Adam L. Mills a/k/a Adam Larry Mills v. State of Mississippi

                   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

                               NO. 2022-KA-00617-SCT

ADAM L. MILLS a/k/a ADAM LARRY MILLS

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI


DATE OF JUDGMENT:                         05/27/2022
TRIAL JUDGE:                              HON. DAL WILLIAMSON
TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS:                    PATRICK LANCE PACIFIC
                                          MATTHEW CHISOLM SHERMAN
                                          DENNIS LEE BISNETTE
                                          ANTHONY J. BUCKLEY
                                          KRISTEN E. MARTIN
                                          KATHERINE BISNETTE SUMRALL
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:                JONES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:                  OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
                                          BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES
                                              MOLLIE MARIE McMILLIN
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:                    OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
                                          BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:                        ANTHONY J. BUCKLEY
NATURE OF THE CASE:                       CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION:                              AFFIRMED - 12/14/2023
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

       BEFORE KITCHENS, P.J., BEAM AND ISHEE, JJ.

       ISHEE, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1.   Adam Mills brutally killed his girlfriend while apparently under the influence of

drugs; she was stabbed more times than the medical examiner could count, and her abdomen

was cut so severely that a first responder repeatedly exclaimed she had been “cut in half.”

Mills was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to serve life in prison. He now
appeals, arguing that he could not be convicted of first-degree murder because the weight of

the evidence did not support a finding that he had the requisite mental capacity to form a

premeditated intent to kill. Mills also contends the trial court erred by admitting photographs

and body camera footage from the scene of the crime. We find no error and affirm.

                                            FACTS

¶2.    On June 4, 2020, around 2:15 in the morning, Ashley Pearson called John Michael

Dearman and asked him to come to the home that she shared with Adam Mills. She told

Dearman that Mills was “freaking out,” and she asked him to come over to help with the

situation. Dearman arrived roughly fifteen minutes later. He later testified he had believed

he was being asked to come over to help “calm [Mills] down before he took off in the truck

and possibly got himself in trouble . . . with the law.”

¶3.    When Dearman arrived, Mills and Pearson met him outside. According to Dearman,

Mills seemed “pretty normal” but “a little erratic.” Mills said he wanted to go pick up his

son, and he was apologizing to Pearson for cheating on her. Pearson was crying. Dearman

consoled Pearson, and the three went inside the home. Once inside, Mills continued to

apologize to Pearson, and she told him it was “fine.”

¶4.    For a moment, “everything seemed fine,” but, according to Dearman, Mills then began

“swatting at something that [Pearson and Dearman] could not see.” Mills acted as if he “was

fighting something [they] could not see, like physically fighting something,” and he appeared

to be “losing.” Mills then picked up a knife and “was . . . trying to fight off . . . whatever he

saw.” He then dropped to his knees, slumped over, stood back up, and pressed the knife



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against the back of his own neck. Pearson tried to take the knife from Mills, who turned his

head towards her and frightened her. Pearson “jumped like a foot in the air and screamed

and took off running towards the laundry room.” Mills ran after her, and they left Dearman’s

sight. Dearman then heard what sounded like a “tussle.” He then left the home, taking

Mills’s keys and locking the front door behind him. Once Dearman reached his car, he called

911 to request an “evaluation” of Mills. Dearman was told someone was on the way, and he

left.

¶5.     Around 2:50 a.m., Deputy Chase Smith responded to a dispatch for a possible suicidal

male, Adam Mills. He was joined by Sergeant Brennon Chancellor and Deputy Michael

Thomas. Deputy Smith was wearing a body camera that captured footage of the night.

¶6.     When Smith arrived on the scene, he found Adam Mills outside of his home, pacing

back and forth, naked and covered in blood. When Mills saw the officers, he started yelling

obscenities and charged toward them. Sergeant Chancellor then fired three rounds of a

nonlethal shotgun, and Deputy Smith deployed his taser, taking Mills to the ground. Once

Mills was subdued, medical personnel began to tend to him. The officers, unaware there had

been a second person at the scene, took some time before entering Mills’s home to “clear”

it.

¶7.     When they went in, the officers found blood was splattered and smeared throughout

the house. Furniture had been knocked over and fixtures broken. Deputy Smith discovered

Ashley Pearson’s body in a pool of blood in the laundry room. Deputy Smith then went to

monitor Mills, who was put into an ambulance.



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¶8.    Around 3:00 a.m., Deputy Steven Graeser arrived at the scene and took photographs.

The photographs and Deputy Smith’s body camera recording were introduced into evidence

at trial over Mills’s objection.

¶9.    A toxicologist from the Mississippi Forensics Laboratory testified that blood drawn

from Mills tested positive for amphetamine (Adderall or pseudoephedrine),

methamphetamine, benzodiazepines (midazolam—a sedative used in hospitals),

benzoylecgonine (a metabolite for cocaine), and cannabinoids. The toxicologist did not

measure the blood level of the substances, nor could he say when they were ingested.

¶10.   Jamie Bush, also employed by the Mississippi Forensics Laboratory, testified that

prints from a bare foot, made in what appeared to be blood and found at the scene, belonged

to Mills.

¶11.   Finally, Dr. Mark Levaughn, a medical examiner, testified as a forensic pathologist.

He reviewed the records from the victim’s autopsy and testified as to her injuries and cause

of death. Pearson had extensive bruising on her face and body, which Dr. Levaughn

described as the result of a “beating.” Pearson also had numerous stab and slash-type injuries

over much of her body, including the face and neck. There were so many stab wounds to

Pearson’s upper left chest that they could not be counted. She also had a massive slash

wound across her abdomen that exposed her abdominal cavity and organs, as well as many

lesser slash wounds to the abdomen. Pearson also had numerous defense wounds on her

hands. Dr. Levaughn believed the wounds were caused by a single-edged knife. He




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determined that Pearson had bled to death and that it would have taken some time for her to

die.

                                       DISCUSSION

       1.     Admissibility of Photographs and Dash Camera Footage

¶12.   Mills contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence several of the

State’s exhibits. These include a body camera recording showing Mills’s apprehension and

the initial police entry into his home, photographs of the scene where Pearson’s body was

found, and one photograph showing Pearson’s wounds after her body had been cleaned.

¶13.   Mills challenged the admissibility of these exhibits under Mississippi Rule of

Evidence 403, which states that relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,

confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting

cumulative evidence.” MRE 403.

¶14.   This Court has explained:

       “[T]he admissibility of photographs rests within the sound discretion of the
       trial court.” “The decision of the trial judge will be upheld unless there has
       been an abuse of discretion, which is a standard very difficult to meet.” The
       admission of photos of a deceased is within the sound discretion and is proper
       so long as the photos serve some useful, evidentiary purpose. “Photographs
       that aid in describing the circumstances of the killing, the location of the body
       and cause of death, or that supplement or clarify a witness’s testimony have
       evidentiary value and are admissible before a jury.”

Ambrose v. State, 

 (Miss. 2018) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).

¶15.   “The discretion of a trial judge to admit photos in criminal cases[] runs toward almost

unlimited admissibility regardless of gruesomeness, repetitiveness, and the extenuation of


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probative value.” 

 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bennett v. State, 

, 946 (Miss. 2006)). “The trial judge’s discretion is nearly unlimited, no matter the

gruesomeness or extent of probative value.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

King v. State, 

 (Miss. 2012)).

¶16.   The trial judge thoughtfully explained his reasons for admitting the video and the

photographs. Regarding the photographs of the scene and the body camera video:

       The crime of first-degree murder is the killing of a human being when done
       with deliberate design to effect the death of the person killed. Second-degree
       murder is the killing of a human being when done in the commission of an act
       eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved heart regardless of
       human life although without premeditated design to effect the death of a
       particular person.

       I’ve already heard the defense posit the position that the State would not be
       able to prove deliberate design. If the Court gives an instruction at the end of
       this case that allows them to consider the lesser crime of second-degree
       murder, the jury would have to determine whether the commission of this
       crime was done in a way that evinced a depraved heart regardless of human
       life. If there is—if the Court is asked for a manslaughter instruction at the end,
       manslaughter is defined as the killing of a human being without malice in the
       heat of passion but in a cruel or unusual manner or by the use of a dangerous
       weapon. The manner in which this lady died is very relevant and the manner
       in which the killing, if so—if such, the manner in which it was done is the key
       thing that the jury has to decide and the wounds or the extent of the wounds or
       the circumstances of the scene. . . . I don’t know how else the State can prove
       that but to show the scene, the type of wounds, the extent of the wounds to try
       to convey to the jury the way in which this lady died and the manner in which
       her death was brought about. . . .

       [T]hey’ve got to look at Mr. Mills, his demeanor and the manner in which his
       actions were that night at the time they arrived. They’ve got to look at the
       scene. They’ve got to look at the type of wounds, the number of wounds to try
       to figure out what verdict to reach in this case. . . . So I realize they may
       be—they may be hard to look at, yet in this case these are the very issues the
       jury has to figure out, has to decide upon. And they’re going to get to see the
       scene and to try to determine those things. So the objection is overruled.

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Regarding the photograph of the cleaned body of the victim from the autopsy:

       This photo that was made at the time of the autopsy is much more of a close-up
       photograph of any of the photographs viewed at this point. The Court in one
       of the other photographs could tell there was some wound to the abdomen, but
       this photograph also shows a wound to the upper chest area above her left
       breast. There appears to be some kind of wound across her throat. There also
       is an extensive wound across her abdomen. And the length of the wound—the
       extent of the wound is shown much more clearly here than in any of the
       photographs that we’ve seen. There also appear to be on her right hand some
       defensive wounds. There are slashes to her right hand, on the top of the hand,
       on top of the index finger in the area of the knuckle, on the top of her right
       hand and another cut on the top of the thumb that could be viewed as
       consistent with defensive wounds. There are other smaller lacerations and
       bruises in other places.

       But just like the Court has mentioned in response to previous objections, the
       jury has to figure out . . . the state of mind of the defendant at the time that the
       wounds were done. This is not one single wound. This multiple, many
       wounds. And the jury has to decide . . . whether this is deliberate design . . .
       .

       I find that the photograph does have probative value to try to help the jury
       make [that] determination, and its probative value is not outweighed by the
       prejudicial effect; that is, the manner in which this was done[—]the state of
       mind of the defendant[—]is at the very heart of this case.

¶17.   We agree with the circuit court’s analysis. There were no witnesses to the killing, so

the jury had to rely on circumstantial evidence to determine Mills’s intent or lack thereof.

The only evidence of what was in Mills’s mind when he committed the crime was what can

be inferred from what he saw and did, and the best evidence of that was photographs and

video recordings from the scene. This was a gruesome crime, but the photographs and dash

camera footage were no more gruesome than they had to be to show the jury what had

happened. We find no abuse of discretion in the decisions to admit the video and the

photographs.

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       2.     Weight of the Evidence

¶18.   In his remaining issue, Mills contends that his conviction for first-degree murder was

against the overwhelming weight of the evidence—because, he argues, the evidence

established that Mills “did not have the mental capacity to form an intent to kill when he

attacked Pearson.”

¶19.   Mills acknowledges that this Court has repeatedly held that “voluntary intoxication

is not a defense to a specific-intent crime.” Anderson v. State, 

, 620 (Miss.

2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hutto v. State, 

 (Miss.

2006)). “[A] defendant’s voluntary intoxication is not a defense to murder.” Abeyta v. State,

 (Miss. 2014) (citing Moore v. State, 

 (Miss. 2003)).

       The rule is that “[i]f a defendant, when sober, is capable of distinguishing
       between right and wrong, and the defendant voluntarily deprives himself of the
       ability to distinguish between right and wrong by reason of becoming
       intoxicated and commits an offense while in that condition, he is criminally
       responsible for such acts.”

 (alteration in original) (quoting Greenlee v. State, 

 (Miss. 1998)). In

Abeyta, this Court expressly held that “Abeyta’s voluntary ingestion of drugs and alcohol did

not negate the element of deliberate design.” Id.

¶20.   Mills acknowledges those authorities, but he cites Lee v. State, 

(Miss. 1981), which had held that “voluntary intoxication is not a substitute for intent” and

that “intent is a requisite ingredient of the offense.”

¶21.   Lee is a 1981 decision and, to the extent it has been contradicted by later decisions,

it has been overruled. In Smith v. State, 

 (Miss. 1984), this Court



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juxtaposed Lee with the earlier decision in McDaniel v. State, 

 (Miss. 1978),

which had overruled all prior decisions permitting a defendant to negate specific intent by

voluntary intoxication. The Court then expressly reaffirmed McDaniel:

       The McDaniel court did not limit the question of voluntary intoxication to
       instructions either for the State or the accused. The rule is simply and clearly
       stated therein and means that, if a person, when sober, is capable of
       distinguishing right and wrong and voluntarily intoxicates or drugs himself to
       the extent that he does not know or understand his actions, e.g., steals, robs, or
       murders, he is responsible and he may be convicted and sentenced for the
       crime.

       In order that there may be no misunderstanding among the bench and the bar,
       we reaffirm McDaniel[.]

Smith, 

.

¶22.   Justice Hawkins, the author of Lee, acknowledged its abrogation in dissent from the

1985 decision in Cummings v. State, 

 (Miss. 1985) (Hawkins, J.,

dissenting). Justice Hawkins wrote that Lee had “endeavored to pull in the horns” of the

1978 decision in McDaniel. Cummings, 

. But, in Cummings, the horns

had been “extended to their original McDaniel length . . . where the majority is content to

let them remain.” 

 Thus, Lee has been overruled to the extent it held that a defendant may

call into question his capacity to commit a specific intent crime by appeal to his voluntary

intoxication.

¶23.   The jury could infer Mills intended to kill Pearson from his use of a knife, a deadly

weapon. See, e.g., Anderson, 361 So. 3d at 617. Even if that were not enough, Pearson’s

injuries bespeak an unmistakable deliberate design to kill—nearly all of Mills’s stabs and

slashes were directed at vital organs: Pearson’s throat was slashed, she was stabbed

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repeatedly in the upper left chest (damaging the heart, lungs, and aorta), and her abdomen

was cut open across its entire front, spilling her entrails and organs. The evidence that Mills

committed first-degree murder was overwhelming.

                                      CONCLUSION

¶24.   The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the photographs or the body

camera video, and Mills’s conviction of first-degree murder was not against the

overwhelming weight of the evidence. We therefore affirm Mills’s conviction and sentence.

¶25.   AFFIRMED.

    RANDOLPH, C.J., KITCHENS AND KING, P.JJ., COLEMAN, MAXWELL,
BEAM, CHAMBERLIN AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.




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