The Armory Commission of Alabama v. Nearen Construction Company, LLC
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketSC-2026-0166
JudgeMcCool, J.
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Rel: November 20, 2026
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027
_________________________
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_________________________
The Armory Commission of Alabama
v.
Nearen Construction Company, LLC
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-25-900081)
McCOOL, Justice.
The Armory Commission of Alabama ("the Commission") has
appealed from a preliminary injunction that the Montgomery Circuit
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Court issued in favor of Nearen Construction Company, LLC ("Nearen").
That injunction temporarily prohibits the Commission from making
further payments toward the construction of the Huntsville Readiness
Center -- a military project that, at the time the injunction was issued,
was "about 60 percent complete." For reasons set forth herein, we
dismiss the appeal because the preliminary injunction is void as to the
Commission, and we instruct the trial court to dismiss the Commission
from the case.
Facts and Procedural History
The Commission's appeal stems from a complaint that Nearen filed
against it in January 2025, in which Nearen sought both a preliminary
injunction and a permanent injunction. This is the second time that the
parties have been before this Court in this litigation, and, in Nearen
Construction Co. v. Armory Commission of Alabama, [Ms. SC-2025-0511,
Dec. 12, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2025), this Court set forth the following
facts and procedural history:
"According to the allegations of the complaint, the
Commission advertised sealed bids for the construction of a
military project designated as the Huntsville Readiness
Center ('the project'). At the prebid meeting, bidders for the
project were informed that the Commission 'preferred,' among
other things, two originals of the bid form. Due to an
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oversight, Nearen submitted only one bid form. The bid
otherwise conformed to the requirements and preferences
imposed by the Commission. In December 2024, Erich
Babbitt, the contracting officer for the Commission, opened
and read the sealed bids. After determining that Nearen had
submitted only one bid form, Babbitt rejected the bid,
completely excluded it from the bid tabulation/abstract, and
refused to read it publicly. In January 2025, after
unsuccessfully exhausting all available administrative
remedies, Nearen commenced an action against the
Commission pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 39-5-4, seeking to
enjoin the letting or execution of the contract to construct the
project and to recover its bid-preparation costs. Nearen
alleged, among other things, that it was the lowest
responsible and responsive bidder and that the Commission
had failed to open its bid publicly and to consider its bid when
its only nonconformity, i.e., failing to submit two bid forms,
constituted a minor irregularity. Following a hearing, the
trial court granted the Commission's motion to dismiss,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P."
___ So. 3d at ___. Nearen appealed to this Court following the dismissal
of its complaint, and, on December 12, 2025, this Court reversed the
judgment of dismissal after concluding that Nearen had pleaded facts
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ.
P.
Following this Court's decision in Nearen, supra, Nearen filed a
motion for an expedited hearing on its request for a preliminary
injunction, alleging that "approximately 50 percent of the project funds
have been disbursed under the contract" and that injunctive relief was
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necessary to "ensure that no further public funds are wrongfully
disbursed." Thereafter, the Commission filed a motion for a judgment on
the pleadings in which it argued, for the first time, that it is an agency of
the State of Alabama and is therefore entitled to sovereign immunity
pursuant to Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution of 2022, which
provides that "the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in
any court of law or equity." According to the Commission, "because [it] is
protected by sovereign immunity," the trial court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over the case, which, the Commission argued, means that
"this lawsuit is due to be dismissed." Nearen argued in response that
sovereign immunity does not apply in "cases involving competitive bid
law," but it also argued that,
"[e]ven if the [trial] court were to find that the
Commission cannot be enjoined to comply with competitive
bid law, Nearen has also asserted an official capacity claim
against the Commission's contracting officer, Erich Babbitt,
and the Commission has failed to rule out the possibility that
this claim falls within an exception to sovereign immunity. In
the body of its complaint, Nearen named both the Commission
and Erich Babbitt in his official capacity as contracting officer,
and Nearen has consistently sought that both the Commission
and its officers/agents be enjoined."
The trial court held a hearing over two days in January 2026 and
February 2026, and, on March 10, 2026, the court granted Nearen's
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request for a preliminary injunction. Specifically, the trial court enjoined
"[t]he Commission and its officers, employees, and agents, including
Erich Babbitt," from "mak[ing] … further payments under the
construction contract after the effective date of this injunction," which
the court ordered would "remain in effect through the date of a final
judgment … or until lifted by separate court order." The trial court
acknowledged the Commission's argument that it is entitled to sovereign
immunity, but the court stated that it was "not persuaded by the
Commission's arguments at this stage," though the court indicated that
it would be willing to reconsider that argument before the trial occurred.
The Commission filed a timely notice of appeal, and, two days later,
it moved the trial court to stay the preliminary injunction pending the
outcome of its appeal, arguing that "cessation of payments … will cause
delay in the construction of this critical public works facility and result
in substantial, additional costs to … the State of Alabama." The trial
court granted the Commission's motion to stay on March 13, 2026.
Analysis
The Commission continues to argue on appeal that it is a State
agency that is entitled to sovereign immunity and that, as a result, the
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trial court "lacked jurisdiction to do anything other than dismiss the
action." The Commission's brief, p. 17.
The law regarding sovereign immunity is well settled.
" ' "Section 14, Ala. Const. 1901, provides: '[T]he State of
Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law
or equity.' (Emphasis added.) 'The wall of immunity erected
by § 14 is nearly impregnable.' Patterson v. Gladwin Corp.,
835 So. 2d 137, 142 (Ala. 2002). Indeed, as regards the State
of Alabama and its agencies, the wall is absolutely
impregnable. Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Human Res., 999 So.
2d 891, 895 (Ala. 2008) ('Section 14 affords absolute immunity
to both the State and State agencies.'); Ex parte Jackson
County Bd. of Educ., 4 So. 3d 1099, 1102 (Ala. 2008) (same);
Atkinson v. State, 986 So. 2d 408, 410-11 (Ala. 2007) (same);
[Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp.], 978 So. 2d 17 (Ala.
2007)] (same); Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., 764 So. 2d
1263, 1268 (Ala. 2000) (same); Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d
801, 806 (Ala. 1992) (same). 'Absolute immunity' means just
that -- the State and its agencies are not subject to suit under
any theory.
" ' " 'This immunity may not be waived.' Patterson, 835
So. 2d at 142. Sovereign immunity is, therefore, not an
affirmative defense, but a 'jurisdictional bar.' Ex parte
Alabama Dep't of Transp., 985 So. 2d 892, 894 (Ala. 2007).
The jurisdictional bar of § 14 simply 'preclud[es] a court from
exercising subject-matter jurisdiction' over the State or a
State agency. Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So. 2d
257, 261 (Ala. 2003). Thus, a complaint filed solely against
the State or one of its agencies is a nullity and is void ab initio.
Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp. (In re Russell Petroleum,
Inc. v. Alabama Dep't of Transp.), 6 So. 3d 1126 (Ala. 2008)
…. Any action taken by a court without subject-matter
jurisdiction -- other than dismissing the action -- is void. State
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v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1029
(Ala. 1999)." ' "
Ex parte Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 348 So. 3d 397, 399-400 (Ala. 2021)
(some emphasis added; some emphasis omitted; citations omitted). See
also Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1203, 1206 (Ala. 2006)
("When an action is one against the State or a State agency, § 14 wholly
removes subject-matter jurisdiction from the courts." (emphasis added)).
Thus, sovereign immunity bars any action that seeks relief, including
injunctive relief, against a State agency. See Ex parte Alabama Dep't of
Hum. Res., 999 So. 2d 891, 898 (Ala. 2007) (holding that "sovereign
immunity precludes a … request for injunctive relief against [a State
agency]").
In this case, Nearen's complaint expressly names only one
defendant -- the Commission.1 The Commission was created by the
1The Commission is the only defendant named in both the caption
of the complaint and the "PARTIES" section of the complaint.
(Capitalization in original.) The factual allegations of the complaint
identify Erich Babbitt, the Commission's contracting officer, as the
person primarily responsible for the allegedly improper bid process, but
the complaint does not expressly identify him as a defendant and does
not expressly seek relief against him, though it does seek relief against
the Commission's "officers, members, agents, servants, employees and
attorneys."
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Alabama Legislature via the enactment of § 31-4-1 et seq., Ala. Code
1975, but a body that has been created by legislative enactment does not
automatically qualify as a State agency. Ex parte Board of Dental
Exam'rs, 102 So. 3d 368, 374 (Ala. 2012). Rather, this Court has
explained that
" '[w]hether a lawsuit against a body created by legislative
enactment is a suit against the [S]tate depends on [1] the
character of power delegated to the body, [2] the relation of
the body to the [S]tate, and [3] the nature of the function
performed by the body. All factors in the relationship must
be examined to determine whether the suit is against an arm
of the [S]tate or merely against a franchisee licensed for some
beneficial purpose. State Docks Commission v. Barnes, 225
Ala. 403, 406-07, 143 So. 581, 584 (1932).' "
Id. (citation omitted). However, with respect to the Commission, this
Court has already addressed those factors in Armory Commission of
Alabama v. Staudt, 388 So. 3d 991, 994 (Ala. 1980), and has concluded
that the Commission "operates as an arm of the [S]tate" and therefore is
entitled to the sovereign immunity afforded by § 14. See id. (holding that
"the Constitution … prohibit[ed] [a] lawsuit" against the Commission).
Thus, any complaint filed against the Commission is a complaint filed
against the State, and, as noted, the only legitimate action a trial court
can take in such a case is to dismiss the complaint. Stated differently,
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the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the Commission and therefore
lacked jurisdiction to provide injunctive relief against it.
Nearen does not dispute that the Commission is a State agency, and
it does not ask this Court to reconsider its holding to that effect in Staudt,
supra. Instead, Nearen argues that, even though the Commission is a
State agency, sovereign immunity does not apply in this case for any one
of multiple reasons.
First, Nearen suggests that sovereign immunity should not apply
in "cases involving competitive bid law." Nearen's brief, p. 12. In support
of that argument, Nearen cites International Telecommunications
Systems v. State, 359 So. 2d 364, 365 (Ala. 1978), a case in which the
plaintiff sought injunctive relief against the State of Alabama, Howard
White -- a State agent -- and General Electric Corp. ("GE") "for an alleged
violation of … the Competitive Bid Law[]." Nearen correctly notes that
this Court did not discuss sovereign immunity in that opinion, but
Nearen ignores the fact that, before the case proceeded to a final
judgment, "[t]he State of Alabama was dismissed by the trial court,
leaving Howard White and GE as defendants." Id. at 366. Thus,
International Telecommunications does not support Nearen's suggestion
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that sovereign immunity should not apply in "cases involving competitive
bid law," and we reiterate that " ' "the State and its agencies are not
subject to suit under any theory." ' " Ex parte Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
348 So. 3d at 399 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
Second, Nearen contends that "this Court has recognized … an
established exception to [sovereign] immunity [in] actions brought to
force State agencies to perform their legal duties." Nearen's brief, p. 12.
In support of that argument, Nearen relies on State Highway
Department v. Milton Construction Co., 586 So. 2d 872 (Ala. 1991), but
Nearen reads that case too broadly. Milton Construction did not hold
that a plaintiff may bring an action against a State agency in an attempt
to force the agency "to perform [its] legal duties." Instead, that case more
narrowly held that,
"[o]nce [a State agency] has legally contracted under state law
for goods or services and accepts such goods or services, [it]
also becomes legally obligated to pay for the goods or services
accepted in accordance with the terms of the contract. It
follows that this obligation is not subject to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity and is enforceable in the courts."
Id. at 875. However, that is not the type of relief that Nearen seeks in
this case. More importantly, even when a State agency is obligated to
pay for goods and services that it has accepted, an action seeking
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payment for those goods and services must be brought against a State
agent in his or her official capacity, not the State agency itself. Indeed,
in Milton Construction "the plaintiff … named the director of the
Highway Department, in his official capacity, as a party to the action,
along with the Highway Department." Ex parte Alabama Dep't of
Transp., 978 So. 2d 17, 23 (Ala. 2007). See id. (noting that Milton
Construction "does not support" the notion that a plaintiff "has a right to
sue a State agency" and emphasizing that "a State agency is absolutely
immune from suit"); and Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Hum. Res., 999 So.
2d at 896 ("[A]n action against a State agency … to compel the agency to
perform its legal duties is … barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.").
Third, Nearen argues that the purpose of sovereign immunity is to
prohibit any action that " 'impacts the State treasury and divests it of
funds.' " Nearen's brief, p. 13 (quoting Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro,
950 So. 2d at 1211). Nearen then argues that "[t]he opposite situation
exists here" because, it says, "[t]he State and its taxpayers would have
saved almost $800,000 by accepting Nearen's bid." Id. (emphasis added).
In other words, Nearen argues that its action for injunctive relief will
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benefit the State treasury, rather than divest the treasury of funds, and
it contends that this type of action "does not erode the concept of
sovereign immunity." Id. However, although it is true that sovereign
immunity protects the State treasury, it does not follow that sovereign
immunity applies only to actions that will divest the State treasury of
funds. Once again, the doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that
" ' "the State and its agencies are not subject to suit under any theory," ' "
Ex parte Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 348 So. 3d at 399 (emphasis added;
citations omitted), including one that will allegedly benefit the State
treasury.
Fourth, Nearen claims that it "filed this action as both a citizen
taxpayer and unsuccessful bidder, so to the extent recovery of bid
preparation costs are prohibited by sovereign immunity (which Nearen
disputes), the action may continue as a taxpayer action." Nearen's brief,
p. 14. However, Nearen cites no authority to support that argument, and
we note that the doctrine of sovereign immunity hinges on whether the
State or a State agency has been named as a defendant in the action, not
on the classification of the plaintiff. In other words, it is irrelevant
whether Nearen chooses to classify itself as a taxpayer or as an
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unsuccessful bidder because the dispositive question in either scenario is
whether Nearen's action is an action against a State agency, which it is.
See Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d 137 (Ala. 2002) (holding that
a class action that taxpayers had filed against the State was barred by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity).
Finally, Nearen notes that certain types of actions may be brought
against a State agent in his or her official capacity and that those actions
are not actions against the State, i.e., are not barred by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. See Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Youth Servs., 401
So. 3d 276, 283 (Ala. 2024) (noting the types of actions that may be
brought against a State agent). One such action is an action " ' "for
injunction brought against State officials in their representative capacity
where it is alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond
their authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of law." ' " Id. (citations
omitted). As noted, Nearen contends that, in addition to seeking relief
against the Commission, it "has also asserted an official capacity claim
against the Commission's contracting officer," Erich Babbitt. Nearen's
brief, p. 14. Babbitt is not expressly named as a defendant anywhere in
Nearen's complaint, and the complaint does not expressly seek relief
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against him. See note 1, supra. Nevertheless, Nearen argues that "[i]t
is evident from the face of the complaint that Nearen alleges … Babbitt
acted beyond his authority and/or in a mistaken interpretation of law
while acting as the contracting officer" and that the complaint has
"sought injunctive relief directly against … Babbitt." Nearen's brief, pp.
14, 15. Thus, Nearen argues that, regardless of the Commission's
immunity, its action may proceed against Babbitt.
The problem with Nearen's argument is that it is framed as though
this Court is reviewing a judgment dismissing Nearen's complaint, which
was the case in Nearen's previous appeal in Nearen, supra. However, we
are not reviewing a judgment of dismissal in this appeal but, instead, are
reviewing a preliminary injunction against the Commission. Even if the
allegations in Nearen's complaint are sufficient to identify Babbitt as a
defendant in this case -- an issue on which we take no position -- that
does not change the fact that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to provide
injunctive relief against the Commission. Ex parte Alabama Dep't of
Hum. Res., supra. In other words, the Commission is entitled to the relief
it seeks in this appeal regardless of whether the complaint identifies
Babbitt as a defendant in this case.
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In short, the preliminary injunction against the Commission is void
because the Commission is a State agency that is entitled to sovereign
immunity. It is well settled that a void judgment will not support an
appeal and that, as a result, any appeal from such a judgment must be
dismissed. See Facebook, Inc. v. K.G.S., 294 So. 3d 122, 141 (Ala. 2019)
("Because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter a preliminary
injunction against [the defendant], that injunction is void. Because a void
judgment will not support an appeal, see Tidwell v. State Ethics Comm'n,
599 So. 2d 12 (Ala. 1992), [the defendant's] appeal is due to be
dismissed."). Thus, we dismiss the Commission's appeal, and we instruct
the trial court to vacate the preliminary injunction against the
Commission and to dismiss the Commission from the case. See Talladega
Cnty. Comm'n v. State ex rel. City of Lincoln, 303 So. 3d 476 (Ala. 2020)
(dismissing an appeal because the underlying judgment was void in part
but providing instructions to the trial court to vacate the void part of its
judgment).
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Stewart, C.J., and Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, and Cook, JJ., concur.
Shaw and Sellers, JJ., concur in the result.
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Parker, J., recuses himself.
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