Beaufort County Board of Education v. Beaufort County Board of Commissioners

This action arises out of a dispute between the Beaufort County Board of Education (the School Board) and the Beaufort County Commissioners (the County Commission) over the amount of funding necessary to operate the local school system for the 2006-2007 fiscal year (FY 2006-2007). The School Board requested $12,106,304 and the County Commission allocated $9,434,217. After complying with the negotiation and mediation procedures set forth in N.C.G.S. § 115C-431 (2007) (section 431), the School Board sued the County *502Commission.1 At trial, a jury found that the School Board needed $10,200,000 for FY 2006-2007 school operations. The trial' court entered a judgment requiring the County Commission to appropriate that amount to the School Board.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals found no error. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 188 N.C. App. 399, 416, 656 S.E.2d 296, 307 (2008). We allowed discretionary review to determine whether “the statutory framework for resolving school funding disputes between the county board of education and the county board of commissioners [is] constitutional” and, if so, whether “the statutory framework [has] been properly applied in this case.”

The County Commission first contends that section 431 is unconstitutional on its face. We observe that a facial challenge to a statute is a “ ‘most difficult challenge to mount successfully.’ ” State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554, 564, 614 S.E.2d 479, 485 (2005) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). A party must show that there are no circumstances under which the statute might be constitutional. See id. at 564, 614 S.E.2d at 486. We seldom uphold facial challenges because it is the role of the legislature, rather than this Court, to balance disparate interests and find a workable compromise among them. See Henry v. Edmisten, 315 N.C. 474, 491, 340 S.E.2d 720, 731 (1986). This Court will only measure the balance struck in the statute against the minimum standards required by the constitution. See id.

The County Commission alleges that by allowing the court system to play a role in deciding the level of funding for public education, section 431(c) impermissibly delegates the legislature’s constitutional duty to “provide ... for a general and uniform system of free public schools.” N.C. Const, art. IX, § 2(1). The County Commission argues that the statutory procedure in section 431(c) thus violates the constitutional requirement that “[t]he legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.” Id. art. I, § 6. Like the United States Supreme Court, however, we acknowledge that our separation of powers clause does not prevent the General Assembly “from seeking assistance, within proper limits, from its coordinate Branches.” *503Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)).

In analyzing the role of the judiciary under section 431(c), we begin by examining the statutory procedures preceding litigation. The local school board first creates a budget setting out its estimate of the cost of providing educatipn within its locale for the upcoming year and submits that budget to the county commission. See N.C.G.S. § 115C-429(a) (2007). The county commission then determines the amount of funds to be appropriated to the school board. See N.C.G.S. § 115C-429(b) (2007). If there is a dispute between the school board and the county commission, the two boards meet with a mediator in an effort to negotiate a compromise. See § 115C-431(a). If there is still no agreement, representatives from the two boards enter a formal mediation. See § 115C-431(b). If no agreement can be reached at the mediation, the school board may file an action in superior court. See § 115C-431(c). In any such action, the trial court is charged to

find the facts as to the amount of money necessary to maintain a system of free public schools, and the amount of money needed from the county to make up this total. . . .

... When the facts have been found, the court shall give judgment ordering the board of county commissioners to appropriate a sum certain to the local school administrative unit, and to levy such taxes on property as may be necessary to make up this sum when added to other revenues available for the purpose.

Id.

Because the trial court must determine the amount necessary to fund “a system of free public schools,” id., we look to other provisions of Chapter 115C to determine the meaning of that phrase. The Chapter contains copious provisions setting standards, often in minute detail, to which local schools must adhere.2 The State Board *504of Education (the State Board) is given the general administrative and supervisory role over public education and is responsible for “establishing] policy for the system of free public schools.” N.C.G.S. § 115C-12 (2007).3 The statutory provisions enacted by the legislature and guidelines adopted by the State Board, when viewed together, comprehensively define the phrase “a system of free public schools” used in section 431(c).

Since the General Assembly has so exhaustively defined its desired system, the section 431(c) procedure does no more than invite the courts to adjudicate a disputed fact: the annual cost of providing a countywide system of education under the policies chosen by the legislature and the State Board. Such fact-finding falls within the historic and proper role of the judiciary. See, e.g., N.C. Const. art. IV, § 13 (discussing civil actions: “[T]here shall be a right to have issues of fact tried before a jury.”). After finding the facts, the trial court enters judgment against the county commission as directed by the legislature. See § 115C-431(c). It is the legislature, not the judiciary, which has assigned responsibility to local government by requiring that judgment be entered against the county commission if the court finds the cost of schooling is greater than the amount appropriated. The legislature has therefore neither assigned policy-making power to the courts nor otherwise delegated its authority, and the judiciary. is at all times exercising a function traditionally assigned to it under our tripartite system of government.

Furthermore, we have previously considered and upheld a provision nearly identical to section 431(c). Chapter 33, section 8, Laws of 1913, provided, just as section 431 does, for judicial fact-finding as to the cost of schools in the event of disagreement between a county school board and the county commission. See Act of Mar. 1, 1913, ch. 33, sec. 8, 1913 N.C. Pub. [Sess.] Laws 58, 60. As in this case, the *505county commission challenged the resolution scheme as unconstitutional. See Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 174 N.C. 469, 474, 93 S.E. 1001, 1003 (1917). In response to that argument, we held, just as we do now, that the scheme “only empowers the courts to ascertain and determine a disputed fact relevant to a pending issue between the two boards, and thereupon command that the tax be levied accordingly, both the finding of the fact and the judgment thereon being, in our opinion, judicial in their nature.” Id. The provisions of section 431(c) thus comport with the State Constitution, and any complaints about the policy or wisdom of the challenged procedures must necessarily be directed to the General Assembly.

The County Commission next asserts that section 431(c) deprives it of funding discretion granted by the State Constitution. Our Constitution provides:

(2) Local responsibility. The General Assembly may assign to units of local government such responsibility for the financial support of the free public schools as it may deem appropriate. The governing boards of units of local government with financial responsibility for public education may use local revenues to add to or supplement any public school or post-secondary school program.

N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2(2). The County Commission maintains that allowing the court to ascertain “the amount of money necessary to maintain a system of free public schools,” § 115C-431(c), is counter to the second sentence of the constitutional provision, which states that the local government “may... add. to or supplement” the amount for which the legislature has assigned responsibility, N.C. Const, art. IX, § 2(2) (emphasis added).

In interpreting our Constitution, we are bound to “give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it.” Perry v. Stancil, 237 N.C. 442, 444, 75 S.E.2d 512, 514 (1953). Moreover, “where one of two reasonable constructions will raise a serious constitutional question, the construction which avoids this question should be adopted.” In re Arthur, 291 N.C. 640, 642, 231 S.E.2d 614, 616 (1977) (citations omitted).

We now consider the meaning of the terms “necessary” and “needed,” as used in section 431(c), in light of Article IX, Section 2(2) of the State Constitution. We acknowledge that these terms are susceptible to reasonable interpretations of varying strictness, about *506which there has been argument from the earliest days of our republic. See, e.g., M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 207, 212-13, 4 Wheat. 316, 323-25 (1819). If a fact-finder were to interpret “necessary” or “needed” in section 431(c) expansively, there is a danger that the resulting verdict could intrude on a county commission’s funding discretion under Article IX, Section 2(2) by requiring the appropriation of a greater amount of money than that for which the legislature has assigned responsibility. Accordingly, in order to reconcile the statute with Article IX, Section 2(2), we accord a restrictive interpretation to the terms “necessary” and “needed” within section 431(c).

So construed, section 431(c)’s requirement that county commissions provide the minimum level of funding required by state law does not abrogate their discretionary authority to contribute more. As discussed above, the legislature has deemed it appropriate to assign responsibility to local government to provide funding to maintain the system of public schools. County commissions are thus required to furnish that amount. See N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2(2). Our State Constitution protects a local government’s discretionary authority to provide more funding than legally required, not less. Consequently, section 431(c) does not encroach on local governments’ discretion to contribute additional funds to schools beyond their minimum legal responsibility.

We next consider the trial court’s charge to the jury in the present case. Although counsel did not object or assign error to the trial court’s instructions, “ ‘[t]his Court will not hesitate to exercise its rarely used general supervisory authority when necessary to promote the expeditious administration of justice,’ and may do so to ‘consider questions which are not properly presented according to [its] rules.’ ” State v. Ellis, 361 N.C. 200, 205, 639 S.E.2d 425, 428 (2007) (quoting State v. Stanley, 288 N.C. 19, 26, 215 S.E.2d 589, 594 (1975)). We invoke our general supervisory authority mindful that because the trial court “did not have the legal standard which we articulate today to guide him in his consideration of the case, ... it is not reasonable to expect him to have applied it without the benefit of this opinion.” State v. McDowell, 310 N.C. 61, 74, 310 S.E.2d 301, 310 (1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1165 (1986). The instant case is analogous to other situations wherein this Court has invoked its general supervisory authority to promptly resolve a novel issue of great import. See In re Brownlee, 301 N.C. 532, 548, 272 S.E.2d 861, 870 (1981) (stating that the Court’s general supervisory authority may be invoked when “[t]he novelty of the issues presented, coupled with *507the potential liability of the counties of North Carolina, serves to emphasize the proper role of the judiciary in securing a prompt resolution” (emphasis added)).

The trial court instructed the jury that the word “needed” in section 431(c) means “that which is reasonable and useful and proper or conducive to the end sought.” Rather than conveying a restrictive definition of “needed,” which is necessary to preserve the discretionary authority of county commissions under Article IX, Section 2(2), the instruction conveyed an impermissible, expansive definition of this statutory term. Because the instruction was in error, we must remand for a new trial. At that trial, the trial court should instruct the jury that section 431(c) requires the County Commission to provide that appropriation legally necessary to support a system of free public schools, as defined by Chapter 115C and the policies of the State Board. The trial court should also instruct the jury, in arriving at its verdict, to consider the educational goals and policies of the state, the budgetary request of the local board of education, the financial resources of the county, and the fiscal policies of the board of county commissioners. See N.C.G.S. § 115C-426(e) (2007). Anything beyond this measure of damages impermissibly infringes upon the discretionary authority of the County Commission under Article IX, Section 2(2) of the State Constitution and may not be awarded by a jury.

The County Commission next asserts that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statutory framework. Specifically, the Commission alleges that the legislature has assigned to local governments responsibility- only for capital expenses and not current expenses. The statutes explicitly contemplate the funding of current expenses by county commissions when state funding is insufficient. See, e.g., § 115C-426(e) (stating that the local current expense fund shall include appropriations sufficient, when added to state funds, to conform to the educational goals of the state; and stating that these appropriations shall be funded by, among other sources, “moneys made available to the local school administrative unit by the board of county commissioners”). Moreover, as we have already discussed, section 431(c) itself assigns to the local government responsibility for funding “a system of free public schools,” not merely the capital expense component. We therefore reject the argument that the General Assembly has not assigned responsibility for current expenses to local governments.

*508Finally, the County Commission alleges that its due process rights were violated by the trial court’s denial of its motion to continue. The legislature intended that the statutory resolution process be carried out promptly. See § 115C-431(c) (“When a jury trial is demanded, the cause shall be set for the first succeeding term of the superior court in the county, and shall take precedence over all other business of the court.”). Assuming, without deciding, that the County Commission is a “person” for due process purposes, it had ample opportunity to communicate with and request information from the School Board after its budget proposal was submitted, including the time during which the boards were engaged in negotiation and mediation leading to the instant suit. See N.C.G.S. § 115C-429(c) (2007) (“The board of county commissioners shall have full authority to call for ... all books, records, audit reports, and other information bearing on the financial operation of the local school administrative unit.”); § 115C-431(a), (b). Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying the motion to continue.

In sum, we reject the County Commission’s facial challenge and uphold section 431(c) as constitutional. Nonetheless, because the trial court’s instructions invited the jury to step beyond its role of determining necessary funding and intrude upon the County Commission’s constitutional discretion, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to that court for further remand to the trial court for a new trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.