State v. Woolard

                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                     No. 208PA22

                               Filed 15 December 2023

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

               v.
MELVIN RAY WOOLARD, JR.


        On writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) to review order granting

defendant’s motion to suppress entered on 29 March 2022 by Judge Darrell B. Cayton

Jr. in District Court, Beaufort County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 13 September

2023.


        Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Kathryne E. Hathcock, Special Deputy
        Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

        The Robinson Law Firm, P.A., by Leslie S. Robinson, for defendant-appellee.


        EARLS, Justice.

        On 11 April 2020, Captain Rodney Sawyer arrested Melvin Woolard Jr. for

driving while impaired. Before trial, Mr. Woolard moved to suppress evidence seized

during his arrest. The district court preliminarily granted his motion, ruling that

Captain Sawyer lacked probable cause to suspect Mr. Woolard of drunk driving.

        The State appealed that decision to superior court. That court also found that

Mr. Woolard’s arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. At the superior court’s

instruction, the district court entered a final order suppressing the evidence.

Dissatisfied with that ruling, the State sought review in the Court of Appeals and
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then this Court. We agreed to review the district court’s final order.

      The question before us is simple: Did Captain Sawyer have probable cause to

arrest Mr. Woolard for impaired driving? Our answer is yes. Drawing on the district

court’s factual findings, we hold that Captain Sawyer’s “belief of guilt” was objectively

reasonable and rooted in concrete evidence. See Maryland v. Pringle, 

 (2003). Because Mr. Woolard’s arrest thus satisfied the Fourth Amendment, we

reverse the district court’s suppression order and remand this case for further

proceedings.

                                     I.    Facts

A. The Arrest

      On the afternoon of 11 April 2020, Captain Sawyer—a State Highway Patrol

Officer—was driving along a rural road in Beaufort County. For a while, he found

himself a solo traveler.

      That changed when a truck pulled onto the road in front of him. Captain

Sawyer and the truck were the only cars in sight. About a mile separated them. Like

Captain Sawyer, the truck travelled south. But unlike Captain Sawyer, the truck

wove in and out of its lane.

      The officer watched as the truck darted over the centerline—six to seven times

by his count. Twice, the truck lurched into the oncoming lane. And at one point, it

even skidded onto the road’s right shoulder.

      Concerned, Captain Sawyer flashed his lights to stop the truck. The other


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driver quickly pulled over. Although canals and ditches flanked both sides of the road,

the truck avoided them as it stopped.

      As Captain Sawyer approached the truck, he saw Mr. Woolard behind the

wheel. A woman sat beside him. On first glance, Mr. Woolard seemed normal.

Captain Sawyer saw no alcohol or contraband in the truck, and nothing in the vehicle

alarmed him.

      The officer told Mr. Woolard the reason for the stop: Mr. Woolard’s erratic

driving. Mr. Woolard replied that he was headed to work. He explained that he

noticed bees inside the truck, and his efforts to shoo them out the window caused him

to swerve. At Captain Sawyer’s request, Mr. Woolard produced his driver’s license

and registration.

      As they spoke, Captain Sawyer smelled alcohol on Mr. Woolard’s breath and

from inside his truck. The officer’s suspicions grew when he noticed Mr. Woolard’s

flushed cheeks, and red and glassy eyes. Still, Mr. Woolard seemed coherent—he

chatted normally with Captain Sawyer and appeared in control of his mind and body.

      Captain Sawyer returned to his patrol car to check Mr. Woolard’s license and

registration. He found “nothing unusual.” But back at Mr. Woolard’s truck, Captain

Sawyer questioned him about the smell of alcohol. Mr. Woolard confessed that he

drank “a couple of beers earlier.”

      At that point, Captain Sawyer asked Mr. Woolard to take a preliminary breath

test (PBT). Mr. Woolard agreed. As he exited his truck, Mr. Woolard’s balance was


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unremarkable.

       Captain Sawyer gave Mr. Woolard two PBTs and a Horizontal Gaze

Nystagmus (HGN) test. During an HGN test, an officer checks for involuntary

nystagmus—the jerking or fluttering of the eyes—as a person watches an object

move.1 See State v. Helms, 

 (1998). As that object “travels toward

the outside of the subject’s vision,” the officer monitors whether the eyes twitch or

bounce. 

. If they do—especially before the “object has traveled 45 degrees

from the center of the person’s vision”—it signals intoxication. 

 At six points during

the HGN test, an officer notes “clues” of impairment. The more clues he gathers, the

more likely the driver is impaired. When Captain Sawyer tested Mr. Woolard, he

logged all six possible clues.

       After the HGN test, Captain Sawyer arrested and charged Mr. Woolard for

driving while impaired in violation of N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1(a)(1). In relevant part, that

statute prohibits people from “driv[ing] any vehicle upon any highway, any street, or

any public vehicular area within this State” while “under the influence of an

impairing substance.” N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1(a)(1) (2021).2



       1  We have more precisely defined “nystagmus” as “a physiological condition that
involves an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball, which may be horizontal, vertical, or
rotary. An inability of the eyes to maintain visual fixation as they are turned from side to
side (in other words, jerking or bouncing) is known as horizontal gaze nystagmus, or HGN.”
See State v. Helms, 

 (1998) (cleaned up).
        2 Under our precedent, a person is “under the influence of intoxicating liquor or

narcotic drugs”—and thus in violation of N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1—when “he has drunk a
sufficient quantity of intoxicating beverages or taken a sufficient amount of narcotic drugs to
cause him to lose the normal control of his bodily or mental faculties, or both, to such an

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B. The Suppression Ruling

       Mr. Woolard’s case came before Judge Darrell B. Cayton Jr. of District Court,

Beaufort County. Before trial, Mr. Woolard moved to suppress portions of the State’s

evidence.

       Mr. Woolard first challenged the PBT results. In his view, Captain Sawyer

broke from the procedures set by N.C.G.S. § 20-16.3(c). That provision—aptly titled

“Tests Must Be Made with Approved Devices and in Approved Manner”—instructs

that “No screening test for alcohol concentration is a valid one” unless “conducted in

accordance with the applicable regulations of the Department as to the manner of its

use.” N.C.G.S. § 20-16.3(c) (2021). When Captain Sawyer tested Mr. Woolard, those

“applicable regulations” required him to first ensure that Mr. Woolard “removed all

food, drink, tobacco products, chewing gum and other substances and objects from his

mouth.” 10A N.C. Admin. Code 41B.0502 (2022). Because the officer neglected to do

so, Mr. Woolard faulted the PBTs as unreliable and procedurally defective. The

district court agreed and excluded them.

       Mr. Woolard also disputed the HGN test. Although no statute sets specific

protocols, Mr. Woolard pointed to the procedures recommended by the National

Highway Traffic Safety Association (NHTSA). Because Captain Sawyer diverged

from those protocols, Mr. Woolard argued, the HGN test—like the PBTs—should be



extent that there is an appreciable impairment of either or both of those faculties.” See State
v. Parisi, 

, 649–50 (2019) (quoting State v. Carroll, 

 (1946)).

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discarded. The district court disagreed. Although Captain Sawyer strayed from the

NHSTA’s guidelines, the court reasoned that his oversight went to the weight of the

HGN results, “not their admissibility.”3

       Most relevant here, Mr. Woolard urged the district court to suppress evidence

seized during his arrest. In his view, that arrest violated the Fourth Amendment

because Captain Sawyer lacked probable cause to suspect him of impaired driving.

The district court agreed and entered a Pre-Trial Indication to suppress the evidence.

It filed a written order soon after.

C. The State’s Appeals

       The State sought review from the Superior Court, Beaufort County as

permitted by statute. See N.C.G.S. 20-38.7(a) (2021). That court also found that

Captain Sawyer lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Woolard for impaired driving.

The superior court thus directed the district court to suppress the evidence. A few

weeks later, the district court entered its final suppression order.

       The State disagreed with that ruling and petitioned the Court of Appeals for a

writ of certiorari. When that court denied its request, the State sought this Court’s

review. We granted certiorari to examine the district court’s final suppression order.




       3 Specifically, the district court noted that Captain Sawyer “testified the time period

to conduct a pass on the lack of smooth pursuit for both the left and right eye was a total of
two seconds for both eyes, not the four seconds required for each eye (total of 8 second for one
pass of both eyes). [Captain] Sawyer testified the speed for passing the stimulus on the
maximum deviation pass was the same and that the stimulus should be held for three seconds
at maximum deviation not the four seconds required.”

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        II.   This Court’s Jurisdiction and the Scope of Our Review

A. Jurisdiction

       Before reaching the merits, we resolve two procedural issues. First, Mr.

Woolard disputes whether this Court may hear his case at all. In his view, the State

improperly leapfrogged the superior court. According to Mr. Woolard, the State

needed to go to superior court before seeking review from the Court of Appeals. And

since the State broke the proper chain of appeal, Mr. Woolard urges, it improperly

sought certiorari and we improperly granted its petition.

       However, the State’s petition does fall within our certiorari jurisdiction. Under

Rule 21, parties may seek a writ of certiorari in “appropriate circumstances” to appeal

the “orders of trial tribunals when . . . no right of appeal from an interlocutory order

exists.” N.C. R. App. P. 21. The State’s petition here fits that condition. For one, the

district court’s final suppression order is interlocutory. Though it excludes portions

of the State’s evidence, it requires “further action by the trial court in order to settle

and determine the entire controversy.” Veazey v. City of Durham, 

(1950); cf. State v. Fowler, 

, 5–6 (2009), disc. rev. denied and appeal

dismissed, 

 (2010) (concluding that a superior court order allowing

motion to suppress did not end a criminal case because, even if the ruling “may have

the same ‘effect’ of a final order,” it “requires further action for finality”).

       The question, then, is whether the State could appeal that interlocutory order

as of right. If not, Rule 21 allowed it to petition this Court for certiorari. The parties


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disagree on that score. According to the State, it lacks a statutory vehicle to challenge

the district court’s ruling. And because the order is not a “final disposition” of Mr.

Woolard’s case, the State is suspended in procedural limbo—an “interlocutory no-

man’s land.” With no avenue to appeal the suppression order, the State contends, a

writ of certiorari was its only opportunity to seek review.4 Mr. Woolard, on the other

hand, points to statutes purportedly allowing the State to obtain redress in the

superior court. According to him, the State could—and should—have used those

statutory mechanisms before seeking certiorari from the Court of Appeals.

       After examining the statutory scheme, it is apparent that no provision

authorized the State to challenge the district court’s final order in superior court. And

because the State could not appeal that final order and would otherwise be marooned

in an “interlocutory no-man’s land,” Rule 21 allowed it to petition this Court for

certiorari. See N.C. R. App. P. 21.

       When Mr. Woolard moved to suppress evidence, the district court preliminarily

granted his motion. At that stage, its decision was tentative. Under N.C.G.S. § 20-

38.6(f), the district court could not enter a “final judgment on the motion” until the




       4 Counsel for the State underscored this point at oral argument. Specifically, the State

explained that it “is stuck in this interlocutory no-man’s land, for lack of a better word. The
case has not been called yet for trial, so there’s nothing for the State to appeal. But the State
also has an ethical obligation not to move forward with evidence that has been suppressed.
So the State can’t appeal, and the State can’t move forward unless the suppressed evidence
is reversed. So there is no way for the State to appeal.”

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State appealed its ruling and the superior court reviewed it.5 N.C.G.S. § 20-38.6(f)

(2021). Another statute—N.C.G.S. § 20-38.7(a)—allowed the State to challenge the

district court’s decision in the superior court. See N.C.G.S. § 20-38.7(a) (2021). So

when the district court provisionally granted Mr. Woolard’s suppression motion, the

State could use subsection 20-38.7(a) to contest that ruling.

       But that statute only covers a district court’s “preliminary determination

granting a motion to suppress.” Id. (emphasis added). That makes the difference in

Mr. Woolard’s case. After the superior court affirmed the district court’s ruling, it

directed the entry of a final order suppressing the evidence. And when the district

court complied, its “preliminary determination” became a “final judgment on the

motion.” Id.; N.C.G.S. § 20-38.6(f). Because that order was final, the State could no

longer use section 20-38.7 to challenge it.

       In other words, the State had to look elsewhere for a right of appeal. And per

subsection 20-38.7(a), “[a]ny further appeal shall be governed by Article 90 of Chapter

15A.” But those statutes, too, offer little help to the State. By its terms, section 15A-

1432—the provision parsing the State’s right to contest a district court decision in

superior court—sweeps narrowly. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1432(a) (2021). It lets the State

challenge just two species of district court rulings: (1) a “decision or judgment

dismissing criminal charges,” and (2) the grant of “a motion for a new trial on the



       5 We note as well that the district court may “enter a final judgment on the motion” if

the State “has indicated it does not intend to appeal.” N.C.G.S. § 20-38.6(f).

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ground of newly discovered or newly available evidence.” See N.C.G.S. § 15A-

1432(a)(1)–(2). But that provision is silent on whether the State may appeal a district

court’s final suppression order to superior court. And without a “statute clearly

conferring that right,” the State here could not challenge the district court’s ruling.

State v. Harrell, 

 (1971) (quoting State v. Vaughan, 

 (1966)). In short, the State was up a creek without a statutory paddle.

       Our Court of Appeals has twice faced a similar issue. See Fowler, 197 N.C. App.

at 5–8; State v. Palmer, 

 (2009), disc. rev. denied and appeal

dismissed, 

 (2010). And twice, that court has rejected the State’s efforts

to conjure up a right of appeal where none exists. In Fowler, for instance, the court

interpreted subsection 20-38.7(a) and section 15A-1432, the provisions at issue here.

See Fowler, 

. In that case—like this one—the district court

preliminarily granted the defendant’s motion to suppress. 

. And in that case—

like this one—the superior court affirmed that ruling. 

 The difference between

Fowler and Mr. Woolard’s case: In Fowler, the State appealed the superior court’s

decision before the district court entered a final order. 

 at 4–5.

       According to the Court of Appeals, the State erred by doing so, as it lacked a

statutory right to challenge the superior court’s ruling. 

. The State, for its part,

tried to stitch together a right to appeal from different statutes. See 

 at 6–7.

Subsection 20-38.7(a), it noted, allowed it to appeal a district court’s “preliminary

determination” to superior court. 

. And that provision—read alongside


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subsection 15A-1432(e)—permitted it to then contest the superior court’s ruling in

the Court of Appeals. 

      The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed. 

 at 6–8. By its plain text, the

court explained, subsection 20-38.7(a) gave the State “a right of appeal to superior

court from a district court’s preliminary determination indicating that it would grant

a defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss or suppress.” 

. Section 15A-1432,

however, covered different ground. 

 If the district court dismissed the charges

against a defendant or granted a new trial, subsection 15A-1432(a) allowed the State

to seek review in superior court. 

 And if the superior court affirmed the district

court, subsection 15A-1432(e) allowed the State to challenge that ruling in the Court

of Appeals. 

      But the State’s right of appeal ended there. 

 By their plain language, the

statutes withheld from the State a vehicle to appeal a district court’s final

suppression order. 

 at 29–30. To challenge that decision, the Court of Appeals

explained, the State had to rely on other statutes or remedial writs. See 

.

Writs like the writ of certiorari.

      Though Fowler and Palmer concluded that the State had no statutory right to

raise its claims, the court in both cases “exercised [its] discretion to grant the State’s

petition for writ of certiorari.” Fowler, 

; Palmer, 

. Rule 21, the court reasoned, was crafted for just these cases—those where no

right of appeal exists. See Fowler, 

; Palmer, 

.


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When a party “is without any other remedy,” a writ of certiorari fills the gaps,

permitting appellate courts to intervene when they could otherwise not. See Bayer v.

Raleigh & Augusta Air Line R.R. Co., 

 (1899); see also 

 (“It

seems to us . . . that, to refuse the writ in this case, ‘the defendant would be

undone.’ ”).

      The same is true of the State’s petition here. Because no statute allowed the

State to appeal the district court’s final suppression order, it lacked a statutory basis

to challenge that ruling in superior court. And since the State had no “right of appeal

from an interlocutory order,” N.C. R. App. P. 21, it could petition this Court for

certiorari. Warren v. Maxwell, 

 (1943) (underscoring that “the

proper method of review is by certiorari” if “there has been an error in law, prejudicial

to the parties” and a “statute provides no appeal”).

      Despite Mr. Woolard’s arguments, we did not err by issuing the writ. In large

part, that is because our jurisdiction is constitutionally etched. N.C. Const. art. IV,

§§ 1, 12. We may “review upon appeal any decision of the courts below, upon any

matter of law or legal inference.” N.C. Const. art. IV, § 12(1). And we may “issue any

remedial writs necessary to give [us] general supervision and control over the

proceedings of the other courts.” Id.

      Certiorari, of course, is an “extraordinary remedial writ.” State v. Roux, 

 (1964). We deploy it sparingly, reserving it “to correct errors of law,”

State v. Simmington, 

 (1952), or to cure a “manifest injustice,” State


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v. Cochran, 

 (1949). To that end, a petitioner must “show merit or

that error was probably committed below.” Cryan v. Nat’l Council of YMCA, 

, 572 (2023) (cleaned up). In the past, this Court has granted certiorari to resolve

legal questions raised by interlocutory orders in criminal cases, even when the

petitioner lacked a right of appeal. See, e.g., State v. Jefferson, 

 (1872)

(noting that petitioner had no right to appeal but still issuing writ of certiorari to

review whether the trial court erroneously discharged a criminal jury); Ex parte

Biggs, 

 (1870).

      Ultimately, though, the writ is “discretionary.” See State v. Ross, 

 (2016) (citing Womble v. Moncure Mill & Gin Co., 

 (1927)). And

here, since the State is “without any other remedy” to challenge the district court’s

final suppression order, it could seek—and we could grant—a writ of certiorari. See

Bayer, 

. In this case, we exercised our “sound discretion” to release the

State from procedural limbo. See State v. Niccum, 

 (1971). This does

not mean we should deploy our certiorari jurisdiction whenever the State loses a

motion to suppress in these circumstances. But since we properly granted the writ in

this case, we have jurisdiction to reach the merits.

B. Scope of Review

      With our jurisdiction settled, we next clarify what we review. After Mr.

Woolard moved to suppress evidence, the district court “preliminarily indicate[d that]

the motion should be granted.” See N.C.G.S. § 20-38.6(f). On review, the superior


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court affirmed the district court’s ruling and directed it to “enter its final order.” The

district court complied—in a 29 March 2022 order, it adopted the Pre-Trial Indication

as its final decision.

       The district court’s final order is the only one before us. We do not consider the

superior court’s ruling or the Court of Appeals’ denial of certiorari. Because we

examine the district court’s order alone, we rest our analysis on that court’s factual

findings.6

                              III.   Standard of Review

       This Court reviews a trial court’s suppression order in two steps. See State v.

Bullock, 

 (2017). We first ask “whether the trial court’s underlying

findings of fact are supported by competent evidence.” State v. Parisi, 

 (2019) (cleaned up). We then examine “whether those factual findings in turn

support the trial court’s ultimate conclusions of law.” 

 (cleaned up).

       Under that framework, we start with the facts. And here, that step is key

because probable cause is context-specific—it hinges “on the totality of the

circumstances present in each case.” State v. Sanders, 

 (1990)



       6 At oral argument the State contended that the district court’s final order “adopted”

or “incorporated” the superior court’s factual findings. We disagree. In its final order, the
district court specified that “the Pre-Trial Indication entered by the Court on 15 November
2021 is now the final order of the Court.” The district court never mentioned the superior
court’s factual findings. True, if “there is a dispute about the findings of fact,” the superior
court may “determine the matter de novo.” N.C.G.S. § 20-38.7(a). But here, it does not appear
that the State disagreed with the district court’s factual conclusions or challenged them in
superior court. Because the district court relied solely on its findings of fact, we, too, rely on
those findings in reviewing its final order.

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(cleaned up); see Ker v. California, 

 (1963). The trial court’s findings

steer our review. See Parisi, 

; see also State v. Bartlett, 

 (2015). Because that tribunal is closer to the case and steeped in the evidence, it

is better equipped to distill “what happened in space and time.” Parisi, 

 (quoting State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n. v. Eddleman, 

 (1987)).

      In cases like Mr. Woolard’s, then, the district court gauges “the actual

observations made by arresting officers” and “the extent to which a person suspected

of driving while impaired exhibits indicia of impairment.” Id. at 656. If backed “by

competent evidence,” we treat those findings as “conclusive on appeal.” State v.

Eason, 

 (1994).

      At the second step, we decide whether—based on the facts—Captain Sawyer

had probable cause as a matter of law. That task “inherently requires” us to exercise

judgment and apply “legal principles.” Parisi, 

 (cleaned up). For that

reason, probable cause is a legal question. 

; see also Ornelas v. United States,

, 697–98 (1996). And for the same reason, we review it de novo. See

Parisi, 

. We thus examine the issue with fresh eyes and may “freely

substitute” our judgment for the district court’s. 

 (quoting State v. Biber, 

 (2011)).

           IV.      Probable Cause to Arrest for Impaired Driving

A. Probable Cause Standard

      Before arresting a person, an officer must have probable cause to suspect him


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of a crime “at the time of the arrest.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 

 (2004);

State v. Streeter, 

 (1973). That requirement is key to the Fourth

Amendment’s protections, and its roots grow “deep in our history.” Bailey v. United

States, 

 (2013) (quoting Henry v. United States, 

(1959)). The Founders’ “[h]ostility to seizures based on mere suspicion” spurred the

Fourth Amendment’s adoption and served as the springboard for its probable-cause

requirement. Dunaway v. New York, 

 (1979); see also Stanford v.

Texas, 

 (1965). In purpose and practice, the probable-cause standard

shields “citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from

unfounded charges of crime.” Pringle, 

 (quoting Brinegar v. United

States, 

 (1949)).

      Probable cause to arrest exists when an officer has a reasonable belief,

anchored in specific facts and objectively rational inferences, that a particular person

has committed a crime. See id.; see also Beck v. Ohio, 

 (1964). Under

that framework, we take the “facts as a whole” rather than “one by one.” District of

Columbia v. Wesby, 

 (2018); see also Sanders, 

. And

though officers must find a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal

wrongdoing,” United States v. Arvizu, 

 (2002), they are not required

“to rule out a suspect’s innocent explanation for suspicious facts,” Wesby, 

.

      But not all evidence satisfies the Fourth Amendment. An officer may not arrest


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based on a “mere hunch” or gut feeling. See Arvizu, 

 (cleaned up); see

also United States v. Sokolow, 

 (1989); State v. Jackson, 

(2015). Nebulous suspicions are also insufficient—an officer’s “belief of guilt must be

particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized.” Pringle, 

 (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 

 (1979)). So the key question is

whether a reasonable officer would find a supported, “good faith,” and objectively

rational basis to suspect a person of a crime. See State v. Zuniga, 

(1984); see also Biber, 

.

      Those principles apply on the road, too. An officer has probable cause to arrest

for impaired driving when, under the “totality of the circumstances,” he reasonably

believes that a motorist “consumed alcoholic beverages” and drove “in a faulty

manner or provided other indicia of impairment.” Parisi, 

. Our cases

have plotted what evidence may support that belief. Erratic driving, we have

explained, provides strong grounds for suspicion. Id.; see State v. Otto, 

 (2012) (finding reasonable suspicion for traffic stop based on the defendant’s

“constant and continual” weaving for three quarters of a mile on a weekend evening).

So too does the “fact that a motorist has been drinking.” Parisi, 

 (citing

State v. Hewitt, 

 (1965)); cf. State v. Ellis, 

 (1964).

      “[O]ther conduct” may also suggest impairment. Parisi, 

. Take

the smell of alcohol on a motorist. That fact, “standing alone, is no evidence that a

driver is under the influence of an intoxicant.” State v. Rich, 

 (2000)


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(cleaned up). But it may signal “that [the driver] has been drinking,” especially when

coupled with other clues. Atkins v. Moye, 

 (1970); cf. State v.

Romano, 

 (2017) (noting that defendant “smelled strongly of

alcohol”). The same holds true when a driver has red and glassy eyes. Parisi, 372 N.C.

at 650–51 (cataloguing cases). And field-sobriety tests—performed in line with

statutory and constitutional standards—may offer reliable metrics of impairment. Id.

at 653 (noting that the “defendant exhibited multiple indicia of impairment while

performing various sobriety tests”); see Romano, 

; State v. Godwin, 

, 612–13 (2017) (allowing an officer, properly qualified as an expert, to testify

about HGN tests).

      Any single fact alone may not establish probable cause. But taken together,

they may clear that hurdle. The probable-cause inquiry is, after all, an additive one.

See Wesby, 

. And so courts—like officers—must examine “each case in

the light of the particular circumstances and the particular offense involved.” State

v. Harris, 

 (1971); see also Atkins, 

 (“[T]he fact that

a motorist has been drinking, when considered in connection with faulty driving or

other conduct indicating an impairment of physical or mental faculties, is sufficient

prima facie to show a violation of [section] 20-138.” (cleaned up)).

      We most recently tackled this topic in Parisi. In that case, a police officer

stopped Mr. Parisi’s car at a checkpoint. Parisi, 

. After requesting his

license, the officer smelled alcohol on Mr. Parisi’s breath and noticed his “glassy and


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                                      Opinion of the Court



watery” eyes. 

 An “open box of beer” sat “on the passenger’s side floorboard,”

though the officer did not see any open containers. 

 When asked, Mr. Parisi

admitted that he had been drinking that evening—three beers, all told. 

          On top of those observations, the officer conducted field-sobriety tests. 

 Each

confirmed Mr. Parisi’s intoxication. On the HGN test, Mr. Parisi showed six clues of

impairment. 

 On the walk-and-turn test, he miscounted his steps walking each

way. 

 And on the one-leg-stand test, he swayed and held out his arms to balance.

          To the officer, the evidence suggested that Mr. Parisi had consumed enough

“alcohol to appreciably impair his mental and physical faculties.” 

 He thus arrested

and charged Mr. Parisi for driving while impaired. 

 at 640–41. But the trial court

disagreed. 

. On Mr. Parisi’s motion, that court suppressed evidence seized

during his arrest, holding that the officer lacked probable cause. 

 The Court of

Appeals reversed that decision.

          We unanimously affirmed the Court of Appeals. In our view, a “prudent officer”

viewing all the evidence would reasonably suspect Mr. Parisi of drunk driving. 

. We noted:

      •   That Mr. Parisi “had been driving”;

      •   That he “admitted having consumed three beers”;

      •   That his “eyes were red and glassy”;

      •   That “a moderate odor of alcohol emanated from [his] person”; and


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                                  Opinion of the Court



   •   That he “exhibited multiple indicia of impairment while performing various

       sobriety tests.”

.

       Given those facts, we had “no hesitation” in finding probable cause. 

 That

was so, we explained, because a “prudent officer” in the same position would harbor

the same suspicions. 

. And since the officer reasonably believed that Mr.

Parisi “consumed alcohol” and that “his faculties were appreciably impaired,” Mr.

Parisi’s arrest squared with the Fourth Amendment. 

.

B. Application

       Because probable cause pivots on the facts, we rely on the district court’s

findings. See 

. We start where Captain Sawyer did—with Mr. Woolard’s

erratic driving. As he trailed Mr. Woolard, the officer watched him swerve over the

centerline six to seven times. Twice, Mr. Woolard ventured into the oncoming lane.

And Mr. Woolard veered the other way, too—at one point, he drifted off the asphalt

and onto the road’s right shoulder.

       Concerned, Captain Sawyer pulled Mr. Woolard over to investigate his

weaving. And during that stop, the clues of impairment mounted. As in Parisi,

Captain Sawyer smelled alcohol on Mr. Woolard’s breath and from inside his truck.

See 

. As in Parisi, he noticed Mr. Woolard’s red and glassy eyes. See 

 And

as in Parisi, Mr. Woolard admitted that he drank several beers before driving. See 

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                                       Opinion of the Court



Captain Sawyer supplemented his observations with an HGN test.7 When checking

Mr. Woolard’s eyes for nystagmus, Captain Sawyer logged all six clues of

impairment—another parallel to Parisi. See 

       So “at the time of the arrest,” Devenpeck, 

, Captain Sawyer

faced these facts:

   •   That while driving, Mr. Woolard veered over the centerline six to seven times;

   •   That he twice swerved into the oncoming lane;

   •   That he skated onto the right shoulder of the road;

   •   That the inside of his truck smelled of alcohol;

   •   That his breath smelled of alcohol, too;

   •   That his eyes were red and glassy;

   •   That he confessed to drinking “a couple of beers” before driving; and

   •   That he showed all six clues of impairment on the HGN test.

       In Mr. Woolard’s view, that evidence does not amount to probable cause. As he

tells it, he swerved on the road because he was shooing bees out of his truck. Besides,

he continues, some evidence cut against his impairment. When pulling over, Mr.

Woolard deftly avoided the ditches flanking the road. He spoke and acted normally


       7 Although the State also challenges the trial court’s suppression of the PBTs, it did

not appeal the trial court’s orders on those tests. See State’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
1, 12, State v. Woolard, No. 208PA22 (N.C. July 8, 2022) (seeking this Court’s “review of the
Beaufort County district court’s Order of Suppression”). Nor did we grant certiorari to
examine those rulings. Instead, we agreed only to consider the district court’s final
suppression order and whether, based on its factual findings, that court correctly determined
whether Captain Sawyer had probable cause to arrest.

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                                   Opinion of the Court



during the traffic stop. He retrieved his license without difficulty. And he easily exited

the truck when asked. So according to Mr. Woolard, the “whole picture” of the

evidence negated Captain Sawyer’s suspicions. See United States v. Cortez, 

 (1981).

      However, an “objectively reasonable police officer” in Captain Sawyer’s shoes

would draw the same conclusions that he did. See Pringle, 

. Though

duly considered, Mr. Woolard’s arguments do not change our holding. While the

totality of the circumstances may include a defendant’s explanations for his conduct,

probable cause does not require officers to rule out a defendant’s version of events.

See Wesby, 

. What matters is whether a reasonable officer, viewing the

“evidence as a whole,” would have a “substantial basis” to suspect Mr. Woolard of a

crime. See State v. Lowe, 

 (2016) (quoting State v. Beam, 

 (1989)); accord Wesby, 

.

      We think that a reasonable officer would find a “substantial basis” to arrest in

this case. See Lowe, 

 (cleaned up). As Mr. Woolard urges, his

explanation of the incident ran counter to Captain Sawyer’s suspicions of

“wrongdoing.” Cf. Kansas v. Glover, 

 (2020). A sober driver, after

all, is more likely than a drunk one to navigate hilly terrain, retrieve his ID, chat

normally, and follow instructions. But the “evidence as a whole” gave Captain Sawyer

probable cause to suspect Mr. Woolard of impaired driving. See Lowe, 

(cleaned up). Despite some arguably innocuous conduct, Mr. Woolard still drove


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                                  Opinion of the Court



erratically; banked onto the road’s shoulder; smelled of alcohol; had red, glassy eyes;

admitted to drinking before driving; and showed every clue of impairment on the

HGN test.

                                V.    Conclusion

      Probable cause is a “fluid concept,” not a fixed formula. See Ornelas, 517 U.S.

at 695–96 (cleaned up). It draws content from “particular factual contexts” as “viewed

through the lens of common sense.” Florida v. Harris, 

 (2013)

(cleaned up). For that reason, the constitutional doctrine rejects rigid rules in favor

of a “flexible, all-things-considered approach.” 

. We keep with that fact-

intensive, “common-sensical standard” in this case. 

      On these facts, we hold that Captain Sawyer had probable cause to arrest Mr.

Woolard for impaired driving. An “objectively reasonable” officer in Captain Sawyer’s

shoes would discern a “substantial chance of criminal activity” from Mr. Woolard’s

erratic weaving; the smell of alcohol on his breath and in his truck; his red, glassy

eyes; his admission to drinking; and his performance on the HGN test. See Wesby,

.

      Because Captain Sawyer’s “belief of guilt” was objectively reasonable and

rooted in sound evidence, Mr. Woolard’s arrest did not violate the Fourth

Amendment. See Pringle, 

. The district court erred in holding the

opposite. We thus reverse the district court’s suppression order and remand Mr.

Woolard’s case for further proceedings.


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            Opinion of the Court



REVERSED.




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