State v. Doohen
STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant v. Tyler J. DOOHEN, Defendant and Appellee
Attorneys
Tom M. Henning, Stateâs Attorney, and James A. Hope (argued), Assistant Stateâs Attorney, Dickinson, N.D., for plaintiff and appellant., Michael R. Hoffman (argued), Bismarck, N.D., for defendant and appellee.
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
[¶ 1] The State of North Dakota appeals the trial courtâs order suppressing evidence found during a search of Tyler Doohenâs vehicle after a Highway Patrol Trooper viewed butane lighters and syringes in a tote bag next to Doohen on the front passengerâs seat. The State claims the butane lighters and syringes gave the trooper probable cause to search the vehicle. We reverse the trial courtâs order suppressing the evidence found in Doo-henâs vehicle and remand for further proceedings.
I
[¶2] On February 28, 2005, Highway Patrol Trooper Roger Clemens received a dispatch about a vehicle that was being driven erratically on the interstate. Clemens responded to the call and stopped the vehicle. Clemens asked Tyler Doohen, the driver, for his license and registration, and advised Doohen of the reason for the stop. Doohen stated he was driving erratically because of problems with his tires.
[¶ 3] Clemens suspected Doohen was driving under the influence, but Clemens did not detect signs of alcohol consumption to substantiate his suspicion. Clemens noticed a tote bag next to Doohen on the front passengerâs seat that contained butane lighters and syringes. The butane fighters were of a higher grade and disposable. The syringes, which were wrapped in plastic, were sticking out of the tote bagâs pockets. Clemens did not notice whether the syringes were medicinal or hypodermic syringes. Clemens testified he knew, based on his training and experience, butane fighters are frequently used in drug production and use, and syringes are often used to inject drugs. Clemens took Doohen to his patrol vehicle and
[¶ 4] Clemens had a camera in his vehicle when he pulled Doohen over, but did not take any pictures of the tote bag. Clemens did not present the tote bag as evidence because it was returned to Doo-henâs mother. The syringes were not sent to the state laboratory because the laboratory does not accept unused items. Clemens believes pictures were taken of the syringes, but did not have them at the suppression hearing. The butane lighters and syringes were disposed of and, therefore, unavailable for the suppression hearing.
[¶ 5] During the search, Clemens found a metal tray with residue on it in the tote bag. The tray was sent to the state laboratory where the residue was determined to be methamphetamine. Clemens also found a machete covered with a sleeping bag.
[¶ 6] Doohen was charged with carrying a concealed weapon and possession of drug paraphernalia. Doohen moved to suppress the items found in his vehicle. The trial court granted Doohenâs motion to suppress the evidence, finding the State did not establish probable cause to search Doohenâs vehicle. The State appeals.
II
[¶ 7] The State argues the evidence seized from Doohenâs vehicle was improperly suppressed because Clemens had probable cause to search the vehicle.
[¶ 8] As we recently explained in State v. Graf, 2006 ND 196, ¶ 7, 721 N.W.2d 881 (citations omitted):
In reviewing a district courtâs decision on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the district courtâs findings of fact and resolve conflicts in testimony in favor of affirmance. We will affirm a district courtâs decision on a motion to suppress if there is sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial courtâs findings, and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Our standard of review recognizes the importance of the district courtâs opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility. Questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal, and whether a finding of fact meets a legal standard is a question of law.
[¶ 9] Unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8, of the North Dakota Constitution. State v. Woinarowicz, 2006 ND 179, ¶ 21, 720 N.W.2d 635. A warrantless search is unreasonable unless it falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Genre, 2006 ND 77, ¶ 17, 712 N.W.2d 624. The automobile exception is a well-established exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Haibeck, 2004 ND 163, ¶ 10, 685 N.W.2d 512; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).
[¶ 10] Under the automobile exception, law enforcement may search for illegal contraband without a warrant when probable cause exists. Haibeck, 2004 ND 163, ¶ 10, 685 N.W.2d 512. âProbable cause to search exists if it is established that certain identifiable objects are proba
[¶ 11] â[A] police officer may draw inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists.â Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). Clemens was trained to identify drug paraphernalia. Drug paraphernalia includes â[h]ypodermic syringes, needles, and other objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in parenterally injecting controlled substances into the human body.â N.D.C.C. § 19-03.4-01(11). Clemens used his training and experience to conclude that the butane lighters and syringes were probably connected with criminal activity. Clemens knew butane lighters can be used as paraphernalia in the production and use of drugs, and that syringes are used to inject drugs. Based on Clemensâ training and experience that the presence of butane lighters and syringes indicated the probability of criminal activity, Clemens had probable cause to search Doohenâs vehicle.
[¶ 12] âProbable cause demands not that an officer be sure or certain but only that the facts available to a reasonably cautious man would warrant a belief that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime.â United States v. Weinbender, 109 F.3d 1327, 1330 (8th Cir.1997) (citations omitted). Clemens saw syringes in the tote bag but was not certain they were hypodermic syringes, which are commonly used to inject drugs. However, a reasonably cautious individual would have believed that the syringes may have been drug paraphernalia. This belief was supported by the presence of the butane lighters. Although Clemens may not have been certain Doohenâs syringes were for drug use, when combined with the butane lighters, they were enough to warrant a belief that they may be drug paraphernalia and evidence of drug activity.
[¶ 13] When determining whether there is probable cause, the evidence should not be considered individually, but as a collective whole. In State v. Nelson, 2005 ND 11, ¶ 21, 691 N.W.2d 218 (citation omitted), we stated:
Although each bit of information ..., by itself, may not be enough to establish probable cause and some of the information may have an innocent explanation, probable cause is the sum total of layers of information and the synthesis of what the police have heard, what they know, and what they observed as trained officers ... which is not weighed in individual layers but in the laminated total.
[¶ 14] Although Doohenâs statements about spraying water and blowing glass alone may not have constituted probable cause, those statements were layers which contributed to the totality of the circumstances that resulted in probable cause. Clemens was reasonable to have his suspicions raised by the statements. Although there may be an innocent explanation for
[¶ 15] Based on the presence of butane lighters and syringes, both known by Clemens to be used for drug production and use, and Doohenâs statements, a reasonable person in Clemensâ position would have concluded that there was probable cause to search Doohenâs vehicle. Because Clemens had probable cause to search, the evidence found in Doohenâs vehicle is admissible under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
Ill
[¶ 16] The trial court erred in concluding Clemens did not have probable cause to search Doohenâs vehicle. We reverse the trial courtâs order suppressing the evidence found in Doohenâs vehicle and remand for further proceedings.