State v. Alvarez

                 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                   No. 278PA21

                              Filed 15 December 2023

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

                v.
FERNANDO ALVAREZ


      On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous,

unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, No. COA20-611 (N.C. Ct. App. July 20,

2021), affirming an order entered on 2 December 2019 by Judge Anna Mills Wagoner

in   Superior    Court,   Rowan   County.   Heard   in   the   Supreme    Court   on

20 September 2023.


      Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Zachary K. Dunn, Assistant Attorney
      General, for the State-appellant.

      Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Kathryn L. VandenBerg, Assistant
      Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee.


      BARRINGER, Justice.

      In this case, we are tasked with determining whether the Court of Appeals

erred in refusing to address whether officers possessed reasonable suspicion to stop

defendant’s vehicle. We are further tasked with determining whether the Court of

Appeals erred in concluding that the traffic checkpoint did not comply with the

Fourth Amendment.

      For the following reasons, we hold that the officers had independent reasonable
                                   STATE V. ALVAREZ

                                      Opinion of the Court



suspicion and, therefore, did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Since

the officers had independent reasonable suspicion, we do not reach the

constitutionality of the checkpoint. Thus, the trial court erred in granting the motion

to suppress and the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s order. We

reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to that court for further

remand to the trial court for appropriate proceedings.

                                 I.      Background

      On 6 June 2018, the Rowan County Sheriff’s Office set up a checkpoint at the

intersection of Stone and Rainey Roads in Salisbury, North Carolina, from 12:00 a.m.

to 2:00 a.m. The checkpoint was in response to a fatal traffic accident in that location.

      At approximately 1:45 a.m., defendant came into view of the checkpoint.

Deputy Nolan Shue testified, and the trial court found as fact, that defendant’s

passenger side wheels came off the road and onto the grass before coming to a stop at

the checkpoint. Deputy Shue further testified that this observation led him to believe

that defendant might be driving while impaired, and that defendant appeared “very

nervous and overly talkative,” could not stop smiling, and had “glassy eyes.”

      Based on defendant’s driving, demeanor, and appearance, officers initiated a

search of defendant’s vehicle. During the search, officers discovered cocaine,

buprenorphine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia, for which defendant was later

indicted for possessing. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence against him on

grounds that it was collected at an unconstitutional checkpoint.


                                              -2-
                                  STATE V. ALVAREZ

                                  Opinion of the Court



      The trial court concluded that the State failed to provide a valid primary

programmatic purpose for the checkpoint. Therefore, the State violated the Fourth

Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the North

Carolina Constitution. Accordingly, the trial court granted defendant’s motion and

suppressed all evidence collected at the checkpoint. The trial court did not address

whether the officers had independent reasonable suspicion to stop defendant, despite

having heard arguments on independent reasonable suspicion.

      The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that the

checkpoint was unconstitutional because the State failed to establish “a valid primary

programmatic purpose” for its implementation. State v. Alvarez, No. COA20-611, slip

op. at 2 (N.C. Ct. App. July 20, 2021) (unpublished). In a brief concurrence, Judges

Dietz and Murphy opined that the Court of Appeals should have addressed whether

officers had independent reasonable suspicion. Id. at 18. However, the Court of

Appeals reasoned, “it is unnecessary to address whether officers possessed

independent reasonable articulable suspicion.” Id. at 16. We disagree.

                           II.   Standard of Review

      In reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, this Court examines whether the

trial court’s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether those

findings support the conclusions of law. State v. Cooke, 

 (1982).

Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. State v. Biber, 

 (2011).




                                          -3-
                                  STATE V. ALVAREZ

                                   Opinion of the Court



                                 III.    Analysis

      “When an officer observes conduct which leads him reasonably to believe that

criminal conduct may be afoot, he may stop the suspicious person to make reasonable

inquiries.” State v. Pearson, 

 (1998). The officer “must be able to

point to specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences

from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.” State v. Thompson, 

 (1979) (alteration in original) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 

 (1968)).

Reasonable suspicion is an issue independent of the constitutionality of the

checkpoint. State v. Griffin, 

 (2013).

      Reasonable suspicion is a “less demanding standard than probable cause and

requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” Illinois v.

Wardlow, 

 (2000) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 

(1989)).

             Only some minimal level of objective justification is
             required. This Court has determined that the reasonable
             suspicion standard requires that the stop be based on
             specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational
             inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of
             a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and
             training.

State v. Barnard, 

 (2008) (cleaned up).

      Here, officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. Deputy Shue

articulated in his testimony that defendant’s failure to maintain lane control made

him “believe that there might be possibly some impaired driving,” in violation of


                                           -4-
                                    STATE V. ALVAREZ

                                    Opinion of the Court



N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1. Further, consistent with the trial court’s finding of fact, three

officers testified that they observed defendant’s vehicle veer out of its lane and

“basically run off the road.” Thus, officers had reasonable suspicion that defendant’s

actions constituted a traffic violation under N.C.G.S. § 20-146(d)(1), which requires

drivers to remain “within a single lane” and not depart from that lane unless it can

be departed safely. See N.C.G.S. § 20-146(d)(1) (2021).

         Although the trial court found that “[t]he location of the checkpoint played a

role in the vehicle’s alleged ‘failure to maintain lane control,’ ” this finding appears to

be based on Deputy Shue’s testimony on the hypothetical use of checkpoints as speed

enforcement. Neither Deputy Shue’s testimony, nor that of any other witness,

supports the inference that placement of the checkpoint contributed to defendant’s

failure to maintain lane control. Moreover, in closing argument, defendant’s counsel

conceded that “[w]e have no testimony as to whether or not the checking station might

have caused him to look down or something as he was approaching and run off the

road.”

         Officers’ observation of defendant as he approached the checkpoint gave them

reasonable suspicion based on defendant’s failure to maintain lane control and

possible impaired driving. The officers had reasonable suspicion to justify stopping

defendant. Thus, the officers did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.

         Since we hold that the officers had independent reasonable suspicion to stop

defendant, we decline to address whether the traffic checkpoint was constitutional.


                                            -5-
                                  STATE V. ALVAREZ

                                  Opinion of the Court



We disavow the Court of Appeals’ broad statements on traffic stop constitutionality.

                               IV.    Conclusion

      The officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant independent of the

traffic checkpoint. Thus, stopping defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress and the Court of

Appeals erred in affirming the trial court. We reverse the decision of the Court of

Appeals and remand to that court for further remand to the trial court for appropriate

proceedings.

      REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      Justice DIETZ did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.




                                          -6-