Major v. McCallister
Victoria MAJOR, Appellant, v. Garrett Doyle MCCALLISTER and Kalupto Creations, L.L.C., Defendants, and ServiceMagic, Inc., Respondent
Attorneys
Gregory W. Aleshire, William R. Robb, and Jessica L. Ward, Springfield, MO, for appellant., Michael J. Patton and Jennifer A. Bro-dersen, Springfield, MO, for respondent.
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
We consider an internet websiteâs forum selection clause.
Background
Appellant used ServiceMagicâs website, which offered free referrals to prescreened construction contractors, to search for someone to remodel her Springfield, Missouri home. That website process involved a series of computer screens or web pages. Appellant entered project information on the first page, clicked to the next page, entered more information, and so on. Each page was hyperlinked
Appellant did not look at these terms while using the website. Eventually, a pop-up screen (âWeâre Matching Your Project to Top-Rated Pros in Springfield, MOâ) was followed by a new page stating that Appellantâs project had been matched to four prescreened professionals. There were spaces for Appellant to enter her contact information, followed by a âSubmit for Matching Prosâ button. Next to the button was a blue hyperlink to the website terms and this notice: âBy submitting you agree to the Terms of Use.â
Still without checking the website terms, Appellant clicked the âSubmit for Matching Prosâ button and got a list which included co-defendants McCallister and Ka-lupto Creations. Appellant contracted with them, but later became dissatisfied and sued all defendants in Greene County, Missouri. Citing its forum selection clause, ServiceMagic was dismissed from the case and Appellant filed this appeal.
We should honor the forum selection clause unless it is unfair or unreasonable to do so. Burke v. Goodman, 114 S.W.3d 276, 279-80 (Mo.App.2003)(citing High Life Sales Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 823 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Mo. banc 1992)). The party resisting such a clause generally bears a heavy burden to show why it should not be held to its bargain. Id. at 280 (citing Whelan Sec. Co. v. Allen, 26 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Mo.App.2000)).
Appellant raises two issues: (1) can she be said to have assented to the website terms; and (2) does the forum selection clause reach her tort claims?
Assent to Website Terms
Appellant denies assenting to the forum selection clause. She claims the notice of website terms was inadequate and no âclickâ was required to accept them. Her argument focuses on two types of electronic form agreements: âclick-wrapsâ and âbrowsewraps.â
The legal effect of online agreements may be âan emerging area of the law,â but courts still âapply traditional principles of contract law and focus on whether the plaintiff had reasonable notice of and manifested assent to the online agreement.â Burcham v. Expedia, Inc., 2009 WL 586513, at *2 (E.D.Mo. Mar.6, 2009)(citing Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F.Supp.2d 229, 236 (E.D.Pa.2007) and Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28-30 (2d Cir.2002)).
Assent is manifested expressly on click-wrap sites, usually by clicking a box or button (e.g., âI Agreeâ). Hotels.com, L.P. v. Canales, 195 S.W.3d 147, 154-55 (Tex.App.2006). Courts routinely enforce click-wraps. See U.S. v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 462 n. 22 (C.D.Cal.2009); Burcham, 2009 WL 586513, at *2-3.
Appellant criticizes ServiceMagicâs use of a browsewrap instead of a clickwrap, and argues primarily from Specht, in which the plaintiffs downloaded free software from Netscapeâs website. The license terms (including an arbitration clause) were not referenced on the software download screen, but could be seen only by scrolling down to another screen. Since Netscapeâs browsewrap âdid not carry an immediately visible notice of the existence of license terms,â the court refused to enforce them. 306 F.3d at 31. The court emphasized this visibility problem by repeated references to âa screen located below the download buttonâ (Id. at 20); âtext that would have become visible to plaintiffs only if they had scrolled down to the next screenâ (Id. at 23); that notice of the existence of license terms âon the next scrollable screenâ was not enough for âinquiry noticeâ (Id. at 30); that an âunexplored portionâ of text âremained below the download buttonâ (Id. at 32); âlicense terms on a submerged screenâ (Id.); and âterms hidden below the âDownloadâ button on the next screenâ (Id. at 35).
By contrast, ServiceMagic did put âimmediately visible notice of the existence of license termsâ â i.e., âBy submitting you agree to the Terms of Useâ and a blue hyperlink â right next to the button that Appellant pushed. A second link to those terms was visible on the same page without scrolling, and similar links were on every other website page. âFailure to read an enforceable online agreement, as with any binding contract, will not excuse compliance with its terms. A customer on notice of contract terms available on the internet is bound by those terms.â Burc-ham, 2009 WL 586513, at *2 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Appellant also cites clickwrap cases Burcham and Feldman, seemingly for the point that clickwraps are better for proving assent. Maybe so, but there is no fundamental reason âwhy the enforceability of the offerorâs terms should depend on whether the taker states (or clicks) T agree.â â Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir.2004), quoted in Burcham, 2009 WL 586513, at *3. Even Specht indicates that âunambiguous manifestation of assent to license termsâ may be unnecessary if there is âan immediately visible noticeâ of their existence. 306 F.3d at 31. Cf. Malan Realty Investors, Inc. v. Harris, 953 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. banc 1997), which enforced a contractual jury waiver in part because it was âprominently displayed as the only and last paragraph on the last page immediately above the signature lines. Even if the defendant did not read the rest of the lease, it would be difficult to miss this provision when she signed the lease.â Id. at 627.
*230 While new commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many new situations, it has not fundamentally changed the principles of contract. It is standard contract doctrine that when a benefit is offered subject to stated conditions, and the offeree makes a decision to take the benefit with knowledge of the terms of the offer, the taking constitutes an acceptance of the terms, which accordingly become binding on the offeree.
Forum Selection Clause and Tort Claims
Appellant also claims that âthis Court held in Service Vending Co. v. Wal-Mart Stores, [93 S.W.3d 764 (Mo.App. 2002) ], that such forum selection clauses apply only to contract claims, not tort actionsâ and that when âan action [is] in tort, any forum selection clause contained in the contract does not apply. Id. [at 767.]â
We did not so hold or establish any per se rule in Service Vending,
We made similar findings in Service Vending. âSVC did not sue Wal-Mart on the basis of the partiesâ contract.â 93 S.W.3d at 769. Since the litigation âdid not arise due to the partiesâ agreement,â but because Wal-Mart allegedly interfered with the plaintiffs business dealings with a third-party, we affirmed the trial courtâs refusal to apply the forum selection clause. Id.
Appellantâs claims differ from those in Greenwood and Service Vending. All three of her counts allege that ServiceM-agic breached its website representations. Appellantâs fraud and negligence claims repeatedly cite such representations and assert that ServiceMagic did not comply with them or properly prescreen the co-defendants as the website promised. Her final count alleges that ServieeMagicâs website âemployed deception, fraud, false promise, and misrepresentationâ in violation of Missouriâs Merchandising Practices Act.
Generally speaking, whether a forum selection clause that by its terms applies to contract actions also reaches non-contract claims âdepends on whether resolution of the claims relates to interpretation of the contract.â Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc., 858 F.2d 509,
. The essential issue here is the same as in many cases: Does the contract clause under, consideration â be it arbitration, forum selection, or some other provisionâ apply to or reach the conduct or action in question? Although that answer was ânoâ in Greenwood and Service Vending, here it is âyes.â Thus, we deny this point as well, and affirm the trial courtâs judgment of dismissal.
. A hyperlink electronically provides direct access from one internet location/file to another, typically by clicking a highlighted word or icon. An online reference work, for example, may hyperlink words or terms in its text to their respective definitions.
. See Missouri Court Rule 74.01(b) (2009). A dismissal without prejudice generally is not final or appealable because the claim can be refiled, but the practical effect of this ruling was to bar Appellant from litigating in her chosen forum state. Burke v. Goodman, 114 S.W.3d 276, 278-79 n. 4 (Mo.App.2003).
. Appellant's points are not substantially in the form prescribed by Rule 84.04(d)(1), but we exercise our discretion to address her contentions as we understand them.
. These terms seem to derive from software "shrinkwrapâ licenses, which purport to become effective when a purchaser removes the cellophane shrinkwrap and opens the software package. See Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 22 n. 4 (2d Cir.2002).
. Stated by the same Second Circuit that, two years earlier, decided the Specht case cited by Appellant.
. Indeed, in dicta we indicated that tort claims would have been covered by "concise language to that effectâ (93 S.W.3d at 768), an observation loo narrow to serve as a bright-line rule. For example, if a claim falls within the scope of a forum selection clause, it should not matter whether the clause is concise.
. There are two aspects of unconscionability: procedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability. Procedural unconsciona-bility concerns the formalities of making the contract, while substantive unconscionability concerns the terms of the contract itself. State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Mo. banc 2006).