties against tort liability, including negligence
claims, except to the extent of applicable liability-insurance coverage. A determination that county
action was ultra vires does not itself establish a cause of action or overcome that immunity.
Moreover, ultra vires claims are limited to injunctive relief and cannot be used to recover monetary
19
A.C.A. §§ 23‑2‑301, ‑304(a)(1)–(4).
20
A.C.A. § 23‑4‑201(a)(1).
21
A.C.A. § 23‑4‑1309(a)–(b).
22
A.C.A. §§ 14‑14‑801(a), (b)(3), ‑805(5), (13); id. §§ 14‑17‑207(a)–(c), ‑209(a).
23
A.C.A. § 4‑35‑109.
The Honorable David Ray
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-100
Page 7
damages.24 The only exception to this barrier is if the county has purchased liability insurance
covering the claim, in which case § 21‑9‑301 expressly waives immunity up to the policy limits.
Accordingly, a county may face liability, but neither foreseeability nor an ultra vires determination
independently establishes that liability. Recovery would require a separate viable cause of action,
such as a covered tort claim.
Question 6: After a county issues a construction permit upon the applicant’s satisfaction of all
conditions, and the applicant enters into contracts on the strength of that permit and begins
construction, does said county have the authority to enact an ordinance that retroactively adds
conditions to the permit and causes work to cease until new conditions are met?
As explained in response to Questions 2 and 3, when a permit has been lawfully issued, the permit
holder has entered contracts and incurred liabilities in reliance on it, and construction has begun,
the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that the permit holder may acquire “a kind of property right”
entitled to protection in some circumstances.25 In Tankersley Bros. Industries, the Arkansas
Supreme Court explained that, after such reliance, a permit generally may not be revoked without
cause or in the absence of public necessity.26
An ordinance that retroactively adds new permit conditions and stops construction until those
conditions are satisfied could therefore operate as a material alteration or effective revocation of
the permit and might be subject to challenge under Tankersley. But as discussed in the response to
Questions 2 and 3, that protection is not absolute. A county may have authority to impose a later
requirement if the county otherwise possesses statutory authority over the subject and the
requirement constitutes a reasonable exercise of the police power.27
But the county cannot rely merely on a change in regulatory preference to retroactively alter an
existing permit. On the facts stated—where all permit conditions were satisfied, contracts were
made in reliance on the permit, and construction began before the new ordinance—the applicant
has substantially stronger reliance interests than the permit holder in Smith. Whether the county
may halt the work would therefore depend on the legal authority for the new conditions, the nature
24
Arkansas Lottery Comm’n v. Alpha Mktg., 2013 Ark. 232, 428 S.W.3d 415 (recognizing that the ultra vires, arbitrary,
capricious, or bad-faith exception does not itself permit a damages claim against the State). Although Alpha Marketing
arose in the sovereign-immunity context, its discussion of ultra vires claims is equally instructive here because the
nature of the claim does not change based on the immunity doctrine invoked; in either context, an ultra vires action is
limited to prospective injunctive relief and does not authorize an award of monetary damages.
25
Tankersley, 227 Ark. at 135, 296 S.W.2d at 415.
26
Tankersley, 227 Ark. at 135–36, 296 S.W.2d at 415.
27
Id.
The Honorable David Ray
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-100
Page 8
and effect of those conditions, and whether cause or public necessity justifies an effective
revocation of the permit.
Accordingly, a county ordinarily may enact valid regulations governing future conduct, but
Arkansas law provides grounds for challenging an ordinance that retroactively conditions an
existing construction permit and requires work to cease after the permit holder has materially relied
on the permit. The stronger the applicant’s good-faith reliance and progress toward completion,
the stronger the protection recognized in Tankersley; conversely, a legally authorized public-health
or safety necessity allows the county to apply new requirements.28
Assistant Attorney General Justin Hughes prepared this opinion, which I hereby approve.
Sincerely,
TIM GRIFFIN
Attorney General
28
Id.