BMI Properties, LLC v. Building Associates, Inc.
Date Filed2023-12-14
Docket23A-PL-00988
Cited0 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
FILED
Dec 14 2023, 8:50 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Lonnie D. Johnson BUILDING ASSOCIATES, INC.
Benjamin A. Katchur Crystal G. Rowe
Clendening Johnson & Bohrer, P.C. April M. Jay
Bloomington, Indiana Kightlinger & Gray, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
TABOR/BRUCE ARCHITECTURE
& DESIGN, INC.
Nicholas C. Nizamoff
Michael D. Heavilon
DeFur Voran, LLP
Fishers, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
EDWARDS MASONRY, INC.
Thomas M. Kimbrough
Michael H. Michmerhuizen
Barrett McNagny LLP
Fort Wayne, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-988 | December 14, 2023 Page 1 of 11
BMI Properties, LLC, December 14, 2023
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
23A-PL-988
v.
Appeal from the
1
Daewoong, LLC; Tabor/Bruce Monroe Circuit Court
Architecture & Design, Inc.;
2 The Honorable
Building Associates, Inc.; and Kara E. Krothe, Judge
Edwards Masonry, Inc.,
Appellees-Defendants. Trial Court Cause No.
53C06-2107-PL-1448
Opinion by Senior Judge Baker
Judges May and Vaidik concur.
Baker, Senior Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] BMI Properties, LLC (BMI) appeals from the trial courtâs order granting
summary judgment in favor of Tabor/Bruce Architecture & Design, Inc.
(Tabor/Bruce), Building Associates, Inc (BAI), and Edwards Masonry, Inc.
(Edwards Masonry). The trial court found that BMIâs claims were precluded as
a matter of law by the economic loss doctrine and the acceptance rule.
1
BMI informs us that â[T]o date, Daewoong has failed to appear or participate in this litigation.â However,
pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 17(A), âA party of record in the trial court . . . shall be a party on
appeal.â
2
Building Associates, Inc. has not filed a separate appellate brief but has sought and was granted permission
to join in the briefs of Edwards Masonry, Inc. and Tabor/Bruce Architecture & Design, Inc.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-988 | December 14, 2023 Page 2 of 11
Concluding that genuine issues of material fact exist making the grant of
summary judgment inappropriate and that BMIâs claims are not precluded as a
matter of law, we reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Daewoong, LLC (Daewoong) owned property in Bloomington and contracted
with BAI in 2016 for the construction of a mixed-use building on the property.
The first floor consisted of commercial units, while the second and third floors
were residential apartment units. BMI entered into a purchase agreement with
Daewoong for the mixed-use building and property on June 4, 2019.
[3] The purchase agreement provided that BMI had the right to obtain a physical
inspection of the property for any âmajor defect in or with the [property]â and
to withdraw from the transaction within fifteen days of the receipt of the
inspection report if the report disclosed any material property defects.
Appellantâs App. Vol. II, pp. 41-42. The purchase agreement further provided
that âIf [BMI] does not make a written objection to any problem(s) revealed in
the report(s) within such time period, the [property] shall be deemed acceptable
to [BMI]. Id. at 42.
[4] A survey, environmental assessment, and observable conditions physical
inspection were completed, and Daewoong provided BMI with an
environmental review completed by the Indiana Department of Environmental
Management. The parties closed on the property on July 31, 2019.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-988 | December 14, 2023 Page 3 of 11
[5] Sometime in August 2019, a residential tenantâs bed post fell through the
floorboard on the day they moved into the apartment. And bricks fell off the
exterior of the building, damaging a tenantâs vehicle.
[6] After these events, BMI arranged to have the building inspected by the Veridus
Groupâs Building Forensics Director Dan Weekes. Weekesâ inspection
included findings of moisture damage to the south and west exterior walls and
adjacent areas, cracks located in the brick veneer, improper drainage systems
for the brick veneer, and design defects in how the brick veneer was to be
constructed. BMI also hired Mold Diagnostics, LLC to perform spore trapping
and surface testing. The results of that inspection revealed there were multiple
areas with unacceptable levels of airborne spores within the building, and
visible black mold, which poses a serious risk to human health.
[7] BMI initially filed its complaint against Daewoong, but later amended its
complaint to name BAI, the general contractor; Edwards Masonry; and the
buildingâs architect, Tabor/Bruce. BMI alleged a breach of contract claim
against Daewoong. As for the others, BMI alleged negligence and breach of the
warranty of habitability, relating to the defects discovered during the
inspections. Though BMI served Daewoong by publication, Daewoong has
failed to appear or participate in this action. The remaining defendants
separately filed motions for summary judgment, with each contending that BMI
was precluded from recovery against them under the acceptance rule and
economic loss doctrine. The trial court agreed and granted the motions for
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-988 | December 14, 2023 Page 4 of 11
summary judgment. BMI now appeals, contending that the entry of summary
judgment was inappropriate.
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[8] We review a trial court's summary judgment decision de novo, using the same
standard as the trial court. Griffin v. Menard, Inc., 175 N.E.3d 811, 812-13 (Ind.
2021). Summary judgment is appropriate âif the designated evidentiary matter
shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.â Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).
[9] âThe moving party bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that there
are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law . . . .â Dreaded, Inc. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 904
N.E.2d 1267, 1270 (Ind. 2009). If the movant satisfies that burden, âthe burden
then shifts to the non-moving party to designate and produce evidence of facts
showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.â Id. âA fact is
âmaterialâ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is
âgenuineâ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the partiesâ differing accounts of
the truth . . . .â Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009). âWe must
construe all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and all doubts
as to the existence of a material issue must be resolved against the moving
party.â Hale v. SS Liquors, Inc., 956 N.E.2d 1189, 1191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-988 | December 14, 2023 Page 5 of 11
[10] The Indiana Supreme Court has explained, âIndiana consciously errs on the
side of letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the merits, rather than risk
short-circuiting meritorious claims.â Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1004
(Ind. 2014). As a result, while the non-moving party has the burden on appeal
of showing the Court that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous, we
carefully assess the trial courtâs decision to ensure the non-movant was not
improperly denied a trial. Brown by Brown v. Southside Animal Shelter, Inc., 158
N.E.3d 401, 405 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), adhered to on rehâg,162 N.E.3d 1121
(2021), trans. denied.
Analysis
A. The Acceptance Rule
[11] The trial court concluded the acceptance rule bars recovery by BMI because of
the lack of privity between BMI, BAI, Edwards Masonry, and Tabor/Bruce.
The court found that BMI, who lacked contractual privity, was precluded from
recovery by Daewoong LLCâs acceptance of the project.
[12] âIn order to prevail on a claim of negligence, the plaintiff is required to prove:
(1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by
the defendant; and (3) an injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the
breach.â Peters v. Forster, 804 N.E.2d 736, 738 (Ind. 2004). âDuty is a question
of law for the court to decide.â Id. âAbsent a duty, there can be no breach of
duty and thus no negligence or liability based upon the breach.â Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-988 | December 14, 2023 Page 6 of 11
[13] The trial courtâs order was entered prior to our Supreme Courtâs decision in
U.S. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 204 N.E.3d 215 (Ind. 2023).
In Automatic Sprinkler, our Supreme Court observed that the acceptance rule,
with its various exceptions, âgenerally shieldedâ contractors âfrom third-party
liability once the work is completed and then accepted by the owner.â 204
N.E.3d at 225. In other words, ââcontractors do not owe a duty of care to third
parties after the owner has accepted the work.ââ Peters, 804 N.E.2d at 738
(quoting Blake v. Calumet Constr. Corp., 674 N.E.2d 167, 170 (Ind. 1996)).
[14] However, the court noted that in Peters it abandoned the acceptance rule in
favor of the âforeseeability doctrine.â 204 N.E.3d at 225. The Peters Court held
that,
A rule that provides that a builder or contractor is liable for injury
or damage to a third person as a result of the condition of the
work, even after completion of the work and acceptance by the
owner, where it was reasonably foreseeable that a third party
would be injured by such work due to the contractorâs
negligence, is consistent with traditional principles of negligence
upon which Indianaâs scheme of negligence law is based.
804 N.E.2d at 742.
[15] In Automatic Sprinkler, our Supreme Court âclarif[ied] the foreseeability
doctrineâs scope in two ways.â 204 N.E.3d at 226. âFirst, the foreseeability
doctrine applies when a third party seeks recovery for personal injury that was a
foreseeable consequence of a contractorâs allegedly negligent work.â Id. This
harmonized the Peters decisionâs goal of âequaliz[ing] the liability field in the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-988 | December 14, 2023 Page 7 of 11
context of negligence claims resulting in injuries to third parties.â Id. âSecond,
the doctrine applies when a third party seeks recovery for property damage if
personal injuryâthough not sustainedâis a foreseeable consequence of a
contractorâs allegedly negligent work.â Id. This harmonized the Citizenâs Gas &
Coke Util. v. Amer. Econ. Ins., 486 N.E.2d 998, 1000 (Ind. 1985) decisionâs goal
of maintaining the privity requirementâs operation to preclude recovery for
property damages in a negligence action, where the negligent work poses a risk
only to property and not persons. Id. at 226-27.
[16] Turning now to the case at hand, we conclude that BMIâs claims survive the
motions for summary judgment. BMIâs complaint alleged that due to the
condition of the mixed-use building, a tenantâs bedpost broke through the
floorboard of the apartment when the tenant was moving in, and airborne
spores were present within the building, along with visible black mold, which
pose a serious risk to human health. Additionally, the brick veneer of the
building was peeling away allegedly due to design defects and improper
drainage leading to bricks falling to the ground. A tenantâs car was allegedly
damaged by the falling brick.
[17] No injuries to a person are alleged to have occurred. And, fortunately, no one
was injured when the bedpost broke through the floorboard, no one became ill
due to exposure to the airborne spores and/or black mold, and no passersby
were injured when the brick veneer peeled away from the building due to the
alleged faulty work, falling and striking the vehicle. However, whether personal
injury was a foreseeable consequence of BAI, Edwards Masonry, or
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-988 | December 14, 2023 Page 8 of 11
Tabor/Bruceâs work presents a genuine issue of material fact. We conclude
that the trial court, although not having the benefit of our Supreme Courtâs
decision in Automatic Sprinkler, erred by granting summary judgment under the
acceptance rule.
B. Economic Loss Doctrine
[18] The trial court also concluded that the economic loss doctrine precluded BMI
from recovering for its claims. More specifically, the court held that âthe costs
[BMI] is aiming to recover, repair to the apartment building, is[sic] purely
economic.â Appellantâs App. Vol. II, p. 21.
[19] â[T]he longstanding rule under Indiana law is that a defendant is not liable in
tort when a plaintiff alleges only purely economic loss, which is financial harm
arising from the failure of the product or service to perform as expected.â
Residences at Ivy Quad Unit Owners Assân, Inc. v. Ivy Quad Dev., LLC, 179 N.E.3d
977, 983 (Ind. 2022) (internal quotations omitted). âUnder Indianaâs economic
loss doctrine, a defendant is not liable in tort âfor any purely economic loss
caused by its negligence.ââ Id. at 982-83 (quoting Indianapolis-Marion Cnty. Pub.
Libr. v. Charlier Clark & Linard, P.C., 929 N.E.2d 722, 729 (Ind. 2010)).
ââEconomic lossesâ occur when there is no personal injury and no physical
harm to other property.â Gunkel v. Renovations, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 150, 153-54
(Ind. 2005).
[20] âBecause these losses are, essentially âdisappointed contractual or commercial
expectations,â contract lawânot tort lawâis most appropriate for resolving
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-988 | December 14, 2023 Page 9 of 11
liability.â Ivy Quad, 179 N.E.3d at 983 (quoting Gunkel, 822 N.E.2d at 154).
âNotably, however, pure economic loss excludes damages that either stem from
personal injury or are sustained by âother property.ââ Id.(quoting Gunkel,822 N.E.2d at 153-54
). âWhen such damages occur, recovery in tort is appropriate,
and the economic loss doctrine does not bar recovery.â Id.
[21] The Court further explained that â[o]ur economic loss doctrine is rooted in the
understanding that parties typically allocate the risk of economic loss through a
direct, contractual relationship.â Id. âBut in the construction-project contextâ
where contractual privity between each participant may be lackingâparties
typically allocate that risk through âa network or chain of contracts.ââ Id.
(quoting Indianapolis-Marion Cnty. Pub. Libr., 929 N.E.2d at 739). With ââsuch a
contract chain,â the participants retain âthe opportunity to bargain and define
their rights and remedies, or to decline to enter into the contractual
relationship.ââ Id.(quoting Indianapolis-Marion Cnty. Pub. Libr.,929 N.E.2d at 740
). âAnd when construction-project participants are connected in this way,
the economic loss rule prevents a party from recovering in tort for commercial
losses that it could have protected itself against through the contractual
relationship.â Id.
[22] Our Supreme Court summarized the analysis involved as follows: âThus, when
determining whether our economic loss doctrine precludes tort recovery, two
considerations guide our review: the type of damages sought and the
contractual relationship between the parties.â Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-988 | December 14, 2023 Page 10 of 11
[23] We first look to the contractual relationship between the parties before engaging
in an analysis of the type of damages sought. BMI concedes that there was no
contractual relationship between it and BAI, Edwards Masonry, and
Tabor/Bruce. Appellantâs Br. p. 14. Edwards Masonry simply contends that
BMI had other options available to allocate its risks, without refuting the lack of
contractual relationship. See Edwards Masonry Br. p. 18. And Bruce/Tabor
states that âBMI . . . had no contract with Tabor/Bruce or any of the other
Construction Parties.â Bruce/Tabor Br. p. 10. The economic loss doctrine
does not apply to this situation because there is no contractual relationship
between the parties and, thus, no network or chain of contracts where the
parties allocated risks. And, as a consequence, we need not examine the type of
damages sought. We conclude that the economic loss doctrine should not
preclude BMIâs claims from going forward and that the trial courtâs entry of
summary judgment was in error.
Conclusion
[24] In light of the foregoing, we conclude that neither the acceptance rule nor the
economic loss rule entitles the defendants to summary judgment. Therefore, we
reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
[25] Reversed and remanded.
May, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-988 | December 14, 2023 Page 11 of 11