People v. Spencer

                                        IN THE
                               SUPREME COURT
                                            OF
                          THE STATE OF ILLINOIS




                                   (Docket No. 130015)

               THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
                        EUGENE SPENCER, Appellant.


                                Opinion filed June 5, 2025.



        JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Overstreet, Holder White, Cunningham,
     Rochford, and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.



                                        OPINION

¶1       The State charged defendant, Eugene Spencer, with first degree murder (730
     ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2010)), attempted murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(C)
     (West 2010)), and home invasion (id. § 12-11(c)) for offenses that occurred on
     September 9, 2012, at which time Spencer was 20 years old. On March 5, 2019, a
     jury convicted Spencer of all three charges. On January 31, 2021, the circuit court
     of Cook County sentenced Spencer to an aggregate of 100 years’ imprisonment.
     Relevant here, Spencer appealed his sentence arguing that, as applied to him, it
     violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution because it
     was a de facto life sentence. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. The appellate court
     disagreed, finding that Spencer’s eligibility for parole pursuant to section 5-4.5-115
     of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code of Corrections) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115
     (West 2020)) precluded his 100-year aggregate sentence from being a de facto life
     sentence. 

. We allowed Spencer’s petition for
     leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). For
     the following reasons we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.


¶2                                   I. BACKGROUND

¶3       The facts of this case have been set forth in the appellate court decision (

), and we, therefore, summarize only the facts relevant to
     our disposition. Spencer was arrested on December 23, 2013. On January 29, 2014,
     a grand jury returned an indictment charging Spencer with multiple offenses
     including first degree murder, attempted murder, and home invasion.


¶4                                       A. Jury Trial

¶5        A jury trial was held from February 26 to March 5, 2019. The evidence at trial
     showed that on September 9, 2012, Spencer, along with Qawmane Wilson and
     Lorina Johnson planned and executed (1) a murder for hire of Wilson’s mother,
     Yolanda Holmes, and (2) a home invasion. In addition, Spencer shot at and choked
     Curtis Wyatt, Holmes’s boyfriend, who was also present during the home invasion.
     Spencer admitted to detectives that Wilson had offered him money to commit the
     murder. Spencer entered the apartment building alone because Wilson had given
     him the code to the building. Wilson also called Holmes and asked her to unlock
     the apartment door explaining that he planned to come over. Spencer maintained
     phone contact with Wilson as he made his way to Holmes’s apartment, and he
     listened to Wilson’s instructions through Spencer’s earbuds. Spencer admitted
     entering the apartment and shooting and then stabbing Holmes in the bedroom.
     Spencer also admitted fighting with Wyatt. At the conclusion of the jury trial,




                                             -2-
       Spencer was found guilty of all three offenses and found guilty of personally
       discharging a firearm during the attempted murder and home invasion.

¶6         On April 8, 2019, Spencer filed a motion for a new trial, and on June 6, 2019,
       he filed a supplemental motion for a new trial. On August 15, 2019, the circuit court
       denied Spencer’s motions.


¶7                               B. Spencer’s Sentencing Hearing

¶8        In August 2019, in anticipation of Spencer’s sentencing hearing, defense
       counsel asked the circuit court to review two appellate court decisions—People v.
       Buffer, 

, and People v. House, 

-
       B—that concerned changes in sentencing law for young offenders. 1 The circuit
       court stated that it was familiar with the cases and directed the parties to address
       them at the sentencing hearing.

¶9         On January 31, 2020, the sentencing hearing was held. Spencer was 28 years
       old. Prior to the hearing, the circuit court received a presentence investigation report
       (PSI), Holmes’s sister’s and Wyatt’s victim impact statements, and testimony
       regarding Spencer’s disciplinary history during pretrial custody.

¶ 10       The PSI provided information regarding Spencer’s background, reflecting—
       inter alia—that Spencer’s mother raised him and his nine siblings after his father
       left when Spencer was a child. Spencer described his childhood as “fair” but
       unstable. Before age 11, he lived with 15 other people in his grandmother’s
       apartment in a public housing complex. His family struggled financially, and his
       basic needs were not always met. When the housing complex was torn down,
       Spencer moved with his mother and siblings to better living conditions but
       continued to experience financial difficulties. From about age 12 to 16, Spencer
       suffered physical abuse by his mother’s boyfriend. Spencer reported that he had a
       good relationship with his siblings until his mother died in the year between his

           1
            This court allowed leave to appeal in both cases. See People v. House, 

 (finding the record needed further development for an as-applied challenge
       and remanding to the circuit court for second stage postconviction proceedings); People v.
       Buffer, 

 (determining that any sentence exceeding 40 years is a
       de facto life sentence).



                                                 -3-
       crimes and arrest; his father died sometime in 2012. Spencer attended multiple
       schools during his childhood and left school during the eleventh grade because his
       home life was unstable and he was struggling to eat and survive. While in school
       he attended a special education program for learning issues. Spencer described
       himself as a “C” and “D” student who did not get along with his teachers because
       he did not understand the work. He was suspended once for fighting. And from age
       16 to 24, Spencer was “affiliated” with the Gangster Disciples.

¶ 11       In 2012, the year preceding his arrest, Spencer worked at a moving company
       earning about $1,200 per month. He lived with a friend’s mother and paid $75 per
       month in rent. Spencer related that he was in good physical health but suffered from
       high blood pressure and had a torn ligament in his knee and nerve damage in his
       neck. He began abusing marijuana at age 13, alcohol at age 18, and cocaine at age
       21. Spencer experienced negative consequences as a result of his substance abuse,
       but he never received treatment. While in pretrial custody, Spencer twice attempted
       suicide and was prescribed medication for depression and anxiety. Spencer had no
       prior criminal history.

¶ 12       The circuit court also heard testimony and received documentation regarding
       Spencer’s disciplinary history while in pretrial custody and the resulting criminal
       charges, which remained pending at the time of sentencing. Spencer had been
       disciplined 33 times. On 13 occasions Spencer masturbated in front of other
       people—including assistant public defenders, nurses, and prison guards—and
       sometimes refused to stop even after being ordered to do so. On nine other
       occasions, Spencer battered staff or fought fellow inmates.


¶ 13                                  C. The Circuit Court

¶ 14        The circuit court recognized that it needed to determine Spencer’s sentences in
       accordance with the seriousness of his crimes and after considering the goal of
       restoring him to useful citizenship. Accordingly, before sentencing Spencer, the
       court reviewed the PSI “two or three times” and considered the aggravating and
       mitigating factors and evidence. The court found Spencer’s youth and lack of a
       prior criminal record to be mitigating. However, the court attached great
       significance to the seriousness of his offenses, emphasizing that Spencer agreed to
       kill for $4,000, shot and then stabbed the victim to make sure she was dead, and



                                              -4-
       tried to kill Wyatt. The court found Spencer’s actions to be “cold-hearted,” noted
       his problems with authority while in pretrial custody, and could not provide “ one
       good reason he should be back on the street again.”

¶ 15       Spencer’s crimes subjected him to consecutive prison terms of 20 to 60 years
       for first degree murder (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2010)), 6 to 30 years for
       attempted murder plus a mandatory firearm enhancement of 20 years (720 ILCS
       5/8-4(c)(1)(C) (West 2010); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2010)), and 6 to 30
       years for home invasion plus a mandatory firearm enhancement of 20 years (720
       ILCS 5/12-11(c) (West 2010); 2 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2010)). See 730
       ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(1) (West 2010) (providing for mandatory consecutive sentences).
       Because Spencer was under 21 when he committed the offenses, he is eligible for
       parole after serving 20 years of the aggregate sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b)
       (West 2020).

¶ 16       The court found that the statutorily authorized sentences for Spencer’s crimes
       were appropriate. The court sentenced Spencer to consecutive prison terms of 50
       years for first degree murder, 25 years for attempted murder, and 25 years for home
       invasion, under a misguided assumption that the minimum sentence for the latter
       two crimes was 21 years. 3 On February 26, 2020, Spencer filed a motion to
       reconsider his sentence. On March 4, 2020, the circuit court denied Spencer’s
       motion. Spencer filed a timely notice of appeal on March 4, 2020.


¶ 17                                  D. The Appellate Court

¶ 18       Relevant here, on appeal, Spencer claimed that his sentence was
       unconstitutional. The appellate court, in a split decision, found that Spencer could
       not establish that his 100-year sentence of imprisonment violated the Illinois
       proportionate penalties clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) where, as a 20-year-old
       at the time that he committed the offense, he was eligible for parole review after

          2
             This provision has since been renumbered as section 19-6. See Pub. Act 97-1108,
       § 10-5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013).
           3
             The minimum sentence for attempted murder and home invasion was 26 years,
       because the sentencing provision required “20 years shall be added to the term of
       imprisonment imposed by the court.” See 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(C), 12-11(c) (2010).




                                                -5-
       serving 20 years (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b) (West 2020)). 

.

¶ 19       The appellate court majority observed that section 5-4.5-115(b) of the Code of
       Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b) (West 2020)) created parole review for
       offenders under the age of 21 at the time of the offense. 

-
       U, ¶ 142. This legislation was enacted in response to emerging case law to address
       youthful offenders under the age of 21. 

 The court recognized that, in assessing
       whether a de facto life sentence has been imposed, the court must consider the
       defendant’s earliest opportunity for release. Id. ¶ 143. Therefore, when section 5-
       4.5-115(b) applies, the defendant’s sentence is not a de facto life sentence, as the
       defendant is eligible for parole after serving 20 years of his sentence. Id. The court
       recognized that, because Spencer has a meaningful opportunity to obtain release
       before serving more than 40 years’ imprisonment, he was not sentenced to a
       de facto life sentence and his sentence did not violate the proportionate penalties
       clause. Id. ¶ 135. The court held that Spencer’s as-applied constitutional challenge
       based on Miller v. Alabama, 

 (2012), failed. 

.

¶ 20       Justice Hyman concurred in part and dissented in part. 

 (Hyman, J.,
       concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Hyman concurred with the
       majority that Spencer could not bring his emerging adult claim in a direct appeal
       (id. ¶ 152) but maintained that Spencer must raise his claim in postconviction
       proceedings as directed by People v. Harris, 

 (

). Justice Hyman further faulted the majority for not applying the
       cruel or degrading standard that governs proportionate penalties claims to
       Spencer’s case and noted only that eligibility for parole did not control that analysis.
       

.

¶ 21       We allowed the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois to file an amicus
       curiae brief in support of Spencer’s position. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20,
       2010).




                                                -6-
¶ 22                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 23        Spencer argues that, as applied to him, his de facto life sentence violates the
       Illinois proportionate penalties clause and Illinois’s youth parole statute (730 ILCS
       5/5-4.5-115(b) (West 2020)) does not cure the imposition of an otherwise
       unconstitutional sentence. Spencer maintains that the imposition of his 100-year
       de facto life sentence without consideration of Miller-based, youth-related factors
       in mitigation violates the proportionate penalties clause. Spencer contends that,
       because Illinois’s parole statute does not provide him with a meaningful
       opportunity for parole, it does not foreclose his claim that his sentence violates the
       proportionate penalties clause. Spencer requests that this court remand this case for
       a new sentencing hearing.


¶ 24                                  A. Standard of Review

¶ 25       An as-applied constitutional challenge is a legal question that we review
       de novo. People v. House, 

; People v. Coty, 

.


¶ 26                 B. Spencer’s Sentence Is Not a De Facto Life Sentence

¶ 27               1. Miller v. Alabama Does Not Apply to Emerging Adults

¶ 28       Spencer argues that, based on Miller, his sentence is an unconstitutional
       de facto life sentence that violates the Illinois proportionate penalties clause. We
       disagree.

¶ 29       In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment
       (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) “forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in
       prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Miller, 

.
       The Court determined that such sentencing schemes were constitutionally flawed
       because juveniles “are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of
       sentencing” (id. at 471) and mandatory sentencing schemes, “by their nature,
       preclude a sentencer from taking account of [those differences]” (id. at 476). The
       Court reasoned that, by making irrelevant the “offender’s age and the wealth of
       characteristics and circumstances attendant to it” (id.), mandatory life-without-




                                               -7-
       parole sentencing schemes simply pose “too great a risk of disproportionate
       punishment” (id. at 479). See People v. Wilson, 

. The primary
       basis for the Miller Court’s reasoning is that a juvenile’s character is not as well
       formed as an adult’s character, a juvenile’s traits are less fixed than an adult’s traits,
       and a juvenile’s actions are less likely to be evidence of irretrievable depravity.
       People v. Clark, 

 (citing Miller, 

).

¶ 30        In Clark, 

, this court found that “Miller did not prohibit
       life sentences for juveniles but, instead, held that the eighth amendment required
       sentencing courts to have discretion in sentencing juveniles after considering the
       juvenile’s youth and the attendant characteristics of youth.”

¶ 31       Furthermore, in People v. Moore, 

 (quoting Clark, 

, quoting People v. Dorsey, 

), this court
       observed that “ ‘ “Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth
       amendment does not provide cause for a [juvenile offender] to raise a claim under
       the proportionate penalties clause.” ’ ” This court clarified that, as Miller directly
       applies only to juveniles and does not apply to young adults, it also does not provide
       cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties
       clause in a successive postconviction petition. Id. ¶¶ 38, 42. Furthermore, this court
       found that Miller did not change the law applicable to discretionary sentences
       imposed on young adult offenders, i.e., 18- to 20-year-olds. Moore, 

; Harris, 

 (“[T]he Supreme Court has clearly and
       consistently drawn the line between juveniles and adults for the purpose of
       sentencing at the age of 18.”).

¶ 32       Additionally, we observe that claims for extending Miller to offenders 18 years
       of age or older have been repeatedly rejected. See, e.g., United States v. Williston,
       

 (10th Cir. 2017) (declining to expand the holding of Miller
       to offenders who are “ ‘just over age 18’ ” at the time of their offenses); United
       States v. Marshall, 

 (6th Cir. 2013) (determining considerations
       of efficiency and certainty require a bright line separating adults from juveniles,
       and for purposes of the eighth amendment, an individual’s eighteenth birthday
       marks that bright line); People v. Argeta, 

 (Ct. App.
       2012) (rejecting argument to extend Miller to an offender who was over 18 years
       old at the time of his offense); People v. Abundio, 

 (Ct.




                                                 -8-
       App. 2013) (same); see also Harris, 

. We agree with those
       decisions and continue to hold that Miller only applies to juveniles and does not
       apply to emerging adults.


¶ 33               2. The Parole Review Statute Precludes Spencer’s Sentence
                             From Being a De Facto Life Sentence

¶ 34       While Miller does not directly apply to Spencer, this court recognized the
       science that helped form the basis for the Miller decision may assist emerging adult
       defendants in supporting an as-applied, proportionate penalties clause challenge.
       Harris, 

. Thus, emerging adult defendants, like Spencer in
       this case, often assert their sentence is a de facto life sentence based on this court’s
       Miller cases.

¶ 35        The statutory scheme under which Spencer was sentenced required an
       aggregate sentence of 72 years in prison—a minimum of 20 years for first degree
       murder (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2010)) and a minimum of 26 years for
       attempted murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(C) (West 2010)) and 26 years for home
       invasion (id. § 12-11(c))—and provided that Spencer, who was under the age of 21
       at the time of his offenses, shall be eligible for parole review by the Prisoner Review
       Board after serving 20 years or more of his sentences (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b)
       (West 2020)). Thus, Spencer was sentenced under a statutory scheme that makes
       him eligible for parole before he spends more than 40 years in prison. See Dorsey,
       

; People v. Buffer, 

 (finding that a
       prison sentence of 40 years or more constitutes a de facto life sentence).

¶ 36       The General Assembly, in response to case law regarding youthful offenders
       under the age of 21, enacted the parole review statute, which provides in relevant
       part:

               “(b) *** A person under 21 years of age at the time of the commission of
          first degree murder who is sentenced on or after June 1, 2019 (the effective date
          of Public Act 100-1182) shall be eligible for parole review by the Prisoner
          Review Board after serving 20 years or more of his or her sentence or sentences,
          except for those subject to a term of natural life imprisonment under Section 5-




                                                -9-
          8-1 of this Code or any person subject to sentencing under subsection (c) of
          Section 5-4.5-105 of this Code.

                                               ***

              (j) ***

                                               ***

              In considering the factors affecting the release determination under 20 Ill.
          Adm. Code 1610.50(b), the Prisoner Review Board panel shall consider the
          diminished culpability of youthful offenders, the hallmark features of youth,
          and any subsequent growth and maturity of the youthful offender during
          incarceration.

                                               ***

               (m) *** [A] person denied parole under subsection (j) of this Section, who
          is serving a sentence or sentences for first degree murder or aggravated criminal
          sexual assault shall be eligible for a second and final parole review by the
          Prisoner Review Board 10 years after the written decision under subsection (k)
          of this Section.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b), (j), (m) (West 2020).

¶ 37        In Dorsey, 

, this court, referencing the day-for-day credit
       available to the defendant, found that “[w]e are simply setting forth the sentencing
       scheme that applies to defendant’s sentence. And we believe it undeniable that the
       ability of defendant to earn day-for-day credit under that scheme presents a
       ‘meaningful opportunity’ for release from prison short of a de facto life sentence.”
       This court found that a judicially imposed sentence that is more than 40 years but
       offers day-for-day, good-conduct sentencing credit does not cross the Buffer line if
       it offers the opportunity to demonstrate maturity and obtain release within 40 years
       or less of incarceration. Id. ¶¶ 64-65; see People v. Reyes, 

       (determining that courts look to the earliest opportunity for release of the defendant
       to assess whether a de facto life sentence has been imposed).

¶ 38       As observed by the appellate court in People v. Doe, 

-
       U, ¶ 22:




                                               - 10 -
          “the Dorsey decision concerned the availability of day-for-day, good-conduct,
          and did not specifically address the situation presented here where a defendant
          is sentenced to more than 40-years in prison but is nevertheless eligible for
          parole under section 5-4.5-115 of the Code. However, in reaching its decision,
          the Dorsey court specifically analogized day-for-day, good-conduct to the
          possibility of parole. [Dorsey, 

] (‘The statutory
          scheme here, which allows for the opportunity of release short of a de facto life
          sentence, is at least on par with discretionary parole for a life sentence[.]’).”

¶ 39       Based on this court’s analogy, numerous appellate court decisions held that
       considering Dorsey and its recognition of the relationship between day-for-day,
       good-conduct, and the possibility of parole, the availability of parole under section
       5-4.5-115 of the Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115 (West 2020)) connotes
       that sentences of greater than 40 years in prison do not amount to de facto life
       sentences. See People v. Kendrick, 

 (finding that, if
       the defendant has a reasonable opportunity for release before serving more than 40
       years in prison, he has not received a de facto life sentence); People v. Cavazos,
       

 (determining that the parole statute affords the
       defendant a meaningful opportunity for release before serving a de facto life
       sentence); People v. Elliott, 

 (finding that the
       defendant’s 70-year sentence was not a de facto life sentence where the defendant
       met the criteria to be eligible for parole review after serving 20 years of his
       sentence); People v. Beck, 

 (determining that the
       parole statute affords the defendant a meaningful opportunity for release based on
       his maturity and rehabilitation before a de facto life sentence of over 40 years’
       imprisonment is served).

¶ 40       We find that the statutory provision invoked to review parole petitions for
       emerging adults convicted of first degree murder provides that the opportunity for
       release requires consideration of “the diminished culpability of youthful offenders,
       the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and maturity of the
       youthful offender during incarceration.” See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(j) (West 2020).
       Spencer was under 21 years of age on September 9, 2012, the date of the offenses.
       Spencer’s sentencing hearing occurred on January 31, 2020—after the effective
       date of this provision of June 1, 2019. Therefore, Spencer meets the criteria to be
       eligible for parole review after serving 20 years of his sentence. See 

 § 5-4.5-




                                              - 11 -
       115. Consequently, the applicable sentencing scheme allows Spencer a meaningful
       opportunity to obtain release before he spends 40 years in prison. See Dorsey, 

; Buffer, 

. Accordingly, Spencer was not
       sentenced to a de facto life sentence. To the extent that People v. Gates, 

, and People v. Carrasquillo, 

, can be interpreted to hold that sentences over 40 years are de facto life
       sentences despite the defendant’s eligibility for parole, they are overruled.


¶ 41                     C. Spencer Is Not Foreclosed From Bringing
                           His as-Applied Challenge to His Sentence
                      Pursuant to the Illinois Proportionate Penalties Clause

¶ 42       Notwithstanding the fact that Spencer is not serving a de facto life sentence, he
       is not foreclosed from bringing an as-applied challenge to his sentence pursuant to
       the Illinois proportionate penalties clause. Thus, the appellate court erred by finding
       that, because Spencer did not receive a de facto life sentence, he cannot establish
       that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause. See 

. Article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution, titled
       “Limitation of Penalties After Conviction,” states: “All penalties shall be
       determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective
       of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. The
       mandate set forth in article I, section 11, provides a check on the judiciary, i.e., the
       individual sentencing judge, as well as the legislature, which sets the statutory
       penalties. People v. Clemons, 

. A defendant’s challenge to the
       decision of the individual sentencing judge is based on the defendant’s belief that,
       although the sentence comports with the sentencing statute, the sentence
       nonetheless violates article I, section 11, because the judge failed to set the sentence
       “according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the
       [defendant] to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11; Clemons, 

.

¶ 43        A defendant may challenge a sentence of any length. See People v. Fuller, 

, 5-6 (1999) (as-applied challenge to Class B misdemeanor punishable by
       up to six months’ imprisonment). Further, the Illinois Constitution does not limit a
       proportionate penalties challenge to just juveniles or individuals with life sentences.




                                                - 12 -
       People v. Hilliard, 

. In addition, this court has not barred
       young adult defendants from raising as-applied proportionate penalties clause
       challenges to life sentences based on the evolving science regarding juvenile
       maturity and brain development. Clark, 

 (citing People v.
       Thompson, 

 (19-year-old defendant sentenced to a term
       of natural life in prison)).

¶ 44       “All as-applied constitutional challenges are, by definition, reliant on the
       application of the law to the specific facts and circumstances alleged by the
       challenger. ‘Therefore, it is paramount that the record be sufficiently developed in
       terms of those facts and circumstances for purposes of appellate review.’ ”
       (Emphasis omitted.) People ex rel. Hartrich v. 2010 Harley-Davidson, 

 (quoting Thompson, 

); see Harris, 

 (18-year-old defendant sentenced to a mandatory minimum
       aggregate term of 76 years’ imprisonment; this court stated that the record needed
       to be sufficiently developed in the circuit court through an evidentiary hearing and
       findings of fact to review the defendant’s constitutional claim); House, 

 (19-year-old defendant sentenced to a mandatory natural life term
       for murder; this court determined that the appellate court erred in holding that his
       natural life sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause as applied to him
       without a developed evidentiary record or factual findings on the issue).

¶ 45       Based on this general principle that as-applied constitutional claims cannot
       ultimately succeed absent a sufficiently developed evidentiary record, we find that
       the proper venue for Spencer’s as-applied challenge is in a postconviction
       proceeding. See Harris, 

 (concluding that the 18-year-old
       defendant’s as-applied proportionate penalties challenge was “more appropriately
       raised” in a postconviction proceeding rather than on direct appeal); Thompson,
       

, ¶ 44 (finding that a 19-year-old defendant was not necessarily
       foreclosed from raising an as-applied challenge in the trial court and observing that
       the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2012)) was
       designed to resolve such constitutional claims).

¶ 46      The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020))
       provides a means for individuals serving criminal sentences to assert that their
       convictions resulted from a substantial denial of their constitutional rights. Hilliard,




                                                - 13 -
       

. Postconviction proceedings are commenced by the filing of
       a petition, which must, among other things, “clearly set forth the respects in which
       petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2020).
       Accordingly, we find that Spencer is not foreclosed from bringing his as-applied
       challenge to his 100-year sentence under the proportionate penalties clause through
       a postconviction proceeding.


¶ 47                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 48       In sum, we continue to hold that Miller only applies to juveniles and not to
       emerging adults. We find that, while Spencer is not serving a de facto life sentence,
       the appellate court erred by concluding that fact prohibited him from establishing
       his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause. Lastly, we hold that
       Spencer is not foreclosed from bringing his proportionate penalties claim in a
       postconviction petition. The judgments of the appellate court and the circuit court
       of Cook County are affirmed.


¶ 49      Judgments affirmed.




                                              - 14 -