People v. Hilliard

                                          IN THE
                                 SUPREME COURT
                                              OF
                           THE STATE OF ILLINOIS




                                     (Docket No. 128186)

                THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
                          ANDRE HILLIARD, Appellant.


                              Opinion filed November 30, 2023.



        JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White,
     Cunningham, and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.



                                          OPINION

¶1        Defendant, Andre Hilliard, filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging that
     the mandatory 25-year firearm enhancement added to his sentence was
     unconstitutional as applied to him under the proportionate penalties clause of the
     Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11), in part because he was 18 years
     old when he committed the offense. The Cook County circuit court summarily
     dismissed his petition, and the appellate court affirmed. For the reasons that follow,
     we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.


¶2                                   I. BACKGROUND

¶3      The facts of this case have been set forth in two prior appellate court decisions
     (

; People v. Hilliard, 

), and
     we summarize only the facts pertinent to our disposition.

¶4       Defendant was tried on one count each of attempted first degree murder (720
     ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2012)) and aggravated battery with a firearm (id.
     § 12-3.05(e)(1)). The charges arose from the shooting of Devaul Killingsworth on
     August 6, 2013. Before jury selection began, the circuit court ordered that defendant
     be removed from the courtroom because he had threatened people, become
     belligerent, and screamed. He was placed in a lockup where he could hear the
     proceedings. Defendant was given the option to return to the courtroom at any time
     during the proceedings but chose not to.

¶5        Devaul Killingsworth testified that at about 12:45 a.m. on August 6, 2013, he
     was visiting Tracy Chatman, his grandchildren’s mother, in her public housing
     complex. Killingsworth was standing outside Chatman’s door, talking to neighbors.
     The neighbors went inside their apartment, and Killingsworth was about to enter
     Chatman’s apartment when he heard a noise and turned around. He saw defendant
     running toward him with a gun pointed at him. Defendant was Chatman’s boyfriend
     and lived in the same housing complex. Killingsworth had previously only engaged
     in small talk with defendant and did not get along with him. Defendant fired two to
     five shots at Killingsworth from one to two feet away. Killingsworth lifted his arm
     to protect himself and ran. He fell down in a grassy area and did not see where
     defendant went. Killingsworth suffered two gunshot wounds to his arm, and an
     ambulance later transported him to the hospital. There, Killingsworth informed
     detectives that defendant shot him and identified defendant in a photo line-up.
     Killingsworth had surgery that involved implanting plates, rods, and pins in his
     arm. The surgeon could not remove all of the bullet fragments, and at the time of
     trial, Killingsworth could not use his arm to the same extent as before. After the
     police arrested defendant the following month, Killingsworth identified him in a
     physical line-up.



                                             -2-
¶6       The jury found defendant guilty of attempted first degree murder and
     aggravated battery with a firearm. The jury also found that, while committing
     attempted murder, defendant personally discharged a firearm that caused great
     bodily harm.

¶7       The circuit court subsequently ordered a fitness examination of defendant based
     on his behavior in court. Dr. Nishad Nadkarni interviewed defendant three times
     but could not render an opinion on fitness because defendant refused to cooperate.
     Dr. Nadkarni stated that there was no objective evidence in collateral information
     or the examinations that demonstrated that defendant had a major mental illness or
     cognitive impairment. Dr. Nadkarni stated that defendant’s behavior was consistent
     with malingering mental issues and that defendant did not show any impairments
     that would prevent him from understanding the charges or participating in the trial.
     Among the documents that Dr. Nadkarni reviewed were medical records of
     defendant’s two hospitalizations in 2009, when he was 14 years old. The first time
     he received a discharge diagnosis of recurrent major depression, and the second
     time the discharge diagnosis was mood disorder. Following a fitness hearing, the
     circuit court found defendant fit for posttrial motions and sentencing.

¶8       Defendant declined to answer most questions in the preparation of his
     presentence investigation report (PSI). The report stated that defendant did not have
     a relationship with his father, had “graduated from elementary school” but had not
     attended high school, and self-reported that he suffered from a mental illness but
     did not want to discuss his mental health history. Defendant described his childhood
     as normal and denied any history of family abuse, substance abuse, or gang
     affiliation. Defendant had no criminal history.

¶9       At the sentencing hearing, neither party chose to present evidence in
     aggravation or mitigation, and defendant declined to make a statement in allocution.
     The circuit court found that the aggravated battery with a firearm charge merged
     into the charge of attempted first degree murder, for which it sentenced defendant
     to 15 years’ imprisonment. 1 The circuit court then stated, “On the proven allegation
     of personally discharging a firearm that proximately caused bodily harm to a

        1
          The sentencing range for attempted first degree murder was between 6 and 30 years’
     imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1) (West 2012); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2012).




                                              -3-
       person, the minimum on that is 25 years, is that correct, State?” The prosecutor
       answered in the affirmative, and the circuit court stated that it was sentencing
       defendant to the minimum of 25 years for the firearm enhancement.

¶ 10       On direct appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that the mandatory 25-year
       firearm enhancement was unconstitutionally disproportionate as applied and that
       his total sentence of 40 years’ imprisonment was excessive in light of his age and
       the absence of any prior criminal activity. Hilliard, 

,
       ¶ 1. Relying on People v. Thompson, 

, the appellate court stated
       that the record was not sufficiently developed to address defendant’s as-applied
       challenge but that he could raise the issue in a collateral proceeding. Hilliard, 

, ¶ 42. The appellate court held that the circuit court acted
       within its discretion in sentencing defendant to 40 years’ imprisonment. Id. ¶ 58.

¶ 11        On September 19, 2019, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition, which
       is the subject of the instant appeal. He argued that the 25-year firearm enhancement
       violated the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const.,
       amend. VIII) and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.
       Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) because its mandatory nature deprived the trial court of
       the ability to consider that defendant was only 18 years old at the time of the offense
       and had no prior criminal convictions. Defendant further stated in part:

              “The United States Supreme Court struck down mandatory natural life
          sentence[s] for juveniles as violative of the Eighth Amendment, noting that new
          scientific and social scientific studies showed that youth carries with it a lesser
          degree of culpability. The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not
          disappear when an individual turn[s] 18, instead, petitioner[’s] chronological
          age placed his cognitive abilities with those of 16-17 year [sic] which in turn
          mitigates his culpability.”

¶ 12       Defendant alleged that evolving scientific research showed that the parts of the
       brain that govern impulsivity, judgment, and future planning continue to mature
       until people are in their early twenties, making young adults less morally culpable.
       Defendant further alleged that his PSI showed that he “had a troubling social
       history, where he did not have a relationship with his father and had not been




                                                -4-
       enrolled in school since the fifth grade.” 2 Defendant alleged that there were several
       factors showing his rehabilitative potential, including that he had never been
       involved in a gang and had a close relationship with his mother and siblings.

¶ 13      The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition on the basis that defendant
       was not a juvenile at the time of the shooting and did not receive the harshest
       penalty possible.

¶ 14       The appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. 

. The court stated that defendant’s as-applied challenge was rooted in
       a line of cases providing heightened protection for juvenile defendants in
       sentencing under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution, which
       prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. Id. ¶ 21. In particular, in Miller v.
       Alabama, 

 (2012), the United States Supreme Court held that the
       eighth amendment prohibits mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles.
       

. The appellate court stated that this court expanded
       Miller protections beyond the context of mandatory life sentences to now include
       juveniles who receive de facto life sentences, which this court has defined as
       imprisonment of more than 40 years. 

 ¶ 22 (citing People v. Buffer, 

).

¶ 15       The appellate court further stated that defendant acknowledged that he did not
       have a viable eighth amendment claim under Miller because he was 18 years old at
       the time of the offense and not a juvenile but instead challenged his sentence under
       the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Id. ¶ 23. It stated that
       in two cases, Thompson, 

, and People v. Harris, 

,
       this court recognized that young adults between ages 18 and 21 may rely on the
       evolving neuroscience regarding brain development in juveniles and its correlation
       to the underlying rationale in Miller to support an as-applied challenge under the
       proportionate penalties clause. 

. The appellate court
       stated that what is clear from Miller and its progeny is that the claim must satisfy
       two threshold requirements: the defendant must be a minor or young adult offender,
       and he must have been sentenced to a natural or de facto life sentence. 

 The
       appellate court held that, because defendant did not receive such a sentence,
       Miller’s procedural protections were not required and he did not state the gist of a

           2
               At oral argument, defendant’s counsel stated that he had only an “eighth grade education.”




                                                        -5-
       constitutional claim that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause.
       Id. ¶ 50. The court held that the circuit court properly dismissed defendant’s
       postconviction petition at the first stage of proceedings. Id.

¶ 16        We granted defendant leave to appeal. We allowed the MacArthur Justice
       Center and Northwestern’s Legal Clinic’s Children and Family Justice Center to
       file a joint amici curiae brief in support of defendant’s position. See Ill. S. Ct. R.
       345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).


¶ 17                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18       The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Postconviction Act) provides a means for
       individuals serving criminal sentences to assert that their convictions resulted from
       substantial denials of their constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West
       2018); People v. Addison 

. The proceedings are not an appeal
       of the underlying judgment but rather a collateral attack on the judgment. People v.
       Clark, 

.

¶ 19        The Postconviction Act creates a three-stage process for adjudicating
       postconviction petitions. Addison, 

. The first stage has a low
       threshold and requires only that the petitioner plead enough facts to assert an
       arguable constitutional claim. People v. Johnson, 

. The court
       must liberally construe the allegations and accept them as true unless the record
       contradicts them. 

 If the court independently determines that the petition is
       “frivolous or is patently without merit,” it must dismiss the petition. 725 ILCS
       5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2018). A petition is frivolous or patently without merit only
       if it has no arguable basis in law or fact, meaning that it relies on an indisputably
       meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation. People v. Hodges, 

 (2009). If the court determines that the petition is not frivolous or patently
       without merit, the petition advances to the second stage of postconviction
       proceedings 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) (West 2018). We review de novo the circuit
       court’s summary dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition. Hodges, 

.

¶ 20      The proportionate penalties clause states: “All penalties shall be determined
       both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring




                                               -6-
       the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. A statute violates
       the proportionate penalties clause if either the penalty is harsher than the penalty
       for a different offense containing identical elements (People v. Sharpe, 

 (2005)) or “the punishment for the offense is cruel, degrading, or so
       wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
       community” (People v. Miller, 

 (2002) (Leon Miller)).
       Defendant challenges the enhancement under the latter standard. Punishments
       satisfying this standard have not been delineated because “as our society evolves,
       so too do our concepts of elemental decency and fairness which shape the ‘moral
       sense’ of the community.” 

. A court reviews “the gravity of the
       defendant’s offense in connection with the severity of the statutorily mandated
       sentence within our community’s evolving standard of decency.” 

.

¶ 21       “[T]he legislature has the power to prescribe penalties for defined offenses, and
       that power necessarily includes the authority to prescribe mandatory sentences,
       even if such sentences restrict the judiciary’s discretion in imposing sentences.”
       People v. Huddleston, 

 (2004). Still, the penalty must satisfy
       constitutional requirements. 

 A constitutional challenge to a statute may be either
       facial or as applied. Harris, 

. A facial challenge requires a
       showing that the statute is unconstitutional under any set of facts, whereas an as-
       applied challenge is dependent on the particular facts and circumstances of the
       challenging party. 

 A defendant bringing an as-applied challenge to a mandatory
       sentencing statute must ultimately overcome the presumption that the statute is
       constitutional by clearly establishing that the statute is invalid as applied to him.
       People v. House, 

.

¶ 22        This court has rejected facial constitutional challenges to the mandatory firearm
       enhancement. We stated that “it is neither cruel nor degrading, nor would it shock
       the moral sense of the community, to apply the 15/20/25-to-life enhancements to
       attempted first degree murder.” (Emphasis omitted.) Sharpe, 

       (citing People v. Morgan, 

 (2003), overruled on other grounds
       by Sharpe, 

). In Morgan, this court stated that the presence of
       firearms during an offense poses an extreme danger to both the intended victims
       and innocent bystanders. Morgan, 

. The legislature enacted the
       enhancements to deter the use of firearms in the commission of offenses, and “we
       will not second-guess the legislature’s determination that the protection of society




                                                -7-
       necessitates the imposition of severe penalties whenever a firearm is used in the
       course of an offense.” 

 We pointed out in Sharpe that the legislature did not apply
       the enhancements to all felonies committed with firearms but, rather, to just some
       of the most serious felonies. Sharpe, 

.

¶ 23       Defendant raises an as-applied challenge to the mandatory firearm
       enhancement rather than a facial challenge. Defendant argues that the appellate
       court’s decision is contrary to the low pleading standards of first-stage
       postconviction proceedings. Defendant further argues that as-applied challenges
       under the proportionate penalties clause have never been limited to juveniles. He
       asserts that in Thompson, 

, Harris, 

, and House,
       

, all cases that referenced or discussed Miller, this court either
       encouraged or allowed young adults older than 17 to develop proportionate
       penalties challenges to mandatory sentencing statutes under the Postconviction Act.

¶ 24       In Thompson, the 19-year-old defendant received a mandatory life sentence
       instead of the death penalty. Thompson, 

, ¶ 7. In appealing the
       dismissal of his petition under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735
       ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010)), the defendant argued, among other things, that his
       sentence violated the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution, as
       applied to him, under Miller. Id. ¶¶ 17, 21. We held that the defendant forfeited his
       argument by raising it for the first time on appeal from the dismissal of his section
       2-1401 petition but that he was not necessarily foreclosed from bringing his as-
       applied challenge in the circuit court through the Postconviction Act. Id. ¶ 44.

¶ 25       This court extended Thompson’s reasoning in Harris to an as-applied
       proportionate penalties challenge that the defendant first raised on direct appeal.
       Harris, 

. The 18-year-old defendant had been sentenced to a
       mandatory minimum aggregate term of 76 years’ imprisonment. Id. ¶ 1. We stated
       that the record needed to be sufficiently developed in the circuit court through an
       evidentiary hearing and findings of fact to review the defendant’s constitutional
       claim. Id. ¶¶ 39, 41.

¶ 26       In House, the defendant was 19 years old and was sentenced to a mandatory
       natural life term for murder, with additional consecutive terms for aggravated
       kidnapping. House, 

. We held that the appellate court erred
       in holding that his natural life sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause



                                               -8-
       as applied to him without a developed evidentiary record or factual findings on the
       issue. Id. ¶ 31.

¶ 27       Defendant interprets this court’s precedent too broadly. Recently, this court
       cited Thompson and Harris in stating that “this court has not foreclosed ‘emerging
       adult’ defendants between 18 and 19 years old from raising as-applied
       proportionate penalties clause challenges to life sentences based on the evolving
       science on juvenile maturity and brain development.” Clark, 

.
       We stated that “those cases addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-
       based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction
       petitions.” 3 (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 88. Similarly, House also involved a
       mandatory life sentence and an initial postconviction petition. House, 

. Here, defendant was 18 years old when he committed the crime
       and filed an initial postconviction petition, consistent with part of the
       aforementioned standards. However, the mandatory 25-year firearm enhancement
       was not a mandatory life sentence, and even with the discretionary sentence for
       murder added to the enhancement, defendant’s total sentence was 40 years, less
       than what we have defined as a de facto life sentence for juveniles under Buffer.
       Thus, as defendant did not receive a mandatory life sentence, Thompson, Harris,
       and House do not provide support for his proportionate penalties claim, beyond the
       general principle that as-applied constitutional claims cannot ultimately succeed
       absent a sufficiently developed evidentiary record.

¶ 28       Defendant’s citations of appellate court cases that have relied on Thompson,
       Harris, and House are not persuasive, as they are contrary to subsequent supreme
       court decisions and fail to recognize that our cases were directing the possibility of
       as-applied proportionate penalties clause postconviction challenges to young adults
       who received mandatory life sentences. In People v. Ruiz, 

, the trial court imposed a discretionary 40-year sentence on the
       18-year-old defendant for first degree murder and a concurrent sentence for a lesser
       charge. The appellate court held that the filing of Miller provided the defendant
       cause for failing to raise his sentencing claim in an earlier postconviction
       proceeding (id. ¶ 29), but we subsequently held that “Miller’s announcement of a

           3
            We note that the defendant in Thompson had already filed a postconviction petition and
       unsuccessfully sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition more than once. See
       Thompson, 

.




                                                  -9-
       new substantive rule under the eighth amendment does not provide cause for a
       defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause” in a successive
       postconviction petition (People v. Dorsey, 

) and that Miller
       applies to neither discretionary sentences nor adults (People v. Moore, 

). Similar infirmities exist in People v. Johnson, 

 (19-year-old defendant with a discretionary life sentence found
       to have satisfied cause and prejudice test to file a successive postconviction
       petition); People v. Minniefield, 

 (same as to 19-
       year-old defendant with a 25-year discretionary sentence and mandatory 25-year
       enhancement); People v. Bland, 

 (allowing
       successive postconviction petition to proceed for 19-year-old defendant with 71-
       year sentence); and People v. Savage, 

 (initial
       postconviction petition for a 22-year-old defendant with a discretionary 85-year
       sentence).

¶ 29       Defendant argues that, contrary to the appellate court’s decision here,
       application of the proportionate penalties clause had never been limited to only the
       harshest penalties. The State concedes that, insofar as the appellate court decision
       can be read as holding that an adult defendant cannot bring an as-applied challenge
       under the proportionate penalties clause to a sentence other than life, it does not
       accurately reflect the law. This concession is clearly correct, as a defendant may
       challenge a sentence of any length. See People v. Fuller, 

 (1999)
       (as-applied challenge to Class B misdemeanor punishable by up to six months’
       imprisonment). The Illinois Constitution does not limit a proportionate penalties
       challenge to just juveniles or individuals with life sentences. Our above discussion
       relates to the improper reliance on Thompson, Harris, and House to support or
       advance a proportionate penalties clause claim in situations where their analysis
       does not apply, but these cases do not preclude a defendant from bringing such a
       claim or the court from considering the claim.

¶ 30        Defendant insists that he is relying on Leon Miller rather than Miller and its
       progeny. In Leon Miller, we held that a mandatory sentence of natural life violated
       the proportionate penalties clause when applied to the juvenile defendant, and we
       affirmed the circuit court’s sentence of 50 years’ imprisonment. Leon Miller, 

. We stated that the convergence of the Illinois transfer statute, the
       accountability statute, and the multiple murder sentencing statute eliminated the




                                              - 10 -
       circuit court’s ability to consider any mitigating factors such as age or degree of
       participation. 

. We held that the mandated penalty distorted the case’s
       factual realities and did not accurately represent the defendant’s personal
       culpability, such that it shocked the moral sense of the community. 

.
       Specifically, the defendant was 15 years old, had one minute to contemplate
       whether to participate in the incident, and stood as a lookout during the shooting
       but never handled a gun. 

¶ 31       Defendant maintains that his claim is not frivolous under the facts because the
       record contains arguable evidence about his immaturity and other mitigating
       factors. Defendant points to the medical documents showing that he stayed at a
       hospital for two separate two-week periods when he was 14, and he makes various
       arguments about his mental health. Defendant maintains that his lack of cooperation
       during the trial and PSI was further evidence of his immaturity, as was the offense’s
       circumstances. Defendant asserts that his lack of a criminal record despite his
       troubling social history shows his potential for rehabilitation. Also, defendant
       argues that, even though Killingsworth was shot only in the arm, defendant received
       the same minimum penalty as if he had inflicted a near-fatal wound.

¶ 32       We do not consider defendant’s arguments about his mental health, as we are
       limited to the allegations set forth in defendant’s postconviction petition and he did
       not raise the issue of mental health. Defendant did compare his “cognitive abilities
       with those of 16-17[-year-olds],” but he did so in the context that his “chronological
       age” of 18 put him in the same category of younger individuals.

¶ 33      This court has described the outcome in Leon Miller as

          “a rare convergence of several factors, including: the defendant was a 15-year-
          old juvenile who, by statute, was automatically transferred for trial as an adult;
          the defendant was tried under an accountability theory which, by statute, holds
          all participants with a common criminal design equally responsible; and the
          applicable multiple-murder sentencing statute does not allow consideration of
          the defendant’s age or extent of participation in the crime.” Huddleston, 

.




                                               - 11 -
       As the State points out, Leon Miller is the only case in which this court has found
       a mandatory minimum penalty unconstitutionally disproportionate as applied to a
       particular offender.

¶ 34        The situation at bar is readily distinguishable from Leon Miller. Specifically,
       Leon Miller had moments to decide whether to help the accomplices and stood as
       a lookout during the subsequent shooting but did not touch a gun. Leon Miller, 

. In contrast, defendant acted alone, made a deliberate choice
       to approach Killingsworth, and fired multiple rounds at him without provocation.
       Crucially, Leon Miller was also a 15-year-old juvenile who received a mandatory
       life sentence, whereas defendant was an adult who received a partially discretionary
       sentence, and his total sentence did not amount to a life sentence. We further note
       our recognition in Morgan that the presence of firearms during an offense extends
       the danger to innocent bystanders (Morgan, 

), and here defendant
       shot at Killingsworth in a public housing complex.

¶ 35       Defendant’s status as an adult also distinguishes this case from the appellate
       court cases that he relies on finding mandatory firearm enhancements
       unconstitutional as applied under the proportionate penalties clause. See People v.
       Womack, 

 (16-year-old defendant); People v. Barnes,
       

 (17-year-old defendant); People v. Aikens, 

 (17-year-old defendant); People v. Gipson, 

 (15-year-old defendant). 4

¶ 36       Defendant argues that, apart from considerations of precedent, we should view
       his petition in light of legislation that shows society’s evolving standard of decency.
       He highlights that effective January 1, 2016, Illinois courts have the statutory
       discretion to choose whether to impose the firearm enhancement on defendants who
       were juveniles at the time of the offense. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b) (West 2022).
       Also, Illinois now offers parole review to defendants under 21 at the time of the
       offense after they have served 10 years, except for first degree murder and certain
       sexual crimes. 

 § 5-4.5-115. Defendant argues that debates for these statutes
       show a deliberate effort of the legislature to offer greater sentencing protection for
       individuals under 21 than the United States Supreme Court established in its own

          4
              We express no opinion on the merits of these decisions.




                                                      - 12 -
       eighth amendment jurisprudence. Defendant asserts that these laws represent our
       current moral compass and demonstrate that society no longer deems it acceptable
       to mandate the enhanced penalty in every case involving a youthful offender.
       Defendant argues that only two other states mandate a firearms enhancement
       similar to what he received, which he asserts shows an evolving standard of
       decency.

¶ 37       The State argues that, even after considering Miller and its scientific research,
       the legislature made a deliberate judgment that young adults who commit serious
       felonies with firearms should still receive the mandatory 25-year firearm
       enhancement. The State points out that, although the legislature chose to allow for
       parole review after 10 years for certain individuals who were under 21 at the time
       of their offenses, it also chose not to apply the new scheme retroactively. See id.
       § 5-4.5-115(b). The State argues that changes in firearm enhancement provisions
       in other states do not apply here and are not relevant to our community’s moral
       sense. The State maintains that defendant’s crime fits squarely within the serious
       conduct, degree of harm, and societal dangers that the General Assembly sought to
       address when it enacted the mandatory firearm enhancement.

¶ 38       We agree with the State that the legislative changes do not support defendant’s
       as-applied challenge. The legislature’s determination of a particular punishment for
       a crime in and of itself is an expression of the general moral ideas of the people.
       People v. Coty, 

. The legislature determined that courts should
       have the discretion to determine whether to impose the firearm enhancement on
       individuals who were juveniles when they committed their crimes (730 ILCS 5/5-
       4.5-105(b) (West 2022)), but the provision is not retroactive (People v. Hunter,
       

). More pertinent here, the legislature made a deliberate
       choice not to extend this discretion to sentences for individuals who were adults at
       the time of their offenses.

¶ 39       The distinction between a juvenile and adult remains significant. The “Supreme
       Court has clearly and consistently drawn the line between juveniles and adults for
       the purpose of sentencing at the age of 18.” Harris, 

, ¶ 58. As the
       Supreme Court stated in Roper v. Simmons, 

 (2005):

             “Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the objections
          always raised against categorical rules. The qualities that distinguish juveniles



                                              - 13 -
          from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token,
          some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never
          reach. For the reasons we have discussed, however, a line must be drawn. ***
          The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes
          between childhood and adulthood.”

       Notably, though the legislature also determined that certain defendants who were
       under 21 at the time of their crimes will be eligible for parole review after 10 years,
       the legislature chose not to make the provision retroactive, such that the provision
       does not apply to defendant. The legislature’s decision not to broaden the statute’s
       reach to all defendants under 21 shows that it was implementing the legislation as
       a policy change rather than a reflection that the previous statutory scheme was
       abhorrent to the community’s moral sense. Accordingly, the legislative changes do
       not aid defendant’s position.

¶ 40        At the first stage of postconviction proceedings, we must take as true
       defendant’s allegations that he “had a troubling social history, where he did not
       have a relationship with his father and had not been enrolled in school since the
       fifth grade.” We also consider as true the allegations that, when defendant
       committed the offense, his brain was not yet fully developed because he was 18
       years old and that he had rehabilitative potential as demonstrated by the absence of
       a criminal history, lack of gang involvement, and a supportive family. However,
       “ ‘ “there is no indication [in our constitution] that the possibility of rehabilitating
       an offender was to be given greater weight and consideration than the seriousness
       of the offense in determining a proper penalty.” ’ ” Coty, 

       (quoting Huddleston, 

, quoting People v. Taylor, 

 (1984)). When defendant’s allegations are considered in conjunction with the
       circumstances of the case, that defendant chose to fire multiple shots at
       Killingsworth at close range with no demonstrated provocation in an attempt to kill
       him, the imposition of the mandatory 25-year firearm enhancement, which brought
       his total sentence to 40 years, is not even arguably “cruel, degrading, or so wholly
       disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.”
       Rather, defendant’s claim is frivolous and patently without merit because it has no
       arguable basis in law, such that the circuit court did not err in summarily dismissing
       defendant’s petition.




                                                - 14 -
¶ 41      Based on our resolution of this case, we do not address the State’s other asserted
       bases for affirmance. We also considered defendant’s remaining arguments and
       conclude that they lack merit.


¶ 42                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 43       For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court upholding
       the circuit court’s decision to summarily dismiss defendant’s postconviction
       petition.


¶ 44      Judgments affirmed.




                                              - 15 -