Doe v. Montgomery County Board of Elections

The issue that presents itself in this case concerns whether the Montgomery County Board of Elections (“County Board”) properly certified a petition for referendum proffered by the Maryland Citizens for Responsible Government (“Citizens Group”) who sought to use the referendum process1 to overturn Bill No. 23-07, enacted by the Montgomery County Council and signed by the County Executive, which would add “gender identity” as a protected characteristic under the County’s anti-discrimination laws.2 After the petition was *703certified for the November 2008 election ballot, twelve Montgomery County citizens, Jane Doe et al., (“Jane Doe”) challenged the validity of the petition by filing, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, a Complaint for Judicial Review and Declaratory Judgment3 under Section 6-209 of the Election Law Article, Maryland Code (2003, 2007 Supp.).4 Both parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the judge entered summary judgment on behalf of the County Board,5 holding that, although the number *704of signatures on the petition did not amount to the requisite 5% of registered voters, Jane Doe’s complaint to remove the referendum from the ballot failed to properly raise the issue because it was time-barred, having been filed after the 10-day limitations period contained in Section 6-210(e).6 We granted cross-petitions for certiorari to answer the following questions, the first two presented by Jane Doe and the third by the Board:

1. Did the Circuit Court err in ruling that a voter challenge to certification of a referendum petition that failed to carry the required number of signatures, which challenge was filed within ten days of the certification, is nonetheless partially time-barred?

2. Did the Circuit Court err in ruling, contrary to the strict compliance standard dictated by this Court in an unbroken line of decisions, that specific signature requirements prescribed under the election laws for referenda petitions need not be met, with the result that a referendum petition carrying an insufficient number of valid signatures was certified for the ballot?

3. [Did] the Circuit Court err[ ] in holding that the Board is required to include inactive voters in calculating the total number of registered voters in Montgomery County and, thus, in calculating 5% of that number to determine the number of signatures required on the petition for referendum[?]

*705I. Introduction

On November 21, 2007, Montgomery County Executive Isiah Leggett signed into law Bill No. 23-07, enacted by the Montgomery County Council, which prohibited discrimination based on “gender identity” under the County’s anti-discrimination statutes. The Citizens Group opposed to the enactment of the “gender identity” bill initiated the process of obtaining the signatures of 5% of the registered voters in the County to petition the law to referendum.7 The petition stated:

We, the undersigned registered voters of Montgomery County, Maryland, do hereby petition for a referendum vote of the registered voters of the County for approval or rejection in the next general election on Bill 23-07, NonDiscrimination — Gender Identity, entitled: “An Act to prohibit discrimination in housing, employment, public accommodation, cable television service, and taxicab service on the basis of gender identity; and generally to amend County laws regarding discrimination”, enacted on November 13, 2007 by the County Council for Montgomery County, Maryland.

The County Board’s Director, Margaret Jurgensen, emailed Ruth M. Jacobs, President of the Citizens Group, on November 30, 2007 to inform her that the petition would require 25,0018 signatures of Montgomery County registered voters, *706with 50% due by February 4, 2008 and the other 50% due by February 19, 2008. Letters from the County Board’s attorney approving the form of the petition as well as an internet version of the form, were sent to the Citizens Group on December 3, 2007, and December 7, 2007, respectively.

The Citizens Group submitted 15,146 petition signatures to the County Board on February 4, 2008. On February 19, 2008, the Citizens Group submitted 15,506 more signatures, and the next day, February 20, 2008, the Director of the County Board sent a letter to the President of the Citizens Group formally notifying her that of the 15,146 signatures submitted on February 4, 13,476 were “valid, accepted signatures.” On March 6, 2008, the County Board sent a letter to the Montgomery County Executive and the President of the Montgomery County Council, among others, certifying the petition and stating that the “petition contained more than the requisite number of signatures necessary to place the question on the 2008 General Election ballot” and “that the petition appears to meet the necessary requirements” regarding content under Section 6-201.9

*707After the petition was certified by the County Board on March 6, 2008, eight days later, on March 14, 2008, twelve Montgomery County citizens, Jane Doe, et al., filed a complaint pursuant to Section 6-209, seeking judicial review and declaratory relief in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County. The complaint alleged, among other arguments, that the County Board “certified the Petition despite the Petition’s failure to include, by the legal deadlines, the requisite number of valid signatures required for certification.” The County Board answered and then moved for summary judgment, arguing that Jane Doe’s complaint was time-barred because it was not filed within the 10-day period prescribed by Section 6-210, and that even if it was timely filed, Jane Doe did not present a legal basis for challenging the County Board’s *708decision to certify the ballot. Jane Doe filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, contending that the petition should be decertified because thousands of purported signatures were invalid and because the petition itself was defective. During the hearing on the summary judgment motions, counsel for the County Board revealed, for the first time, that “inactive” voters were not included in the total number of registered county voters from which the Board derived the 5% figure, and based on this new information, Jane Doe moved for leave to amend the complaint. The Circuit Court granted the motion, stating in a later order that it believed that the “new theory [wa]s based upon the same core of operative facts originally pled by Plaintiffs”; an amended complaint was filed on July 8, 2008. The County Board did not file a motion to strike or a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order granting leave to amend, and the case proceeded on the basis of the amended complaint.

After the completion of oral argument on the motions for summary judgment, the judge granted the County Board’s motion for summary judgment, denied Jane Doe’s cross-motion and in his Memorandum Decision and Declaratory Judgment Order, dismissed the amended complaint because he determined that the 6-209 cause of action for judicial review and declaratory relief accrued on February 20, when the County Board had sent the Citizens Group a letter stating that 13,476 signatures of the 15,146 purported signatures submitted on February 4 were “valid [and] accepted,” so that the complaint was filed beyond the limitations period; the judge also explored the various bases for invalidating the petition and held that the challenged signatures were valid, but insufficient.

In addressing the sufficiency of the challenged signatures, the court determined that “inactive” voters should have been included as registered voters, having declined to accept the County Board’s argument that doing so “would artificially inflate the number of signatures required to successfully petition for referendum.” The court also considered whether the signatures on the referendum petition were required to com*709ply with the provisions of Section 6-203.10 On this issue the parties stipulated that 5,141 signatures included in the February 4 submission and 5,735 signatures of the February 19 submission failed to mirror the voter’s identity on the statewide voter registration list. The court determined that the signature provisions of Section 6-203 were merely suggestive as opposed to required and validated the 10,876 challenged *710signatures.11

Jane Doe petitioned for certiorari as well as for expedited review, and the County Board cross-petitioned; we granted both petitions. Doe v. Board of Elections, 405 Md. 505, 954 A.2d 467 (2008). Oral argument was heard on September 8, 2008, and the next day, on September 9, 2008, we issued our Per Curiam Order reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court and remanding the case to that court with directions to enter judgment in favor of Jane Doe.12 Doe v. Montgomery County Board of Elections, 406 Md. 110, 111, 956 A.2d 199, 200 (2008). We shall now set forth our reasons for that Order.

II. Discussion

In the case sub judice, we are asked to consider two questions: whether Jane Doe filed a timely complaint for judicial review and declaratory relief contesting the Board’s certification of the referendum petition for the November 2008 ballot; and then, if the suit is not time-barred, whether the referendum contained a sufficient number of valid signatures to reach 5% of Montgomery County registered voters, as required by Section 114 of the Montgomery County Charter. Because we shall hold that the complaint was not time-barred, we shall address the merits of the referendum challenge.

*711The parties before us had filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of the County Board and denied Jane Doe’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.13 In considering a trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Bednar v. Provident Bank of Maryland, Inc., 402 Md. 532, 542, 937 A.2d 210, 215 (2007); Rhoads v. Sommer, 401 Md. 131, 148, 931 A.2d 508, 518 (2007) (“We review the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and construe any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts against the moving party.”); Harford County v. Saks Fifth Ave. Distribution Co., 399 Md. 73, 82, 923 A.2d 1, 6 (2007) (In reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment, “we seek to determine whether any material facts are in dispute and, if they are, we resolve them in favor of the non-moving party.”); Serio v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 373, 388-89, 863 A.2d 952, 961 (2004); Lovelace v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 695, 785 A.2d 726, 728 (2001) (In reviewing a grant of the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, “we must review the facts, and all inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.”). If no material facts are placed in genuine dispute, this Court must determine whether the Circuit Court correctly entered summary judgment as a matter of law. See Maryland Rule 2-501(f);14 Bednar, 402 Md. at 532, 937 A.2d at 216; Saks, 399 Md. at 82, 923 A.2d at 6; Prop. and Cas. Ins. Guar. Corp. v. Yanni, 397 Md. 474, 480, 919 A.2d 1, 5 (2007); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Berrett, 395 Md. 439, 451, 910 A.2d 1072, 1079 (2006); Ross v. State Bd. of Elections, 387 Md. 649, 659, 876 *712A.2d 692, 698 (2005). In the case before us, there are no material facts in dispute.

Here, we are also faced with the interpretation of four sections of the Election Law Article, Sections 3-503, 6-203, 6-209 and 6-210. In statutory interpretation, our primary goal is always “to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the Rules.” Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 172, 935 A.2d 699, 708 (2007); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 352, 879 A.2d 1049, 1055 (2005). See also Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Kelly, 397 Md. 399, 419-20, 918 A.2d 470, 482 (2007). We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that “ ‘no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’ ” Barbre, 402 Md. at 172, 935 A.2d at 708; Kelly, 397 Md. at 420, 918 A.2d at 482. See also Kane v. Bd. of Appeals of Prince George’s County, 390 Md. 145, 167, 887 A.2d 1060, 1073 (2005). If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends. Barbre, 402 Md. at 173, 935 A.2d at 708-09; Kelly, 397 Md. at 419, 918 A.2d at 482; City of Frederick v. Pickett, 392 Md. 411, 427, 897 A.2d 228, 237 (2006); Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604-05, 861 A.2d 78, 81 (2004). If, however, the language is subject to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we endeavor to resolve that ambiguity by looking to the statute’s legislative history, case law, statutory purpose, as well as the structure of the statute. Barbre, 402 Md. at 173, 935 A.2d at 709; Kelly, 397 Md. at 419-20, 918 A.2d at 482; Smack v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 378 Md. 298, 305, 835 A.2d 1175, 1179 (2003). When the statute is part of a larger statutory scheme, it is axiomatic that the language of a provision is not interpreted in isolation; rather, we analyze the statutory scheme as a whole considering the “purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body,” Serio v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 373, 390, 863 A.2d at 952, 962 (2004); Drew v. First Guar. Mortgage Corp., 379 Md. 318, *713327, 842 A.2d 1, 6 (2003), and attempt to harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect. Bowen v. City of Annapolis, 402 Md. 587, 613-14, 937 A.2d 242, 258 (2007); Magnetti v. Univ. of Md., 402 Md. 548, 565, 937 A.2d 219, 229 (2007); Clipper Windpower, Inc. v. Sprenger, 399 Md. 539, 554, 924 A.2d 1160, 1168 (2007).

A.

Accrual of the 6-209 Cause of Action

The first question before us is whether Jane Doe’s March 14, 2008, complaint, seeking judicial review of and declaratory relief from the County Board’s March 6, 2008 determination to certify the referendum for ballot under Section 6-20915 is time-barred under the dictates of Section 6-210(e), which states that “any judicial review of a determination, as provided in § 6-209 of this subtitle, shall be sought by the 10th day following the determination to which it relates.” We assume, without having to decide that the 10-day period applies, because we shall hold that the “determination,” which caused Jane Doe to become aggrieved and thereby triggered Doe’s cause of action for judicial review, accrued on March 6, 2008, when the County Board made a final determination, certifying the petition in a letter to the County Executive and the President of the Montgomery County Council stating that “the petition contained more than the requisite number of signatures necessary to place the question on the 2008 General Election ballot” and “that the petition appears to meet the necessary requirements.”

The County Board argues that the cause of action accrued prior to March 6, 2008, because each of the County Board’s letters to the Citizens group constituted “determinations” under Section 6-209 and, therefore, Doe’s cause of action accrued on November 30, 2007, when the County Board emailed the Citizens Group informing them that 5% of regis*714tered Montgomery County voters was 25,001; in December of 2007, when the County Board informed the Citizens group that it had made an advance determination of the sufficiency of the form petition; or on February 20, 2008, when the County Board informed the Citizens Group that 13,476 of the signatures submitted February 4 were “valid [and] accepted,” so that Doe waived her ability to challenge the March 6 determination by failing to challenge these previous determinations. The Circuit Court, in granting the County Board’s Motion for Summary Judgment, agreed that February 20, when half of the signatures were accepted as valid, was the relevant “determination” to trigger the Section 6-210(e), 10-day limitation period.

Jane Doe argues, on the other hand, that the 10-day limitations period does not apply, and, even if it applied, that she complied with the limitations period because the complaint was filed on March 14, which was -within 10-days of March 6, when the County Board made a final determination that all of the necessary signatures had been gathered and certified the referendum question for the November 2008 ballot. Jane Doe argues that she was not “aggrieved” before the March 6 determination of the County Board, and that therefore, she could not have sought judicial review before that date.16

Section 6-210(e) establishes a 10-day period within which an aggrieved person must seek judicial review of a determination under Section 6-209:

(e) Judicial review. — (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, any judicial review of a determination, *715as provided in § 6-209 of this subtitle, shall be sought by the 10th day following the determination to which it relates.

For the purposes of this analysis, we assume, without deciding, that this 10-day period applies and must interpret Section 6-209 to analyze when the cause of action for judicial review accrued.

Section 6-209(a), entitled “In general,” governs when a plaintiff may seek judicial review of an election board determination and provides for relief to be afforded by the court, “as it considers appropriate”:

§ 6-209. Judicial review.

(a) In general. — (1) A person aggrieved by a determination made under § 6-202, § 6-206, or § 6-208(a)(2) of this subtitle may seek judicial review:

(1) in the case of a statewide petition, a petition to refer an enactment of the General Assembly pursuant to Article XVI of the Maryland Constitution, or a petition for a congressional or General Assembly candidacy, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County; or

(ii) as to any other petition, in the circuit court for the county in which the petition is filed.

(2) The court may grant relief as it considers appropriate to assure the integrity of the electoral process.

(3) Judicial review shall be expedited by each court that hears the cause to the extent necessary in consideration of the deadlines established by law.

Although, then, one who is aggrieved may seek any type of appropriate relief, such as injunctive, declaratory or another type, under subsection 6-209(b), a voter who seeks judicial review is limited to declaratory relief:

(b) Declaration relief. — Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act and upon the complaint of any registered voter, the circuit court of the county in which a petition has been or will be filed may grant declaratory relief as to any petition with respect to the provisions of this title or other provisions of law.

*716Under the scheme, therefore, a registered voter may bring the action for judicial review, i.e. become a plaintiff, when a determination is made that results in aggrievement.

We have had numerous occasions to define “aggrieved” in the context of judicial review of an administrative agency determination. In Sugarloaf Citizens’ Association v. Department of Environment, 344 Md. 271, 288, 686 A.2d 605, 614 (1996), Judge John C. Eldridge, speaking for the Court, reflected upon our jurisprudence when he stated:

While the term “aggrieved” is not defined in the Administrative Procedure Act, we have held that the statutory requirement that a party be “ ‘aggrieved’ mirrors general common law standing principles applicable to judicial review of administrative decisions.” Medical Waste [Associates, Inc.] v. Maryland Waste [Coalition, Inc.], supra, 327 Md. [596] at 611 n. 9, 612 A.2d [241] at 248-249 n. 9; Bryniarski v. Montgomery Co., 247 Md. 137, 143-146, 230 A.2d 289, 294-295 (1967). Accordingly, in order to be “aggrieved” for purposes of judicial review, a person ordinarily must have an interest “ ‘such that he is personally and specifically affected in a way different from ... the public generally.’ ” Medical Waste v. Maryland Waste, supra, 327 Md. at 611 n. 9, 612 A.2d at 248-249 n. 9, quoting Bryniarski v. Montgomery Co., supra, 247 Md. at 144, 230 A.2d at 294. See Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Com’n v. Smith, supra, 333 Md. [3] at 11, 633 A.2d [855] at 859; Abramson v. Montgomery County, 328 Md. 721, 733, 616 A.2d 894, 900 (1992); DuBay v. Crane, 240 Md. 180, 185, 213 A.2d 487, 489-490 (1965) (“the [administrative] decision must not only affect a matter in which the protestant has a specific interest or property right but his interest therein must be such that he is personally and specially affected in a way different from ... the public generally”).

(Ellipses in original). See also Jordan Towing, Inc. v. Hebbville Auto Repair, Inc., 369 Md. 439, 442, 800 A.2d 768, 770 (2002) (“A party is aggrieved and there is standing if the party suffers some ‘special damage ... differing in character and *717kind from that suffered by the general public.’ ”) (ellipsis in original).

Moreover, Judge Eldridge, in State v. Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals, 364 Md. 446, 457, 773 A.2d 504, 510-11 (2001), explained that an administrative determination must be final before judicial review is invoked:

Where an administrative agency has primary or exclusive jurisdiction over a controversy, the parties to the controversy must ordinarily await a final administrative decision before resorting to the courts for resolution of the controversy. Board of License Commissioners v. Corridor Wine, supra, 361 Md. at 418, 761 A.2d at 924, and cases there cited. See also Furnitureland South, Inc. v. Comptroller, 364 Md. 126, 771 A.2d 1061 (2001). Furthermore, in Driggs Corp. v. Md. Aviation, 348 Md. 389, 406-408, 704 A.2d 433, 442-443 (1998), we held that the Board of Contract Appeals has either primary or exclusive jurisdiction over government contract matters encompassed by § 15-211 of the State Finance and Procurement Article and that, consequently, any judicial resolution of the matter, before a final decision by the Board of Contract Appeals, would be premature.

(Footnote omitted). See also Board of License Comm’rs for Anne Arundel County v. Corridor Wine, Inc., 361 Md. 403, 418, 761 A.2d 916, 924 (2000) (“It is a general principle of Maryland Administrative law that an action for judicial review of an administrative order will lie only if the administrative order is final.”) (Internal quotations omitted). Judge Glenn T. Harrell, speaking on behalf of this Court in Heery International, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 384 Md. 129, 137, 862 A.2d 976, 981 (2004), also iterated the general rule, requiring a final determination before an aggrieved party, a potential plaintiff, can seek judicial review of an agency decision:

We have long held that “[wjhere an administrative agency has primary or exclusive jurisdiction over a controversy, the parties to the controversy must ordinarily await a final administrative decision before resorting to the courts for resolution of the controversy.”

*718In the present case, the Circuit Court Judge relied upon Roskelly v. Lamone, 396 Md. 27, 912 A.2d 658 (2006), to decide that Jane Doe should have initiated a judicial review action of the February 20 Board determination that half of the signatures were valid, even though another half was still necessary to certify the petition for the November ballot, stating that “Roskelly mandates that where referendum petitioners are aggrieved by a rejection of signatures at the first step of the signature-gathering process, they are required to seek judicial review within 10 days of the determination.” We disagree.

In Roskelly the sponsor of the petition did not file for judicial review of a June 8 determination of the Board of Elections, which stated that Roskelly’s petition was deficient, so his challenge 19 days later was time-barred. Clearly, Roskelly, as the petition sponsor, was “aggrieved” on June 8 when a final determination denying certification was made.

Here, Jane Doe was not “aggrieved” by the actions of the County Board in letters sent on November 30, December 3 and 7, or February 20, nor were these actions “final.” On November 30, 2007, the County Board merely informed the Citizens Group of the necessary number of valid signatures to place the referendum on the ballot. On December 3 and 7, 2007, the County Board sent a letter to the Citizens Group, stating that the paper and internet forms of the Citizens Group’s petition were valid. On February 20, 2008, the County Board determined that the Citizens Group had submitted over 50% of the signatures, but needed 11,534 more to be submitted before the referendum could be successfully certified and placed on the November ballot. Rather, not until March 6, 2008, when the County Board certified that the Citizens Group had met the statutory requirements to put the referendum question on the November 2008 ballot, was Jane Doe “aggrieved” by a final “determination” of the County Board and capable of seeking judicial review under Section 6-209. Accordingly, March 6, 2008, was the triggering date for when Jane Doe’s cause of action for judicial review accrued, and the complaint filed on March 14 was timely.

*719 Amended Complaint

We next address the effect that the amended pleading had on the original complaint. The County Board argues that Jane Doe failed to challenge the determination regarding the number of registered voters within ten days of March 6, 2008, because the amended complaint, filed July 8, 2008, which more specifically addressed the issue of “inactive” voters, “added a new theory or cause of action and, thus, does not relate back to the filing of the original complaint.” Doe counters that paragraph 51 on the original complaint, which pled that the “[defendant BOARD OF ELECTIONS certified the Petition despite the Petition’s failure to include, by the legal deadlines, the requisite number of valid signatures required for certification,” adequately stated the factual basis for the cause of action for judicial review and declaratory relief, and that the later amended complaint merely added greater specificity to this assertion. Leave to amend the complaint was granted, nevertheless, because the trial judge determined that the “new theory is based upon the same core of operative facts originally pled by Plaintiffs, and that amendment [would] facilitate a determination based on the true issues of the litigations and [would avoid] an injustice by reasons of a procedural technicality.” The County Board, furthermore, filed no motion challenging the trial court’s grant of leave to amend because the amended complaint originated from the same core of operative facts, and the summary judgment process proceeded on the basis of the amended complaint.

In Morrell v. Williams, 279 Md. 497, 506, 366 A.2d 1040, 1044 (1976), we explained the relation-back principle, iterating that “an amended [complaint] filed after the expiration of a statute of limitations will be barred, if [it] states a new cause of action or a new theory of liability.” See also Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Phoenix Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 239 Md. 195, 201, 210 A.2d 515, 518 (1965); Cline v. Fountain Rock Lime & Brick Co., 214 Md. 251, 258, 134 A.2d 304, 308 (1957); Schuck v. Bramble, 122 Md. 411, 413, 89 A. 719, 720 (1914); Paul Mark Sandler & James K. Archibald, Pleading Causes of Action in Maryland 38-39 (4th ed. 2008). We also have held, *720on numerous other occasions, that when the amendment does not state a new cause of action or theory of liability, it will relate back to the filing of the original. See, e.g., Crowe v. Houseworth, 272 Md. 481, 489-90, 325 A.2d 592, 597 (1974) (amendment, which added other joint tenants as parties, related back to original trespass action); Doughty v. Prettyman, 219 Md. 83, 93, 148 A.2d 438, 443 (1959) (amendments related back because they stated same operational facts and did not introduce a new theory of liability but merely spelled out in detail the basis of the alleged liability); State ex rel. Cavanaugh v. Arundel Park Corp., 218 Md. 484, 489, 147 A.2d 427, 429-30 (1959) (amendments that “spell[ed] out in detail the basis of the alleged liability” was a different statement of the same cause of action based on negligence and thus related back); Brooks v. Childress, 198 Md. 1, 14, 81 A.2d 47, 54 (1951) (amendment related back where original declaration was predicated upon father’s responsibility for the negligence of his son based on agency principals and the amendment imputed negligence to the father by virtue of his consent in signing his son’s application for a driver’s license); Western Union Tel. Co. v. State ex rel. Nelson, 82 Md. 293, 306, 33 A. 763, 764 (1896) (amendment that corrected the name of one of two corporate defendants was not the equivalent of a new suit).

The conceptual framework of the relation-back concept was articulated by Chief Judge James McSherry in State ex rel Zier v. Chesapeake Beach Railway Co., 98 Md. 35, 40-41, 56 A. 385, 387 (1903) (hereinafter “Zier”):

The institution of a suit arrests the running of the Statute of Limitations, and the general rule is that, where the period of limitations has not elapsed before the suit was brought, a mere amendment of the declaration, when the cause of action remains the same, will not warrant the filing of a plea of limitations, even though the statutory period has intervened between the time when the cause of action accrued and the date of making the amendment. The reason for this rule is that the bringing of the suit stops the running of the statute and consequently, so long as the suit *721proceeds for the same cause of action, the bar of the statute cannot attach. When, however, by amendment, the cause of action is changed, a new suit is begun when the amendment is made, and if between the accruing of that cause of action and the date of the amendment, which for the first time invokes that cause of action, the period of limitations has supervened, then the plea may be interposed to that new suit.

(Emphasis in original). See also State ex rel. Cavanaugh, 218 Md. at 490, 147 A.2d at 430 (“The amendment supplying that allegation was not the statement of a new or different cause of action, but the statement of the same cause of action, with an amendment to spell out in detail the basis of the alleged liability.”); Lichtenberg v. Joyce, 183 Md. 689, 697, 39 A.2d 789, 793 (1944) (“The period of limitation must elapse prior to the date of the filing of the suit, unless the cause of action is changed.”).

In Zier, the wife of Charles Zier, initiated a wrongful death action against her husband’s employer when he was terminally injured by a train collision. Zier died on July 2, 1900, and the wife’s suit was brought on January 3, 1901, with an amendment filed on April 17, 1902, past the one-year limitation period for a wrongful death action. The lower court dismissed the entire Complaint, holding that it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. We reinstated the Complaint, holding that the addition of the employer’s negligence in the amendment did not recite a new cause of action for wrongful-death and therefore related-back to the original:

The statement of the cause of action was different, but the cause of action itself was identical. Injury resulting in death is what occasioned the suit. The imperfect statement of the case did not cause the correct statement to be a different cause of action. Being the same cause of action, the accurate statement of it in the amended declaration did not convert the original suit into a new and different suit; and therefore did not warrant the filing of any other plea of *722the Statute of Limitations than such as could have been interposed to the original____

Zier, 98 Md. at 42-43, 56 A. at 387-88 (emphasis in original).

In the instant case, Jane Doe specifically averred in Paragraph 51 of her Complaint that the Board “certified the Petition despite the Petition’s failure to include, by the legal deadlines, the requisite number of valid signatures required for certification,” in support of her cause of action for judicial review. The Complaint was then amended in July to allege, based upon the recently revealed information proffered by the attorney for the County Board, that “inactive” voters had not been included in the total number of registered voters, so that the requisite number of valid signatures had not been included. Clearly, as in Zier, “[t]he statement of the cause of action was different, but the cause of action itself was identical,” for Doe’s amended complaint did not “convert the original suit into a new and different suit” (emphasis in original).

B.

Because we hold that Jane Doe’s complaint was timely, we now turn to whether the percentage of registered voters included only “active” voters or the combined total of “active” plus “inactive” voters. According to Section 3-503(a),17 an “inactive” voter is one who has been placed on “inactive” status for failing to respond to a confirmation of address notice;18 Jane Doe asserts that “inactive” voters should have *723been combined with the number of “active” voters to constitute the total number of registered voters upon which the 5% requisite number of signatures would be based. Essentially, Jane Doe asserts that the denominator of the equation, or the total number of registered voters, means a combination of “active” and “inactive” voters, while the numerator of the equation would represent the number of registered voters constituting 5% of the total. The County Board, conversely, argues that “inactive” voters should not be included in the denominator, because doing so would artificially inflate the number of signatures required to place the referendum on the ballot and also that for the purposes of determining the number of people supporting a referendum, an “inactive” voter becomes an “active” one merely by affixing a signature on a referendum petition. Had “inactive” voters been included in the total, the requisite number of signatures would not have been sufficient.

Section 114 of the Montgomery County Charter refers only to the universe of registered voters: “Any legislation enacted by the Council shall be submitted to a referendum of the voters upon petition of five percent of the registered voters of the County. ...” (emphasis added). We recently had the opportunity to interpret whether the term “registered voter” included “inactive” voters in Maryland Green Party v. Maryland Board of Elections, 377 Md. 127, 832 A.2d 214 (2003). In that case, the Maryland Board of Elections declined to certify a nominating petition for a Congressional candidate due to a lack of verifiable signatures on the petition; among the reasons cited for the rejection of over a thousand signatures was that many of the signatures were from “inactive” voters. At the time of Green Party, Section 1-101(mm) of the Election *724Law Article stated that “ ‘registered voter’ does not include an individual whose name is on a list of inactive voters,” and Section 3-504(f)(4) provided that “[[Individuals whose names have been placed on the inactive list may not be counted as part of the registry.” We declared these provisions unconstitutional, because the Maryland Constitution, in speaking of registered voters, did not distinguish an “inactive” voter from a registered one; both are registered voters:

[Section 2 of Article I of the Maryland Constitution19] contemplates a single registry for a particular area, containing the names of all qualified voters, leaving the General Assembly no discretion to decide who may or may not be listed therein, no discretion to create a second registry for “ inactive” voters, and no authority to decree that an “inactive” voter is not a “registered voter” with all the rights of a registered voter. Furthermore, § 2 provides that, once registered, the registration shall be “conclusive” evidence of the right to vote. In other words, the Maryland Constitution does not require anything more from the voter on election day.

Id. at 142-43, 832 A.2d at 223. We held that “any statutory provision or administrative regulation which treats ‘inactive’ voters differently from ‘active’ voters is invalid” and remonstrated against maintaining a separate registry of “inactive” voters. Id. at 152-53, 832 A.2d at 229. See also Gisriel v. Ocean City Board of Supervisors of Elections, 345 Md. 477, 504, 693 A.2d 757, 770 (1997) (“[T]he 128 residents of Ocean *725City who had not voted in the preceding two general municipal elections, but whose names remained on the voter registration list, were not unqualified voters. In no event should their names be removed from the voter registration list.”); State Administrative Bd. of Election Laws v. Board of Sup’rs of Election of Baltimore City, 342 Md. 586, 599, 679 A.2d 96, 102 (1996) (“[Hjaving voted frequently in the past is not a qualification for voting and, under the Maryland Constitution, could not be a qualification. The ‘inactive’ voters who remained on the registration rolls and who continued to meet the constitutional qualifications for voting in Baltimore City, were not ‘ineligible’ voters.”).

The Legislature responded to our decision in Green Party by amending former Sections l-101(mm) and 3-504.20 See 2005 Maryland Laws, Chapter 572. Section 3-503, which currently governs placement of voters on “inactive” status, as well as the restoration to “active” status, states:

(a) In general. — If a voter fails to respond to a confirmation notice under § 3-502(c)[21] of this subtitle, the voter’s name shall be placed into inactive status on the statewide voter registration list.

*726(b) Restoration to active status. — A voter shall be restored to active status on the statewide voter registration list after completing and signing any of the following election documents:

(1) a voter registration application;

(2) a petition governed by Title 6;

(3) a certificate of candidacy;

(4) an absentee ballot application; or

(5) a written affirmation of residence completed on election day to entitle the voter to vote either at the election district or precinct for the voter’s current residence or the voter’s previous residence, as determined by the State Board.

(c) Removal. — An inactive voter who fails to vote in an election in the period ending with the second general election shall be removed from the statewide voter registration list.

(d) Counting for official administrative purposes. — Registrants placed into inactive status may not be counted for official administrative purposes including establishing precincts and reporting official statistics.

To the extent that this statute, however, permits the maintenance of two lists to determine an individual’s registration status in order to exclude “inactive” voters from the list of registered voters, it is unconstitutional for the reasons stated in our decision in Green Party. We emphasize that there is no room, after our decision in Green Party, for the maintenance of an “inactive” list to define registration status, because both “active” and “inactive” voters are registered voters. The Legislature has “no authority to decree that an ‘inactive’ voter is not a ‘registered voter’ with all the rights of a registered voter,” Green Party, 377 Md. at 143, 832 A.2d at 223, including the ability to petition for referendum under statutory and constitutional provisions.

In the present case Montgomery County’s 52,269 “inactive” voters were excluded from the total number of registered voters, thus greatly diminishing the number of *727voters necessary to achieve the requisite 5% of registered voters. Had the County Board used all 552,281 registered voters, which includes both “active” and “inactive” voters, as opposed to only the 500,012 “active” voters, it would have determined that 27,615 petition signatures, not 25,001, were needed to achieve the 5% benchmark. Even were we to agree with the Circuit Court that only 26,81322 signatures are valid, which we do not, the petition would fail to meet the requisite 27,615 signatures necessary to meet the 5% requirement.

The judge in the present case, however, also determined that 10,876 signatures that did not comport with the voter’s registration identification were valid, because the dictates of Section 6-203 were suggestive rather than required. We disagree.

Section 6-203, which governs the process of signing a referendum petition and validating signatures on a referendum petition states, in pertinent part:

(a) In general. — To sign a petition, an individual shall:

(1) sign the individual’s name as it appears on the statewide voter registration list or the individual’s surname of registration and at least one full given name and the initials of any other names; and

(2) include the following information, printed or typed, in the spaces provided:

(i) the signer’s name as it was signed;

(ii) the signer’s address;

(in) the date of signing; and

(iv) other information required by regulations adopted by the State Board.

*728(b) Validation and counting. — The signature of an individual shall be validated and counted if:

(1) the requirements of subsection (a) of this section have been satisfied;

(2) the individual is a registered voter assigned to the county specified on the signature page and, if applicable, in a particular geographic area of the county;

(3) the individual has not previously signed the same petition;

(4) the signature is attested by an affidavit appearing on the page on which the signature appears;

(5) the date accompanying the signature is not later than the date of the affidavit on the page; and

(6) if applicable, the signature was affixed within the requisite period of time, as specified by law.

(Emphasis added). The plain meaning of the words “shall” and “requirements” in Section 6-203 reflect that the statutory provisions require that the voter must sign his or her name “as it appears on the statewide voter registration lists or the individual’s surname of registration and at least one full given name and the initials of any other names”; the provisions are mandatory, not suggestive. See Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 172-73, 935 A.2d 699, 708-09 (2007) (stating that “[w]e begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute,” reading the statute as a whole to ensure that “ ‘no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory,’ ” and “if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends”). “Shall” is defined as “[h]as a duty to; more broadly, is required to,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1407 (8th ed. 2004), while “require” means “to demand as necessary or essential.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1058 (11th ed. 2005). We have heretofore interpreted the word “shall” to be mandatory in other cases in which we considered whether petition specifications are required or suggestive. In City of Takoma Park v. Citizens for Decent Government, 301 Md. 439, 442-44, *729483 A.2d 348, 351 (1984), we were asked to consider whether the Montgomery County Board properly declined to certify a petition for referendum of a piece of legislation prohibiting discrimination in employment, housing and public accommodations on the basis of sexual orientation,23 because it did not “comply with the legal requirements as to form” under Section 16-5 of Article 3, Montgomery County Code, which stated:

A petition for referendum on any legislation, or part thereof, enacted by the council and subject to referendum under the charter, shall be composed of one or more sheets, each in substantially the following form:

REFERENDUM PETITION

“We, the undersigned registered voters of Montgomery County, Maryland, do hereby petition for a referendum vote on [the provisions (identifying them briefly) of] the Act entitled ‘An Act [inserting title],’ enacted by the County Council for Montgomery County, Maryland, at its [month and year] legislative session.”

(Emphasis added). Those citizens protesting the Bill, however, provided only the Bill number and the following statement: “Those certain provisions hereby petitioned for a referendum vote are any mention or definition within the bill of the terms, ‘sexual orientation, homosexuality, heterosexuality, or bisexuality.’ ” Id. at 443, 483 A.2d at 350. We concluded that the petition was insufficient, having not met the required statutory provisions of Section 16-5, because it failed to set forth the title of the act in question and did not inform voters of “precisely what portions of the act the petition sponsors proposed for deletion.” Id. at 449, 483 A.2d at 354.

We also have had occasion to consider whether the signature requirements formerly set forth in Section 169, Article 33, Maryland Code (1957, 1964 Supp.), the precursor of the present Section 6-203, are required or suggestive, in Barnes v. *730State ex rel. Pinkney, 236 Md. 564, 204 A.2d 787 (1964). In Barnes, a restaurant owner contended that he did not violate the Public Accommodations Act when he refused to serve a customer based on race, because, he argued, the implementation of the law was suspended by a petition for referendum challenging the Act, which the Secretary of State had improperly refused to certify. The signature requirements at issue provided that:

“In every petition (including an associated or related set of petitions) under the provisions of Article XVI of the State Constitution, there shall be appended to the signature of each signer his residence, the precinct or district wherein he is registered as a voter, and immediately below the signature of any such signer, there shall be either printed or typed, the name of such signer.”

Maryland Code (1957, 1964 Supp.), Article 33, Section 169. (emphasis added). We approved of the Secretary’s rejection of a number of petition signatures for failing to comply with the signatures requirement, which left the petition with an inadequate amount of valid signatures, and concluded that signature requirements “designed to provide additional means by which fraudulent or otherwise improper signatures upon a referendum petition may be detected” were required as opposed to merely suggestive, noting that signature requirements “facilitate checking of the petitions by interested persons to ensure that only qualified persons have signed.” Barnes, 236 Md. at 571-72, 574, 204 A.2d at 791, 793.24 See *731also Ferguson v. Secretary of State, 249 Md. 510, 240 A.2d 232 (1968) (finding a petition to fail when it did not comply with the “mandatory requirement” that the person procuring the signatures attach an affidavit attesting to their personal knowledge that “the signers are registered voters of the State and City of Baltimore or county as set opposite their names”).

The County Board argues, nevertheless, that the plain language of Section 6-203, governing validation, is not dispositive because the entire Section is rendered ambiguous by the interaction of it with Section 6-207,25 dealing with verification. In this regard, the County Board is in essence arguing that the validation of signatures, which, for the purposes of this case, requires an election official to confirm that each entry includes the signature of the individual’s name as it appears on the statewide voter registration list or at least one first name, the initials of any other names and a surname, must be construed liberally in light of the verification provisions, which require election authorities to “ensure that the name of the individual who signed the petition is listed as a registered voter.”26

*732We disagree that the verification provision renders the “validation” provision ambiguous; validation is a distinct step in the process that must occur before a signature can be verified.27 The purpose of validation, relating to whether the signature is sufficient, is to “provide additional means by which fraudulent or otherwise improper signatures upon a referendum petition may be detected,” see Barnes, 236 Md. at 571-72, 204 A.2d at 793, while the purpose of signature verification, relating to the existence of registration of the voter and the signature count, is to “ensure that the name of the individual who signed the petition is listed as a registered voter.” Section 6-207. Because the two provisions are distinct, we are not persuaded that “shall” means anything other than mandatory.28 Finding none of the County Board’s argu*733ments persuasive, we decline the invitation to reverse our past holding that a signer is required to comply with the signature requirements governing petitions for referendum. Such a holding is in accord with our view that signature requirements “provide additional means by which fraudulent or otherwise improper signatures upon a referendum petition may be detected.” Barnes, 236 Md. at 571-72, 204 A.2d at 793.

Because we hold that Jane Doe’s judicial review action was not time-barred, that “inactive” voters should have been included in the total number of registered voters and finally that the 10,876 challenged signatures were invalid as a matter of law, the reversal of summary judgment entered on behalf of the County Board and entry of summary judgment on behalf of Jane Doe was mandated by this Court on September 9, 2008.

ADKINS, J., dissents with opinion in which HARRELL and MURPHY, JJ., join.