State v. Monroe
Date Filed2022-12-20
Docket20-839
Cited0 times
StatusPublished
Syllabus
statute authorizing punishment of second-degree murder as a class B1 felony under two of three definitions of malice was not ambiguous, and sentencing defendant as a B1 felony offender was not error where jury unanimously found by special verdict form that all three forms of malice had been proven by the state
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
2022-NCCOA-846
No. COA20-839
Filed 20 December 2022
Wake County, No. 17 CRS 220095
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
AUSBAN MONROE, III, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 29 January 2020 by Judge
Rebecca W. Holt in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20
October 2021.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Steven
Armstrong, for the State.
Michael E. Casterline for Defendant-Appellant.
JACKSON, Judge.
¶1 Defendant Ausban Monroe, III, (âDefendantâ) appeals from his conviction for
second-degree murder. For the reasons detailed below, we hold that the trial court
did not err.
I. Background
¶2 Early in the morning on 15 October 2017, Lazarus Hohn attended a house
party on New Market Way in Raleigh, North Carolina, with several friends.
Relatively soon after arriving at the party, Mr. Hohn and two of his friends, Khalid
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Al-Najjar and Jamie Reyes, became involved in an altercation with another
individual, Victor Benitez, outside the front of the house. Mr. Benitez ended up on
the ground. After the fight was over, Mr. Hohn, Mr. Al-Najjar, and Mr. Reyes walked
to the complexâs parking lot to leave. As they approached their car, Defendant and
one of his friends entered the parking lot on foot. Mr. Benitez had informed
Defendant, who was attending the same house party, about the altercation in front
of the home and that he felt that it had been an unfair fight. Defendant, already
heavily intoxicated at that point, decided to seek out Mr. Hohn, Mr. Al-Najjar, and
Mr. Reyes to confront them. Once in the parking lot, Defendant pulled out a gun and
began pointing it between the three friends, asking who had fought Mr. Benitez.
Defendant had purchased the gun on the street, and testimony at trial revealed that
it had been stolen from the original ownerâs home. Defendant testified that he
purchased the gun and kept it on him for protection.
¶3 Mr. Hohn stepped forward in response to Defendantâs question and answered
that he had been the one to fight Mr. Benitez. Defendant then pointed the gun at Mr.
Hohn, and Mr. Hohn attempted to hit the gun away from him. Defendant and Mr.
Hohn started fighting, while Mr. Reyes started fighting with the other individual who
had accompanied Defendant to the parking lot. Mr. Al-Najjar testified at trial that
he attempted to grab the gun from Defendant during the fight and that it was âgoing
everywhere.â As Defendant and Mr. Hohn were fighting, the gun that Defendant was
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holding fired, and Mr. Hohn fell to the ground, having been shot in the chest. Mr. Al-
Najjar threw Defendant to the ground and grabbed the gun. He then discarded the
gun and applied pressure to Mr. Hohnâs wound with his shirt. Defendant and his
friend left the scene.
¶4 Paramedics arrived and determined that Mr. Hohn had a single gunshot
wound and did not have a pulse or other signs of life. Mr. Hohn was transported to
Wake County Medical Center and was pronounced dead shortly after arriving.
¶5 Defendant was arrested and, on 6 November 2017, was indicted on one count
of first-degree murder. Defendant was tried by jury at the 21 January 2020 Criminal
Session of Wake County Superior Court. At the close of the evidence, the trial court
instructed the jury on first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and involuntary
manslaughter.
¶6 With respect to second-degree murder, the trial court instructed the jury that,
if they found Defendant guilty of second-degree murder, they should indicate on the
verdict form which theory or theories of malice they found. The verdict form itself
listed three theories of malice: (1) malice meaning hatred, ill will, or spite; (2) malice
defined as condition of mind which prompts a person to take the life of another
intentionally or to intentionally inflict serious bodily harm which proximately results
in anotherâs death; and (3) malice that arises when an act which is inherently
dangerous to human life is intentionally done so recklessly and wantonly as to
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manifest a mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty and
deliberately bent on mischief.
¶7 During deliberations, the jury asked for clarification on malice and second-
degree murder. The trial court repeated its prior second-degree murder instructions.
¶8 On 29 January 2020, the jury returned a verdict finding Defendant guilty of
second-degree murder. The jury answered âyesâ on the form as to whether they found
each of the three theories of malice, finding all three present. The trial court
sentenced Defendant for second-degree murder as a Class B1 to a minimum of 240
months to a maximum of 300 months active incarceration. Defendant objected to the
B1 classification, contending that a B2 classification was appropriate.
¶9 Defendant orally noticed appeal.
II. Analysis
¶ 10 Defendant argues on appeal that he is entitled to be resentenced as a Class B2
felon because N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17(b) is ambiguous as to how a defendant should
be sentenced when the jury finds that the evidence supports multiple theories of
malice that do not all carry the same sentence.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 11 âThe standard of review relating to the sentence imposed by the trial court is
whether the sentence is supported by evidence introduced at the trial and sentencing
hearing.â State v. Fortney, 201 N.C. App. 662, 669,687 S.E.2d 518, 524
(2010). âWe
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review de novo whether the sentence imposed was authorized by the juryâs verdict.â
State v. Lail, 251 N.C. App. 463, 471,795 S.E.2d 401, 408
(2016).
B. Rule of Lenity
¶ 12 Defendant contends that he is entitled to the application of the rule of lenity,
and therefore that he should be sentenced as Class B2 rather than Class B1 for his
second-degree murder conviction. We disagree.
¶ 13 âThe rule of lenity forbids a court to interpret a statute so as to increase the
penalty that it places on an individual when the Legislature has not clearly stated
such an intention.â State v. Conley, 374 N.C. 209, 212,839 S.E.2d 805
, 807 (2020)
(internal quotations omitted). This rule is only applicable to ambiguous criminal
statutes. State v. Cates, 154 N.C. App. 737, 740,573 S.E.2d 208, 210
(2002).
¶ 14 For example, in State v. Smith, our Supreme Court held that a statute which
prohibited the dissemination of âany obscene writing, picture, record or other
representation or embodiment of the obsceneâ was ambiguous. 323 N.C. 439, 444,
373 S.E.2d 435, 438 (1988). Because the use of the word âanyâ could be reasonably
construed as referring to either a single item or multiple items, the Court applied the
rule of lenity and held that the defendant could only be convicted of one violation of
that statute, even where there were multiple items seized. Id.
¶ 15 Similarly, in Conley, our Supreme Court held that the prohibition contained in
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269.2(b) on the possession or carrying of âany gun, rifle, pistol,
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or other firearmâ on educational property was ambiguous and prohibited conviction
for multiple violations where the defendant had several firearms in his possession on
school grounds. Conley, 374 N.C. at 214, 839 S.E.2d at 808.
¶ 16 âWhen the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty
of this Court to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute, and judicial
construction of legislative intent is not required.â Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs. & Div.
of Med. Assistance, N.C. Depât of Health and Human Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387,628 S.E.2d 1, 3
(2006). The statute at issue here is our sentencing scheme for second-
degree murder, specifically N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17(b).
¶ 17 âSecond-degree murder is defined as (1) the unlawful killing, (2) of another
human being, (3) with malice, but (4) without premeditation and deliberation.â State
v. Arrington, 371 N.C. 518, 523,819 S.E.2d 329, 332
(2018). North Carolina
recognizes three forms of malice: (1) âactual malice, meaning hatred, ill-will or spiteâ;
(2) âthat condition of mind which prompts a person to take the life of another
intentionally without just cause, excuse, or justificationâ; and (3) âan inherently
dangerous act done so recklessly and wantonly as to manifest a mind utterly without
regard for human life and social duty and deliberately bent on mischief.â Id. (internal
citations and quotations omitted). The third theory of malice is often referred to as
âdepraved heartâ malice. Lail, 251 N.C. App. at 464,795 S.E.2d at 404
.
¶ 18 North Carolina General Statute § 14-17 was amended in 2012, and, in relevant
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part, currently reads:
(b) A murder other than described in subsection (a) or
(a1) of this section or in G.S. 14-23.2 shall be deemed
second degree murder. Any person who commits second
degree murder shall be punished as a Class B1 felon,
except that a person who commits second degree murder
shall be punished as a Class B2 felon in either of the
following circumstances:
(1) The malice necessary to prove second degree murder
is based on an inherently dangerous act or omission, done
in such a reckless and wanton manner as to manifest a
mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty
and deliberately bent on mischief.
....
(emphasis added).
¶ 19 Defendant contends that this statute is ambiguous as to how a trial court
should sentence a defendant that is found guilty of second-degree murder under
multiple theories of malice, and therefore the rule of lenity prohibits the trial court
from sentencing him at the higher Class B1 range. We disagree.
¶ 20 The key term contained in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17(b) is that for a defendant to
be entitled to sentencing as a Class B2, the malice necessary to prove second-degree
murder must be âbased on an inherently dangerous act or omission, done in such a
reckless and wanton manner as to manifest a mind utterly without regard for human
life and social duty and deliberately bent on mischief[],â i.e. depraved heart malice.
The word ânecessaryâ has a plain and routinely used meaning in our law. According
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to Blackâs Law Dictionary, it means âneeded for some purpose or reason; essential.â
Necessary, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). A ânecessary elementâ of an
offense is one that is required to support a conviction. See State v. Ledwell, 171 N.C.
App. 328, 329,614 S.E.2d 412, 413
(2005). A ânecessary witnessâ is one whose
testimony is ârelevant, material, and unobtainable by other means.â See State v.
Smith, 230 N.C. App. 387, 391,749 S.E.2d 507, 510
(2013) (emphasis added)
(discussing Rule 3.7(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Professional conduct).
¶ 21 We hold that the language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17(b) is clear and without
ambiguity. It is apparent from the statute that a defendant is only entitled to be
sentenced as a Class B2 if the malice that is essential or required for the defendant
to be convicted of second-degree murder is depraved heart malice. If the jury finds
that the evidence supports either, or both, of the other two forms of malice in addition
to depraved heart malice, then a finding of depraved heart malice is not necessary to
convict the defendant of second-degree murder, and he is not entitled to sentencing
as a Class B2 and will instead be sentenced as a Class B1.
¶ 22 Here, a finding of depraved heart malice was not necessary or essential for the
jury to convict Defendant of second-degree murder. Defendant concedes that the jury
verdict itself was not ambiguous and does not challenge its finding of all three
theories of malice beyond a reasonable doubt. A second-degree murder conviction
predicated on a malice theory other than depraved heart malice is sentenced as a
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Class B1. The jury not only found that the evidence supported depraved heart malice,
but that it also supported the other two theories of malice. If the jury had found that
the evidence did not support depraved heart malice, Defendant still would have been
convicted of second-degree murder under the other two theories. A finding of
depraved heart malice was therefore not necessary to his conviction and Defendant
was appropriately sentenced as a Class B1 felon.
¶ 23 Defendant relies on our prior decision in State v. Mosley, 256 N.C. App. 148,
806 S.E.2d 365 (2017), for his contention that the juryâs verdict finding all three forms
of malice present in his case requires a sentence in the Class B2 range. Mosley is
inapplicable under the circumstances of this case.
¶ 24 In Mosley, we found that where there was evidence presented at trial that
would have supported a second-degree murder conviction on more than one theory of
malice, and because those theories of malice carry different sentences, the juryâs
general finding of unspecified malice was ambiguous. Id. at 153,806 S.E.2d at 369
.
The trial court had provided the jury with a general verdict form that did not specify
which potential forms of malice the jury could find. Id. at 149,806 S.E.2d at 367
.
When the jury returned a guilty verdict for second-degree murder, the trial court had
no way of knowing under which theory of malice that verdict resulted from, and
therefore was unable to properly sentence the defendant. Id. at 153,806 S.E.2d at 369
. We recommended that:
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In order to avoid such ambiguity in the future, we
recommend two actions. First, the second degree murder
instructions contained as a lesser included offense in
N.C.P.I.âCrim. 206.13 should be expanded to explain all
the theories of malice that can support a verdict of second
degree murder, as set forth in N.C.P.I.âCrim. 206.30A.
Secondly, when there is evidence to support more than one
theory of malice for second degree murder, the trial court
should present a special verdict form that requires the jury
to specify the theory of malice found to support a second
degree murder conviction.
Id.
¶ 25 The trial court in this case did provide the jury with instructions that explained
all three theories of malice, in addition to providing a verdict form that required the
jury to specify the theory of malice that they found supported a second-degree murder
conviction. Further, Defendant does not challenge the jury verdict here as
ambiguous. Therefore, the issues we identified in Mosley were not present in this
case.
¶ 26 We note that this Court recently decided a similar issue where the jury was
presented with, and selected, all three categories of malice on the verdict form for
second-degree murder in State v. Borum, 274 N.C. App. 249,849 S.E.2d 367
(2020).
However, our Supreme Court granted a petition for discretionary review and petition
for writ of supersedeas in Borum, in addition to a temporary stay. State v. Borum,
867 S.E.2d 667 (N.C. 2022). Borum is still pending at our Supreme Court and
therefore it is not controlling on our decision here. See State v. Hutchens, 272 N.C.
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App. 156, 161, 846 S.E.2d 306, 311 (2020). ¶ 27 We hold thatN.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17
(b) is not ambiguous, and therefore
Defendant is not entitled to the application of the rule of lenity. The statute is clear
that only where a finding of depraved heart malice is necessary to the conviction of
second-degree murder will a defendant be entitled to sentencing as a Class B2 felon.
Because the jury here explicitly found that the evidence supported other theories of
malice in addition to depraved heart malice, Defendant was properly sentenced as a
Class B1 felon.
III. Conclusion
¶ 28 For the aforementioned reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in
sentencing Defendant as a Class B1 felon.
NO ERROR.
Judge CARPENTER concurs.
Judge HAMPSON concurs in result only.