Full Opinion (html_with_citations)

                                    Judgment rendered December 14, 2022.
                                    Application for rehearing may be filed
                                    within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
                                    La. C. Cr. P.

                            No. 54,852-KA

                       COURT OF APPEAL
                        SECOND CIRCUIT
                      STATE OF LOUISIANA

                               *****

STATE OF LOUISIANA                                   Appellee

                                 versus

LEDARRON DEMARION                                    Appellant
CARTER

                               *****

                           Appealed from the
                  First Judicial District Court for the
                      Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
                        Trial Court No. 367,768

                  Honorable John Mosely, Jr., Judge

                               *****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT                           Counsel for Appellant
By: Mary Constance Hanes

JAMES E. STEWART, SR.                                 Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

MEKEISHA SMITH CREAL
WILLIAM J. EDWARDS
ALEXANDRA L. PORUBSKY
Assistant District Attorneys

                               *****


            Before MOORE, STONE, and THOMPSON, JJ.
MOORE, C.J.

       Charged with second degree murder, LeDarron Carter was found

guilty of manslaughter, adjudicated a second felony offender, and sentenced

to 60 years at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of

sentence. He now appeals this sentence as excessive. We affirm.

                          FACTUAL BACKGROUND

       The shooting occurred on the afternoon of June 12, 2019, at “Country

Corner,” a four-plex apartment on Stoner Ave., near the intersection with

Gilbert Dr. The victim, Deverous Holden, went there to help his cousin

Markeisha Maywether move out of her upstairs apartment; other members of

Markeisha’s family also arrived to help with the move.

       Another tenant of Country Corner was Tamara Baker, who lived

downstairs; her boyfriend, the defendant, LeDarron Carter, was also there at

the time.1 After most of the group had gone upstairs to help Markeisha,

Holden had some sort of interaction with Tamara, who was standing in the

breezeway (there was testimony that Tamara had argued with Holden’s

girlfriend, Shema Turner, some weeks prior). The argument between

Holden and Tamara escalated fast. Tamara picked up her phone and

threatened to call somebody, but Holden knocked it out of her hand and

slapped her in the face. Tamara then ran into her apartment, calling for

Carter. At this point, Holden and Shema rushed toward their car, trying to

escape.

       Carter, however, stormed out of the apartment brandishing a handgun,

ran after Holden, and started firing at him. Shema testified that she saw


       1
         Carter told investigators that he lived in the apartment with Tamara, but some
other witnesses said he actually lived elsewhere.
Carter shoot Holden in the back two or three times; forensic evidence

showed two gunshot wounds, the fatal one being in his side, under the

ribcage.

      Various people tried to come to Holden’s aid as he lay facedown on

Stoner Ave., but Carter waved or pointed the gun at them. These included

Holden’s sister, Kainshasa Holden; his godsister, Troinesha Eason, whom he

told, “Who’s next?”, and Shema, whom he told, “You want it too?” Carter

then fled the scene.

      Surveillance video from a nearby house captured most of the incident,

and several witnesses identified Carter in a photo lineup. Officers arrested

him later that day at a house on East Jordan St. After being Mirandized,

Carter consistently denied that he shot Holden, but admitted that if he caught

anybody slapping his girlfriend, he would “beat them up.” He maintained

that his girlfriend, Tamara, actually fired the shots, and, at first, he said he

never even touched the gun. Later in the interview, however, he said that he

took the weapon from her, disposed of it nearby, and then fled the scene

with her. The weapon was never recovered. Nobody saw Holden using a

weapon, and none was found on or near his body.

                         PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      As noted, the state charged Carter with second degree murder. The

matter came to trial over five days in September 2021. Witnesses included

six of the people who were present at the apartment and either saw or heard

the shooting; eight law enforcement officers; two forensics experts; and two

other fact witnesses. The state also played the videos of Carter’s and

Tamara’s interviews with police. The defense put on no evidence. The jury

unanimously found Carter guilty of the responsive offense of manslaughter.
                                         2
      The state then charged Carter as a second-felony habitual offender,

citing his 2013 guilty plea to carnal knowledge of juveniles, for which he

received probation which ended within five years of this homicide. The

court adjudicated him as charged. At a sentencing hearing, Holden’s mother

testified that his death was hard on her health and on Holden’s four minor

children. Carter addressed the court, admitting it was a “sad time” for the

victim’s mother, “but at the end of the day I did what I thought was right as

a man.”

      The court acknowledged Carter’s statement of remorse, but balanced

it against his insistence on being justified: “A weapon used in a situation

where the victim does not have a weapon, the victim is fleeing and is no

longer a danger to the defendant or his family or friends, then that cannot be

justified.” The court also found that Carter “sought other people that were

on the scene” and “there could have been multiple homicides,” making him

a danger to the community. The court noted Carter’s “youthful age” but

found his “reckless behavior” could not be excused. The court sentenced

him to 60 years at hard labor, without benefit of probation or suspension of

sentence.

      Carter now appeals, raising one assignment of error: the sentence of

60 years for manslaughter, as a second-felony offender, is excessive under

the circumstances.

                            APPLICABLE LAW

      An appellate court uses a two-pronged test to review sentences for

excessiveness. First, the record must show that the trial court took

cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial court

is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance, so long
                                        3
as it adequately considered them in particularizing the sentence to the

defendant. State v. Smith,
433 So. 2d 688
 (La. 1983). The goal of Art.

894.1 is to articulate a factual basis for the sentence, not to achieve rigid or

mechanical compliance with its provisions. State v. Lanclos,
419 So. 2d 475

(La. 1982); State v. West, 53,526 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/24/20),
297 So. 3d 1081
.

There is no requirement that any specific factor be given any particular

weight at sentencing. State v. Taves, 03-0518 (La. 12/3/03),
861 So. 2d 144
.

The important elements to be considered are the defendant’s personal history

(age, family ties, marital status, health, employment record), prior criminal

record, seriousness of the offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. State

v. Soco,
441 So. 2d 719
 (La. 1983); State v. West, supra. Where the record

shows an adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed, remand is

unnecessary even in the absence of full compliance with Art. 894.1. State v.
Lanclos, supra;
 State v. West, supra.

      Second, the appellate court must determine whether the sentence is

constitutionally excessive. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is

grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more

than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v.

Dorthey,
623 So. 2d 1276
 (La. 1993). A sentence is deemed grossly

disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of

the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-

0467 (La. 1/15/02),
805 So. 2d 166
. The sentencing court has wide

discretion in imposing a sentence within statutory limits, and such a sentence

will not be set aside as excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of that

discretion. State v. Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04),
893 So. 2d 7
.



                                        4
      Manslaughter carries a sentence of not more than 40 years at hard

labor. La. R.S. 14:31 B. Because this sentence is for less than natural life,

the second felony carries a sentence of not less than one-third the longest

term and not more than twice the longest term for a first conviction. La.

R.S. 15:529.1 A(1). The sentence range for manslaughter, as a second

felony offense, is therefore 13⅓ to 80 years. The sentence shall be at hard

labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S.

15:529.1 G.

                                DISCUSSION

      Carter’s sole assignment of error is that the sentence of 60 years for

manslaughter, as a second felony offender, is excessive under the

circumstances. He raises three arguments.

      Carter first contends that the trial court not only failed to order a

presentence investigation report, but “totally omitted” consideration of any

of the factors in his history other than his youthful age. He suggests this is

simply not adequate compliance with Art. 894.1 and does not individualize

the sentence to the defendant. He argues the court should have also

considered his marital status, dependents, family stability, employment,

mental, emotional, and physical health, the circumstances of the offense, the

likelihood that he will commit another crime, and the potential for

rehabilitation through correctional services other than confinement. State v.

Crawford,
410 So. 2d 1076
 (La. 1982).

      The sentencing colloquy, while perhaps minimal as to Carter’s

personal history, was adequate as to his criminal record and appropriate as to

the facts of the offense and the gravity of his conduct. The record does not

show how the confrontation started between Tamara and the victim in the
                                       5
breezeway, but it clearly shows that Carter was not present when the victim

knocked the phone out of her hand and slapped her in the face.

Nevertheless, he impetuously blazed out of the apartment, pistol in hand,

chased the victim trying to flee, and shot him from behind, not once but

twice. As if that were not enough, Carter then pointed the pistol at the

victim’s girlfriend and female relatives, and threatened to shoot them as

well. After this, he tossed the weapon and fled. At sentencing, he feebly

protested that he did what he thought was right. The district court clearly

expressed its dismay at the recklessness, violence, loss of life, potentially

more than one life, and the implausible attempt to justify these appalling

acts. The court’s silence as to aspects of the offender’s family situation,

employment record, and emotional stability did not, on this record, diminish

from the factual basis for the sentence. We find adequate compliance with

Art. 894.1.

      Carter next contends that his prior felony, carnal knowledge of

juveniles, occurred when he was very young, involved no violence, was

completely consensual, and he “successfully completed” his probated

sentence for it. He suggests that this prior offense should not have weighed

so heavily in the court’s considerations.

      As noted, there is no requirement that specific matters be given any

particular weight at sentencing. State v.
Taves, supra.
 Carter correctly

shows that carnal knowledge of juveniles is, by definition, a crime of

consent, La. R.S. 14:80 A, and not a crime of violence, R.S. 14:2 B, but the

prior conviction dispels the suggestion that he led a law-abiding life for a

substantial period of time before this offense. On this record, we do not find

that the district court placed undue emphasis on the prior offense.
                                       6
       Finally, Carter urges that the sentence range was 13⅓ to 80 years, so

the sentence of 60 years is, in reality, a life sentence, as he was only 19 years

old when he shot Holden. He contends that this essentially negates the

jury’s determination that he was not guilty of second degree murder, which

would have carried a mandatory life sentence. He submits that he should

have “the opportunity to learn another way of behaving” and his life should

not be “treated as disposable.”

       The record shows that Carter was, in fact, 25 years old when he shot

Holden.2 While 25 is still relatively youthful, it is not an age of immaturity

and inability to grasp the consequences of one’s actions. The district court

explicitly considered Carter’s age but found that other acts outweighed it.

We perceive no abuse of discretion. The level of recklessness, harm to the

victim, threat of harm to others, and reluctance to admit culpability place

this case in the same spectrum with State v. Gaines, 52,536 (La. App. 2 Cir.

2/27/19),
266 So. 3d 948
, writ denied, 19-00773 (La. 9/17/19),
279 So. 3d 379
, and State v. Carey, 47,650 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/13),
110 So. 3d 221
,

writ denied, 13-0726 (La. 11/1/13),
125 So. 3d 417
, in which we affirmed

sentences of 50 and 80 years for defendants convicted of manslaughter and

adjudicated second-felony offenders. Carter’s sentence, though severe, does

not shock the sense of justice.

       We also note that under R.S. 15:529.1 H, the sentence does not

exclude the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court has recognized that

the availability of early release is a valid factor in the review for




       2
        His date of birth was June 14, 1993, and this offense occurred on June 12, 2019,
making him two days shy of age 26.

                                           7
excessiveness. State v. LeBlanc, 09-1355 (La. 7/6/10),
41 So. 3d 1168
; State

v. Green,
418 So. 2d 609
 (La. 1982). We note that La. R.S. 15:574.4A(1)(b)

permits Carter’s qualification for parole after serving 75% of his sentence.

On this record, we perceive no abuse of the district court’s sentencing

discretion.

                              CONCLUSION

      We have reviewed the entire record and find nothing we consider to

be error patent. La. C. Cr. P. art. 920(2). For the reasons expressed, the

conviction and sentence are affirmed.

      CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.




                                        8