State of Louisiana, Division of Administration, Office of Community Development - Disaster Recovery Unit v. Stephanie B. Poree A/K/A Stephanie Brookins Poree
Date Filed2022-12-20
Docket2022-CA-0425
JudgeJudge Roland L. Belsome; Judge Rosemary Ledet; Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins
Cited0 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
STATE OF LOUISIANA, * NO. 2022-CA-0425
DIVISION OF
ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE *
OF COMMUNITY COURT OF APPEAL
DEVELOPMENT - DISASTER *
RECOVERY UNIT FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
VERSUS STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******
STEPHANIE B. POREE A/K/A
STEPHANIE BROOKINS
POREE
APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2018-12622, DIVISION āB-5ā
Honorable Rachael Johnson,
******
JUDGE SANDRA CABRINA JENKINS
******
(Court composed of Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge
Sandra Cabrina Jenkins)
Mary Catherine Cali
John Carroll Walsh
Caroline M. Tomeny
William J. Wilson
John C. Conine, Jr.
Hunter N. Farrar
Drew D. Lyons
SHOWS CALI & WALSH, LLP
628 St. Louis Street
P.O. Drawer 4425
Baton Rouge, LA 70802
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
Christopher H. Szeto
Ian G. Dunbar
THE LAW OFFICE OF CHRISTOPHER SZETO
8131 Plum Street, Suite 1
New Orleans, LA 70118
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
JUDGMENT REVERSED; EXCEPTIONS REMANDED
DECEMBER 20, 2022
SCJ
RLB
RML
Defendant, Stephanie Poree, appeals the trial courtās September 22, 2022
judgment granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the State of Louisiana,
Division of Administration, Office of Community Development, Disaster Recovery
Unit (hereinafter āthe Stateā), and ordering judgment in favor of the State and against
Ms. Poree in the amount of $37,500.00, plus legal interest. In addition to this appeal,
Ms. Poree filed five peremptory exceptions for the first time in this Court.
Upon our de novo review of the record and in light of applicable law, we find
genuine issues of material fact remain that preclude summary judgment at this time,
and we reverse the trial courtās September 22, 2022 judgment. In addition, we
remand this matter to the trial court for a trial on the peremptory exceptions filed in
this Court.
1
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ms. Poree owns a residential home located at 97 Morrison Court in New
Orleans that sustained devastating losses as a result of the impact of Hurricane
Katrina, on or about August 29, 2005.
Due to the widespread devastation throughout New Orleans from Hurricane
Katrina, the State instituted the federally funded Road Home Program to award
grants to eligible homeowners in the affected areas to assist them in repairing their
homes, elevating their homes, and implementing mitigating measures.
In May 2007, Ms. Poree received an initial Road Home compensation grant
in the amount of $60,664.76, which did not include an elevation grant.1
Subsequently, in October 2008, Ms. Poree received a Road Home Elevation grant in
the amount of $30,000; and, in connection therewith, Ms. Poree signed an Elevation
Incentive Agreement (āEIAā). The EIA states, in part, that the homeowner agrees
that within three years of the date of the signing of the EIA, the elevation of the home
will be at or above the Advisory Base Flood Elevations (āABFEsā) published by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (āFEMAā).
In June 2011, Ms. Poree received a final Road Home grant for Individual
Mitigation Measures in the amount of $7500.00, for which she signed a separate
Individual Mitigation Measures Agreement (āIMMAā). The IMMA states, in part,
the homeowner agrees that, within three years of the date of the agreement, she will
1 The record includes several exhibits pertinent only to the initial Compensation grant, which Ms.
Poree received in May 2007. One exhibit includes a Benefit Selection Form, which indicates that
Ms. Poree was eligible for an Elevation Compensation grant but that she elected not to elevate her
home and receive such Elevation Compensation.
2
use ābest efforts in accomplishing such activities that stand to mitigate losses from
future damages resulting from hurricanes and similar natural disasters,ā such as
installing window protection and installing hurricane straps/clips.
On December 17, 2018, the State filed a petition against Ms. Poree, alleging
she breached the EIA and IMMA and seeking the repayment of grant funds in the
amount of $37,500.00 plus legal interest, attorney fees, and costs.2 After personal
service on Ms. Poree was attempted and failed, the State filed a motion to appoint
curator, which was granted on February 2, 2021. On March 18, 2021, the curator
filed an answer on behalf of Ms. Poree, and, on April 19, 2021, the curator filed a
note of evidence stating his attempts to locate and contact Ms. Poree.
On June 2, 2021, the State filed its motion for summary judgment seeking
judgment against Ms. Poree for the full amount demanded in the petition. No
opposition was filed on behalf of Ms. Poree. On August 24, 2021, the trial court
held the hearing on the Stateās motion for summary judgment, at which the State
presented argument in support of its motion but the appointed curator for Ms. Poree
did not present any argument in opposition. The trial court granted the Stateās
motion for summary judgment and signed the written judgment on September 22,
2021.
2 Prior to filing the petition, the record reflects that the State mailed several notices to Ms. Poree
stating that she was not in compliance with the EIA and IMMA agreements and that she was
obligated to repay the amounts of both grants for failure to comply.
3
Ms. Poree filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied on March
3, 2022. Ms. Poree then filed this timely appeal of the trial courtās September 22,
2022 and March 3, 2022 judgments.
DISCUSSION
Ms. Poree raises three assignments of error on appeal, but we find our de novo
review of the Stateās motion for summary judgment dispositive of the appeal and
pretermit discussion of the other assignments of error.3
Motion for Summary Judgment
An appellate court reviews a ruling on a motion for summary judgment under
the de novo standard of review, applying the same standard as the trial court, and the
appellate court does not analyze the facts and evidence with deference to the
judgment of the trial court or its reasons for judgment. Precept Credit Opportunities
Fund, L.P. v. Elmore, 21-0502, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/20/22), 338 So.3d 87, 89-90 (quoting Smith v. State, 18-0197, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/9/19),262 So.3d 977
, 980).
Therefore, in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3), ā[a]fter an opportunity for
adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion,
memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to
material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.ā A
genuine issue is a triable issue, as to which reasonable persons could disagree, and
facts are material when they āmay insure or preclude recovery, affect a litigantās
ultimate success, or determine the outcome of the legal dispute.ā FMC Enterprises,
3 Ms. Poree also argues that the trial court erred in failing to declare the EIA void as an absolute
nullity, and that trial court erred in denying her motion for new trial.
4
L.L.C. v. Prytania-St. Mary Condominiums Assān, Inc., 12-1634, p. 6 (La. App. 4
Cir. 5/15/13), 117 So.3d 217, 222.
āThe only documents that may be filed in support or in opposition to the
motion are pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, certified medical records, written stipulations, and admissions.ā La.
C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4). In meeting the burden of proof, unsworn or unverified
documents attached to a motion for summary judgment are not self-proving and will
not be considered as competent summary judgment evidence. Williams v. Memorial
Med. Ctr., 03-1806, p. 14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/17/04), 870 So.2d 1044, 1053. Only documents which are properly authenticated by an affidavit or deposition to which they are attached may be considered as supporting documentation on a motion for summary judgment. Dowdle v. State through Depāt of Culture, Recreation, and Tourism, 18-878, p. 4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/15/19),272 So.3d 77
, 81 (quoting Official
Comment (c of 2015) to La. C.C.P. art. 966). In addition, ā[s]upporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts
as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein.ā La. C.C.P. art. 967(A).
āThe burden of proof rests with the moving party and all doubts should be
resolved in the non-moving partyās favor.ā Carmbat v. City of New Orleans Police
Dept., 14-0810, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/4/15), 160 So.3d 1031, 1034(citing Gailey v. Barnett, 12-0830, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/5/12),106 So.3d 625, 627-28
). Thus,
any doubt regarding a material issue of fact āmust be resolved against granting the
5
motion and in favor of a trial on the merits.ā FMC Enterprises, 12-1634, pp. 6-7,
117 So.3d at 222-223 (citing Windham v. Murray, 06-1275, p.3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/30/07),960 So.2d 328, 331
).
In this case, the Stateās motion for summary judgment asserts that there is no
genuine issue of material fact that Ms. Poree breached the EIA and the IMMA and
that she was obligated to repay the full amount of both grants to the State. In order
to carry its burden of proof on this motion for summary judgment, the State must
prove it can satisfy the three essential elements of its breach of contract claim: ā(1)
the obligorās undertaking an obligation to perform, (2) the obligor failed to perform
the obligation (the breach), and (3) the failure to perform resulted in damages to the
obligee.ā Favrot v. Favrot, 10-0986, pp. 14-15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/9/11), 68 So.3d
1099, 1108-09; see also, 1100 South Jefferson Davis Parkway, LLC v. Williams, 14- 1326, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/20/15),165 So.3d 1211, 1216
(āessential elements of a
breach of contract claim are the existence of a contract, the partyās breach thereof,
and resulting damages.ā). Since there are two separate agreements, the EIA and the
IMMA, which the State argues Ms. Poree breached, we must consider the evidence
submitted to support each breach of contract claim.
Elevation Incentive Agreement
The State argues that Ms. Poree received a $30,000.00 elevation incentive
grant from the State in October 2008, and that, by signing the EIA, she affirmatively
obligated herself to (1) elevate her home in accordance with the elevation provisions
set forth in the EIA; (2) comply with the elevation provisions within three years of
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the date of the EIA; (3) repay the entire amount of the EIA grant if she failed to
comply with the elevation provisions within three years. Regarding her breach of
the agreement, the State argues that Ms. Poree did not elevate her home to the
applicable ABFE within three years of executing the EIA. Finally, the State argues
that, after the expiration of the three year deadline to elevate her home, Ms. Poree
failed to repay the full amount of the EIA grant and now owes the State that amount
plus attorney fees and costs.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the State submitted the
affidavit of Jeff Haley, the Chief Operating Officer of the Office of Community
Development, Disaster Recovery Unit and twenty-three exhibits. In the affidavit,
Mr. Haley attests, in pertinent part, to the following: he has care, custody, and access
to the Road Home grant file of Ms. Poree; he is familiar with Ms. Poreeās Road
Home grant file; the attached documents are the records kept by the State in
connection with that grant file; and verifying and certifying each attached
document.4 The following relevant documents are attached to Mr. Haleyās affidavit:
ā¢ A āFinal Disbursement Statementā from First American Title Insurance
Company indicating that a $30,000.00 disbursement was paid to Ms. Poree
for āLRH-Elevation grant.ā The statement indicates the āPrint Dateā as
October 13, 2008, and includes Ms. Poreeās undated signature.
ā¢ A āFinal Award Acknowledgment Formā signed by Ms. Poree on
October 16, 2008, indicating an āAdjustment Disbursementā of
$30,000.00 for Elevation.5
4 In consideration of our finding that the State failed to meet its burden of proof on summary
judgment, we do not address Ms. Poreeās argument that Mr. Haleyās affidavit is not based upon
personal knowledge and he cannot authenticate the attached documents.
5 A separate exhibit is also entitled āFinal Award Acknowledgment Formā which reflects the āFirst
Closing/Disbursementā for the grant amount of $60,664.76 and the āSecond
Closing/Disbursementā for the grant amount of ā$30,000.00/elevation.ā This form is also signed
by Ms. Poree.
7
ā¢ The EIA, which is signed by Ms. Poree but not dated.
ā¢ Field Review Report from the Road Home Compliance and
Monitoring Department, indicating a field review was completed for
Ms. Poreeās property on July 7, 2014, and stating the results of that
field review.
As previously noted, the curator appointed to represent Ms. Poree did not file
an opposition to Stateās motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Ms. Poree argues
that the obligations under the EIA do not explicitly require elevating the home, and
that its terms allow for the grant funds to be used for repairs or rebuilding or
elevating the home. Due to ambiguity in the obligations imposed and undertaken,
Ms. Poree argues that there are genuine issues of fact concerning the intent of the
contract and the consent of the parties that must be resolved in favor of the obligor,
Ms. Poree, and that precludes granting summary judgment in favor of the State. See
La. C.C. arts. 2056 and 2057;6 Pollard v. Schiff, 13-1682, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir.
2/4/15), 161 So.3d 48, 55.
To determine the obligations undertaken, we look to the language of the EIA
that Ms. Poree signed. āIf the words of a contract are clear, unambiguous, and lead
to no absurd consequences, we may not look beyond the contract language to
6 La. C.C. art. 2056 provides:
In case of doubt that cannot be otherwise resolved, a provision in a contract must
be interpreted against the party who furnished its text.
A contract executed in a standard form of one party must be interpreted, in case of
doubt, in favor of the other party.
La. C.C. art. 2057 provides:
In case of doubt that cannot be otherwise resolved, a contract must be interpreted
against the obligee and in favor of the obligor of a particular obligation.
Yet, if doubt arises from lack of a necessary explanation that one party should have
given, or from negligence or fault of one party, the contract must be interpreted in
a manner favorable to the other party whether oblige or obligor.
8
determine the true intent of the parties.ā Rousset v. Smith, 14-1409, p. 6 (La. App.
4 Cir. 9/23/15), 176 So.3d 632, 637 (citing La. C.C. art. 2046).
The stated purpose of the Elevation Incentive grant is āto compensate the
Homeowner for damage to his home caused [sic] incurred by the Homeowner(s) due
to Hurricanes Katrina in August 2005 and/or Rita in September 2005 and the
diminishment of equity resulting from the need to elevate the homeā; and the grant
received through the EIA āis to provide an incentive to the Homeowner to elevate
[her] home to a level that meets or exceeds the Advisory Base Flood Elevations
(ABFEās) established by the Federal Emergency Management Agency as of the date
of the [EIA].ā The ā[EIA] Conditionsā set forth in Section 4 of the agreement read,
in pertinent part, as follows:
By accepting this grant provided through the [EIA], I agree that:
a. Flood Elevation Compliance: Within three years of the date of this
[EIA], the elevation (height) of the home on the above Property will
be at or above the [ABFE] published by FEMA. Where no ABFE
has been published for the Property, the property must be elevated
to meet the Base Flood Elevation (BFE) shown on the communityās
legally adopted Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) floodplain
regulatory map, plus any freeboard required by local ordinance.
ABFE and BFE are those elevations in effect on the date this
Agreement was signed. By accepting the Elevation Incentive, I
assert that when the home was damaged by Hurricane Katrina or
Rita, its elevation was lower than the elevation required under this
Agreement. I understand that to comply with this paragraph, I must
elevate my home to be at or above the elevation required by this
Agreement even if the authority having jurisdiction of building code
enforcement is not requiring elevation of the home. Adoption of a
new FIRM by the community subsequent to signing of this
Agreement, which new FIRM may have BFEs higher or lower than
the ABFE or BFE in effect on the date of signing, will not change
the elevation required by this Agreement.
b. Covenant as to Compliance with Building Codes/Manufactured
Housing: (i) Repair. If the existing structure located on the Property
9
was not destroyed by Hurricane Katrina and/or Rita and has been
fully or partially repaired as of the Effective Date, the completed
repairs shall conform to the minimal building codes . . . . Any
further repairs commenced on or after the Effective Date shall
conform to the minimum standards set by . . . in effect at the time of
the repair. (ii) Rebuilding. If a structure on the Property was
destroyed by Hurricane Katrina and/or Rita, or if there is hereafter a
tearing down or destruction of a structure located on the Property,
any rebuilding of a new structure shall conform to the minimum
standards set by . . . .
c. Obligation to Return Elevation Incentive for Failure to Comply: If
the home on the Property does not meet or exceed the applicable
ABFEās or BFEās by three years from the date of this Elevation
Incentive Agreement, the entire amount of my Elevation Incentive
must be repaid to the State of Louisiana.
* * *
e. Final Disbursement of Road Home Funds/Waiver of Second
Disbursements: I acknowledge that this is my FINAL disbursement
of Road Home funds, whether as incentive for me to elevate my
home or as a compensation grant or additional grant for damage to
my home. Any pending Road Home resolution or appeal
proceeding will be discontinued.
From our review of the foregoing language, we find the stated purpose and
certain conditions of the EIA to be open to more than one interpretation and, thus,
ambiguous. First, we note that the stated purpose of the EIA is āto compensate the
Homeowner for damage to his homeā and āto provide an incentive to the
Homeowner to elevate the homeā. While we acknowledge that the incentive to
elevate the home appears throughout the agreement, the stated purpose also refers to
compensation for damage to the home generally. In addition, the EIA conditions in
Section 4(b) set forth a covenant to comply with building codes in the repair and
rebuilding of the home; and, from a review of the entire agreement, there is no
prohibition on the funds being used for such repairs or rebuilding in lieu of elevating
the home. Finally, Section 4(e) states an acknowledgement of the disbursement of
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funds āwhether as incentive for me to elevate my home or as a compensation grant
or additional grant for damage to my homeā, which could be interpreted as allowing
the homeowner to decide how to use the funds.
We also note the complete ambiguity regarding the obligation for compliance
with the EIA. The State contends that, by signing the EIA, Ms. Poree obligated
herself to comply with the elevation provisions within three years of the date of the
EIA. First, the EIA in the record reflects no effective date or signing date. Second,
the agreement contains no clear terms for determining the homeownerās compliance
with elevation provisions.7
Where an uncertainty exists as to the terms of the written contract, because
the provisions are susceptible to more than one interpretation, parol evidence
becomes admissible to clarify the ambiguity or show the intent of the parties.
Succession of Barreca v. Weiser, 10-0574, p. 16 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/3/10), 53 So.3d
481, 491(citing Highlands Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Foley, 96-1018, p. 7 (La. App. 1 Cit. 3/27/97),691 So.2d 1336, 1340
). āIn cases in which the contract is ambiguous,
the agreement shall be construed according to the intent of the partiesā, which is an
issue of fact to be inferred from all of the surrounding circumstances.ā Highlands,
7 The terms of the obligation to comply are ambiguous by failing to specify how the homeowner
can or shall prove compliance, or how the State will determine a homeownerās failure to comply.
In addition, though we do not reach a discussion of the Stateās burden to prove the second element
of the breach of EIA contract claimāthe breach of the obligation, we find no evidentiary support
for the Stateās argument that Ms. Poree failed to elevate her home. The documentation submitted
by the State in support of the breach element is the Field Review Report from July 7, 2014, which
states, in pertinent part: āRepairs appear to be complete. Unable to determine if structure is
elevated to BFE. Elevation appears incomplete. The Homeowner was not interviewed.ā This
document does not establish a failure to comply with specific provisions of the EIA. In addition,
the State provides no affidavit from the person who conducted the field review, Garrett
Romagossa, to authenticate the document, attest to his qualifications for conducting the field
review, or attest to his findings.
11
96-1018, p.7, 691 So.2d at 1341. And, where an issue of fact must be resolved, the matter is not ripe for summary judgment. Landis Const. Co., L.L.C. v. St. Bernard Parish, 14-0096, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/22/14),151 So.3d 959, 963
.
From our de novo review, we conclude that genuine issues of material fact
remain as to the intent of the parties regarding the obligations undertaken by Ms.
Poree in accepting the EIA grant funds. Thus, we find the trial court erred in finding
that the State was entitled to summary judgment and repayment of the EIA grant
funds.
Individual Mitigation Measures Agreement
We now consider whether the State met its burden of proof on summary
judgment on the claim that Ms. Poree breached the IMMA contract. On this claim,
the State argues that Ms. Poree received $7,500.00 in grant funds and, by signing the
IMMA, she obligated herself to (1) use her ābest efforts in accomplishing such
activities that stand to mitigate losses from future damages resulting from hurricanes
and similar natural disasters;ā (2) comply with the IMMA provisions within three
years of the date of the Agreement; and (3) repay the IMMA funds if she failed to
demonstrate compliance. The State further argues that Ms. Poree failed to
demonstrate how she used the grant funds in compliance with the IMMA provisions
and failed to repay the funds after the expiration of the three year compliance period,
and that Ms. Poree now owes the State the full amount of the IMMA grant plus
attorney fees and costs.
12
In support of summary judgment on the IMMA breach of contract claim, the
State relied upon the affidavit of Mr. Haley and the following relevant exhibits:
ā¢ A āFinal Award Acknowledgment Formā signed by Ms. Poree on
June 16, 2011, indicating an āAdjustment Disbursementā of
$7,500.00 for Individual Mitigation Measures.
ā¢ The IMMA, which is signed, but not dated, by Ms. Poree.
ā¢ Field Review Report from the Road Home Compliance and
Monitoring Department, indicating a field review was completed for
Ms. Poreeās property on July 7, 2014, and stating the results of that
field review.
From our review of the language of the IMMA and the Field Review Report,
we find genuine issues of fact remain regarding Ms. Poreeās obligations under the
IMMA and the Stateās assertions regarding compliance with the IMMA provisions.
Under the conditions of the IMMA, in Section 4(a), the homeowner agrees to the
following:
Within three years of the date of this Agreement, . . ., I will use my best
efforts in accomplishing such activities that stand to mitigate losses
from future damages resulting from hurricanes and similar natural
disasters. Those activities include, but are not limited to: installing
window protection, installing hurricane straps/clips, bolting walls to
foundation, strengthening doors, anchoring propane tank/heating fuel
tank, and elevating the electrical panel, HVAC unit, washer/dryer,
furnace and/or water heater.
Based on the non-exhaustive list of activities that a homeowner could perform to
accomplish the goal of mitigating future losses, we find the obligations undertaken
under the IMMA are open to interpretation. In addition, there are no provisions for
how the homeowner can or shall show compliance with the IMMA or for how the
State will determine compliance or non-compliance. Moreover, the State did not
submit evidence that reflects Ms. Poreeās failure to comply with IMMA provisions;
13
the Field Review Report from the Compliance and Monitoring Department does not
include any mention of mitigation measures. Finally, in regards to a breach of the
three-year compliance period, there is no effective date or signing date on the IMMA
signed by Ms. Poree.
From our de novo review, we find genuine issues of fact remain regarding the
Stateās breach of contract claim regarding the IMMA, and we find the trial court
erred in finding the State was entitled to summary judgment and ordering Ms. Poree
to repay the IMMA grant funds.
Thus, we find the trial court erred in granting the Stateās motion for summary
judgment and rendering judgment in favor of the State and against Ms. Poree for the
entire amount of the EIA and IMMA grant funds ($37,500.00) plus interest.
Peremptory exceptions
Finally, we briefly address the peremptory exceptions filed by Ms. Poree for
the first time in this Court on appeal, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 2163, which provides
as follows:
The appellate court may consider the peremptory exception filed for the
first time in that court, if pleaded prior to a submission of the case for a
decision, and if proof of the ground of the exception appears of record.
If the ground for the peremptory exception pleaded in the appellate
court is prescription, the plaintiff may demand that the case be
remanded to the trial court for trial of the exception.
In this Court, Ms. Poree filed: 1) an exception of peremption under La. R.S. 9:2772;
2) an exception of no cause of action; 3) an exception of prescription based on La.
C.C. art. 1564; 4) an exception of prescription based on La. C.C. art. 3494; and 5)
14
an exception of prescription based on La. C.C. art. 3499. Ms. Poree seeks a full
hearing on these exceptions.
In consideration of this Courtās reversal of the judgment granting the Stateās
motion for summary judgment, and in consideration of La. C.C.P. art. 931 allowing
for evidence to be introduced at a hearing in the trial court on certain peremptory
exceptions, and finding that the record on appeal does not provide the facts necessary
for a determination of the merits of the exceptions pleaded, we remand these
exceptions to the trial court for hearing and judgment. See Marable v. Empire Truck
Sales of Louisiana, LLC, 16-0876, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/23/17), 221 So.3d 880,
889(finding the granting of a motion to remand pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 2163 is discretionary and that remand is generally not necessary if the merits can be determined from the record on appeal); Willett v. Premier Bank, 97-187, p. 10 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/4/97),696 So.2d 196, 201
(finding the appellate court has discretion
to remand for trial of peremptory exception pleaded for the first time on appeal when
the interests of justice require a full hearing).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial courtās September 21, 2022
judgment granting the Stateās motion for summary judgment and rendering
judgment against Ms. Poree in the amount of $37,500.00 plus legal interest. We
remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings, including a trial of the
exceptions pleaded in this Court.
JUDGMENT REVERSED; EXCEPTIONS REMANDED
15