In the Interest of A.G., Minor Child
Date Filed2022-12-21
Docket22-1446
Cited0 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1446
Filed December 21, 2022
IN THE INTEREST OF A.G.,
Minor Child,
C.G., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County,
Charles D. Fagan, District Associate Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Sara E. Benson of Meldrum & Benson Law, P.C., Council Bluffs, for
appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Maura C. Goaley, Council Bluffs, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
child.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ.
2
BULLER, Judge.
The legal father of a child appeals from an order terminating his parental
rights to A.G., born in 2020. A paternity test taken during the course of the
proceedings established that the legal father was not the biological father. Neither
the mother or biological father appeal termination. The legal father challenges
whether the termination hearing should have proceeded without him, but he does
not challenge the merits of termination. We find that the father did not ask to
personally participate in the termination proceedings. We therefore affirm.
Much of the factual development below relates to the biological mother of
the child. Methamphetamine looms large in her life. By her own admission, she
is a lifelong methamphetamine user and repeatedly failed to complete both
outpatient and inpatient treatment during the life of the case. She used
methamphetamine and marijuana while pregnant. And she could not provide a
suitable home for the child after birth, leading to a finding that the child was in need
of assistance and the termination proceedings that give rise to this appeal.
The legal father is incarcerated in federal prison and has been throughout
the child-in-need-of-assistance and termination proceedings. So far as the record
discloses, it appears the legal father never met the child. The legal father remotely
participated in various proceedings by Zoom but, after learning that he was not the
biological father, he informed the juvenile court at the permanency hearing that he
intended to consent to termination. The record was left open for the legal father to
file a written consent to termination, but (for reasons unknown) that never
happened. The record is silent about why the legal father was not present at the
termination hearing by Zoom, but he makes no claim that he did not receive notice.
3
Counsel for the legal father was present at the hearing. The legal father’s counsel
said nothing about the legal father’s desire to attend or participate, but counsel did
expressly relay that the legal father intended to consent to termination under Iowa
Code section 232.116(1)(a) (2022) (“The parents voluntarily and intelligently
consent to the termination of parental rights and the parent-child relationship and
for good cause desire the termination.”). The court found a lack of evidence to
terminate the legal father’s parental rights under section 232.116(1)(a) but did
terminate his rights under section 232.116(1)(e) and (h).
The legal father’s sole challenge on appeal concerns his absence from the
termination hearing. The State contests whether error was preserved, focusing on
how the father’s legal counsel did not seek a continuance or any other remedy to
arrange for her client’s participation. We conclude error was not preserved
because the father never indicated he wished to participate in the proceeding.
Without such a request, and a subsequent ruling by the juvenile court, we have
nothing to review. See Iowa Code § 602.5103(1) (“The court of appeals . . . constitutes a court for the correction of errors at law.”); In re M.L.H., No. 16-1216,2016 WL 4803999
, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2016) (finding the
father did not preserve error on appeal after he failed to appear for the termination
hearing and his “attorney stated the father had essentially ‘given up’”).
4
We also note that, if the legal father’s absence at the termination hearing
implicated procedural due process, the fundamental obligation to afford a parent
notice and an opportunity for hearing was satisfied. See In re S.P., 672 N.W.2d
842, 845 (Iowa 2003). The father had notice, he appeared at prior hearings, and
his attorney conveyed his intent to consent to termination of his parental rights.
AFFIRMED.