600 Land, Inc. v. Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals of Marion County

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A05-0604-CV-223

600 Land, Inc. is the owner of land in Marion County on which it wants to build a “solid waste transfer station.” The County contends that a special exception from the zoning ordinance is required. The land is zoned to permit a “motor truck terminal” to be operated without a special use permit. 600 Land’s proposed use qualifies as a “motor truck terminal” because “[a] terminal may include facilities for the temporary storage of loads prior to transshipment.”

Background

600 Land, Inc. purchased an 8-acre parcel of land in Marion County with the intent to develop it as a “solid waste transfer station” and recycling facility. Trucks bring loads of solid waste and recyelables to a “transfer station,” a building where *307the trucks are unloaded, the loads stored temporarily, and then re-loaded onto larger trucks to be taken to incinerators, landfills, or recycling facilities. Marion County has adopted an Industrial Zoning Ordinance (IZO) and under the IZO, 600 Land’s property is zoned as I-4-S, the heaviest industrial classification. The IZO does not explicitly list a “solid waste transfer station” as a permitted or prohibited use in an I-4-S district.

The Indianapolis Department of Metropolitan Development (DMD) is responsible for administering the IZO and its staff advised 600 Land that it was required to file a petition for a special exception from the IZO in order to operate the proposed transfer station. 600 Land filed a petition for a special exception with the Marion County Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), as provided for under the IZO and as advised by the DMD staff. A number of area property and business owners remonstrated against the proposed special exception, including Kite Realty Group, L.P. (Kite) and Sybaris Club of Indianapolis, LLC (Sybaris), who are intervenors in this appeal.1 The BZA denied the petition after a public hearing. 600 Land then appealed the BZA’s denial to the trial court. 600 Land subsequently amended its appeal from the BZA’s decision to include a request for a declaratory judgment that the IZO did not require it to obtain a special exception at all because its proposed use qualified as a “motor truck terminal,” an explicitly permitted land use in a district zoned I-4-S.

The trial court held that (1) the IZO did require 600 Land to obtain a special use exception for this use and (2) affirmed the denial of the special exception. 600 Land appealed. The Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the trial court’s determination that a special exception was required, but (2) reversed the BZA’s denial of the special exception on grounds that its findings were unsupported by the evidence. 600 Land, Inc. v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Marion County, 863 N.E.2d 339, 356 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). The BZA and Kite petitioned for, and we granted, transfer, 878 N.E.2d 218 (Ind.2007) (table), thereby vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Discussion

I

Under the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure, when the Supreme Court grants transfer, as we have done in this case, the case stands before us in the same procedural posture as it did when initially filed in the Court of Appeals: this Court has “jurisdiction over the appeal and all issues as if originally filed in the Supreme Court.” App. R. 58(A). In this appeal, the BZA and Kite seek transfer on grounds that the Court of Appeals incorrectly reversed the BZA’s decision denying 600 Land’s request for a special exception. 600 Land has not sought transfer from the Court of Appeals determination that a special exception was required. But because the effect of a grant of transfer is to place all issues initially raised in the Court of Appeals before this Court, both the question of whether a special exception was required and the question of whether the special exception was properly denied are before us.

In the Court of Appeals, Kite (but neither the BZA nor Sybaris) argued that the issue of whether a special exception was required was not properly before the court, contending that 600 Land had con*308ceded the point by filing a petition for a special exception in the first place and, in any event, that 600 Land had waived the right to appellate review of the issue by not seeking a determination on the point from the BZA or, for that matter, until amending its complaint in the trial court.

We acknowledge that there is some authority from the Court of Appeals in support of Kite’s position.2 See Ayers v. Porter County Plan Comm’n, 544 N.E.2d 213, 217 n. 7 (Ind.Ct.App.1989) (dicta); Children’s Home of S.E. Ind., Inc. v. Area Planning Comm’n of Franklin County, 486 N.E.2d 1048, 1051 (Ind.Ct.App.1985). But for several reasons we have decided to resolve 600 Land’s claim on the merits.

First, 600 Land had been advised by the DMD staff that in its view a special exception was required. This gave 600 Land three choices if it wanted to proceed with the project. It could commence work and face injunctive action initiated by the government.3 It could file a declaratory judgment action in the trial court. Or it could follow the advice of the DMD staff and seek a special exception from the BZA. Given these circumstances, 600 Land took what seems even in retrospect to be the most practical approach, the one that imposed the least burden on the legal system.

Second, we perceive absolutely no prejudice to the BZA or the intervenors from the way things evolved. They had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue both in the trial court and Court of Appeals (and here had they chosen to do so). Similarly, because the issue of whether a special exception was required is a question of law, Flying J., Inc. v. City of New Haven Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 855 N.E.2d 1035, 1039 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied, any determination that the BZA might have made on the subject would have been reviewed de novo by the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and this Court.

Third, we find nothing in the record that suggests that the BZA or the intervenors objected in the trial court to 600 Land seeking a declaratory judgment and, as noted above, neither the BZA nor Sybaris contended in the Court of Appeals that it was not available for review. Nor does the BZA or Kite renew the point in their transfer petition, though we acknowledge that the issue did come up in oral argument. Given this history, we perceive at least some acquiescence to having the issue resolved on the merits, as both courts below have done.

II

Turning to the issue of whether 600 Land’s proposed waste transfer station is land use permitted by the IZO, we begin by observing that Section 1.00 of the IZO establishes four levels of industrial zoning for suburban areas from I-l-S (least intense industrial uses) to I-4-S (most intense). As noted, 600 Land’s property is zoned I-4-S. Section 2.01 lists the various uses that are permitted within these four levels of industrial districts. Waste transfer stations are not specifically referenced in Section 2.01 as a permitted use. But “motor truck terminals” are permitted uses in the heaviest industrial suburban district (I — 4—S) without a special exception.4

*309The IZO’s definition of “motor truck terminal” consists of two separate sentences:

“[a] building or area in which trucks, including tractor or trailer units are parked, stored, or serviced, including the transfer, loading or unloading of goods. A terminal may include facilities for the temporary storage of loads prior to transshipment.”

IZO, § 2.13(B)(70) (Appellant’s App. 559.)

600 Land contends that its proposed waste transfer station meets the definition of “motor truck terminal” because it intends to store loads of waste there temporarily prior to shipping them to their final destination and because “it will use the facility to park, store and service its trucks.” (Appellant’s Br. at 16.) Appel-lees counter that in order to meet the definition of “motor truck terminal,” the facility must transfer, load or unload “goods.” They argue that since waste does not constitute “goods,” 600 Land’s proposed facility fails to satisfy the definition. (Appellees’ Brief at 9-10.)

“Construction of a zoning ordinance is a question of law.” Flying J., Inc., 855 N.E.2d at 1039. “We review questions of law under a de novo standard and owe no deference to a trial court’s legal conclusions.” Int’l Union of Police Ass’ns, Local No. 133 v. Ralston, 872 N.E.2d 682, 687 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). “When asked to interpret an ordinance, this court will apply the same principles as those employed for the construction of statutes.” T.W. Thom Constr., Inc. v. City of Jeffersonville, 721 N.E.2d 319, 324 (Ind.Ct.App.1999).

Mr. Scott Fitzgerald and Mr. Rod Perkins, managers for 600 Land, testified in their depositions that the collection trucks used in 600 Land’s proposed waste transfer station will be parked, stored, and serviced at the facility. 600 Land’s proposed use fits the threshold requirements of a “motor truck terminal” contained in the first sentence of the definition.

Next, 600 Land points us to the second sentence of the definition: “A terminal may include facilities for the temporary storage of loads prior to transshipment.” (Appellant’s Br. at 13.) It contends that its proposed transfer station’s temporary storage of waste before transport to final disposal fits precisely into this part of the definition.

The term “loads” is not defined in the IZO. Undefined words in a statute or ordinance are given their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning.5 “In determining the plain and ordinary meaning of a term, courts may use English language dictionaries as well as consider the relationship with other words and phrases.” Flying J., Inc., 855 N.E.2d at 1040. The term “load” has a common meaning of “[s]omething that is carried, as by a vehicle, person, or animal,”6 or “whatever is put in a ship or vehicle or airplane for *310conveyance.”7 The Court of Appeals in this case concluded that “under these common definitions, waste falls within the definition of ‘load,’ ” 600 Land, Inc., 863 N.E.2d at 346, and we agree.

However, the Court of Appeals went on to conclude that “the term ‘load’ is limited by the preceding term ‘goods’ that is, “in the context of the ordinance, the term ‘loads’ allows for the temporary storage of only the ‘goods’ that trucks may transfer, load, or unload at the station.” Id. at 346-47. This too is the position taken by the BZA and intervenors — that a facility must transfer, load, or unload goods in order to satisfy the definition of “motor truck terminal.”

The relevant portion of the definition states that a motor truck terminal is a “building or area in which trucks, including tractor or trailer units are parked, stored, or serviced, including the transfer, loading or unloading of goods.” IZO, § 2.13(B)(70) (Appellant’s App. 559) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that at a minimum a motor truck terminal must be a “building or area in which trucks, including tractor or trailer units are parked, stored, or serviced.”8 The phrase “including tractor or trailor units” refers to “trucks,” describing the types of trucks that can be parked, stored, or serviced at motor truck terminals. Similarly, “including the transfer, loading or unloading of goods” refers to “serviced,” describing the ways that trucks can be serviced at a motor truck terminal. Neither “including tractor or trailor units” nor “including the transfer, loading or unloading of goods” are required elements of a “motor truck terminal.” Instead, they both describe their respective antecedent terms: “trucks” and “serviced.”

The question thus becomes whether the City-County Council, when it enacted the ordinance, meant “goods” or something other than the usual and ordinary meaning of the word “loads” when it used that word in the second sentence of the definition. We think not.

The Court of Appeals came to a contrary conclusion by employing two venerable “canons” of statutory construction referred to by the Latin expressions “ejusdem generis” and “noscitur a sociis.” While we acknowledge the utility of these formulations, we find them inapplicable here where the words “goods” and “loads” appear in entirely separate sentences.

The first of these rules — ejusdem generis — applies when a list (or enumeration) of words of specific and limited meaning are followed by words of more general and comprehensive meaning. The general words are then construed as including only those persons, places, or things that are like those designated by the specific words.9 But here the more *311general word “loads” does not follow a list of more specific words; indeed, there is no listing or enumeration of persons, places, or things at all. It is true that the more specific word “goods” does appear by itself in the preceding sentence but this is not enough to invoke the logic that animates the canon.

The second rule — noscitur a sociis — is a variation of the first and stands for the proposition that “the meaning of doubtful words may be determined by reference to their relationship with other associated words and phrases.” 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction 347-48 (7th ed.2007).10 The definition of “motor truck terminal” does not group the words “goods” and “loads” together. To repeat, they appear in separate sentences and refer to different antecedents.

The BZA and intervenors make another argument in this regard. The IZO does require a special exception if the proposed use is for “[s]erap metal, junk or salvage storage or operation, open or enclosed, including automobile or truck wrecking or recycling, construction materials recycling, or similar uses.” § 2.01(D)(2)(j) (Appellant’s App. 487-88.) The BZA contends that 600 Land’s proposed use falls under this description thereby triggering the requirement for a special use permit.

We think that the special exception requirement for what we will call the “salvage and storage” use is triggered upon the occurrence of one. of two events: (1) some type of processing or transforming— “salvage,” “wrecking,” “recycling” — of the scrap metal, junk, autos, trucks, construction materials, or similar materials delivered to the site; or (2) “storage” of those materials on the site. We take it as a given that at least some of the 'material in 600 Land’s loads will constitute the materials encompassed by the salvage and storage use special exception. At the same time, we see nothing in the record that suggests that anything like the processing or transforming that would be covered by triggering event (1) will occur at 600 Land’s transfer station. The closer question is whether the fact that some of 600 Land’s loads will be temporarily stored prior to transshipment constitutes “storage” for purposes of triggering event (2). Here we think the key is in the motor truck terminal’s provision for “temporary storage of loads.” We believe that the intent of the ordinance is to require a special use permit for any storage beyond *312a temporary period of the materials covered by the “salvage and storage” use special exception. The record indicates to us that 600 Land’s business plan calls for its loads to be transshipped by no later than the next business day after which they arrive at the transfer station. Such storage does not extend beyond a temporary period and does not trigger the requirement for a salvage and storage use special exception.

In summary, the term “loads” in the definition of “motor truck terminal” is not limited by the preceding term “goods.” The loads of waste to be hauled in and out of 600 Land’s proposed waste transfer station by its collection trucks fit into this common meaning of “loads.” 600 Land’s proposed use qualifies as a “motor truck terminal” because “[a] terminal may include facilities for the temporary storage of loads prior to transshipment.” IZO, § 2.13(B)(70) (Appellant’s App. 559.) 600 Land’s proposed waste transfer station is a permitted use under the IZO without a special exception.

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court that 600 Land is required to obtain a special use permit for its transfer station is reversed.