State of Louisiana v. Cornell Lewis

• 2023-12-11

Date Filed2023-12-11

Docket2023-K-0736

JudgeChief Judge Terri F. Love; Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase; Judge Dale N. Atkins

Cited0 times

StatusPublished

Full Opinion (html_with_citations)

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2023-K-0736

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
CORNELL LEWIS *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 535-274, SECTION “SECTION E”
Judge Rhonda Goode-Douglas,
******
Chief Judge Terri F. Love
******
(Court composed of Chief Judge Terri F. Love, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase,
Judge Dale N. Atkins)

Cornell Lewis
Franklin Parish Detention Center
388 Natures Acres Road
Winnsboro, LA 71295

PRO SE COUNSEL FOR RELATOR

WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
December 11, 2023
TFL

TGC Relator, Cornell Lewis, presently seeks supervisory writ review of the
DNA
district court’s September 7, 2023 judgment which denied Relator’s application for

post-conviction relief.

On April 27, 2023, Relator filed a pro se application for post-conviction

relief to set aside convictions for multiple offenses resulting from guilty pleas

entered on July 23, 2019. Relator asserted that he was denied effective assistance

of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.

Relator’s application for post-conviction relief is untimely pursuant to La.

C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Moreover, Relator fails to meet his burden of proof as required

by La. C.Cr.P. art 930.2 to show entitlement to relief on his ineffective assistance

of counsel allegations. Accordingly, finding no error in the district court’s

judgment, we grant Relator’s writ application and deny relief.

1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 23, 2019, Relator, represented by counsel, pled guilty to the

following charges: two counts of attempted second degree murder in violation of

La. R.S. 14:(27)30; one count of illegal possession of stolen things in violation of

La. R.S. 14:69(B)(1); one count of illegal possession of stolen firearms—first

offense—in violation of La. R.S. 14:69.1(B)(1); one count of possession of a

firearm by felon in violation of La. R.S. 14:95; one count of aggravated flight from

an officer in violation of La. R.S. 14:108.1; one count of resisting an officer in

violation of La. R.S. 14:108; two counts of armed robbery with a firearm in

violation of La. R.S. 14:64.3; and one count of possession of a firearm by felon in

violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. Relator was sentenced on Count 1 and Count 2—

the attempted murder charges—to seventeen years at hard labor on each count.

The attempted murder sentences were to run concurrently with the sentences

imposed for all the other counts for which Relator had entered guilty pleas.1

After his incarceration, Relator filed a claim for administrative relief before

the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DPSC”) on

November 16, 2022. Relator contended that his sentence was being served “under

the incorrect good time act.” The DPSC denied his claim on January 25, 2023.

1 As to the remaining counts, Relator was sentenced as follows:

La. R.S. 14:69(B)(1)- illegal possession of stolen things: ten years; $1500 fine;
La. R.S. 14:69.1(B )(1)- illegal possession of stolen firearms: five years;
La. R.S. 14:95.1-possession of firearm by felon: seventeen years;
La. R.S. 14:108.1- aggravated flight from officer: five years;
La. R.S. 14:108- resisting an officer: six months;
La. R.S. 14.64.3- armed robbery; use of firearm; additional penalty: twelve years;
La. R.S. 14.64.3- armed robbery; use of firearm; additional penalty: twelve years;
La. R.S. 14.95.1- possession of a firearm by felon: seventeen years.

2
Subsequent to the denial, Relator filed his application for post-conviction relief,

alleging discovery of ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

Relator’s application for post-conviction relief alleged his counsel was

ineffective in the following respects: (i) counsel failed to investigate Relator’s

case; (ii) counsel failed to conduct discovery; (iii) counsel’s representation was

deficient during the sentencing phase; and (iv) counsel never informed him of the

elements needed for conviction, in particular, on the charges related to his armed

robbery convictions.

After a hearing on the merits, the district court denied Relator’s application

for post-conviction relief. In rejecting Relator’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claims, the district court found that Relator had failed to provide sufficient

evidence that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency

prejudiced Relator.2 The district court also held that Relator’s post-conviction

application was untimely in that it was filed more than two years after his

conviction had become final, in contravention of the time delays established in La.

C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 for consideration of an application for post-conviction relief.

The district court granted Relator’s request to seek supervisory writ review

of the judgment before this Court.

DISCUSSION

Before we address the substantive merits of Relator’s writ application, we

shall first consider the timeliness of Relator’s application for post-conviction relief.

2 The district court cited Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668

104 S.Ct. 2052

80 L.Ed. 674

(1984), as will be discussed infra.

3
As recognized by the district court, Relator’s application is untimely.

Relator did not appeal his conviction. Hence, his conviction became final in 2019.

Relator’s application for post conviction relief was not filed until April 2023,

which is well outside the two-year time limitation set forth in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8

for consideration of claims for post-conviction relief. 3 Moreover, Relator offered

3 La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 provides, in pertinent part, the following:

A. No application for post conviction relief, including applications which seek an
out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after
the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the
provisions of Article 914 or 922, unless any of the following apply:

1) The application alleges, and the petitioner proves or the state admits, that the
facts upon which the claim is predicated were not known to the petitioner or his
prior attorneys. Further, the petitioner shall prove that he exercised diligence in
attempting to discover any post conviction claims that may exist. “Diligence” for
the purposes of this Article is a subjective inquiry that shall take into account the
circumstances of the petitioner. Those circumstances shall include but are not
limited to the educational background of the petitioner, the petitioner’s access to
formally trained inmate counsel, the financial resources of the petitioner, the age
of the petitioner, the mental abilities of the petitioner, or whether the interests of
justice will be served by the consideration of new evidence. New facts discovered
pursuant to this exception shall be submitted to the court within two years of
discovery. If the petitioner pled guilty or nolo contendere to the offense of
conviction and is seeking relief pursuant to Article 926.2 and five years or more
have elapsed since the petitioner pled guilty or nolo contendere to the offense of
conviction, he shall not be eligible for the exception provided for by this
Subparagraph.

(2) The claim asserted in the petition is based upon a final ruling of an appellate
court establishing a theretofore unknown interpretation of constitutional law and
petitioner establishes that this interpretation is retroactively applicable to his case,
and the petition is filed within one year of the finality of such ruling.

(3) The application would already be barred by the provisions of this Article, but
the application is filed on or before October 1, 2001, and the date on which the
application was filed is within three years after the judgment of conviction and
sentence has become final.

(4) The person asserting the claim has been sentenced to death.

(5) The petitioner qualifies for the exception to timeliness in Article 926.1.

4
no evidence to show that he met any of the exceptions outlined in La. C.Cr.P. art.

930.84 to entitle Relator to an extension of the prescriptive period set forth in the

code article. See State v. Chapman, 1997-0967, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/3/97),

699 So.2d 504, 506-7

. Specifically, other than his assertions, Relator offered no new

facts or evidence to support his claim that he was prevented from discovery of his

ineffective assistance of counsel claims because he allegedly had a mental,

educational, or financial impediment. Relator also failed to demonstrate that his

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not known or could have been

discoverable by Relator by the exercise of due diligence. Indeed, Relator’s claims

that his counsel did not sufficiently work his case or gave him substandard legal

advice were “discoverable” by Relator before or at the time Relator entered his

guilty pleas.      Accordingly, Relator’s writ application can be denied on the

exclusive basis of timeliness. Nevertheless, this Court shall review the merits of

Relator’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

        The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and

La. Const. art. I, § 2 and § 13 protect a defendant who enters a guilty plea. “When

a defendant enters a counselled plea of guilty, this court will review the quality of

counsel’s representation in deciding whether the plea should be set aside.” State

v. Beatty,

391 So.2d 828, 831

 (La. 1980). As noted by the district court, the two-

prong test established in Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 669

104 S.Ct. 2052, 2055

80 L.Ed.2d 674

 (1984), provides that in order to prevail on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show both that: (1) counsel’s

performance was deficient; and (2) he was prejudiced by the deficiency so as to

        (6) The petitioner qualifies for the exception to timeliness in Article 926.2.
4

Id.




                                                  5
deprive the defendant of a fair trial. In particular, the defendant must show that

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under

the existing circumstances of the case.

Id.


      At the onset of our review of Relator’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claims, we note that La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2 states that “[t]he petitioner in an

application for post conviction relief shall have the burden of proving that relief

should be granted.” Therefore, the burden of proof rests with Relator to show that

his counsel offered ineffective representation because counsel did not properly

investigate and conduct discovery on his case and that counsel offered substandard

legal advice regarding his sentencing and the elements needed to support a

conviction.

      In reviewing Relator’s allegations that his counsel was deficient because he

did not properly investigate and conduct adequate discovery, Relator did not meet

his burden of proof to establish counsel’s ineffectiveness. Relator failed to provide

any objective documentation in support of these allegations. Relator identified no

specific evidence that might have been retrieved from an investigation or obtained

through discovery that could have changed the result of his decision to enter the

guilty pleas or could have provided substantial evidence of Relator’s innocence or

impacted the State’s ability to prove the charged offenses. See Strickland,

466 U.S. at 690

104 S.Ct. at 2066

.

      Relator also offered no supporting evidence regarding his claims that

counsel was ineffective during the sentencing phase and did not adequately advise

him of the elements of his crimes. Relator complains that his counsel neglected to

properly inform him that he was ineligible for a “good-time” diminution in his

sentence when he pled guilty to the armed robbery offenses—convictions which

                                         6
made him a multiple offender and subject to sentence enhancement. Relator

suggests that had he known of the enhancements and his ineligibility for a good-

time diminution, he would not have entered the guilty pleas. However, given that

the armed robbery convictions alone could have subjected Relator to sentences

between ten and ninety-nine years, Relator does not show that counsel’s negotiated

plea agreement, whereby Relator received concurrent sentences of no more than

seventeen years, amounted to ineffective legal representation. His contention that

he would not have accepted the plea agreement amounts to no more than a

conclusory, general statement. Such general statements are insufficient proof to

establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See State v. Castaneda, 1994-

1118, p. 14 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/23/95),

658 So.2d 297, 306

.

      For similar reasons, Relator’s general statement that he would not have

entered the guilty pleas because counsel did not explain the elements of proof

required for his convictions is not persuasive evidence in proving an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. In particular, Relator did not include a copy of his

guilty plea colloquy to support that he did not understand the terms of the plea

bargain at the time he entered his guilty pleas.

      Upon review, Relator did not prove that counsel made any errors and but for

those errors, Relator would not have pleaded guilty.       Accordingly, Relator’s

ineffective assistance of counsel errors lack merit.

                                        CONCLUSION

      Based on the foregoing reasons, we grant Relator’s writ application and

deny relief.



                                        WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

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