State v. Martin

OPINION

This case is before us following a remand for reconstruction of the record regarding communications between the judge and the jury. An Anoka County jury found Lennell Maurice Martin guilty of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree murder while committing a burglary, second-degree assault, and two kidnapping offenses. On direct appeal to this court, one of Martin’s arguments was that the district court committed reversible error by communicating four times with the deliberating jury outside his presence. The district court record as transmitted to this court contained no information about the substance of the four communications. We affirmed Martin’s conviction in part, but also retained jurisdiction and remanded to the district court to make a record of the communications. State v. Martin, 695 N.W.2d 578, 587 (Minn.2005).1 We have now received that record and we affirm.

In the file originally sent to this court for Martin’s direct appeal, the only record of any communications between the deliberating jury and court personnel consisted of certain notations made by the in-court *617deputy, Della Davidson, identified as “Anoka County District Court Minutes of Criminal Proceedings.” Many of these notations indicate routine, non-prejudicial communications between the jury and deputy' — such as requests for smoke breaks and meals.2 In Martin’s initial appeal, however, he argued “that the trial court erred by failing to have him present when the court responded to [four] jury questions and by failing to secure his waiver of the right to be present.” Id. The minutes note the date and time of the four jury questions with which Martin took issue but do not describe either the questions asked by the jury or the responses given by the judge.

In remanding, we stated:

Our review of the record leaves us with some doubt as to whether the four communications at issue relate to housekeeping matters or substantive matters. Because there is some doubt about the nature of the communications, we remand to the trial court to make a record of the four communications at issue, so that we may make an informed decision regarding the matter.

Id. at 587. Two evidentiary hearings were conducted, the transcripts of which have been transmitted to this court.

The evidence gathered during the remand proceedings provides the following information about the four communications: ,

(1) On October 28, 2003, at 5:29 p.m., the jury asked a question which the judge answered at 5:30 p.m. The written content of this communication was not located, but Davidson testified that the “question was to the Judge indicating or questioning what time [the jury] would have to leave for the hotel.” The deputy also recalled that the judge responded to this question at 5:30 p.m. telling the jury they would leave for the hotel at 8:00 p.m.

(2) On October 28, at 8:18 p.m., the jury asked a question which the judge answered at 8:21 p.m. The written content of this communication was not located and neither the deputy nor the trial judge could recall the content.

(3) On October 29, at 9:58 a.m., the jury submitted a note to the judge asking “Can we have a dictionary? If so give us one.” The judge’s response, written on the note, is “No,” followed by “Judge Olson 10:04 10/29/03[.]”

(4) On October 29 at 10:08 a.m., the jury submitted a note to the judge asking “Does [the] rule of law define rash impulse? What is it?” The response, again written on the note, is, “You have the law the Judge has given you. That is the only law that applies to this case[.] Judge Olson 10:10 am 10/29/03[.]”

At the first hearing on remand, conducted on August 19, 2005, deputy Davidson *618and presiding Judge Lynn Olson (now retired) testified as to their recollections regarding communications between the judge and the jury. Judge Olson also testified regarding the agreement she reached with counsel about how questions from the jury would be handled.

After excusing the jury to begin deliberations in Martin’s trial, the district court discussed with the parties’ attorneys and in Martin’s presence the “typical questions” or requests the jury might make as it deliberated. The purpose of the discussion, Judge Olson said, was to “get your assent that I don’t need to contact you first before answering them.” The judge said she would grant a request for equipment to watch the video tape of the crime scene that was admitted at trial, but would deny a request- to review testimony. She also said she would deny a request for definitions, unless the question presented was “[cjomplicated * * * even if it’s pretty minor but still complicated, I would feel a need to talk with both of you, but I wouldn’t necessarily need to have you come in, if that’s okay with you.” Counsel for the state and for Martin agreed, without discussion or modification, to the judge’s proposal.

In the agreement initiated by the district court, the court also stated that “the only time I would really want you actually here, with Mr. Martin here, is if there’s something of real substance that they ask about that I feel I just * * * [sjhouldn’t do alone.” Martin’s counsel replied, “sure” before the court had finished and “that’s fine” when the court had finished. The court then asked, “Is that okay with everybody?” Martin’s counsel replied, “Fine with me, Judge.” The court’s language indicates that the parties understood the court would have broad discretion in determining whether a question fell within the scope of the agreement. Martin has conceded as much, stating: “This agreement * * * gave the judge unchecked discretion to determine what constituted ‘something of real substance’ * * *.”3

On remand, Judge Olson testified that she believed that she followed the agreement every time there was a question and an answer between her and the jury. She also testified that in the absence of an agreement, she would have brought the attorneys “back [for] every question.” Finally, she explained during her testimony that if the jury had asked a question that was outside the terms of the agreement, she would have called the attorneys.

After our receipt of the transcript from the first remand hearing and the parties’ supplemental briefs, we remanded for a Schwartz4 hearing so jurors could be examined regarding the communications. At the Schivartz hearing, conducted March 30, 2006, the twelve jurors from Martin’s trial testified.

In the second remand, we also ordered findings of fact from the district court. *619Because Judge Olson had retired, the remand proceedings were conducted before Judge Thomas Hayes. Judge Hayes found that. “[n]o juror has a concrete recollection of the specific communications occurring at 5:29 p.m. and 8:18 p.m. of the first day of deliberation.” He also found that “[sjpecific recollections regarding communications between the jury and the trial court were generally confined to the five notes preserved in Schwartz hearing Exhibit 2.” The reference to five notes includes the dictionary and “rash impulse” notes plus the following notes: the jury’s request at 8:00 p.m. on October 28 requesting an additional half hour to deliberate, the jury’s request on October 29 at 9:37 a.m. for a VCR, and the jury’s note at 3:10 p.m. on October 29 stating that it had reached a verdict.5 Judge Hayes also found that “[n]o person entered the deliberation room during the jury’s deliberation,” and that “[a]ll questions submitted by the deliberating jury were submitted to the trial court in writing.”

I.

We first address whether the district court committed reversible error when it communicated with the deliberating jury outside of Martin’s presence. A defendant in a criminal proceeding has a Fourteenth Amendment due process “right to be present at all critical stages of trial.” Ford v. State, 690 N.W.2d 706, 712 (Minn.2005). Minnesota’s criminal rules state that the defendant shall be present “at every stage of the trial.” Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 1(1). We have previously determined that a district court erred when it communicated with a jury on a substantive matter outside the defendant’s presence without the defendant’s consent. State v. Sessions, 621 N.W.2d 751, 753 (Minn.2001) (“We hold that the trial court erred by engaging in substantive communications with a deliberating jury outside of open court, without the appellant’s knowledge, consent or presence, and without the presence of appellant’s counsel and the prosecutor * * *.”).6

It is clear, however, that “[l]ike. any constitutional right, the right to be present at trial may be waived by the accused.” State v. Cassidy, 567 N.W.2d 707, 709 (Minn.1997). Although a “defendant can waive his right to be present at a stage of trial, the decision to waive the right is ‘not for counsel to make but a personal decision for defendant to make after consultation with counsel.’ ” Martin, 695 N.W.2d at 586 (quoting State v. Ware, 498 N.W.2d 454, 457 (Minn.1993)). While it is plainly the preferred practice, we have not required, either in our original opinion in the instant case or in any other opinion, a defendant to explicitly affirm to the district court his personal waiver of his right to be present. See id. (listing the parties’ arguments regarding whether Martin had *620waived his right to be present, but ultimately not deciding the question); cf. State v. Osborne, 715 N.W.2d 436, 442 (Minn.2006) (“When it comes to the waiver of at least two fundamental rights, the right to a jury trial and the right to counsel, our law is clear that these rights cannot be waived by silence.”).7

Rather than requiring an explicit waiver, we have said with respect to the defendant’s right to be present that “the fact that a personal waiver does not appear of record on appeal does not mean that there was no waiver.” State v. Ware, 498 N.W.2d 454, 457 (Minn.1993). We have also determined that “a detailed on-the-record colloquy between the defendant and the trial court” is not necessary to show that a defendant has waived his right to be present for a portion of the trial. See State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270, 276 (Minn.1998).

Martin asserts that “he did not personally waive his right to be present for this critical stage of the trial.” ■ The state argues that the communications at issue fell within the scope of the agreement made between the district court and Martin’s counsel, and that the agreement was made in Martin’s presence. This court “reviewfs] a decision to proceed with trial [with the defendant absent] under an abuse-of-diseretion standard, and [this court] will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous.” Cassidy, 567 N.W.2d at 709-10.

Where, as in this case, a defendant claims that he did not waive his right to be present, “[c]learly, a defendant bears the burden of showing that his or her absence from trial was involuntary. That burden is a heavy one to meet, and rightly so.” Cassidy, 567 N.W.2d at 710. In Cassidy, the defendant was out of custody during his trial, which was scheduled to last two days and was conducted in northern Minnesota. Id. at 708. At the end of the first day of trial, the defendant returned to his home in Canada, and because of an unrelated emergency involving the owner of the vehicle he was supposed to use to return, he was unable to secure transportation back to court for the continuation of his trial. Id. at 708-09. The defendant telephoned the court, explained his situation and stated “for the record I want to be there for the whole trial.” Id. at 709. Notwithstanding this evidence, the court ordered that the trial should continue in the defendant’s absence. We reversed, holding that the court abused its discretion. Id. at 710-11.

*621In contrast to Cassidy, Martin provided no evidence that he wanted to be present if the district court received questions from the jury. There is no dispute that the court made an agreement with counsel regarding how to handle certain types of questions from the jury and that under the terms of that agreement Martin would not be present. There likewise is no dispute that this agreement was made in Martin’s presence, and there is no evidence that Martin objected in any way to the agreement. It is certainly true that the court should have secured Martin’s on-the-record acceptance of the agreement. But, in the context of a defendant’s right to be present at trial, we have specifically found a waiver even though it was not expressed on the record. See Hannon, 703 N.W.2d at 506. In Hannon, the district court halted the testimony of a defense witness “after the witness twice disobeyed the district court’s instruction.” Id. The court conducted an off-the-record interview with the witness in chambers in the presence of counsel. Id. A summary of this interview was prepared and the summary was presented to the jury in lieu of further live testimony from the witness. Id. at 504. On appeal, the defendant claimed that his right to be present at trial was violated because he was not present during the chambers conference where the summary of the testimony was prepared. Id. at 506. We held that the defendant waived his right to be present because neither the defendant “nor his attorney objected to the creation or use of the summary nor was any objection raised at trial to [the defendant’s] exclusion from the conference.” Id. Because of the failure to object, we concluded that the defendant “waived any right he had to attend the conference.” Id.

In other contexts, beyond the right to be present at trial, we have also construed a defendant’s failure to object as the defendant’s acquiescence. See State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 617 (Minn.2004) (concluding- that “[a] court may imply a waiver from a defendant’s conduct”); State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 97 (Minn.1992) (construing defendant’s failure to object as acquiescence to his counsel’s concession that defendant was guilty of a lesser charge and rejecting defendant’s argument “that there must be a ‘contemporaneous’ record made of the defendant’s consent to his counsel’s strategy of admitting guilt to a lesser charge”); State v. Smith, 299 N.W.2d 504, 506 (Minn.1980) (“Without anything in the -record suggesting otherwise, we must presume that the decision not to testify was made by defendant voluntarily and intelligently.”). We reach the same conclusion here, and hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Martin waived his right to be present for communications with the jury that fell within the scope of the agreement.8

*622II.

We next examine whether the four disputed communications fell within the scope of the agreement. We first examine the two communications that are reflected in notes (the request for a dictionary and the “rash impulse” question) and then turn to the two communications for which notes were not located (the communication at 5:29 p.m. on October 28 and the communication at 8:18 p.m. on October 28).

The Dictionary request

According to the deputy’s minutes, at 9:58 a.m. on October 29, 2003, the jury knocked with a question. The judge was called two minutes later and an answer was provided to the jury at 10:04 a.m. At the first remand hearing, the following note was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 3: “Can we have a dictionary? If so give us one.” The response, written on the note, is “No,” followed by “Judge Olson 10:04 10/29/03[.]”

Judge Olson testified at the first remand hearing that this was “the kind of question that juries often ask when they want to be supplemented. And clearly they can’t be supplemented.” Judge Olson did not consider calling the parties about the dictionary request because she thought she was “not allowed to give” the jury a dictionary and “thought this was one of those kinds of questions [the court and the parties] had already discussed.” As the agreement did encompass denying the jury “[definitions that have to do with the jury instructions, have to do with the law,” and Judge Olson appears to have reasonably understood the agreement to also encompass denying the jury’s request for materials not in evidence, we conclude that the request for a dictionary fell within the scope of the agreement and therefore the district court did not commit reversible error in communicating with the jury regarding the dictionary request.

Rash impulse question

Four minutes after the jury was told that it could not have a dictionary, the jury again knocked with a question. Judge Olson was called a minute later and at 10:10 a.m. an answer was given to the jury. At the first remand hearing, the following note was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 4: “Does [the] rule of law define rash impulse? What is it?” The response, again written on the note, is, ‘You have the law the Judge has given you. That is the only law that applies to this case[.] Judge Olson 10:10 am 10/29/03[.]”

In testimony at the first remand hearing, Judge Olson agreed that the jury was “essentially asking for a definition” of “rash impulse” in the questions on Exhibit 4. Judge Olson said that “I couldn’t possibly give [the jury] anymore [sic] answer than I did give them” with regard to the rash impulse question. She did not consider contacting the parties “because we discussed it ahead of time” and the parties had “been in complete agreement that with the obvious sorts of questions wanting more information, that I [Judge Olson] couldn’t give it to [the jury].”

Exhibit 4 indicates that the jury wanted to know the definition of rash impulse. In reading the instructions to the jury immediately prior to the start of deliberations, the district court said: “A premeditated decision to kill may be reached in a short period of time. However, an *623unconsidered or rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not premeditated.” The agreement regarding communications between the court and the jury encompassed the court denying the jury “[djefinitions that have to do with the jury instructions, have to do with the law.” The communication of Exhibit 4 fell within the agreement, and therefore the court did not commit reversible error in communicating with the jury regarding the rash impulse question.9

October 28 question at 5:29 p.m.

There is no written contemporaneous record of this communication. The deputy recalled on remand, however, that this communication related to the time the jury would leave for the hotel. There is no other credible evidence in the record that this communication involved anything other than a housekeeping matter. Based on the deputy’s description of this communication, we conclude that it fell within the terms of the agreement. The district court framed the agreement as requiring it to call the parties back only “if there’s something of real substance that they ask about that I feel I just * * * shouldn’t do alone.” Both sides agreed with this arrangement. The question regarding how long the jury would continue deliberating cannot by any definition be viewed as a question of “real substance” and we hold that the court did not commit reversible error in concluding that the question fell within the scope of the agreement and in handling this question as it did.

October 28 question at 8:18 p.m.

The reconstructed record contains little information about this communication, and, as a result, Martin asks us to presume prejudice and award him a new trial. We have said, however, that we generally do not “presum[e] prejudice” merely because of a defect in the proceedings. State v. Dame, 670 N.W.2d 261, 266 (Minn.2003) (holding that the district court’s decision to delay jury instructions and deliberations did not warrant a presumption of prejudice). In another case where we addressed “private communications or contact” with deliberating jurors, we said that “a new trial will be ordered only upon a showing of prejudice by the appellant.” State v. Erickson, 597 N.W.2d 897, 901-02 (Minn.1999). We also said in Erickson that “[prejudice will be presumed” if the *624defendant provides evidence “showing * * * private communications or contact or other circumstances suggesting direct or indirect improper influence or jury tampering * * ⅜.” Id. at 902.10 We concluded that if the defendant makes this showing, then the burden shifts to the state to overcome the presumption. Id.

At issue in Erickson was whether the district court committed reversible error in allowing a deliberating jury to separate overnight without first securing the defendant’s consent. Id. at 901. We held that the district court had, contrary to our rule, allowed the jury to separate without the defendant’s consent. Id. at 902. Yet, we did not presume prejudice and order a new trial based on the rule violation. Id.11

The concern underlying the jury sequestration rule at issue in Erickson was to avoid the potential for “outside influences” on a deliberating jury. Id. at 902. This case does not involve jury sequestration. But Martin’s claim that his right to be present during proceedings involving jury questions implicates the same concern— guarding the sanctity of the deliberating jury — we addressed in Erickson. See also Sessions, 621 N.W.2d at 756 (noting that requirement in Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 19, that jury questions be handled in open court, is “mandatory” because “[t]he public interest requires that parties to lawsuits or defendants on trial should have nothing to complain of or suspect in the administration of justice.” (quotation omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude that Erickson provides the appropriate framework for our analysis.12

We emphasize that the rule applied in Erickson does not require that Martin prove that the communications were harmful. Rather, Erickson requires only that appellants come forward with evidence “suggesting” that there was “improper influence.” 597 N.W.2d at 902. As we concluded above, Martin implicitly waived his right to be present for any communications that fell within the scope of the agreement reached in his presence. Thus, for purposes of this case, Martin could be found to have met his burden under the Erickson framework if there was some evidence suggesting contact with the jury outside the scope of the agreement. If Martin had met that burden of showing such a contact, a presumption of prejudice would arise and the burden would shift to the state to overcome the presumption of prejudice. Id. The reconstructed record (based on two separate evidentiary hearings) leads us to conclude that Martin has not met his burden of producing evidence suggesting that there was a contact with the jury that fell outside the scope of the agreement such that *625he would be entitled to a presumption of prejudice.13

We reach this conclusion for several reasons. First, Judge Olson did not personally talk to the jurors or enter the jury room while the jury was deliberating. Cf. Brown, 682 N.W.2d at 167-68 (holding that the judge’s entry into the jury room constituted reversible error). Second, the minutes indicate that the judge’s response to the jury’s 8:18 p.m. question was delivered in three minutes. While Judge Olson could not recall the substance of the 8:18 p.m. communication, she testified that it was probably not a difficult or substantial question because she answered it so quickly. She testified that she believed she handled all of the jurors’ questions in accord with the agreement and indicated that “[i]f it were a question of substance, [she] would have had to call the attorneys.” Judge Olson also explained that “[i]f there were any question in her mind as to whether or not it was a question of substance,” she would have called the attorneys.14 Third, and perhaps most important, all twelve jurors were asked about substantive communications. As the district court found on remand, no juror could recall any substantive type of question being asked of the court, other than the communications that were the subject of the contemporaneous notes (i.e., the dictionary question, the rash impulse question, the VCR question).

On this reconstructed record, where we have the sworn testimony of the trial judge, the testimony of all 12 jurors and the findings of fact from the district court on remand, we hold that Martin has not met his burden of producing evidence suggesting that this communication fell outside the scope of the agreement. We therefore hold that the district court did not violate Martin’s right to be present at all stages of trial when the court communicated with the jury outside of his presence.

III.

It is important to note that we do not intend to condone the practice the district court used here. The better practice, and the practice we expect, is for the court to convene counsel and the defen*626dant in the courtroom and make a contemporaneous record of all communications with the jury, both those that are housekeeping and those that are not, so that the record for appeal is clear. See Sessions, 621 N.W.2d at 756 (“We caution district courts to make a contemporaneous record of each stage of trial, particularly a stage as delicate as communications with the jury and with counsel during deliberations.”). That did not happen in this case, and so we (and the district court and the parties) were faced with the challenge of reconstructing the record some two years after the trial in this matter and over a year after the trial judge had retired. That reconstructed record contains the sworn testimony of the trial judge who confirmed that all of the questions she received from the deliberating jury were handled in accordance with the agreement that was made in the defendant’s presence. Plainly the district court should have done a better job, but we are mindful that “[n]ot every judicial error automatically requires reversal.” State v. Shoen, 598 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn.1999). In this case, the evidence of Martin’s guilt was strong, including eyewitness testimony and DNA evidence. See Martin, 695 N.W.2d at 581-82 (discussing evidence). Because “the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial does not insure the accused of a trial which is perfect in every detail,” we have said that “[t]he granting of a new trial in criminal cases is done cautiously, and a conviction will not be reversed for mere technical errors where it appears that the accused has not been prejudiced through the impairment of substantial rights essential to a fair trial.” State v. Billington, 241 Minn. 418, 427, 63 N.W.2d 387, 392-93 (1954); see also State v. Greenleaf, 591 N.W.2d 488, 505 (Minn.1999). Our review of the record leaves us with the conclusion that while Martin may not have received a perfect trial, he did receive a fair trial. See Blom, 682 N.W.2d at 626.

IV.

In his supplemental brief, Martin argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because of his counsel’s consent to the district court’s proposed procedures for handling questions from the jury. This basis for claiming ineffective assistance of counsel is different from the five bases Martin claimed in his original appeal. See Martin, 695 N.W.2d at 587-88 (discussing Martin’s original arguments and preserving the issues for possible postconviction review). In State v. Greer, we held that “when a case returns to an appellate court after remand, the matters raised and resolved in the original appeal that resulted in the remand, and any claims that were known but not raised in the original appeal, will not be considered.” 662 N.W.2d at 125. Consistent with Greer, we hold that this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is barred during this review.

Martin also raises for the first time in his supplemental brief a claim that “prejudicial irregularities surrounding the communications between the judge and the jury and the failure to maintain and timely provide information about those communications” entitles him to a new trial. In particular, Martin claims he was prejudiced by the judge’s alleged absence from the courthouse, by the procedure by which the judge received the jury questions and responded, and by the deputy’s reading of the judge’s responses to the jury. We hold that this claim is also barred by the rule articulated in Greer.

Affirmed.