People v. Lighthart
Citation231 N.E.3d 127, 2023 IL 128398
Date Filed2023-10-19
Docket128398
Cited16 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
2023 IL 128398
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 128398)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee,
v. JESSICA R. LIGHTHART, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 19, 2023.
JUSTICE OVERSTREET delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Cunningham, Rochford, and OâBrien
concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Holder White took no part in the decision.
OPINION
¶1 Petitioner, Jessica R. Lighthart, appeals the judgments of the circuit and
appellate courts, which found that her petition, brought pursuant to the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2006)), is untimely,
resulting in its dismissal at the second stage of proceedings. In this appeal, the court
must determine whether the filing of an ineffective notice of appeal from a
negotiated plea of guilty, which is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction due
to failure to follow the procedural requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule
604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017), triggers a six-month limitations period for bringing a
postconviction petition or whether, in such a case, the petitioner has three years
from the date of her conviction to file such a petition. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c)
(West 2022). 1 For the following reasons, we find that the six-month limitation
period applies. However, we find that, under the circumstances presented here, the
petitioner could not have been culpably negligent in the untimely filing of her
petition. Thus, we reverse the judgments of the courts below and remand to the
circuit court with directions that petitioner be permitted to amend the petition to
reflect our findings regarding her lack of culpable negligence and for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion, to be conducted without further delay.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 A. Plea Proceedings in the Circuit Court
¶4 Petitioner was charged with multiple counts of first degree murder based on the
shooting death of the victim by her codefendant, which occurred during an armed
robbery. On June 15, 2004, she entered a partially negotiated plea of guilty to one
count in the indictment, in exchange for the Stateâs dismissal of all other charges
and a sentencing cap of 35 years in the Department of Corrections, with 3 years of
mandatory supervisory release. The factual basis for the plea was stated as follows.
¶5 Petitioner, who was 23 years old at the time of her plea, had dated the victim,
as well as her codefendant, Markus Buchanan, âon and off.â The victim was known
to have access to large amounts of money. Petitioner drove the victim to a
residence, knowing that Buchanan was there intending to rob the victim. Petitioner
asked the victim to carry a laundry basket into the residence, where Buchanan was
armed with a handgun. Buchanan beat the victim while demanding money and
eventually shot the victim to death. At some point in time following the shooting,
1
While section 122-1 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2022)) has undergone amendment
since the time the petition at issue in the case was filed in 2006, the language of subsection (c) has
not changed in that timeframe, and except when outlining the history of subsection (c) in our
analysis, we cite the current version in the remainder of this opinion.
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Petitioner either injected the victim with a solution that contained Drano or
attempted to do so. Petitioner then participated, along with Buchanan, with a
woman who lived at the residence, and with the womanâs friend who was visiting
at the time, in cleaning the scene to remove evidence and disposing of the body, by
setting it on fire inside the victimâs Jeep in a rural field.
¶6 B. Sentencing
¶7 During the sentencing hearing on August 17, 2004, petitioner presented three
witnesses who testified that Buchanan had abused, stalked, and isolated petitioner
over the two years preceding the crime and introduced a photo into evidence of
petitioner depicting substantial bruising of her face following one of the incidents.
The woman who owned the residence testified that Buchanan had threatened to kill
the woman and her friend if they did not participate in cleaning the scene and
disposing of the body. After hearing this evidence, along with other factors in
aggravation and mitigation, the circuit court sentenced petitioner to 35 years, which
was the cap on sentencing required by the terms of the plea agreement.
¶8 C. Plea Counselâs Postjudgment Motion to Reduce Sentence
¶9 Immediately following the sentencing hearing, petitioner, through plea counsel,
filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, arguing it was excessive, which the circuit
court denied on October 1, 2004.
¶ 10 Although counsel assured the circuit court that petitioner understood âher right
to appeal and the time limits on filing those choices,â at the time the circuit court
denied the motion to reconsider sentence, petitioner had already lost her right to
directly appeal from both the conviction and the sentence because counsel did not
file a motion to withdraw her guilty plea within 30 days of the imposition of
sentence. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Nov. 1, 2000) (no appeal from a plea of
guilty shall be taken unless a motion to withdraw guilty plea is filed within 30 days
of sentence)
¶ 11 D. Petitionerâs Untimely Pro Se Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
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¶ 12 On October 14, 2004, petitioner filed a pro se motion to withdraw her guilty
plea. In her motion, she alleged she received ineffective assistance of counsel who
refused to cooperate with her, denied her access to her court records and discovery,
advised her not to accept a 27-year fully negotiated plea offer, but then advised her
to take the open plea because she would receive a lighter sentence. At a status
hearing on November 24, 2004, the State informed the circuit court that the motion
to withdraw the guilty plea was untimely because it was not filed within 30 days of
the sentence. See id. Noting that it had only denied the motion to reconsider
sentence on October 1, 2004, the circuit court stated that it was going to âallowâ
petitioner to file the motion to withdraw and appoint conflict counsel for her due to
the allegation that she pled guilty due to the ineffective assistance of counsel.
Appointed counsel sought repeated continuances to prepare an amendment to the
pro se motion, culminating in the eventual filing of an amended motion to withdraw
the guilty plea on February 14, 2006, with an evidentiary hearing held the same
day.
¶ 13 E. Evidentiary Hearing on Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
¶ 14 At the hearing, petitioner testified more specifically about the abuse she
suffered at the hands of Buchanan and that she had wished to pursue a compulsion
defense to the charges based on Buchananâs use of a gun to make her participate.
After a preliminary investigation, defense counsel told petitioner âthere was
nothing left to doâ and assured her if she took the plea for 20 to 35 yearsâ
incarceration, she would âget the minimum.â Plea counsel testified that she
discussed the compulsion defense with petitioner based on the long underlying
history of domestic violence between petitioner and Buchanan but counseled her
that trials are inherently uncertain. Finding petitioner was ânot credible,â the circuit
court denied the amended motion to withdraw. However, despite these extensive
proceedings, the circuit court had no subject-matter jurisdiction to extend the time
for filing the motion to withdraw or to consider the merits thereof because, when
petitioner filed the motion, more than 30 days had elapsed since her sentence was
imposed and the circuit court did not extend the deadline within the 30 days. See
People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291, 303 (2003).
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¶ 15 F. Counsel Files an Ineffective Notice of Appeal
¶ 16 On February 21, 2006, appointed counsel filed a notice of appeal on behalf of
petitioner, and the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) was appointed
to represent petitioner in that appeal. However, the notice of appeal was ineffective
to perfect an appeal on the merits of the motion to withdraw because of the failure
of counsel to file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea within 30 days of the
sentence. See id. (no appeal from a plea of guilty shall be taken unless a motion to
withdraw guilty plea is filed within 30 days of sentence). In addition, the notice of
appeal was untimely because the proceedings on the motion to withdraw the plea
did not extend the time for filing the appeal past the 30 days following the denial
of the timely motion to reconsider the sentence. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(d) (eff. Dec.
13, 2005) (notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk within 30 days of disposition
of timely filed postjudgment motion).
¶ 17 The appellate court ordered OSAD to show cause why the appeal should not be
dismissed for a lack of appellate jurisdiction. OSAD unsuccessfully argued that,
because the State acquiesced to the untimely proceedings on the motion to
withdraw the guilty plea, the circuit court was revested with jurisdiction to consider
the motion, which resulted in the appellate court having jurisdiction to consider it
on the merits. The appellate court rejected OSADâs revestment argument and
dismissed the appeal on September 19, 2006. People v. Lighthart, 367 Ill. App. 3d
1103 (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
Accordingly, a petition for leave to appeal the order dismissing the appeal was due
in this court on October 24, 2006. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(b) (eff. Aug. 15, 2006)
(unless a timely petition for rehearing is filed, the party seeking review must file
the petition for leave to appeal within 35 days of the entry of the appellate courtâs
judgment).
¶ 18 OSAD did not petition this court for leave to appeal the appellate courtâs
decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. OSAD sent petitioner a letter
on November 6, 2006, after the deadline for filing a petition for leave to appeal to
this court had passed, informing her that her appeal was dismissed because her
âguilty plea was filed too late.â The letter informed petitioner that she would need
to file a postconviction petition to challenge her conviction and sentence. However,
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it did not inform her of the time requirements for filing the petition.
¶ 19 G. Petitioner Files Pro Se Postconviction Petition
¶ 20 On August 10, 2007, petitioner filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging
that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. She faulted her plea counsel for
failing to investigate and present a compulsion defense based on the domestic
violence she endured from Buchanan and restated her allegations regarding
ineffective assistance in the negotiation of the plea. In addition, she alleged
ineffective assistance of plea counsel for failing to file a timely motion to withdraw
the guilty plea, which culminated in the loss of her right to appeal her conviction
and sentence. On October 22, 2007, the circuit court dismissed the petition at the
first stage, finding it to be frivolous and patently without merit.
¶ 21 On June 12, 2009, the appellate court reversed the circuit courtâs decision,
finding that the postconviction petition states the gist of a constitutional claim that,
because of the ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner lost her right to challenge
the voluntariness of her guilty plea and, consequently, her right to appeal her
conviction. People v. Lighthart, 391 Ill. App. 3d 1129 (table) (unpublished order
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court remanded the
postconviction petition to the circuit court for second stage proceedings under the
Act. Id. In so doing, the appellate court observed that petitioner âmay well wish to
resurrect the other arguments she advanced in her petition, as the Act does not
recognize the partial dismissal of postconviction petitions.â Id. (citing People v.
Rivera, 198 Ill. 2d 364, 371 (2001). The mandate issued on August 26, 2009.
¶ 22 H. Unconscionable Delay in Second Stage Proceedings
¶ 23 Upon remand to the circuit court, counsel was appointed to represent petitioner
on September 11, 2009. A review of the record reveals that there was an
inexcusable and unconscionable 11œ-year delay in the second stage proceedings
following that initial appointment of counsel. Between September 2009 and March
2014, the circuit court held approximately 25 status conferences, in which counsel
requested and was granted continuances, stating, at different times, that counsel
needed more time to review the case, time to amend the petition, and time to
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correspond with petitioner. In March 2014, counsel withdrew because he was
appointed as an associate judge and, by that time, had not filed an amended petition
or otherwise moved the proceedings forward.
¶ 24 A second attorney was appointed to represent petitioner in May 2014. After
requesting and receiving six continuances, counsel filed an amended postconviction
petition on May 27, 2015. The State was then granted four continuances so that it
could prepare a response. Before a response was filed, the second appointed counsel
withdrew due to an unspecified conflict on May 13, 2016. A third attorney was
appointed to represent petitioner the same day.
¶ 25 Although the amended postconviction petition drafted by prior counsel
remained pending without response by the State, the third appointed counsel
requested and received approximately 12 continuances between May 2016 and
August 2018, before filing a second amended postconviction petition. The State
then requested and received continuances to draft the response until May 24, 2019,
when private counsel entered an appearance on behalf of petitioner. Private counsel
received continuances to file a supplemental postconviction petition, which he filed
on January 3, 2020.
¶ 26 I. Supplemental Postconviction Petition
¶ 27 In the supplemental petition, petitioner further developed her allegations of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, alleging that, prior to advising her to plead
guilty to first degree felony murder, counsel failed to investigate and interview
available witnesses regarding the repeated physical abuse she suffered at the hands
of Buchanan, which would have supported a compulsion defense, prior to advising
petitioner to plead guilty to first degree felony murder instead of proceeding to trial.
In addition, the supplemental petition reiterated the allegations regarding the
ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations, as well as ineffective
assistance in postjudgment proceedings, which resulted in her inability to pursue a
direct appeal. Between the original, amended, and supplemental petitions, there are
several affidavits attesting to the history of severe abuse petitioner suffered at the
hands of Buchanan, as well as petitionerâs affidavit regarding the facts and
circumstances surrounding her involvement with Buchanan on the date in question.
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¶ 28 J. The Stateâs Motion to Dismiss
¶ 29 The State sought and received three further continuances to draft a response to
the supplemental petition. On December 7, 2020, the State filed a motion to dismiss
the postconviction petition, arguing, inter alia, the petition is untimely pursuant to
section 122-1(c) of the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2006). According to the
motion, because petitioner filed a direct appeal from her conviction but did not file
a petition for leave to appeal from the order dismissing that appeal, she was required
to file a postconviction petition by April 23, 2007, six months from the date the
petition for leave to appeal was due in this court. Because she did not file the
petition until August 10, 2007, the State argued her petition was required to be
dismissed. In support, the State cited People v. Byrd, 2018 IL App (4th) 160526,
which held that if a petitioner files a notice of appeal, regardless of its effectiveness,
the six-month limitation period applies.
¶ 30 In response, petitioner argued that, due to the ineffective assistance of counsel,
petitioner lost her right to directly appeal her conviction and sentence when counsel
failed to file a timely motion to withdraw her guilty plea as required by Rule 604(d).
Petitioner argued that, as a result, the notice of appeal filed by counsel was a nullity
before it was filed and should not be considered the filing of a direct appeal for
purposes of section 122-1(c) of the Act. Petitioner argued that, because she could
not, and thus did not, file a direct appeal from her conviction, her postconviction
petition was required to be filed within three years of the August 17, 2004,
judgment of conviction, rendering the August 10, 2007, petition timely.
¶ 31 In support of her position, petitioner cited People v. Ross, 352 Ill. App. 3d 617
(2004), a Third District decision holding that, in a case where Rule 604(d) precludes
a defendant from filing an appeal due to the failure to file a timely motion to
withdraw a guilty plea, the filing of a notice of appeal does not constitute the filing
of a direct appeal for purposes of section 122-1(c). The circuit court agreed with
the State and dismissed the postconviction petition for untimeliness on April 15,
2021, 11œ years after the petition was remanded by the appellate court for second
stage proceedings under the Act.
¶ 32 K. Appellate Court Proceedings
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¶ 33 Before the appellate court, focus centered on whether Ross or Byrd governed
the issue of the timeliness of the postconviction petition. The appellate court found
the Byrd case controlled, and following Byrd, petitionerâs counselâs filing of the
ineffective notice of appeal on February 21, 2006, constituted the filing of a direct
appeal for the purposes of section 122-1(c) of the Act. 2022 IL App (2d) 210197,
¶ 43. The appellate court reasoned that, under the plain language of the statute, only
the âfilingâ of an appeal is required and to hold that an appeal is only filed if it is
resolved on its merits would be to add language to the statute that is not present. Id.
The appellate court agreed with Byrd, finding that, pursuant to Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 606(a) (eff. Mar. 12, 2021), the only requirement for â âperfectingâ â an
appeal is to file a notice of appeal and that the timeliness element set forth in Rule
606(b) was not relevant to the question of whether an appeal had been â âfiled.â â
2022 IL App (2d) 210197, ¶ 44. Finally, the appellate court found that this courtâs
use of the phrase â ânotice of appealâ â interchangeably with â âdirect appealâ â in
discussing section 122-1(c) of the Act in People v. Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 23,
âstrongly support[s] Byrdâs holding.â 2022 IL App (2d) 210197, ¶ 45.
¶ 34 As for the prior Ross decision, the appellate court found that the decision âwas
not well reasoned.â Id. ¶ 46. The court found Ross addressed a prior version of
section 122-1(c), which was effective from July 1, 1997, to November 18, 2003. Id.
Moreover, the appellate court found that, although noncompliance with Rule 604(d)
âprecluded the appellate court from reaching the merits of the defendantâs direct
appeal,â this did not preclude petitioner from filing a petition for leave to appeal to
this court, which would trigger the six-month period. Id.
¶ 35 Finally, the appellate court rejected the notion that Ross controlled the deadline
for filing a postconviction petition in her situation. Id. ¶ 48. The court reasoned that
the version of the statute that Ross interpreted had been amended âover two years
prior,â and there was no indication in the record that petitioner was relying on Ross
in the first place. Id. Finally, the appellate court did not address the issue of whether
petitioner was culpably negligent in the delay in filing her petition because she did
not argue the issue. Id. ¶ 49. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the circuit courtâs
dismissal of the postconviction petition as untimely. This court granted petitioner
leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021).
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¶ 36 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 37 A. Standard of Review
¶ 38 The primary substantive legal issue presented by this appeal is whether the
courts below erred in applying the six-month time limit set forth in section 122-1(c)
of the Act, which applies in a case where petitioner has filed a direct appeal,
although the notice of appeal was untimely and thus the appellate court lacked
jurisdiction, and petitioner had lost the right to appeal due to the failure to file a
timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea as required by Rule 604(d). The standard
for our review of issues of timeliness as it pertains to a postconviction petition at
the second stage of proceedings have been set forth by this court as follows:
âThe Act provides a method by which persons under criminal sentence in
this state can assert that their convictions were a result of a substantial denial of
their rights under the United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution or
both. [Citation.] In a noncapital case, a postconviction proceeding contains
three stages. *** When reviewing a motion to dismiss at the second stage of
proceedings, we accept as true all factual allegations that are not positively
rebutted by the record. [Citation.] Our review of a petition dismissed at this
stage is de novo.â Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 14.
¶ 39 Our review of the order dismissing petitionerâs postconviction petition presents
an issue involving the interpretation of section 122-1(c) of the Act. In addressing
this issue, âour primary objective is âto ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
legislature.â â Brunton v. Kruger, 2015 IL 117663, ¶ 24 (quoting Gaffney v. Board
of Trustees of the Orland Fire Protection District, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 56). âThe best
indication of that intent is the language of the statute itself, which must be given its
plain and ordinary meaning.â Id.(citing People v. Hammond,2011 IL 110044, ¶ 53
). â âWe will not depart from the plain statutory language by reading into it
exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the expressed intent of the
legislature.â â Id.(quoting Gaffney,2012 IL 110012, ¶ 56
). âFurther, we will not
utilize extrinsic aids of statutory interpretation unless the statutory language is
unclear or ambiguous.â Id. â âA statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being
understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different ways.â â
Id.(quoting Krohe v. City of Bloomington,204 Ill. 2d 392, 395-96
(2003)).
âBecause interpretation of a statute is a question of law, our review is de novo.â Id.
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(citing In re Commitment of Fields, 2014 IL 115542, ¶ 32). Having set forth the
standards relevant to our review, we turn to the issue of the timeliness of the
postconviction petition in this case.
¶ 40 B. Section 122-1(c) of the Act Is a Statute of Limitations
¶ 41 This court has said that timeliness is not an inherent element of the right to bring
a postconviction petition and, thus, is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. People v.
Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 101 (2002). As such, the time limitations set forth in section
122-1(c) of the Act should be considered as an affirmative defense akin to a statute
of limitations and can be raised, waived, or forfeited by the State. Id. Thus, â[i]f an
untimely petition demonstrates that a defendant suffered a deprivation of
constitutional magnitude, a dutiful prosecutor may waive that procedural defect
during the second stage of post-conviction proceedings.â Id. at 101-02.
¶ 42 C. Statutory Language
¶ 43 The legislature has frequently amended the limitations periods governing the
filing of postconviction petitions. See People v. Harris, 224 Ill. 2d 115, 125 (2007).
The version that governs this case is the one in effect at the time the petition was
filed on August 10, 2007. See id. This version, which remains effective as of this
date, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
âWhen a defendant has a sentence other than death, no proceedings under
this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the conclusion of
proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, unless the petitioner alleges
facts showing that the delay is not due to his or her culpable negligence. If a
petition for certiorari is not filed, no proceedings under this Article shall be
commenced more than 6 months from the date for filing a certiorari petition,
unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or
her culpable negligence. If a defendant does not file a direct appeal, the post-
conviction petition shall be filed no later than 3 years from the date of
conviction, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not
due to his or her culpable negligence.â 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2022).
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¶ 44 As the appellate court aptly noted in Byrd, and further explained infra, this court
in Johnson inserted a requirement into this section that, in a case where a petitioner
does not file a petition for leave to appeal in this court, a postconviction petition be
filed within six months of the due date of a petition for leave to appeal. Byrd, 2018
IL App (4th) 160526, ¶ 45(citing Johnson,2017 IL 120310, ¶ 24
). Accordingly, if
petitioner is held to the six-month statute of limitations, her petition was due six
months from the date a petition for leave to appeal the appellate courtâs dismissal
order was due in this court, and it is thus untimely. If petitioner is held to the â3
years from the date of convictionâ statute of limitations set for those who do not
file a direct appeal, her petition is timely. Based on the statutory language, which
provision applies depends on whether petitioner âfiled a direct appeal.â It is to this
question that we now turn.
¶ 45 It is undisputed that petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the appellate court after
the circuit court, without subject-matter jurisdiction over her untimely motion to
withdraw her guilty plea, denied the motion. The courts below, following the Fourth
District decision in Byrd, held that filing a notice of appeal constitutes the filing of
a direct appeal for purposes of section 122-1 of the Act because, based on the plain
meaning of the word âfile,â all that is required to âfile a direct appealâ is the act of
filing the notice of appeal. 2022 IL App (2d) 210197, ¶¶ 42-43(citing Byrd,2018 IL App (4th) 160526, ¶ 52
). In addition, the appellate court below and the Byrd
court emphasized the fact that this court in Johnson, while unnecessary to the
holding in that case, stated that section 122-1(c) â âeven provides a three-year
deadline for filing a petition when no notice of appeal is filed.â â (Emphasis in
original.) Id.¶ 42 (quoting Johnson,2017 IL 120310
, ¶ 23, and citing Byrd,2018 IL App (4th) 160526, ¶ 52
). Finally, the courts found support for their holding in
the language of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(a) (eff. Mar. 20, 2009), which
provides that, âappeals shall be perfected by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk
of the trial court.â For the following reasons, as we consider each of these points of
reasoning in turn, we disagree with the Lighthart and Byrd courts and find the
language of the statute to be ambiguous, as the meaning of âfile a direct appealâ is
subject to at least two reasonable interpretations.
¶ 46 D. Dictionary Definition of âFileâ
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¶ 47 The appellate court found that the word âfileâ in section 122-(c) is
unambiguous. 2022 IL App (2d) 210197, ¶ 43. In so doing, though, it quoted from
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, which, in relation to law and the courts,
presents several potentially relevant definitions: (1) to place among official records
as prescribed by law; (2) to return to the office of the clerk of a court without action
on the merits; and (3) to initiate (something, such as legal action) through proper
formal procedure. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.
merriamwebster.com/dictionary/file (last visited Aug. 31, 2023) [https://perma.cc/
8WNM-AGPH]. Of these three definitions, two of them refer to the adherence to
law or procedure. Considering the reference in section 122-1(c) to âfiling a direct
appeal,â the definition that makes the most sense is the third, which is to initiate
(something, such as legal action) through proper formal procedure. Thus, a
reasonable interpretation of the phrase âfile a direct appealâ is to initiate an appeal
through proper formal procedure. However, a review of the definition of âfileâ in
Blackâs Law Dictionary provides greater support for the appellate courtâs
conclusion than does the regular dictionary definition. Blackâs Law Dictionary 772
(11th ed. 2019). The primary definition therein is â[t]o deliver a legal document to
the court clerk or recordâ and makes no reference to a requirement that such a
document be delivered in conformance with proper procedure. Id.
¶ 48 Based on the various uses of the word âfileâ in conjunction with the legal
process, both in ordinary meaning and in legal terms, we conclude that, while
equating âfile a direct appealâ with âfile a notice of appealâ as did the courts below
and the court in Byrd is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory language,
petitionerâs interpretation, which requires the notice of appeal to be effective (i.e.,
to initiate the appeal through proper formal procedure), is also reasonable,
especially when the legislature could have used the phrase âfile a notice of appealâ
in order to clearly convey its intent. Accordingly, we find the phrase to be
ambiguous. See Dynak v. Board of Education of Wood Dale School District 7, 2020
IL 125062, ¶ 16 (a statute is ambiguous if it is subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation). When considering the courtâs statements in Johnson and the
language of Rule 606(a), we find further support for the conclusion that the
differing interpretations of this language set forth by the parties are both reasonable,
thus supporting the conclusion that the language creates an ambiguity.
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¶ 49 E. This Courtâs Statements in Johnson
¶ 50 As the State and the courts below point out, in Johnson, this court made a
statement that â[t]he statute even provides a three-year deadline for filing a petition
when no notice of appeal is filedâ and that â[w]e see no reason for the legislature
to provide a deadline when no notice of appeal has been filed but not to include one
when no petition for leave to appeal has been filed.â (Emphases added.) 2017 IL
120310, ¶ 23. Accordingly, this court in Johnson seemed to equate the filing of an
appeal with the filing of the notice of appeal, lending support for an interpretation
of that provision that would impose a six-month statute of limitations in any case
where a notice of appeal is filed in the appellate court, regardless of whether it is
filed âthrough proper formal procedure.â However, in Johnson, the court was called
on to consider whether there was any deadline imposed on someone who filed an
appeal in the appellate court but no petition for leave to appeal in this court. Id.
¶ 17. Because petitioner in that case did not contend that he had not filed a direct
appeal, the court had no need to interpret the phrase because it was not germane to
the courtâs analysis. Accordingly, the characterization of the statutory language as
providing a three-year deadline when âno notice of appeal has been filedâ is
obiter dictum, as it was not essential to the outcome of the case, is not an integral
part of the opinion, and thus is not binding authority or precedent within the
stare decisis rule. See Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 236
(2010). Thus, this courtâs statement in Johnson does not clarify the ambiguity
presented by the language of section 122-1(c) of the Act.
¶ 51 F. Rule 606(a)
¶ 52 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(a) (eff. Mar. 12, 2021) provides that â[a]ppeals
shall be perfected by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial courtâ and
that â[n]o step in the perfection of the appeal other than the filing of the notice of
appeal is jurisdictional.â The State argues, and the courts below found, that this
language supports a finding that the filing of a notice of appeal is to be considered
the filing of a direct appeal for purposes of section 122-1. Again, this is a reasonable
interpretation of the statutory language and is indeed supported by the language of
Rule 606(a).
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¶ 53 Nevertheless, Rule 606(b) goes on to place a time limit on the filing of the notice
of appeal and excepts from that time limit appeals from motions to withdraw guilty
pleas, for which it references Rule 604(d). Rule 604(d) provides that no appeal shall
be taken in such a case without the filing of a timely motion to withdraw the guilty
plea. Accordingly, these provisions lend credence to our conclusion that it is also a
reasonable interpretation of section 122-1 to find that, to file a direct appeal, a
timely notice of appeal is required, as is compliance with Rule 604(d) when
necessary. As further illustration of this conclusion, we note that the courts often
interchangeably refer to the âfiling of a notice of appealâ and the âfiling of a timely
notice of appealâ when describing the requirements for triggering the jurisdiction
of the appellate court. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (2008) (âThe
filing of a notice of appeal âis the jurisdictional step which initiates appellate
review.â â (quoting Niccum v. Botti, Marinaccio, DeSalvo & Tameling, Ltd., 182
Ill. 2d 6, 7(1998))); cf. People v. Patrick,2011 IL 111666, ¶ 20
(âThe timely filing
of a notice of appeal is the only jurisdictional step for initiating appellate review.â).
¶ 54 For the foregoing reasons, we find that the language in section 122-1 of the Act,
which sets forth a three-year statute of limitations for the filing of a postconviction
petition when defendant âdoes not file a direct appeal,â is subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation and is thus ambiguous, and we will resort to extrinsic aids
of statutory interpretation to determine legislative intent. See Krohe, 204 Ill. 2d
392, 395 (2003). In so doing, we turn to the history of section 122-1 of the Act and
any discernible legislative debates, as a statuteâs legislative history and debates are
â â[v]aluable construction aids in interpreting an ambiguous statute.â â Id. at 397
(quoting Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 19 (1996)).
¶ 55 G. Legislative History and Debates
¶ 56 This court outlined the early history of section 122-1(c) of the Act in Johnson,
noting that the legislature has gradually decreased the time period in which a
postconviction petition may be filed. 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 21. By 1995, the time had
been decreased to a period of three years from the date of conviction, unless a
petition for leave to appeal to this court or a petition for writ of certiorari was either
due to be filed or filed and denied, in which case the petition was due six months
from the due date or denial date. Id. (citing Pub. Act 86-1210, § 2 (eff. Jan. 1, 1992),
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Pub. Act 87-580, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1992), and Pub. Act 88-678, § 15 (eff. July 1,
1995)).
¶ 57 The version of section 122-1(c) that was in effect between 1997 and 2003
omitted a deadline that was tied to certiorari petitions in the United States Supreme
Court and added a deadline in cases where a petition for leave to appeal had been
allowed in this court, but with a three-year âstatute of repose,â thus providing:
âNo proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months
after the denial of a petition for leave to appeal or the date for filing such a
petition if none is filed or more than 45 days after the defendant files his or her
brief in the appeal of the sentence before the Illinois Supreme Court (or more
than 45 days after the deadline for the filing of the defendantâs brief with the
Illinois Supreme Court if no brief is filed) or 3 years from the date of conviction,
whichever is sooner, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay
was not due to his or her culpable negligence.â (Emphasis added.) Pub. Act 90-
14, art. 2, § 2-240, (eff. July 1, 1997).
¶ 58 Effective November 19, 2003, as part of a legislative package toward âdeath
penalty reform,â section 122-1(c) was amended to provide a specific statute of
limitations for cases involving death sentences, with accrual tied to direct appeal
proceedings before the United States Supreme Court, providing:
âExcept as otherwise provided in subsection (a-5),[2] if the petitioner is under
sentence of death, no proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more
than 6 months after the denial of a petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court on direct appeal, or more than 6 months from the date for filing
such a petition if none is filed, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that
the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.â Pub. Act 93-605, § 15
(eff. Nov. 19, 2003).
2
Subsection (a-5) of section 122-1 of the Act provides for the filing of a postconviction petition
in cases involving newly discovered evidence establishing a substantial basis to believe the
petitioner is actually innocent in cases involving the death penalty, to be commenced âwithin a
reasonable period of time after the personâs conviction.â 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a-5) (West 2022).
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¶ 59 In contrast, cases that did not involve the death penalty continued with a statute
of limitations accrual tied directly to proceedings before this court, but with
simplified language tying such accrual solely to the petition for leave to appeal:
âWhen a defendant has a sentence other than death, no proceedings under
this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the denial of the
Petition for Leave to Appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, or more than 6
months from the date for filing such a petition if none is filed, unless the
petitioner alleges facts showing the delay is not due to his or her culpable
negligence.â Id.
¶ 60 Noticeably absent from this version of the statute is the three-year âreposeâ
period that was included in the prior versions. This amendment to the provision was
short-lived, however, as it was amended by the legislature effective August 20,
2004, culminating in the version that remained in effect at the time petitioner filed
her postconviction petition in 2007. See Pub. Act 93-972, § 10 (eff. Aug. 20, 2004).
This version left the distinction between death penalty and non-death-penalty cases
intact. Id. As to cases involving the death penalty, the language was changed to
clarify the applicable statute of limitations whether a petition for writ of certiorari
is granted or denied by the United States Supreme Court. Thus, this version
applicable to death penalty cases provided:
âExcept as otherwise provided in subsection (a-5), if the petitioner is under
sentence of death and a petition for writ of certiorari is filed, no proceedings
under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the conclusion
of proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, unless the petitioner alleges
facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence. If a
petition for certiorari is not filed, no proceedings under this Article shall be
commenced more than 6 months from the date for filing a certiorari petition,
unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or
her culpable negligence.â 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2004).
¶ 61 Thus, in a case involving the death penalty, the amendment clarified that a
postconviction petition is required to be filed within six months after conclusion of
any direct appeal before the United States Supreme Court or, if there is no such
direct appeal, six months from the date a petition for writ of certiorari would be
due to effectuate such a direct appeal. Id. Inexplicably though, the provision
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regarding cases not involving the death penalty was likewise amended, deleting any
reference to proceedings before this court and inserting reference to proceedings
before the United States Supreme Court. See id. This is the provision in effect when
the petitionerâs direct appeal was dismissed and when she filed her postconviction
petition, and we repeat it here, in relevant part, for convenience:
âWhen a defendant has a sentence other than death, no proceedings under
this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the conclusion of
proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, unless the petitioner alleges
facts showing that the delay is not due to his or her culpable negligence. If a
petition for certiorari is not filed, no proceedings under this Article shall be
commenced more than 6 months from the date for filing a certiorari petition,
unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or
her culpable negligence. If a defendant does not file a direct appeal, the post-
conviction petition shall be filed no later than 3 years from the date of
conviction, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not
due to his or her culpable negligence.â (Emphases added.) 725 ILCS 5/122-1
(West 2004).
¶ 62 Pursuant to this amendment, in a non-death-penalty case, the plain language of
the statute seemed to tie accrual of a six-month statute of limitations solely to
proceedings before the United States Supreme Court, or the due date of a petition
for writ of certiorari if no such proceedings were had, and inserted a three-year
limitations period, but only for those cases where a defendant did not file a direct
appeal. As this court explained in Johnson, however, for defendants who appealed
to the appellate court but did not file a petition for leave to appeal in this court, there
was no way to calculate the due date of a petition for writ of certiorari. 2017 IL
120310, ¶ 20. This is because (except in death penalty cases) the United States
Supreme Court only has jurisdiction to consider a petition for writ of certiorari
when an appeal has been taken to the state court of last resort. Id. As such, United
States Supreme Court Rule 13 provides that a petition for certiorari must be filed
within 90 days of this courtâs judgment. Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 20.
¶ 63 In Johnson, this court rejected the petitionerâs argument that, because he did
not file a petition for leave to appeal in this court, he was not subject to a statute of
limitations for the filing of a postconviction petition at all, finding a literal reading
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of that section of the statute is at odds with its purpose, which is to provide a
deadline for filing a postconviction petition, and created an absurd result. Id. ¶ 21.
Accordingly, this court âinsertedâ the petition for leave to appeal language into the
statute, which âthe legislature omitted by oversight,â thus providing that a
postconviction petition must be filed within six months of (1) the conclusion of
proceedings before the United States Supreme Court or, if none, (2) the date for
filing a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court or, if none, the
date for filing a petition for leave to appeal to this court. Id. ¶ 24.
¶ 64 A review of legislative debate of this amendment is unhelpful to this court.
According to a brief description given by Senator Cullerton when describing an
unrelated floor amendment during the billâs second reading, it was considered to be
âa cleanup of the *** death penalty reform billâ from the year before. 93d Ill. Gen.
Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 12, 2004, at 43 (statement of Senator Cullerton).
A discussion in the House when debating the adoption of the bill considering the
Senate amendment reveals a lot of confusion on the part of a cosponsor of the bill
and others as to the meaning of the change to section 122-1(c). See 93d Ill. Gen.
Assem., House Proceedings, May 27, 2004, at 19-22. The following colloquy took
place between one of the cosponsors and a representative:
â[Representative]: And then if. . . if. . . I guess an inmate decides to file a
petition, he has 3 years to file it?
[Cosponsor]: In death penalty cases he has 3 years.[3] I think in a nondeath
penalty case this would allow. . . right. He has 3 years if he chooses not to file
a direct appeal. So this would extend the time.
[Representative]: So, this last appeal that has to be filed within 3 years, is
that an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court or. . .?
[Cosponsor]: What happens is, once a verdict has been issued the person
can either file a direct appeal or he can. . .
3
As set forth above, there is no three-year deadline set forth in this version of section 122-1(c)
of the Act for death penalty cases.
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[Representative]: But who is. . . who is. . . the 3-year deadline is for him to
appeal to whom or what organization or what authority?
[Cosponsor]: Itâs. . . itâs the period of time that he has to file the petition.
So, he has 3 years to file for a post-conviction hearing on that particular case,
to go back into his case. So in other words, if there was new evidence or
something that came about during his appeal, that first appeal, this would still
allow them the 3 year[sâ] time framework to then bring that new evidence up
to. . .[4]
â[Representative]: Currently, whatâs the time frame?
[Cosponsor]: Currently, itâs 3 years.[5]
[Representative]: ItâsâŠitâs 3 years now?
[Cosponsor]: Right. Itâs 3 years currently.
[Representative]: So, weâre. . . weâre. . .
[Cosponsor]: âIt doesnât change that. . . it doesnât expand that length of
time. But itâs when the 3 years start.
[Representative]: Weâre not lengthening it and weâre not shortening it, is
that correct?
[Cosponsor]: No. Weâre just clarifying it, thatâs correct.
[Representative]:Do you think 3 years is enough time?
***
[Cosponsor]: Well, thatâs. . . thatâs been agreed upon between defense
attorneys and prosecutors at the same time.
4
As set forth above, the three-year period only applies when a defendant does not file a direct
appeal, and a six-month period is applicable when an appeal has been filed, so this statement is
incorrect.
5
Again, prior to the passage of this amendment, any three-year period had been eliminated from
the section, and the amendment being debated was reintroducing the three-year period in a non-
death-penalty case where a defendant does not file a direct appeal.
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[Cosponsor]: And the public defenderâs office is approving?
[Representative]: Right, theyâre all onboard with this.â Id. at 21-22
(statements of Representatives M. Davis and Turner).
Without further discussion on the issue of the amendment to section 122-5 of the
Act, the bill was passed into law. Id. at 25.
¶ 65 H. This Courtâs Conclusion Regarding Legislative Intent
¶ 66 The debates on the applicable amendment to section 122-1 of the Act do not
assist the court in determining whether the legislature intended the filing of a notice
of appeal, regardless of its effectiveness in conferring appellate jurisdiction on the
court of review, to trigger the six-month provision or whether the legislature
intended the three-year provision to operate only in cases where no notice of appeal
had been filed at all, because the statements made during the debate conflict with
the plain language of section 122-1. However, we do find some guidance in the
history of the statute, as outlined above.
¶ 67 Considering the overall legislative trend of shortening the statute of limitations
down to a three-year statute with a series of amendments designed to ensure the
relevant process of appeal is complete prior to the running of a shorter, six-month
limitations period, we find that the legislature intended that a six-month limitations
be applied where a deadline for filing a petition for leave to appeal or petition for a
writ of certiorari can be ascertained by reference to the entry of an order by a court
of review. As such, we find the legislature intended that the three-year statute of
limitations be applicable only where neither this court nor the United States
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to consider a petition for leave to appeal or for a
writ of certiorari, and thus there is no method of calculating a six-month deadline.
For these reasons, we hold that a petitioner is to be found to have âfiled a direct
appealâ if he or she files a notice of appeal that culminates in an appellate court
order disposing of the appeal, whether by dismissal or on the merits. 6
6
Of course, this court would not have jurisdiction over a petition for leave to appeal from an
order striking a notice of appeal as premature due to a pending postjudgment motion as set forth in
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(b) (eff. Sept. 18, 2003), and an appellate court order striking the
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¶ 68 We are confident that this bright-line rule will ultimately make it easier for self-
represented, incarcerated litigants to ascertain the appropriate deadline for filing a
postconviction petition because it will be unnecessary for them to differentiate
between effective and ineffective notices of appeal or to inquire for the meaning of
the disposition of their appeal, whether on the merits, on jurisdictional grounds, or
for failure to comply with rules requiring a condition precedent, such as Rule
604(d). Once an incarcerated, self-represented litigant is in receipt of an order of
the appellate court disposing of her appeal, she will be able to either file a petition
for leave to appeal with this court within 35 days pursuant to Rule 315, or she will
have six months from the date such a petition would be due in which to file a
postconviction petition.
¶ 69 I. Application of Our Holding to Petitioner
¶ 70 Here, petitioner lost her right to appeal due to counselâs failure to comply with
Rule 604(d), and her notice of appeal was untimely because her untimely motion
to withdraw her guilty plea did not toll the deadline for filing a notice of appeal.
However, she did, in fact, file a notice of appeal, although ineffective, which
culminated in an appellate court order dismissing her appeal on September 19,
2006. This dismissal order triggered this courtâs jurisdiction to consider a petition
for leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 315 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Aug. 15, 2006)),
with a 35-day deadline for filing the petition expiring on October 24, 2006. At that
point, she had the option to file a petition for leave to appeal in this court within 35
days or to file a postconviction petition within six months of the deadline for filing
a petition for leave to appeal, which was April 24, 2007. Because she did not file a
petition for leave to appeal and did not file her postconviction petition until August
10, 2007, her petition is untimely pursuant to section 122-1(c) of the Act, as
interpreted by this court in Johnson and in this opinion. Thus, we agree with the
appellate court on the issue of the construction and application of section 122-1(c).
Having found the petition to be untimely, we turn to consider whether the circuit
court erred in finding petitioner culpably negligent for the delay in filing.
notice of appeal does not constitute a dismissal of the appeal. Thus, an order of the appellate court
striking a notice of appeal as premature does not trigger the six-month period.
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¶ 71 J. Lack of Culpable Negligence
¶ 72 The appellate court declined to consider the issue of petitionerâs culpable
negligence because she did not argue that she was not culpably negligent in filing
her petition beyond the deadline. 2022 IL App (2d) 210197, ¶ 49. 7 However,
petitioner has taken the position from the start that her petition is timely, a position
that, as explained above, represented a reasonable interpretation of section 122-1(c)
of the Act. From the time the appellate court mandated that petitionerâs claims
advance to the second stage of proceedings, she has had three appointed attorneys
and one privately retained attorney, and none of them appeared to recognize a
timeliness issue with the petition until the State filed its motion to dismiss the
petition on December 7, 2020. Regardless, this court has held Rule 651(c) (Ill. S.
Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017)) requires counsel to amend an untimely pro se
petition to allege any available facts necessary to establish that the delay was not
due to the petitionerâs culpable negligence. People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 49
(2007). Thus, in light of our holding regarding the untimeliness of the petition, this
court must, at a minimum, remand this cause to the circuit court to allow for counsel
to consult with petitioner and to amend the petition to allege facts establishing
petitionerâs lack of culpable negligence. See id. However, for the following reasons,
we decline to do so in the interests of judicial economy and in light of the
inordinately long procedural history in this case, because we find petitioner could
not have been culpably negligent in the late filing of her petition under the
circumstances as they existed in 2007 when she filed her petition.
¶ 73 This court has held that culpable negligence in the context of section 122-1(c)
of the Act contemplates something greater than ordinary negligence and is akin to
recklessness. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d at 106-08. While ignorance of the law will not
excuse any delay in bringing a postconviction petition (see Johnson, 2017 IL
120310, ¶ 26(citing Boclair,202 Ill. 2d at 104-05
)), this court has upheld a finding
7
Petitioner has alleged a lack of culpable negligence in her briefs submitted to this court and, to
the extent that waiver or forfeiture of that issue could be found, considering her argument with
respect to timeliness and the vast amount of time that has passed since she filed her postconviction
petition, we choose to overlook it under the unique circumstances presented here. See Walworth
Investments-LG, LLC v. Mu Sigma, Inc., 2022 IL 127177, ¶ 94 (âwaiver and forfeiture are
limitations on the parties and not on the court, and a court may overlook forfeiture where necessary
to reach a just result or maintain a sound body of precedentâ).
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that delay was not due to a postconviction petitionerâs culpable negligence where
the law and legal doctrine governing petitionerâs claims was evolving and was not
clarified by this court until after the deadline, pursuant to the version of section
122-1(c) that was applicable at that time, had passed (see People v. Hernandez, 296
Ill. App. 3d 349 (1998)).
¶ 74 Here, we find that, at the time that petitioner filed her postconviction petition
on August 10, 2007, she had no way of knowing her petition was untimely. First,
at the time she filed her petition, as described in detail above, section 122-1(c) of
the Act had been amended to omit any reference to a petition for leave to appeal in
this court when setting forth a six-month deadline for filing a postconviction
petition, and the text was replaced with a six-month deadline tied to the conclusion
of proceedings before the United States Supreme Court or the deadline for filing a
petition for a writ of certiorari. See Pub. Act 93-972, § 10 (eff. Aug. 20, 2004).
However, as this court pointed out in Johnson, there is no way to calculate a
deadline for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court in a non-death-penalty case unless a petition for leave to appeal in this court
were filed and denied or allowed with an opinion from this court on the merits.
2017 IL 120310, ¶ 20. While this court found the omission of the petition for leave
to appeal was legislative oversight and inserted that language into the statute by
judicial opinion, this did not happen until 10 years after petitioner filed her petition,
so she did not have the benefit of this courtâs decision in Johnson. See id.
¶ 75 In addition to the foregoing, at the time petitioner filed her petition, Ross was
the only reported opinion in Illinois addressing the timing of a postconviction
petition in a situation where a petitioner has lost the right to directly appeal the
conviction due to the failure to file a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea
pursuant to Rule 604(d). See 352 Ill. App. 3d at 619. Contrary to the finding of the
appellate court, we do not see how the August 2004 amendment to section 122-1
of the Act impacted the Ross holding as it relates to petitioner. Under both versions
of the statute, the six-month period was tied to the appellate process. See Pub. Act
93-972, § 10 (eff. Aug. 20, 2004). The Ross court held that, â[f]or postconviction
purposes, a direct appeal dismissed for failure to file a timely postplea motion
pursuant to Rule 604(d) is tantamount to no appeal at all.â 352 Ill. App. 3d at 620.
Thus, although the petitioner had filed a notice of appeal, it was dismissed for
failure to comply with Rule 604(d), so the six-month limitation period was not
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triggered, and petitioner had three years from the date of conviction to file a timely
petition for postconviction relief. Id. This was petitionerâs situation at the time she
filed her postconviction petition, and circuit courts were bound to follow Ross until
the Fourth District issued its decision in Byrd in 2018, creating a split in authority.
See People v. Carpenter, 228 Ill. 2d 250, 259-60 (2008) (â âdecisions of an
appellate court are binding precedent on all circuit courts regardless of locale,â â
and âuntil this court says otherwise, an applicable appellate court decision must be
followed by the circuit courts of this stateâ (quoting People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d
113, 128 (1988))).
¶ 76 Based on the unique situation petitioner was in at the time she filed her
postconviction petition, where it was impossible to calculate a six-month deadline
based on the statutory language at the time and where the only existing precedent
established that, because of her counselâs failure to comply with Rule 604(d), her
notice of appeal from her conviction was âtantamount to no appeal at allâ in the
context of the postconviction statute of limitations and she filed her petition within
three years of her conviction, we find that petitioner cannot be found to have been
culpably negligent for failing to file her postconviction petition within six months
of the appellate courtâs dismissal of her notice of appeal. Thus, despite our holding
today, clarifying the applicable period is six months in all cases where an appellate
court order triggers this courtâs jurisdiction to entertain a petition for leave to
appeal, we reverse the circuit courtâs order dismissing the postconviction petition
on grounds of untimeliness.
¶ 77 Having found that petitioner could not have been culpably negligent in the late
filing of her petition under the circumstances presented here, we remand with
instructions that she be permitted to amend her supplemental postconviction
petition to include such allegations and for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. In addition, we would be remiss if we did not express our strong
disapproval of the delay in these proceedings brought about by appointed counsel
and condoned by the circuit court by the granting of no less than 30 continuances
spanning over a decade during the second stage of proceedings. Thus, we direct
that the proceedings on remand be conducted without further delay.
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¶ 78 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 79 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that pursuant to section 122-1(c) of the Act,
in any case where a notice of appeal is filed by a defendant following a conviction,
whether that notice of appeal is dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, for
noncompliance with Rule 604(d), or heard on its merits, the six-month statute of
limitations for filing a postconviction petition applies. Pursuant to this holding,
petitionerâs postconviction petition was untimely. However, under the unique
circumstances presented in this case, petitioner could not have been culpably
negligent in failing to file her petition within that six-month period. Accordingly,
we reverse the order of the circuit court that dismissed the postconviction petition
as untimely, and we remand with directions that petitioner be permitted to amend
her supplemental postconviction petition to reflect her lack of culpable negligence
and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, to be conducted without
further delay.
¶ 80 Judgements reversed.
¶ 81 Cause remanded with directions.
¶ 82 JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
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