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                                                         - 730 -
                               Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                                        317 Nebraska Reports
                                                     STATE V. YAH
                                                  Cite as
317 Neb. 730




                                        State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
                                            M,A, Yah, appellant.
                                                    ___ N.W.3d ___

                                        Filed September 27, 2024.   No. S-23-866.

                 1. Trial: Appeal and Error. An issue not presented to or decided on by
                    the trial court is not an appropriate issue for consideration on appeal.
                 2. Appeal and Error. An alleged error must be both specifically assigned
                    and specifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error to be
                    considered by an appellate court.
                 3. Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a criminal
                    conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, whether the evidence is
                    direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, the standard is the same:
                    An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the
                    credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters are for
                    the finder of fact.
                 4. Ordinances: Judicial Notice: Appeal and Error. Under the “ordinance
                    rule,” an appellate court will not take judicial notice of a municipal
                    ordinance not in the record.
                 5. Intent: Words and Phrases. Intent is the state of the actor’s mind when
                    the actor’s conduct occurs.
                 6. Criminal Law: Intent: Circumstantial Evidence. When an element of
                    a crime involves existence of a defendant’s mental process or other state
                    of mind of an accused, such elements may be proved by circumstantial
                    evidence.
                 7. Criminal Law: Intent. A trier of fact may infer that the defendant
                    intended the natural and probable consequences of the defendant’s vol-
                    untary acts.
                 8. Appeal and Error. In the absence of plain error, when an issue is raised
                    for the first time in an appellate court, it will be disregarded inasmuch as
                    a lower court cannot commit error in resolving an issue never presented
                    and submitted to it for disposition.
                              - 731 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  317 Nebraska Reports
                           STATE V. YAH
                        Cite as
317 Neb. 730

   Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County, Peter
C. Bataillon, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court
for Douglas County, Stephanie R. Hansen, Judge. Judgment
of District Court affirmed.

  Sarah M. Mooney, of Mooney Law Office, for appellant.

  Kevin J. Slimp, Omaha City Prosecutor, for appellee.

  Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

  Freudenberg, J.
                      I. INTRODUCTION
   The defendant appeals from the district court’s affirmance of
his conviction by the county court for obstructing the admin-
istration of law in violation of Omaha Mun. Code, ch. 20, art.
II, § 20-21 (1980). The defendant argues the evidence was
insufficient to find that he had the requisite intent to obstruct
or interfere with a law enforcement officer performing an
official duty. He also argues that the county court erroneously
applied
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-906
 (Reissue 2016), which he was
not charged with, in finding him guilty of violating § 20-21.
Because he believes the evidence did not support finding him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant argues his
conviction violated due process. We affirm the conviction.

                     II. BACKGROUND
   M,A, Yah was charged by criminal complaint in the county
court for Douglas County with one count of obstructing the
administration of law in violation of § 20-21. The complaint
alleged that on or about September 23, 2021, Yah “did pur-
posely or knowingly do any act, refuse to do any act, or
commit any act of omission with the intent to obstruct or
interfere with any law enforcement officer . . . performing an
official duty.”
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  317 Nebraska Reports
                           STATE V. YAH
                        Cite as
317 Neb. 730

  A bench trial was held. Photographs were entered into evi-
dence. A law enforcement officer testified for the State, and
Yah and his son, M,A, Yah II (Yah Jr.), testified for the defense.
  The county court inventory of evidence does not include a
copy of the ordinance. Likewise, the list of exhibits offered
before the district court on appeal does not include the ordi-
nance. The ordinance does not appear anywhere else in the
appellate record.
                            1. Trial
             (a) Testimony of Deputy U.S. Marshal
   Mark Anderson, a deputy U.S. marshal, testified that on
September 23, 2021, he was on duty with the Metro Fugitive
Task Force looking for Yah Jr., who had a felony warrant for
his arrest. Anderson’s team consisted of three law enforcement
officers in three unmarked vehicles with tinted windows. They
were watching the apartment building where Yah lived.
   Around 6:45 a.m., Anderson observed Yah exit the apart-
ment building with “a large dog on a leash.” Anderson was
familiar with Yah and was “aware of his violent criminal his-
tory.” Anderson estimated the dog weighed 70 to 80 pounds.
The dog was a Cane Corso.
   It appeared that Yah was looking around and using his cell
phone, first to text and then to make a call. Shortly thereaf-
ter, Anderson saw a person matching the description of Yah
Jr. “come out from behind the apartment.” He was wearing a
hoodie, with the hood on his head; carrying a backpack; and
“walking very briskly” toward the front of the building where
Yah was standing.
   One of the other officers activated his vehicle’s lights, and
the three officers exited their vehicles. Anderson testified the
officers were wearing tactical gear that indicated they were
members of law enforcement. The officers ordered Yah Jr. to
get down on the ground, and Yah Jr. complied immediately.
   Before the officers could secure Yah Jr. with handcuffs,
Yah, who was approximately 30 yards away, approached with
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  317 Nebraska Reports
                           STATE V. YAH
                        Cite as
317 Neb. 730

the dog. Anderson testified that Yah started yelling, which
was “very distracting,” and that Yah “got very close to [the
officers].” Anderson ordered Yah to get back, and Yah did
not comply. On cross-examination, Anderson confirmed Yah’s
noncompliance interfered with the officers’ ability to place Yah
Jr. in handcuffs.
   On cross-examination, Anderson confirmed that both Yah
and Yah Jr. were Black men. Anderson testified that “one of
the things” he believed Yah to have said was not to shoot Yah
Jr. He also testified Yah said something similar to “‘[p]ut your
guns away. He’s on the ground. He’s complying with you.’”
Anderson testified that Yah “was saying a lot of things.”
   Anderson testified that he continued repeat the command
for Yah to get back and to get the dog back. The dog “was get-
ting very excited, barking, jumping.” Anderson was “amped-
up” and concerned that if Yah let go of the leash, one of the
officers would be bit by the dog. Anderson did not know if
Yah was carrying a weapon and “was concerned the situation
could be escalated to possibly deadly force, either on [Yah] or
the dog, if [Yah] did not follow [his] commands to step back
away from [the officers].”
   At some point, Anderson told Yah that if he did not retreat,
the dog could be shot. Yah finally complied and “backed off
the scene a little bit, [and] gave [the officers] some space.”
Anderson estimated the period of noncompliance lasted 20 to
30 seconds.
   The officers were then able to redirect their attention to
Yah Jr. and secure him in handcuffs. One of the other officers
placed Yah Jr. under arrest and took him to a law enforcement
vehicle.
   Yah Jr.’s backpack was still on the ground and had not yet
been searched for contraband or weapons. Yah walked to the
backpack and picked it up. Anderson ordered Yah to put the
backpack down, and Yah did not comply.
   Anderson testified that Yah was arguing with him and yell-
ing at him while he repeatedly and loudly ordered Yah to put
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  317 Nebraska Reports
                           STATE V. YAH
                        Cite as
317 Neb. 730

the backpack down, and that the dog again “got really excited
and [was] jumping and barking.” While Yah held the back-
pack, Anderson and Yah continued their “verbal standoff.”
Eventually, Anderson pulled out his firearm. The confrontation
lasted approximately 20 to 30 seconds until Yah eventually
dropped the backpack and backed off.
                 (b) Testimony of Yah and Yah Jr.
   Yah testified that while he knew Yah Jr. was being investi-
gated for a crime, he did not know Yah Jr. had a warrant out
for his arrest. On the morning of the incident, Yah took the dog
outside first thing in the morning, as was typical for him.
   Yah Jr. was living with Yah part of the time. Yah Jr. worked
as a blinds installer and was headed to work when he was
arrested. Yah Jr. testified that he carried his laptop and workout
gear in his backpack and that he dropped his backpack and
“got on the ground immediately” when confronted with the
three officers with their guns drawn.
   Yah testified that after Yah Jr. complied with the officers’
request to get down on the ground, Anderson still had “his gun
. . . trailing down with [Yah Jr.].” Yah testified that he was
scared and that he yelled and “begged” Anderson not to shoot
Yah Jr. Yah explained that he lived in Minnesota “when George
[Floyd] got killed” by law enforcement.
   Yah denied stepping toward the officer and testified the dog
did not bite or growl during the incident. Yah testified that
the dog was “somewhere between nine to 11 months” on the
day Yah Jr. was arrested and weighed approximately 50 to 55
pounds. According to Yah, it was an emotional support dog and
wore a collar so indicating.
   Yah denied having any intent to prevent the officers from
arresting Yah Jr. Yah testified that he grabbed the backpack to
look for Yah Jr.’s cell phone in order to call Yah Jr.’s employer
to let them know Yah Jr. would not be in. Yah reported to
a police sergeant that day that he felt Anderson had been
“aggressive.” Yah was cited on the obstruction charge on
September 27, 2021.
                              - 735 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  317 Nebraska Reports
                           STATE V. YAH
                        Cite as
317 Neb. 730 2
. Arguments to Trial Court
   Defense counsel argued to the trial court that Yah lacked the
requisite intent to obstruct or interfere with a law enforcement
officer performing an official duty. Defense counsel asserted
that Yah had no issue with the officers’ arresting Yah Jr.; he
just wished to prevent Yah Jr. from being shot. Defense coun-
sel elaborated:
      Whether or not [Yah Jr.] was actually going to be harmed,
      I don’t think anybody is saying here today that he was
      going to be harmed, but I think that when you’re looking
      at the statute and you’re looking that intent is an element
      of this, you have to look at all the circumstances of what
      was going through [Yah’s] mind that day.
Defense counsel suggested, based on the timing, that the only
reason Yah was cited was because he filed a complaint against
Anderson. The record does not reflect that defense counsel
raised to the trial court either Yah’s due process rights or Yah’s
First Amendment right to freedom of speech.
   The State emphasized that law enforcement was following
standard operating procedure in effectuating the arrest and that
Yah did not have a right to interfere and obstruct law enforce-
ment from doing its job. The State also suggested that it was
not a coincidence that Yah Jr. exited the back of the apartment
after Yah, who exited from the front, was on his cell phone.
Further, the State noted that when Yah refused to comply with
the commands to drop the backpack, Yah was no longer con-
cerned that Yah Jr. was in imminent danger of being shot. The
State argued that Yah’s actions in refusing to comply with law
enforcement’s orders demonstrated the requisite intent.

                   3. Verdict and Sentence
   The trial court stated, “The issue is whether [Yah] acted
with the intent to obstruct or interfere with a law enforcement
officer performing an official duty.” The court quoted § 20-21
as providing, “‘It shall be unlawful for any person to pur-
posefully or knowingly do any act, refuse to do any act, or to
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            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     317 Nebraska Reports
                                STATE V. YAH
                             Cite as
317 Neb. 730

commit an act of omission with the intent to obstruct or inter-
fere with any law enforcement officer or firefighter performing
an official duty.’”
   The court relied on State v. Ferrin 1 for the proposition that
the proper inquiry in analyzing whether a defendant’s conduct
violates § 28-906, the offense of obstructing a peace officer,
is whether a defendant’s conduct, however expressed, used or
threatened to use either violence, force, physical interference,
or obstacle to intentionally obstruct, impair, or hinder a peace
officer or judge who was acting to either enforce the penal
law or preserve the peace under color of his or her official
authority. The court said that Yah argued the “evidence at trial
was insufficient to show that he intentionally used or threat-
ened to use physical interference or obstruction while the
officers were actively engaged in effectuating the arrest . . .
because [Yah] was afraid for [Yah Jr.].” The court explained
that this concern “does not negate the requirement to comply
with lawful commands of a police officer engaged in their
official duties.”
   The court found that Yah’s conduct “equated to a series
of willful, defiant refusals to comply with the lawful com-
mands of the officers on the scene,” which “created obstacle
to the officers as they were performing their official duties.”
More specifically, the court found that “[a]t the same time the
officers were actively arresting and cuffing [Yah Jr.], [Yah]
began advancing toward the officers with his leashed dog
and yelling at the officers.” Further, “Anderson ordered [Yah]
to get back,” and “[Yah] did not comply and continued to
advance.” Meanwhile, the dog “was getting agitated, jumping,
and barking.”
   The court found that Anderson “repeatedly yelled com-
mands to [Yah] to get back.” Yah complied only after Anderson
threatened to shoot the dog if Yah did not get back. The court
further found that while Anderson was walking Yah Jr. to
1
    State v. Ferrin,
305 Neb. 762
,
942 N.W.2d 404
 (2020).
                              - 737 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  317 Nebraska Reports
                           STATE V. YAH
                        Cite as
317 Neb. 730

the police vehicle, Yah advanced toward the point of arrest
and picked up Yah Jr.’s backpack. Anderson immediately
commanded Yah to drop the backpack but Yah “refuse[d]
and argue[d] with . . . Anderson, repeating the cycle of . . .
Anderson giving commands and [Yah] refusing to follow the
commands.” When the dog again became agitated, Yah finally
dropped the backpack.
   The court concluded that the State had proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that Yah violated § 20-21. Yah was convicted
and ordered to pay a fine of $250 and court costs in the amount
of $50.

                 4. Appeal to District Court
   Yah appealed his conviction to the district court. Yah
assigned to the district court that the trial court erred (1) when
it found the State had proved a prima facie case of guilt for
the violation of § 20-21; (2) when it applied § 28-906, the
offense for obstructing a peace officer, in its finding of guilt,
as opposed to § 20-21; (3) when it found that the State had
proved the element of intent as set forth in § 20-21; and (4)
when it found Yah guilty because the guilty verdict violated
Yah’s due process rights pursuant to the U.S. and Nebraska
Constitutions.
   In relation to the first assignment of error, in his brief on
appeal to the district court, Yah pointed to his testimony that
his only intention was to protect Yah Jr., not to interfere with
the investigation. Yah argued that the State did not present any
evidence to contradict his testimony and that the trial court
did not specifically state it found either Yah or Yah Jr. not to
be credible.
   Yah’s argument on his third assignment of error was simi-
lar. He pointed out that Anderson was “amped-up” and Yah
yelled at Anderson not to shoot Yah Jr. and to put his gun
down, supporting Yah’s testimony that “his sole concern dur-
ing his interaction that day was that [Yah Jr.] would be safe.”
Yah pointed out that under the Due Process Clause of the 14th
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              Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                       317 Nebraska Reports
                            STATE V. YAH
                         Cite as
317 Neb. 730

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and under the Nebraska
Constitution, the State must prove every element of an offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. He claimed the State had failed to
prove the requisite intent for a violation of § 20-21 because
“[n]o reasonable inference could be adduced from Yah’s tes-
timony or from the other witnesses that Yah’s intent was to
obstruct the officers’ execution of their duties.”
   On his second assignment of error, Yah argued that it was
improper for the county court to rely on a proposition from
Ferrin to conclude that “the emotion that . . . Yah felt in
watching [Yah Jr.] be arrested did not negate the requirement
to comply with lawful commands of a police officer engaged
in their official duties.” 2 Yah pointed out that § 20-21 has dif-
ferent elements from § 28-906, including the fact that § 28-906
allows for a conviction for “merely ‘threatening’ to use vio-
lence, physical interference or force, while no such provision
appears in [§ 20-21].”
   According to Yah, “[§ 20-21] does not require bystanders to
comply with commands of officers, and to do so necessarily
impairs the free speech rights of those not subject to warrant.”
Yah asserted that “[b]y citing to State v. Ferrin, the [c]ourt
was applying the factors of the state statute in this case as
opposed to the city ordinance.” Yah concluded, “Therefore,
to apply the law from [§] 28-906 as opposed to [§] 20-21 is
clear error.” Yah also pointed out that the facts relating to his
interaction with law enforcement were distinct from those
in Ferrin.
   On his fourth assignment of error, Yah argued that Anderson
violated Yah’s due process rights not to be deprived of prop-
erty, freedom, or life without due process when Anderson
considered using deadly force if the situation escalated, even
though Yah was not threatening Anderson with physical vio-
lence. In addition, Yah pointed out that he “has a right under
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to free speech”
2
    See id.
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            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     317 Nebraska Reports
                               STATE V. YAH
                            Cite as
317 Neb. 730

such that law enforcement should respond with restraint to
verbal challenges. Yah asserted that the trial court violated
Yah’s First Amendment right to free speech by finding him
guilty “of only speech [which] was not threatening, violent or
which in any way directed officers away from the execution of
their warrant.”
   The district court affirmed the conviction. It reasoned that
the evidence showed that nothing improper was done by law
enforcement to Yah Jr., that law enforcement gave Yah reason-
able commands that had to be repeated before finally being
heeded, and that “it is expected that a person will immediately
follow the commands of a police officer.”

               III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
   Yah assigns that the district court erred (1) by concluding
that the county court did not abuse its discretion by apply-
ing § 28-906 in finding him guilty, (2) by concluding that the
county court did not abuse its discretion by finding the State
had proved the element of intent as set forth in § 20-21, (3) by
concluding that the county court did not abuse its discretion
in finding Yah guilty, and (4) by failing to find that the guilty
verdict violated Yah’s due process rights.

                 IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
   [1] An issue not presented to or decided on by the trial court
is not an appropriate issue for consideration on appeal. 3
   [2] An alleged error must be both specifically assigned and
specifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error
to be considered by an appellate court. 4
   [3] In reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the
evidence, whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a
combination thereof, the standard is the same: An appellate
court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the
3
    State v. Lee,
304 Neb. 252
,
934 N.W.2d 145
 (2019).
4
    State v. Wood,
310 Neb. 391
,
966 N.W.2d 825
 (2021).
                                   - 740 -
           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    317 Nebraska Reports
                                STATE V. YAH
                             Cite as
317 Neb. 730

credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters
are for the finder of fact. 5

                        V. ANALYSIS
   Yah argues the evidence was insufficient to support his con-
viction because there was no evidence to support the county
court’s finding that he acted with intent to obstruct or inter-
fere with a law enforcement officer performing an official
duty. Relatedly, Yah argues his conviction violated due proc­
ess because the evidence did not support finding him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. He also argues the county court
applied the elements of a statute he was not charged with in
finding him guilty. Lastly, Yah argues his conviction violates
his First Amendment right to free speech and that Anderson’s
aggressiveness and willingness to use deadly force violated
Yah’s due process rights.
   [4] The Nebraska Supreme Court has long held, under the
“ordinance rule,” that an appellate court will not take judicial
notice of a municipal ordinance not in the record. 6 Because
the ordinance Yah was charged with violating is not in the
record, we will assume that the material allegations contained
in the long-form complaint against Yah reflect the substan-
tive content of the ordinance. 7 The complaint alleged Yah
“did purposely or knowingly do any act, refuse to do any act,
or commit any act of omission with the intent to obstruct or
interfere with any law enforcement officer . . . performing an
official duty.”
5
  State v. Haynie, ante p. 371, 9 N.W.3d 915 (2024).
6
  See, e.g., Harris v. O’Connor,
287 Neb. 182
,
842 N.W.2d 50
 (2014); State
  v. Hill,
254 Neb. 460
,
577 N.W.2d 259
 (1998); Vrana Paving Co. v. City
  of Omaha,
220 Neb. 269
,
369 N.W.2d 613
 (1985); City of Omaha Human
  Relations Dept. v. City Wide Rock & Exc. Co.,
201 Neb. 405
,
268 N.W.2d 98
 (1978); State v. Hohensee,
164 Neb. 476
,
82 N.W.2d 554
 (1957);
  Steiner v. State,
78 Neb. 147
,
110 N.W. 723
 (1907).
7
  See State v.
Hill, supra note 6
. See, also, State v. Grant,
310 Neb. 700
,
968 N.W.2d 837
 (2022).
                                 - 741 -
           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    317 Nebraska Reports
                              STATE V. YAH
                           Cite as
317 Neb. 730

   There is no merit to Yah’s contention that the county court,
in its fact finding, improperly relied on elements of a statute
that he was not charged with. The court’s order finding Yah
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt quoted the language of the
ordinance as set forth in the complaint. Referring to that lan-
guage, the court stated the question was whether Yah “acted
with the intent to obstruct or interfere with a law enforcement
officer performing an official duty.” We do not read the court’s
order as using Ferrin to add or change the meaning of the ele-
ments of the ordinance Yah was charged with violating. 8 The
court’s order plainly indicates it was relying on Ferrin as a
similar but not completely apposite case and that it made inde-
pendent findings of fact under the elements of the ordinance
set forth in the complaint.
   We find the evidence sufficient to support Yah’s conviction
and, more specifically, to support a finding that Yah intended
to obstruct or interfere with a law enforcement officer per-
forming an official duty. In reviewing a criminal convic-
tion for sufficiency of the evidence, whether the evidence is
direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, the standard
is the same: An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in
the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh
the evidence; such matters are for the finder of fact. 9 The
relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. 10
   [5-7] “‘Intent is the state of the actor’s mind when the
actor’s conduct occurs.’” 11 Yah points to his testimony that
he never intended to interfere with the arrest of Yah Jr. or the
officers’ investigation but was simply acting out of concern
8
   See State v.
Ferrin, supra note 1
.
9
   State v. Haynie, supra note 5.
10
   Id.
11
   State v. Rokus,
240 Neb. 613, 620
,
483 N.W.2d 149, 154
 (1992).
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      317 Nebraska Reports
                                 STATE V. YAH
                              Cite as
317 Neb. 730

for Yah Jr.’s safety and wished to call Yah Jr.’s employer
when he retrieved the backpack. Yah argues there was no
evidence contradicting this testimony and the trial court did
not expressly find him not to be credible. However, when an
element of a crime involves existence of a defendant’s mental
process or other state of mind of an accused, such elements
may be proved by circumstantial evidence. 12 A trier of fact
may infer that the defendant intended the natural and probable
consequences of the defendant’s voluntary acts. 13
   There was evidence that Yah approached the officers while
they were trying to place Yah Jr. in handcuffs. Yah did not
comply with orders to get back. Instead, Yah was yelling at
the officers and the dog was barking. After Yah Jr. was placed
under arrest, Yah voluntarily picked up the backpack and did
not comply with orders to put it down. Anderson testified
that these actions interfered with the officers’ duties pertain-
ing to the arrest of Yah Jr. and their safety protocols. The
county court, by concluding that Yah’s “conduct equated to
a series of willful, defiant refusals to comply with the law-
ful commands of the officers on the scene,” inferred that Yah
intended the natural and probable consequences of his volun-
tary acts. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, we find the evidence was sufficient to sup-
port this finding.
   [8] Yah’s argument concerning his First Amendment right
to free speech is not properly before us because it was not
presented to the trial court, and it was not specifically assigned
as error on appeal. Yah’s argument that Anderson violated
his right to due process through Anderson’s aggressiveness
and willingness to use deadly force is not properly before us
because it was not presented to the trial court. In the absence
of plain error, when an issue is raised for the first time in an
appellate court, it will be disregarded inasmuch as a lower
12
     See
id.
13
     State v. Woolridge-Jones,
316 Neb. 500
, 5 N.W.3d 426 (2024).
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    317 Nebraska Reports
                               STATE V. YAH
                            Cite as
317 Neb. 730

court cannot commit error in resolving an issue never pre-
sented and submitted to it for disposition. 14 And it is a funda-
mental rule of appellate practice that an alleged error must be
both specifically assigned and specifically argued in the brief
of the party asserting the error. 15
                        VI. CONCLUSION
     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction.
                                                    Affirmed.
14
   See, State v. Simnick,
279 Neb. 499
,
779 N.W.2d 335
 (2010); In re Estate
   of Rosso,
270 Neb. 323
,
701 N.W.2d 355
 (2005). See, also, e.g., State v.
   Diaz,
266 Neb. 966
,
670 N.W.2d 794
 (2003).
15
   State v. $18,000,
311 Neb. 621
,
974 N.W.2d 290
 (2022).