People v. Clark

                                         IN THE
                                SUPREME COURT
                                             OF
                          THE STATE OF ILLINOIS




                                    (Docket No. 127838)

                THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
                           ANGELO CLARK, Appellant.


                             Opinion filed December 19, 2024.



        JUSTICE OVERSTREET delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Holder White, Cunningham, Rochford, and
     O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.

        Justice Neville dissented, with opinion.



                                         OPINION

¶1       The State, by indictment, charged defendant Angelo Clark with multiple counts
     of attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2012)) and
     aggravated battery (id. § 12-3.05(e)(1)), arising out of a gang-related shooting that
     seriously injured two people at an outdoor gathering held on July 19, 2013.
     Defendant moved to quash his arrest, which was effected pursuant to an
     investigative alert—a computer notification to officers in the field that detectives
     had found probable cause for defendant’s arrest—issued by the Chicago Police
     Department. Following defendant’s arrest, he made an inculpatory statement. After
     a hearing, the circuit court denied defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress
     his statement. Defendant did not contest the denial in the circuit court.

¶2       Thereafter, following a 2017 jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County,
     defendant was convicted, under an accountability theory, of two counts of
     aggravated battery with a firearm (id.) and was initially sentenced to two
     consecutive terms of 23 years in prison. Upon an amended motion to reconsider his
     sentence, the circuit court reduced the aggregate sentence from 46 years to 32 years
     in prison.

¶3       Defendant appealed, and the Appellate Court, First District, affirmed
     defendant’s conviction and sentence. 

. We allowed
     defendant’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021)), and
     for the following reasons, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment.


¶4                                    BACKGROUND

¶5       On July 19, 2013, at approximately 7:30 p.m., two people attending an outdoor
     event, a 6-year-old girl and a 52-year-old woman, were shot and injured. Shortly
     after the shooting, police pulled over Cragg Hardaway a few blocks from the crime
     scene after his vehicle was identified as possibly having been involved. He was
     arrested the next day, and on the following morning, July 21, 2013, he gave a video-
     recorded statement. In his statement, he told detectives that, shortly after he heard
     gunshots on the day of the shooting, he encountered DeAndre Butler, who got in
     Hardaway’s car and told him that some younger men had shot at someone. Three
     young men—Terrence Lynom, Ladon Barker, and defendant—then ran to
     Hardaway’s car, got in, and told Butler they had committed the shooting and
     believed Lynom had successfully killed someone. Hardaway later testified to the
     grand jury that he encountered defendant again about a half hour later, when
     defendant reported to Butler that he had disposed of the guns. After Hardaway’s
     video-recorded statement, the detectives issued investigative alerts notifying




                                             -2-
     officers that there was probable cause to arrest Lynom, Barker, and defendant. On
     July 22, 2013, between noon and 3:30 p.m., officers arrested defendant.

¶6       Before trial, defendant filed a motion to quash arrest, contending that he was
     arrested without probable cause or a valid arrest warrant. At the hearing on the
     motion, Lashan Clark, defendant’s mother, testified that at approximately 3 p.m. on
     July 22, 2013, she was in her mother’s home when two police officers arrived
     looking for defendant, who was not there. Ms. Clark testified that she voluntarily
     accompanied the officers to her sister’s South Lafayette Avenue residence, where
     she said defendant was living. Ms. Clark testified that, after she and the officers
     arrived at her sister’s residence, she told the officers to wait outside, she entered the
     back door, and she saw defendant sitting at the kitchen table. Ms. Clark testified
     that she told defendant that the police were there “about a little girl” and that it was
     serious and that defendant “was getting mad” because the police were there. Ms.
     Clark testified that, while she and defendant were talking, the officers entered the
     house and threatened to tase defendant. Ms. Clark testified that the officers then
     choked defendant, threw him against the wall, and handcuffed him. Ms. Clark
     testified that the officers then escorted defendant from the home.

¶7       Chicago police officer Patrick Kinney 1 testified that on July 22, 2013, he and
     his partner, Chicago police officer Kevin O’Neill, went to defendant’s
     grandmother’s house after receiving an investigative alert that there was probable
     cause to arrest defendant for the shooting of two victims. Officer Kinney believed
     that the basis for the probable cause for the investigative alert was that defendant
     had been “positively identified as being the shooter where two victims were shot.”

¶8       After learning that there was an investigative alert with probable cause to arrest
     defendant, Kinney performed a database search on defendant’s name and went to
     the residence of the first address that appeared. Kinney testified that, at that
     residence, they encountered Ms. Clark, who was “extremely” cooperative,
     informed them that defendant lived with her sister, and accompanied the officers to
     her sister’s house at South Lafayette Avenue. Kinney testified that, when they
     arrived at the sister’s address, Kinney approached the back of the residence, O’Neill

          1
           The report of proceedings in the record spells Officer Kinney’s name as “Kenny,” but the
     parties below, the arrest report contained in the common-law record, and the appellate court spell
     his name “Kinney.”




                                                   -3-
       approached the front, and Ms. Clark waited in the back of the police car in front of
       the residence.

¶9         Kinney testified that he knocked on the door and a male adult in his twenties
       answered it. Kinney introduced himself to the young man and explained that he was
       looking for defendant, whom he had probable cause to arrest. Kinney testified that,
       although the man did not verbally invite Kinney inside, the man opened the door,
       moved to the side, and pointed to a back bedroom where Kinney saw defendant.
       Kinney, who remained outside the residence, told defendant that there was a
       probable cause investigatory alert for his arrest and that the detectives wanted to
       speak to him, and Kinney asked defendant to accompany him to the police station.
       Defendant said, “Okay, let me get some clothes,” after which Kinney stepped inside
       the residence and defendant put on his clothes. Kinney testified that he entered into
       the house as defendant gathered his clothing “to have eyes on him prior” to arresting
       him because he did not “know what he was going to grab.” Kinney testified that
       defendant was very cooperative, defendant exited the home, and he placed
       defendant under arrest and escorted him to the police station.

¶ 10       The circuit court denied defendant’s motion. In doing so, the circuit court found
       that Kinney was a “believable” and “compelling” witness and that Ms. Clark’s
       testimony was biased and “utterly without any credibility.” The court stated that it
       agreed with defense counsel that the existence of an investigative alert with
       probable cause to arrest does not alone provide authorization for an officer to enter
       a home to effect an arrest. The circuit court noted, however, that Kinney’s eventual
       entry occurred after defendant had “already agreed to accompany” the officers and
       it was not “to effect arrest but to effect and facilitate his accompaniment, which
       [defendant] [had] already agreed to do.”

¶ 11       After defendant’s arrest, he submitted a written statement to police, wherein he
       stated that he was a member of the Goon Town gang, rivals of the 10-4Ls gang,
       and that he and about 10 fellow gang members, including Lynom and Barker,
       decided they would shoot some 10-4Ls. Lynom and Barker volunteered to shoot,
       and defendant volunteered to go along with them to make sure they were alright.
       Once Barker was armed with a 9-millimeter gun and Lynom with a .40-caliber gun,
       they walked through the alley, and Barker and Lynom opened fire while defendant




                                               -4-
       stayed near the alley’s entrance. The three then ran back down the alley and escaped
       in Hardaway’s car.

¶ 12       At defendant’s jury trial, the State proceeded on three counts of aggravated
       battery and five counts of attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-
       1(a)(1) (West 2012)). Codefendants, Lynom and Barker, were tried separately and
       are not parties to this appeal. At defendant’s trial, the State presented evidence that
       defendant was the lookout for the two shooters and was therefore accountable for
       their actions. The jury returned guilty verdicts on two counts of aggravated battery
       with a firearm (id. § 12-3.05(e)(1)) under an accountability theory. The circuit court
       declared a mistrial on the remaining counts of attempted first degree murder and
       the sentence enhancement for the use of a firearm, on which the jury could not reach
       a unanimous verdict.

¶ 13       In December 2017, at the sentencing hearing, the circuit court heard the victims’
       statements about their lasting injuries and defendant’s statement in allocution that
       he was “no longer that reckless 17[-]year[-]old kid” and was “truly sorry” that “the
       offense [he] was charged with” had “caused two innocent people pain and suffering
       every night plus [his] family.” Defendant’s statement in allocution indicated that
       he started getting into trouble when he returned to Chicago from Wisconsin, his
       surroundings led him to “the street life,” and he never planned “to be part of some
       nonsense.” Defendant’s statement indicated that he was “past [his] adolescent state
       of mind,” “a mature adult now 21 years old,” and “would have been dead if [he]
       [were] free due to [his] adolescent state of mind.” Defendant’s statement indicated
       that he was part of a spiritual program and wanted to attend college.

¶ 14       The circuit court also received a presentence investigation report (PSI), which
       confirmed that defendant was 17 at the time of the shooting, revealed that he had
       been adjudicated delinquent for aggravated assault a month before the shooting,
       and provided information about defendant’s social, family, and psychological
       history. The PSI revealed that, when defendant was 15 years old, he suffered from
       depression, attempted suicide by hanging himself, and was hospitalized for two
       weeks. The PSI revealed that defendant denied being a gang member or being
       involved in any gang-related criminal activity, even though he had “Goon Town”
       tattooed on the knuckles of both hands.




                                                -5-
¶ 15       In mitigation, defense counsel argued that defendant was “just a child,” never
       had the opportunity to go to high school because he was working when he was 15
       years old, and “was only a little over 10 years older than the victim.” Counsel stated
       that defendant had a “tough life” and grew up without his dad in his life. Counsel
       stated that defendant “did not have direction” and had “no one to show him the
       way,” and counsel requested that “be factored in greatly” for sentencing.

¶ 16       Before sentencing defendant, the court explained that it had considered “[t]he
       evidence presented at trial,” the PSI (which the court had “reviewed in its entirety”),
       “the evidence offered in aggravation and mitigation,” and the statutory factors in
       aggravation and mitigation, as well as arguments of counsel, the victim impact
       statements, and “[d]efendant’s allocution” (which “provide[d] [the court] with
       some degree of optimism”). After noting the “extreme gravity” of the conduct for
       which defendant had been found accountable and defendant’s eligibility for a 6- to
       30-year sentence on each count of aggravated battery with a firearm, the circuit
       court sentenced him to 46 years in prison, which included two consecutive
       sentences of 23 years. The circuit court denied defendant’s immediate oral motion
       to reconsider based on his youth, explaining that it was “mindful of [his] youth” but
       that other factors, including the “extremely aggravating” facts that the offenses
       resulted from a “concerted effort” by defendant and his fellow gang members,
       supported the sentence.

¶ 17       In January 2018, defendant filed an amended motion to reconsider sentence,
       arguing that 46 years was excessive in light of defendant’s background, young age,
       and the nature of his participation in the offense, including that he had not fired a
       gun during the shooting. On February 16, 2018, at the hearing on the amended
       motion to reconsider, defendant argued that the 46-year sentence was excessive and
       “akin to a life sentence” because he was a 17-year-old boy at the time of the offense,
       he was not the shooter, and he was found to be guilty only of aggravated battery
       with a firearm, not attempted murder. The circuit court reiterated that it was
       “mindful of the fact that he is a young person” and, after “tak[ing] that into further
       account,” reduced defendant’s sentence to 32 years total, with 16 years in prison on
       each count of aggravated battery with a firearm. After the circuit court reduced
       defendant’s sentence, the court noted that defendant “absented himself from the
       courtroom” and “pushed the officer aside as he attempted to exit.” The circuit court
       found that defendant “was obstreperous, even in his final moments before the




                                                -6-
       [c]ourt,” which was “noteworthy” because defendant had “acted violently and in a
       disruptive way on many occasions within [the] courtroom.”

¶ 18      Defendant filed his timely notice of appeal.


¶ 19                                      Appellate Court

¶ 20       The appellate court affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentence. 

. On appeal, relying on the appellate court’s opinion in
       People v. Bass, 

, ¶¶ 62, 71, aff’d in part and vacated in
       part, 

, before Bass reached this court, defendant argued, as
       relevant here, that the circuit court erred by failing to quash his arrest and suppress
       his following statement because his arrest was prompted by an investigative alert
       and not an arrest warrant. In Bass, a divided panel of the appellate court had held
       that the defendant’s motion to suppress should have been granted because arrests
       based solely on investigative alerts, even if the alert is based on probable cause,
       violate the Illinois Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 7, 42, 71. In addressing defendant’s
       argument, the appellate court in this case noted that defendant had not argued on
       appeal that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. 

.

¶ 21       The appellate court also noted that after briefing had completed, in April 2021,
       this court filed an opinion in Bass, agreeing with the appellate court that the
       defendant’s motion to suppress should have been granted, but this court reached
       that conclusion on narrower grounds, finding that the traffic stop at issue was
       unconstitutionally extended. 

 ¶ 83 (citing People v. Bass, 

).
       Because this court decided the case on narrower grounds, it did not address the
       constitutional issue regarding whether investigative alerts violate the Illinois
       Constitution, and this court vacated the portions of the appellate opinion relating to
       investigatory alerts. Bass, 

.

¶ 22       Thus, following its own precedent (People v. Braswell, 

; People v. Simmons, 

; People v.
       Thornton, 

; People v. Bahena, 

), the appellate court in this case was unpersuaded by defendant’s
       argument that his arrest was unconstitutional because he was arrested pursuant to




                                                -7-
       an investigative alert that violated the Illinois Constitution. 

. The appellate court therefore held that the circuit court did not err
       when it denied defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress his statement. 

¶ 23       Defendant also argued on appeal that the circuit court improperly failed to
       consider the sentencing factors listed in the Unified Code of Corrections (Code)
       that are applicable when sentencing individuals under the age of 18 at the time of
       the commission of an offense (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2016)). 

. Section 5-4.5-105(a) of the Code first became effective
       January 1, 2016, 2 yet defendant did not raise it prior to appeal.

¶ 24        Accordingly, due to defendant’s forfeiture of the issue, the appellate court
       reviewed the issue under plain error principles and found no plain error. 

 ¶¶ 130-
       37. The appellate court held that section 5-4.5-105(a) of the Code did not apply to
       defendant’s sentencing because defendant committed his offenses prior to its
       effective date and, in any event, the circuit court had considered the relevant factors
       listed. 

 The appellate court rejected defendant’s assertion that, even though the
       circuit court was “mindful” of his young age at the time of the offense, the circuit
       court had not considered the specific factors relative to youth set forth in section 5-
       4.5-105 of the Code. 

. The appellate court held that the circuit court was
       not required to recite and assign value to each sentencing factor, nor was it required
       to articulate the process it used to determine an appropriate sentence. 

       Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that the circuit court had considered the
       relevant factors and did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced defendant. 

.

¶ 25       Presiding Justice Mikva concurred in part and dissented in part, noting that she
       would have affirmed defendant’s convictions but would have remanded for
       resentencing because the circuit court did not expressly discuss the statutory
       mitigating factors at sentencing. 

 (Mikva, P.J., concurring in part and
       dissenting in part). Presiding Justice Mikva asserted that the circuit court was
       obligated to consider the factors imposed on individuals under the age of 18 (730


            2
             Pursuant to the Effective Date of Laws Act (5 ILCS 75/0.01 et seq. (West 2014)), because the
       underlying bill was “passed” prior to June 1, 2015 (see 5 ILCS 75/3 (West 2014)), the effective date
       for Public Act 99-69 was January 1, 2016 (see 5 ILCS 75/1(a) (West 2014)). Ill. Const. 1970, art.
       IV, § 10; People v. Hunter, 

, ¶ 7 n.1.




                                                      -8-
       ILCS 5/5-4.5-104(a) (West 2016)) because the circuit court was reconsidering the
       originally imposed de facto life sentence. 

.
       Citing this court’s decision in People v. Buffer, 

, Presiding
       Justice Mikva found the circuit court’s statements insufficient to suggest that the
       relevant factors were considered and would have remanded to apply those factors
       and resentence defendant. 

.

¶ 26       This court allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315
       (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). We allowed the ACLU of Illinois, Chicago Appleseed Center,
       Chicago Council of Lawyers, and National Association for Criminal Defense
       Attorneys to file a joint brief as amici curiae in support of defendant’s position. We
       also allowed the City of Chicago, the Illinois Sheriffs’ Association, the Illinois
       Association of Chiefs of Police, the Village of Bannockburn, the City of Crystal
       Lake, the Village of Glenview, and the Village of Grayslake to file briefs as amici
       curiae in support of the State’s position. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).
       All of the amici briefs involve the constitutionality of investigatory alerts.


¶ 27                                        ANALYSIS

¶ 28                                    Investigative Alerts

¶ 29       Defendant contends that the investigative alert system used by the Chicago
       Police Department, wherein the police entered and retrieved a notice in a database
       that identified defendant as one whom there was probable cause to arrest, was
       inconsistent with the United States and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend.
       IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6) and, thus, the circuit court erred in failing to grant
       his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Defendant requests this court to
       reverse the appellate court’s judgment affirming his convictions and remand for a
       new trial.

¶ 30       “In reviewing a ruling on a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, we
       apply a two-part standard of review.” People v. Grant, 

.
       “While we accord great deference to the trial court’s factual findings, and will
       reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence,
       we review de novo the court’s ultimate ruling on a motion to suppress involving
       probable cause.” 

                                                 -9-
¶ 31       With regard to his motion to quash arrest, defendant’s arguments throughout
       this case have shifted. In his brief submitted to this court, defendant argues that
       under the federal and state constitutions, absent exigent circumstances or consent,
       police must, whenever possible, obtain an arrest warrant issued by a neutral
       magistrate upon a finding of probable cause prior to effectuating an arrest in the
       home. We agree with this proposition. Absent exigent circumstances or consent,
       officers may not effect a warrantless arrest in the home. Payton v. New York, 

 (1980) (absent exigent circumstances, fourth amendment prohibits
       police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home
       to make a routine felony arrest).

¶ 32       We note, however, that at no time after the hearing on the motion to suppress
       did defendant argue in the circuit court that the State had failed to prove voluntary
       consent to enter the home to effect the defendant’s arrest, despite the circuit court’s
       finding otherwise. Defendant did not argue in posttrial motions before the circuit
       court, on appeal from the order denying his motion to suppress, or in his petition
       for leave to appeal in this court that the State failed to prove voluntary consent to
       enter the home to effect defendant’s arrest in violation of Payton. See People v.
       Bean, 

 (1981) (“when voluntary consent is given to enter one’s
       residence and an arrest is effected based on probable cause, the suspect’s rights
       under the fourth amendment are not violated, even in the absence of exigent
       circumstances”); see also 

 (consent may be given by arrestee or third
       party (citing United States v. Matlock, 

 (1974))).

¶ 33       Accordingly, after the hearing on the motion to quash arrest and suppress
       evidence, defendant forfeited any argument that the State failed to prove that the
       officers, at the threshold of the home at daylight using no force or deception (People
       v. Bonilla, 

 (police officer not armed with a warrant may
       approach home and knock, as any private citizen might do (citing Kentucky v. King,
       

 (2011)))), had acquired proper consent to enter the residence to
       effectuate defendant’s arrest. See People v. Brown, 

 (2010)
       (issue may be deemed forfeited if not raised in the petition for leave to appeal);
       People v. Phillips, 

 (2005) (failure to argue point in appellant’s
       opening brief results in forfeiture of issue); People v. Cuadrado, 

       (2005) (in general, failure to raise issue in posttrial motion results in forfeiture of
       that issue on appeal). Because defendant did not previously raise this issue, the




                                               - 10 -
       appellate court did not address it, and we therefore decline to overlook defendant’s
       forfeiture of it. We caution, however, that Payton remains good law and, despite
       our holding below, that probable cause supports a warrantless arrest even if
       communicated via an investigatory alert, the fourth amendment nevertheless
       prohibits police officers from making a warrantless entry into the home to make a
       routine felony arrest, absent exigent circumstances or consent. See Payton, 

.

¶ 34        After the appellate court’s 2019 holding in Bass, defendant argued for the first
       time in the appellate court that, pursuant to Bass, the circuit court erred in denying
       his motion to quash arrest because “the unwarranted arrest was made pursuant to
       an investigative alert [with] probable cause attached.” Likewise, in his petition for
       leave to appeal to this court, defendant argued the police “effectuated an
       unconstitutional arrest by relying on a police investigative alert.” Although
       defendant also forfeited this argument by failing to preserve it in the circuit court
       by challenging the denial of his motion to quash in a posttrial motion (People v.
       Cosby, 

 (2008) (challenges to denial of motion to suppress
       at trial, constitutional or otherwise, are forfeited if not raised in a posttrial motion)),
       we nevertheless address defendant’s contention, raised and addressed in the
       appellate court and raised in this court, that his statement should be suppressed
       because he was arrested pursuant to an investigative alert, not a warrant based on
       probable cause, pursuant to the appellate court’s reasoning in Bass, 

, ¶¶ 62, 71, aff’d in part and vacated in part, 

.
       See People v. Sophanavong, 

 (forfeiture is a limitation on the
       parties and not on the court, and a court may overlook forfeiture where necessary
       to reach a just result or maintain a sound body of precedent). Upon review, we find
       no error.

¶ 35       We begin by briefly reviewing the law related to warrantless arrests based on
       probable cause. In United States v. Watson, 

 (1976), the United States
       Supreme Court held that a warrantless arrest based on probable cause complies with
       the fourth amendment, even if there was time to obtain an arrest warrant. The court
       explained that “there is nothing in the Court’s prior cases indicating that under the
       Fourth Amendment a warrant is required to make a valid arrest for a felony.” 

. Thus, “[t]he necessary inquiry *** was not whether there was a warrant or
       whether there was time to get one, but whether there was probable cause for the




                                                 - 11 -
       arrest.” 

. The court noted that this was an “ancient common-law rule” and
       traced it back to at least the time of Blackstone. 

. The court further noted
       that this was the prevailing rule under state constitutions and statutes as well. 

. The court explained why it was continuing to adhere to this rule:

           “Law enforcement officers may find it wise to seek arrest warrants where
           practicable to do so, and their judgments about probable cause may be more
           readily accepted where backed by a warrant issued by a magistrate. See United
           States v. Ventresca, 

 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 

 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 

 (1963). But we
           decline to transform this judicial preference into a constitutional rule when the
           judgment of the Nation and Congress has for so long been to authorize
           warrantless public arrests on probable cause rather than to encumber criminal
           prosecutions with endless litigation with respect to the existence of exigent
           circumstances, whether it was practicable to get a warrant, whether the suspect
           was about to flee, and the like.” Id. at 423-24.

¶ 36       In Illinois, the legislature has placed warrantless arrests based on probable cause
       on equal footing with arrests made pursuant to warrants. Section 107-2(1) of the
       Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/107-2(1) (West 2012)) provides
       as follows:

               “A peace officer may arrest a person when:

                   (a) He has a warrant commanding that such person be arrested; or

                   (b) He has reasonable grounds to believe that a warrant for the person’s
               arrest has been issued in this State or in another jurisdiction; or

                   (c) He has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing
               or has committed an offense.”

       Like the United States Supreme Court, this court has long recognized the validity
       of warrantless arrests based on probable cause. See, e.g., Grant, 

; People v. Jackson, 

 (2009); People v. Montgomery,
       

 (1986); People v. Jones, 

 (1959); People v.
       Tillman, 

 (1953); People v. Henneman, 

 (1940);
       People v. Swift, 

 (1925).




                                                - 12 -
¶ 37        Despite this authority, defendant argues that his arrest was unlawful because
       the Chicago Police Department had issued an investigative alert in his case.
       Defendant makes two somewhat distinct arguments about investigative alerts. His
       first argument focuses on the structure of the investigative alert system and argues
       that it establishes a parallel internal proxy warrant system that is unconstitutional
       because it fails to comply with necessary warrant procedures such as the
       requirement of an affidavit presented to a neutral and detached magistrate.
       Defendant argues that the Chicago Police Department’s internal proxy warrant
       system puts arresting officers in situations where they do not have sufficient
       assurances that they are acting on trustworthy information.

¶ 38       As noted, defendant did not raise this issue in the circuit court and therefore
       forfeited it for purposes of review. More importantly, however, defendant failed to
       introduce evidence in the circuit court about the structure of the Chicago Police
       Department’s investigative alert system, so a record does not exist on this issue.
       Defendant’s argument in his brief is based on references to directives found on the
       Chicago Police Department’s website, on testimony in another case, and not on
       evidence in the record here. See People v. Gipson, 

 (1963) (court
       will not consider argument relying on document not of record); People v. Neukom,
       

 (1959) (“we cannot pass upon matters not appearing in the record
       before us”); see, e.g., Freedman v. Muller, 

 (refusing
       to consider documents provided only in the appendix to a brief because “a court of
       review must determine the issues before it solely on the basis of the record made in
       the trial court”). We are unable to review this issue because it is not sufficiently
       presented by the record.

¶ 39        Defendant’s second argument about investigative alerts is based on an analysis
       first used by the appellate court in Bass, 

, aff’d in part & vacated
       in part, 

. 3 In Bass, the victim told the police that she had been
       sexually assaulted by Bass, and the police issued an investigative alert for him. Id.
       ¶ 7. The investigative alert summarized the incident and stated that there was
       probable cause to arrest Bass. Id. Three weeks later, Bass was a passenger in a
       vehicle that was pulled over by the police. Id. ¶ 8. When the police ran a “ ‘name

           3
            Although this portion of Bass was vacated by this court when it affirmed the appellate court’s
       decision on another ground, we discuss it at some length because it formed the basis for defendant’s
       argument.




                                                     - 13 -
       check’ ” on Bass, they discovered the investigative alert and placed him under
       arrest. Id. The circuit court denied Bass’s motion to quash arrest and suppress
       evidence. Id. ¶ 14.

¶ 40       The appellate court reversed. Id. ¶ 97. The court acknowledged that Bass’s
       arrest pursuant to an investigative alert did not violate the fourth amendment, as it
       is well settled that the police may make warrantless arrests outside the home as long
       as they have probable cause for the arrest. Id. ¶ 37. Because Bass conceded that
       probable cause existed for his arrest, that arrest did not violate the fourth
       amendment. Id.

¶ 41       The appellate court in Bass determined, nevertheless, that the arrest violated
       article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution. Id. ¶ 43. The appellate court
       acknowledged that this court had adopted the “limited lockstep” approach for
       construing our constitution vis-à-vis the United States Constitution. Id. ¶ 40. 4 The
       appellate court held that departure from lockstep construction was warranted
       because of a difference in wording between the fourth amendment and the search
       and seizure clause of our state constitution. The fourth amendment provides that no
       warrants shall issue “but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation”
       (emphasis added) (U.S. Const., amend. IV), while article I, section 6, of the Illinois
       Constitution provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
       “supported by affidavit” (emphasis added) (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6). The court
       explained that the requirement of an “affidavit” rather than an “Oath or affirmation”
       dated from the 1870 Constitution and indicated that the search and seizure clause
       of our constitution was intended to provide greater protection than the fourth
       amendment. Bass, 

, ¶¶ 49-57. The appellate court cited Lippman v.
       People, 

 (1898), for the proposition that the requirement of an
       “affidavit” shows that the search and seizure clause of the state constitution goes


           4
            Under this approach, we construe provisions of our state constitution in lockstep with their
       federal counterparts unless certain criteria are met. In order to depart from lockstep,
           “ ‘We must find in the language of our constitution, or in the debates and the committee reports
           of the constitutional convention, something which will indicate that the provisions of our
           constitution are intended to be construed differently than are similar provisions in the Federal
           Constitution, after which they are patterned.’ ” People v. Caballes, 

 (2006)
           (quoting People v. Tisler, 

 (1984)).
           This court has also recognized that it may depart from lockstep construction based on long-
       standing state traditions and values. 

.




                                                     - 14 -
       “ ‘a step beyond’ ” the fourth amendment. Bass, 

, ¶ 52
       (quoting Lippman, 

).

¶ 42       The appellate court then discussed People v. McGurn, 

 (1930), a
       case in which two police officers arrested the defendant pursuant to a “standing
       order” from a superior officer to arrest the defendant. Bass, 

, ¶ 55.
       In that case, this court invalidated the arrest, explaining that

          “under the constitution of this [s]tate no municipality has authority to clothe
          any officer with the autocratic power to order the summary arrest and
          incarceration of any citizen without warrant or process of law and thus render
          the liberty of every one of its citizenry subject to the arbitrary whim of such
          officer.” McGurn, 

.

       The Bass majority found in this court’s case law a thread that “the mere word of an
       executive branch official fails, on its own, as a substantiate for a finding of probable
       cause.” Bass, 

, ¶ 57. Rather, in Illinois, the “interposition
       of a neutral magistrate became the paradigm of investigative propriety.” Id.

¶ 43       The appellate court in Bass acknowledged the long-standing common-law rule
       allowing warrantless felony arrests based on probable cause. Id. ¶ 58. Nevertheless,
       the court believed that McGurn had placed limits on this rule that were “relevant to
       the constitutionality of investigative alerts.” Id. ¶ 59. The court concluded that this
       court’s case law established the proposition that “[t]he mere word of another
       officer, based on the mere word of another citizen, does not meet the Illinois
       constitutional threshold for effectuating a lawful arrest.” Id.

¶ 44       The appellate court in Bass explained, however, that the rule it was adopting
       would not impede officers from relying on the collective knowledge of their fellow
       officers. The court agreed with the State that it had clearly been established in cases
       such as Whiteley v. Warden, 

 (1971), and United States v. Hensley,
       

 (1985), that arresting officers may rely on information provided by
       nonarresting officers, as long as the facts known to the nonarresting officers
       establish probable cause. Bass, 

, ¶ 60. However, the Bass
       majority determined that this rule applies “in a world without investigative alerts.”
       Id. ¶ 62.




                                                - 15 -
¶ 45        Justice Mason concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. ¶¶ 108-28 (Mason, J.,
       concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Mason rejected the majority’s
       determination that Bass’s arrest, which was supported by probable cause, was
       nevertheless rendered unconstitutional because an investigative alert had been
       issued. Id. ¶ 120. Justice Mason reasoned that “there is no apparent reason why,
       when police have probable cause to arrest an individual (as they did here), the use
       of an investigative alert gives them any untoward advantage,” and she pointed out
       that the majority had not articulated any such reason. Id. Justice Mason noted that
       Illinois law permits warrantless arrests based on probable cause (see 725 ILCS
       5/107-2(1)(c) (West 2014)) and this court’s case law permits the police to rely on
       their collective knowledge in establishing probable cause (see People v. Buss, 

 (1999)). Bass, 

, ¶ 120. Thus, she could

          “perceive no principled basis on which to hold that police may arrest an
          individual without a warrant and without an investigative alert as long as they
          have probable cause, but if they issue an investigative alert based on the same
          facts giving rise to probable cause, they have run afoul of the Illinois
          Constitution.” Id.

¶ 46       As noted, this court would ultimately vacate the portion of Bass dealing with
       the constitutionality of investigative alerts. This court agreed with the appellate
       court’s alternative basis for holding Bass’s arrest unconstitutional—that it followed
       a traffic stop that was unlawfully extended in violation of the fourth amendment—
       and therefore vacated the remaining portion of the appellate court’s opinion. Bass,
       

. In the meantime, however, the Bass investigative alerts
       analysis had already been rejected by another panel of the First District. In
       Braswell, 

, the appellate court declined to follow
       Bass and expressed its agreement with the Bass dissent. The appellate court
       explained its rejection of Bass as follows:

          “The majority in Bass suggests, however, that even where a police officer has
          probable cause to arrest an individual, such arrest is unconstitutional if any
          police agency has issued an investigative alert. This creates the somewhat
          paradoxical situation where police may arrest an individual without a warrant
          and without an investigative alert if they have probable cause to do so, but that




                                              - 16 -
          same arrest becomes unconstitutional if police issue an investigative alert based
          on the same facts that gave rise to the probable cause.” 

       Until recently, all subsequent First District decisions, including the appellate court
       in this case (

 (majority opinion)), would follow
       Braswell rather than Bass. See, e.g., People v. Hardaway, 

; People v. Hodrick, 

; People v.
       Little, 

; Simmons, 

;
       Bahena, 

; Thornton, 

.

¶ 47        Even so, another panel of the First District revived the Bass analysis. See People
       v. Smith, 

. In that case, the defendant was arrested in
       connection with the beating and death of Anthony Morris. Id. ¶ 3. The defendant
       filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, arguing that the arrest was
       illegal because it was based on an investigative alert and the police had waited more
       than six months to arrest him. Id. ¶ 4. The trial court denied the motion because it
       found that the police had probable cause to arrest him. Id. ¶ 16. The First District
       concluded that the defendant had been subjected to an unconstitutional arrest, but
       it ultimately did not reverse his conviction because it held that the admission of the
       evidence derived from the unlawful arrest was harmless error. Id. ¶ 101.

¶ 48        In concluding that the arrest was unlawful, the appellate court largely followed
       the Bass analysis. The court noted that the defendant had not challenged his arrest
       under the fourth amendment, as the United States Supreme Court has held that
       warrantless arrests based on probable cause do not violate the fourth amendment.
       Id. ¶ 68. The appellate court then held that the search and seizure clause of the
       Illinois Constitution provides greater protection than the fourth amendment because
       it requires that a warrant be based on probable cause supported by affidavit, rather
       than by oath or affirmation. Id. ¶ 78. Like the Bass court, Smith cited Lippman for
       the proposition that the affidavit requirement goes “a step beyond” the fourth
       amendment. Id. ¶ 81 (citing Lippman, 

). The appellate court argued
       that Lippman recognized the importance of a magistrate in the probable cause
       determination when it invalidated a statute allowing a search warrant to be issued
       based on the written oath of a property owner before a justice of the peace or a
       police magistrate that he had reason to believe that another person was using the




                                               - 17 -
       owner’s casks, barrels, kegs, bottles, or boxes. Id. ¶¶ 82-84. The statute was held
       unconstitutional because it attempted to transfer the judicial discretion from the
       magistrate to the party making the affidavit. Id. ¶ 83.

¶ 49       Like the Bass majority, Smith also placed great importance on McGurn. Smith
       noted that McGurn had rejected a warrantless arrest based on a standing order,
       which the Smith majority believed resembled an investigative alert. Id. ¶ 86. The
       Smith majority asserted that McGurn stands for the proposition that “an officer who
       otherwise lacked reason to suspect a crime could not make an arrest based merely
       on a standing order.” Id. ¶ 89. The appellate court summed up what it believed was
       the state of the law under the 1870 Constitution:

               “In sum, our supreme court precedent interpreting the search and seizure
           clause of the 1870 Constitution emphasized that an ‘affidavit’ supporting
           probable cause should be presented to a neutral magistrate before a warrant may
           issue. A warrantless arrest may be justified where the arresting officer has
           personal knowledge giving rise to a reasonable ground for believing that the
           arrestee committed a crime. See [McGurn, 341 Ill.] at 636. However, a
           municipality may not ‘clothe any officer with the autocratic power to order the
           summary arrest and incarceration of any citizen without warrant or process of
           law.’ Id. at 638.” Id. ¶ 90.

¶ 50       Smith then noted that the affidavit language had been retained in the 1970
       Constitution and, thus, concluded that the law as summarized above remains the
       same to this day. Id. ¶¶ 92-93. The appellate court explained that, just as this court
       had invalidated an arrest based on a standing order in McGurn, it had no choice but
       to hold that the defendant’s arrest based on an investigative alert was unlawful. Id.
       ¶ 95. The appellate court further held that, although there were some circumstances
       under which an arrest based on an investigative alert might be appropriate, such as
       when probable cause existed and there was a danger that the suspect may commit
       crimes in the immediate future or was a known flight risk, those circumstances were
       not present there, where the police waited six months to arrest the defendant. Id.
       ¶ 97. The court acknowledged that probable cause existed for the defendant’s arrest
       but held this to be irrelevant, as the police did not submit an affidavit to a magistrate.
       Id. ¶ 98.




                                                 - 18 -
¶ 51       Justice Coghlan specially concurred. Id. ¶¶ 114-21 (Coghlan, J., concurring).
       Justice Coghlan agreed with the majority that overwhelming evidence supported
       the defendant’s guilt and that, therefore, the conviction should be affirmed. Id.
       ¶ 115. She disagreed, however, that defendant’s arrest was unconstitutional. Id.
       ¶ 116. Justice Coghlan would have held that the defendant’s arrest was not
       unconstitutional, as it was supported by probable cause. Id. ¶ 117. While the
       arresting officer did not have personal knowledge of the facts underlying the
       murder investigation, probable cause may be established by the collective
       knowledge of officers investigating a crime. Id.

¶ 52      Before explaining why we reject the Bass/Smith analysis, we note that Braswell
       and other cases that followed Braswell described the Bass holding too narrowly.
       Again, Braswell said that Bass created

          “the somewhat paradoxical situation where police may arrest an individual
          without a warrant and without an investigative alert if they have probable cause
          to do so, but that same arrest becomes unconstitutional if police issue an
          investigative alert based on the same facts that gave rise to the probable cause.”
          Braswell, 

.

       But the Bass majority was clear that it regarded the lack of a warrant—rather than
       the issuance of an investigative alert—as the essential problem. The court explained
       that it was “beyond dispute that a finding of probable cause must be based, not only
       on a minimum threshold of sufficient facts, but sufficient facts presented in proper
       form (a sworn affidavit) to the appropriate person (a neutral magistrate).” Bass,
       

, ¶ 62 (majority opinion). Thus, the court held that “the
       Illinois Constitution requires, in the ordinary case, a warrant to issue before an
       arrest can be made.” (Emphasis added.) Id.

¶ 53       And, if there were any doubt about the court’s holding, Bass went on to say that
       officers may still act without a warrant when “they are confronted with ‘the need
       to render emergency assistance, the “hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect,” and the need
       to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.’ ” Id. ¶ 67 (quoting People v.
       Harrison, 

, quoting King, 

). None
       of these exceptions applied to Bass’s case. Thus, the court said at the end of its
       discussion, “[w]e find that our constitution goes ‘a step beyond’ the United States
       Constitution and requires, in ordinary cases like Bass’s, that a warrant issue before



                                              - 19 -
       a valid arrest can be made.” Id. ¶ 71. Clearly, despite what Braswell stated, Bass
       would have held the defendant’s warrantless arrest to be unlawful even if an
       investigative alert had not been issued. Smith, likewise, focused on the lack of
       exigent circumstances and explained that the arrest was invalid, despite the
       presence of probable cause, because the police had not submitted an affidavit to a
       magistrate. Smith, 

.

¶ 54        Bass and Smith reflect a comprehensive rejection of the position the United
       States Supreme Court adopted in Watson. Again, Watson held that the United States
       Constitution does not require arrest warrants in cases where probable cause exists,
       and the Supreme Court explained that it was not going to “encumber criminal
       prosecutions with endless litigation with respect to the existence of exigent
       circumstances, whether it was practicable to get a warrant, whether the suspect was
       about to flee, and the like.” Watson, 

. By contrast, Bass and
       Smith held that the Illinois Constitution does require arrest warrants even when
       probable cause exists, and Bass and Smith would require criminal prosecutions in
       Illinois to be encumbered with litigation with respect to exigent circumstances, etc.

¶ 55       Having clarified the holdings in Bass and Smith, we now explain why we reject
       them. First, the premise that the difference between the fourth amendment’s use of
       “Oath or affirmation” and the Illinois Constitution’s use of “affidavit” is a reason
       to depart from lockstep construction was specifically rejected in People v. Caballes,
       

 (2006). Indeed, Caballes viewed the similarity between the wording
       of the fourth amendment and the search and seizure clause of the Illinois
       Constitution as a reason not to depart from lockstep:

               “The phrase ‘supported by affidavit’ in the state provision being virtually
          synonymous with ‘by Oath or affirmation’ in the fourth amendment, this court
          repeatedly held that the two constitutions should be construed alike. See People
          v. Castree, 

 (1924) (‘The fourth amendment to the Federal
          constitution is in practically the same words’); People v. Reynolds, 

 (1932) (noting that the fourth amendment was ‘the prototype for section 6
          of article 2 of our State constitution and no reason is perceived why the latter
          should not receive the same interpretation as the former’); People v. Grod, 

 (1944) (the guarantees of the fourth and fifth amendments ‘are in
          effect the same as sections 6 and 10 of article II of the Illinois constitution, and




                                               - 20 -
          are construed alike’); People v. Tillman, 

 (1953) (‘while in
          somewhat different language,’ the two provisions are ‘in effect the same’ and
          should be construed alike); People v. Jackson, 

 (1961)
          (restating intention to ‘follow the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
          on identical State and Federal constitutional problems’).” Caballes, 

.

       See also People v. Smith, 

 (1992) (“This court has determined
       that the protections afforded by article I, section 6, of our State constitution against
       ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures are substantially identical to those provided
       by the fourth amendment.”).

¶ 56       Second, as the State points out, the difference between the wording of the two
       provisions goes only to the mechanism for obtaining a warrant and not to the scope
       of the warrant requirement itself. Thus, as correctly pointed out by the State, that a
       warrant application must be supported by affidavit does not suggest that a warrant
       is required for all arrests, nor does it have any bearing on the question before the
       court. We are concerned here with the propriety of a warrantless arrest supported
       by probable cause. Any long-standing state tradition of requiring that probable
       cause to obtain a warrant be based on an affidavit rather than on oath or affirmation
       provides no basis to depart from lockstep on the question of the propriety of
       warrantless arrests based on probable cause. With respect to that question, our long-
       standing state tradition is to allow warrantless arrests based on probable cause. See,
       e.g., People v. Bambulas, 

 (1969) (“a lawful arrest may be made
       without an arrest warrant if the officers making the arrest had probable cause to
       make it”); Swift, 

 (“[i]t is the rule in this State, and generally, that
       where an arrest is made by an officer who has reasonable ground for believing that
       the person arrested is implicated in a crime, such officer has a right to arrest without
       a warrant”); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1874, ch. 38, § 342 (allowing warrantless arrest when a
       criminal offense has been committed and the officer has “reasonable ground for
       believing that the person to be arrested has committed it”).

¶ 57       Third, the principal cases relied on by Bass and Smith do not compel a different
       result. Lippman did state, as Bass and Smith noted, that the warrant clause of the
       state constitution goes “a step beyond” the fourth amendment because it requires
       an affidavit rather than an oath or affirmation. Lippman, 

. But




                                                - 21 -
Lippman was not a lockstep case, and this court explained in Caballes that the
wording was sufficiently similar that it did not compel a departure from lockstep.
See Caballes, 

. Indeed, the full quote from Lippman is that “[i]t
is a step beyond the constitution of the United States, in requiring the evidence of
probable cause to be made a permanent record in the form of an affidavit,
otherwise it is the same.” (Emphases added.) Lippman, 

. Thus, the
difference between the two provisions is only in how the evidence supporting
probable cause is recorded. It is not clear how one could conclude from this
difference that warrantless arrests in Illinois are generally unconstitutional.
Moreover, Lippman itself did not view this as a reason to depart from lockstep
construction. Quite the opposite. Right after the “step beyond” comment, the court
proceeded to rely on fourth amendment law and cases from states that have an
“Oath or affirmation” requirement. 

. The statute at issue in Lippman
provided:

   “ ‘In case the owner or owners of any cask, barrel, keg, bottle or box so marked,
   stamped and registered as aforesaid, shall, in person or by agent, make oath in
   writing, before any justice of the peace or police magistrate, that he has reason
   to believe, and does believe, that any manufacturer or bottler of ale, porter, lager
   beer, soda, mineral water or other beverage, or any other person, is using, in
   any manner by this act declared to be unlawful, any of the casks, barrels, kegs,
   bottles or boxes of such person or his principal, or that any junk dealer or dealer
   in casks, barrels, kegs, bottles or boxes, or any other dealer, manufacturer or
   bottler, has any such cask, barrel, keg, bottle or box secreted in, about or upon
   his, her or their premises, the said justice of the peace or police magistrate shall
   issue his search warrant and cause the premises designated to be searched as in
   other cases where search warrants are issued, as is now provided by law; and in
   case any such cask, barrel, keg, bottle or box, duly marked or stamped and
   registered as aforesaid, shall be found in, upon or about the premises so
   designated, the officer executing such search warrant shall thereupon arrest the
   person or persons named in such search warrant, and bring him, her or them
   before the justice of the peace or police magistrate who issued such warrant
   ***.’ ” (Emphases added.) Lippman, 

-11 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat.
   1874, ch. 120, § 4).




                                        - 22 -
¶ 58        The court’s concern was that the written oath required by the statute did not
       have to be based on facts but rather could be based on a mere belief. Id. at 112. The
       court looked to cases construing the fourth amendment and out-of-state cases
       construing statutes that had an “Oath or affirmation” requirement and noted that
       they required that the complaint “must set up facts and cannot rest on mere belief.”
       Id. at 112-13. Either under the fourth amendment or state statutes that have an “Oath
       or affirmation” requirement, a mere belief is not sufficient to establish probable
       cause. Id. at 113. The problem in Lippman was that the statute allowed a warrant to
       issue based on the belief of the party requesting it. The court invalidated the statute
       on this basis. That party was not required “to state any fact or satisfy the magistrate
       that there is reasonable ground for his belief.” Id. The court did not view the
       affidavit requirement as a reason to depart from fourth amendment law. The court
       followed fourth amendment law. Both in cases where the complaint was supported
       by an affidavit and those in which it was supported by an oath, probable cause could
       not be based on a mere belief. Id. at 112-13. Contrary to what Bass and Smith held,
       Lippman provides no basis to depart from lockstep.

¶ 59       Nor does McGurn support the Bass/Smith conclusion. Bass and Smith noted that
       McGurn held the defendant’s arrest unlawful when he was arrested on the basis of
       a “standing order” issued by the commissioner of detectives. Smith specifically
       analogized the standing order to an investigative alert. See Smith, 

. Both Bass and Smith relied on McGurn’s statement that “under the
       constitution of this State no municipality has authority to clothe any officer with
       the autocratic power to order the summary arrest and incarceration of any citizen
       without warrant or process of law.” McGurn, 

; see Bass, 

, ¶ 56 (citing McGurn, 

); Smith, 

, ¶ 89 (citing McGurn, 

).

¶ 60       The passage that Bass and Smith relied on was made in the context of an arrest
       made without probable cause. See McGurn, 

. The court noted that
       it had long been the rule at common law that police may arrest without a warrant
       when they have probable cause and that such arrests were permitted by statute. 

       at 636 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1929, ch. 38, ¶ 657 (Smith 1929)). The court also
       explained that “[i]t is the rule in this State where a criminal offense has, in fact,
       been committed, that an officer has a right to arrest without a warrant where he has
       reasonable ground for believing that the person to be arrested is implicated in the




                                               - 23 -
       crime.” Id. The court then stated that the problem in the case before it was that
       “ ‘[t]here was no felony which had, in fact, been committed for the commission of
       which [the arresting officer] had reasonable grounds to suspect [plaintiff in
       error].’ ” Id. at 637. The arrest in that case was based solely on a standing order,
       and there was no probable cause for the arrest. It is clear from the McGurn analysis
       that the court would have upheld the arrest had it been based on probable cause.
       Thus, that decision provides no support for the Bass/Smith conclusion, and Smith
       was clearly wrong to analogize the standing order in that case to an investigative
       alert based on probable cause.

¶ 61        Fourth, the Bass/Smith analysis is incompatible with the rule that probable
       cause may be established by the collective knowledge of the police. See Buss, 

 (when officers are working in concert, probable cause may be
       established by information collectively received, even if that information is not
       specifically known to arresting officer). Smith ignored that principle altogether,
       while Bass acknowledged that it had been established by the United States Supreme
       Court in cases such as Whiteley and Hensley that “arresting officers can rely on
       information provided by nonarresting officers as long as the facts known to the
       nonarresting officers suffice to establish probable cause.” Bass, 

, ¶ 60. Bass, however, stated that the principle applies “in a world without
       investigative alerts.” Id. ¶ 61. We disagree. As Professor LaFave has noted:

              “Whiteley has been properly applied by the lower courts to a variety of
          situations. Clearly, the fellow officer rule is applicable to situations involving
          all modes of communication, including computer, radio, telephone, teletype and
          face-to-face contact. It governs whether the communication is from a superior
          or fellow officer within the department ***.” 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
          Seizure § 3.5(b), at 336-37 (6th ed. 2020).

¶ 62       When Officers Kinney and O’Neill were assigned the investigative alert on July
       22, 2013, the detectives investigating the shooting had probable cause to arrest
       defendant, as provided by Hardaway’s statements that, shortly after he heard
       gunshots, defendant, Barker, and Lynom entered his car and said they had
       committed the shooting and believed Lynom had killed someone. See People v.
       Gocmen, 

 (“probable cause exists when the facts known to the
       officer at the time are sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious person to believe that




                                               - 24 -
       the arrestee has committed a crime,” which is “not proof beyond a reasonable doubt
       or even that it be more likely than not” that the person committed a crime); see also
       Beck v. Ohio, 

 (1964) (constitutionality of arrest depends upon
       whether, at the moment arrest was made, officers had probable cause to make it);
       Grant, 

 (probable cause to arrest is based on what police knew
       “at the time of the arrest”). As noted by the appellate court, defendant did not
       dispute on appeal that the officers had probable cause to arrest. The fact that the
       information was shared with Officers Kinney and O’Neill by way of an
       investigative alert does not invalidate the arrest. As the Seventh Circuit has
       explained:

          “[The] police often act on each other’s instructions. An all points bulletin or
          wanted flyer induces an officer to arrest someone about whom he knows
          nothing beyond the instruction to make an arrest. Whether the arrest is lawful
          depends on the information available to the police collectively; if the person
          issuing the radio bulletin or authorizing the wanted poster had probable cause
          to do so, the facts need not be present to the mind of the person making the
          arrest.” Gordon v. Degelmann, 

 (7th Cir. 1994).

¶ 63       In sum, Bass and Smith erred in holding that arrests pursuant to investigative
       alerts automatically violate the Illinois Constitution. Those cases failed to identify
       any valid basis for departing from lockstep construction. This court has already held
       that the difference between “affidavit” in our search and seizure clause and “Oath
       or affirmation” in the fourth amendment was not a reason to depart from lockstep.
       See Caballes, 

. Moreover, Bass and Smith did not identify any
       “state tradition and values as reflected by long-standing state case precedent” (id.
       at 314) that would justify a departure. Indeed, state case precedent demonstrates
       that this court has long recognized the validity of warrantless arrests based on
       probable cause. Thus, just as defendant’s arrest did not violate the fourth
       amendment, it also did not violate the search and seizure clause of the Illinois
       Constitution. And once it is accepted that warrantless arrests for felonies do not
       violate the Illinois Constitution, there is no basis to hold that arrests pursuant to
       investigative alerts violate the Illinois Constitution. As Justice Mason noted, when
       the police already have the right to make a warrantless arrest for a felony, “there is
       no apparent reason why *** the use of an investigative alert gives them any




                                               - 25 -
       untoward advantage.” Bass, 

, ¶ 120 (Mason, J.,
       concurring in part and dissenting in part). Smith is hereby overruled.

¶ 64        Defendant also argues for the first time in his opening brief in this court that
       arrests pursuant to investigative alerts violate the separation of powers clause of the
       Illinois Constitution. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1. Defendant failed to raise this
       issue in his petition for leave to appeal and acknowledges that the separation-of-
       powers clause “has not been previously cited in this case.” It is therefore forfeited.
       See People v. Williams, 

 (2009) (argument not raised in
       appellate court or petition for leave to appeal is twice forfeited). Moreover, the
       separation of powers argument is not properly presented by the record, as defendant
       never made this argument in the trial court. Accordingly, we decline to excuse
       defendant’s forfeiture of this issue.

¶ 65      Furthermore, because we find defendant’s arrest constitutional, we need not
       address his argument with regard to the inapplicability of the good faith exception.


¶ 66                                         Sentencing

¶ 67       Defendant argues that the circuit court improperly sentenced him without
       making findings pursuant to section 5-4.5-105(a) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-
       105(a) (West 2016)). Defendant argues that, as a 17-year-old offender, he should
       have been sentenced with subsection (a)’s specific findings relative to his status as
       a juvenile offender. Defendant requests this court to order the circuit court to
       conduct a new sentencing hearing to consider these factors.

¶ 68       The State asserts that defendant forfeited his claim that the circuit court erred
       by not considering the sentencing factors listed in section 5-4.5-105(a) of the Code
       (id.) because he did not raise the issue at sentencing or in his motion to reconsider
       sentence. See People v. Hillier, 

 (2010) (“It is well settled that,
       to preserve a claim of sentencing error, both a contemporaneous objection and a
       written postsentencing motion raising the issue are required.”). Defendant counters
       that the issue is not forfeited because he raised the issue of his youth generally in
       his motion to reconsider and, alternatively, the error amounts to plain error. See
       People v. Piatkowski, 

 (2007) (plain error exists when “(1) a
       clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error




                                                - 26 -
       alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the
       seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so
       serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the
       integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence”); Ill.
       S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) (plain errors affecting substantial rights may be
       noticed although not brought to the trial court’s attention).

¶ 69       We agree with the State that defendant forfeited the issue by failing to raise it
       at sentencing or in his postsentencing motion. See Hillier, 

; see
       also People v. Jackson, 

 (“This forfeiture rule also prevents
       criminal defendants from sitting idly by and knowingly allowing an irregular
       proceeding to go forward only to seek reversal due to the error when the outcome
       of the proceeding is not favorable.”). Moreover, because we find no clear error
       occurred, we find no plain error. See Piatkowski, 

.

¶ 70       Whether section 5-4.5-105(a)’s sentencing provisions (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-
       105(a) (West 2016)) applied to defendant presents a question of statutory
       interpretation that this court reviews de novo. People v. Hunter, 

. “The cardinal rule in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the
       legislative intent.” In re Jarquan B., 

. “The most reliable
       indicator of that intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language
       itself.” 

 “If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we will give effect
       to the statute’s plain meaning.” 

 “[I]n determining the intent of the legislature,
       the court may properly consider not only the language of the statute, but also the
       reason and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the purpose
       to be achieved.” In re Detention of Lieberman, 

 (2002). “[A]
       court presumes that the legislature did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient, or
       unjust results.” People v. Gutman, 

.

¶ 71      When defendant was sentenced, subsection (a) provided as follows:

          “On or after the effective date of this amendatory Act *** [(January 1, 2016,
          the effective date of Public Act 99-69)], when a person commits an offense and
          the person is under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense,
          the court, at the sentencing hearing ***, shall consider the following additional
          factors in mitigation in determining the appropriate sentence:




                                                - 27 -
           (1) the person’s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at the time of the
       offense, including the ability to consider risks and consequences of
       behavior, and the presence of cognitive or developmental disability, or both,
       if any;

           (2) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure, including peer
       pressure, familial pressure, or negative influences;

           (3) the person’s family, home environment, educational and social
       background, including any history of parental neglect, physical abuse, or
       other childhood trauma;

           (4) the person’s potential for rehabilitation or evidence of rehabilitation,
       or both;

           (5) the circumstances of the offense;

           (6) the person’s degree of participation and specific role in the offense,
       including the level of planning by the defendant before the offense;

           (7) whether the person was able to meaningfully participate in his or her
       defense;

           (8) the person’s prior juvenile or criminal history; and

           (9) any other information the court finds relevant and reliable, including
       an expression of remorse, if appropriate.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West
       2016).

Defendant argues that, pursuant to the statute’s plain language and this court’s
precedent, the initial “on or after the effective date” clause refers to the date of the
sentencing hearing, not the date of the offense. Defendant asserts that the
intervening phrase identifies to whom the statute applies: persons “under 18 years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense.” 

 The State counters that the
circuit court’s obligation to consider the sentencing factors under subsection (a) is
triggered when, “[o]n or after the effective date” of that provision, “a person
commits an offense.” 

 The State argues that because defendant committed his
offense in 2013, prior to subsection (a)’s January 1, 2016, effective date, the
provisions did not apply to defendant’s sentencing hearing.



                                         - 28 -
¶ 72       We hereby hold that the version of section 5-4.5-105(a) in effect at the time of
       defendant’s sentencing applied to defendant, even though he committed his offense
       prior to the section’s effective date. This court has implicitly held as such in prior
       cases before this court. See People v. Reyes, 

 (remanding for
       resentencing under section 5-4.5-105(a) even though offense was committed prior
       to enactment of the statute); Buffer, 

, ¶ 47 (same); see also Hunter,
       

, ¶¶ 45-56 (in holding that because subsection (b) (730 ILCS 5/5-
       4.5-105(b) (West 2016)), which included juvenile sentencing provisions giving
       court discretion not to impose otherwise mandatory firearm enhancements, 5 did
       not apply to defendants because they were sentenced well before the new juvenile
       sentencing provisions became effective, this court referenced subsection (a)’s
       temporal reach, yet it did not identify that temporal reach).

¶ 73       This construction is consistent with the subsection’s clear purpose: to require
       courts sentencing juvenile offenders to consider the many differences between
       juvenile offenders and adults. See Miller v. Alabama, 

 (2012)
       (juveniles have diminished culpability, greater prospects for reform, lack of
       maturity, underdeveloped senses of responsibility, vulnerabilities to negative
       influences and outside pressures, limited control over their environments, an
       inability to extricate themselves from crime-producing settings, and less-fixed traits
       leading to irretrievable depravity). To construe it otherwise would allow circuit
       courts to ignore these additional mitigating factors when sentencing some juvenile
       offenders solely because of the date of their offense. This construction of section 5-
       4.5-105(a), a sentencing amendment mitigating punishment, is also consistent with
       section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016)), which entitles a
       defendant “to be sentenced under either the law in effect at the time the offense was
       committed or that in effect at the time of sentencing.” People v. Hollins, 

 (1972); see Perry v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation,
       

 (section 4 of the Statute on Statutes “is triggered where the
       legislature’s intent as to temporal reach is not clear”). Accordingly, the version of
       section 5-4.5-105(a) in effect at the time of defendant’s sentencing applied to
       defendant, even though he committed his offense prior to the section’s effective



           5
            As of January 1, 2024, the subsection providing this discretion is subsection (e). See Pub. Act
       103-191, § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2024) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105).




                                                     - 29 -
       date. Even so, the record reveals that the circuit court considered the relevant factors
       found in section 5-4.5-105(a) when it sentenced defendant.

¶ 74       Defendant argues that the circuit court failed to consider these statutory factors
       when sentencing him to an aggregate sentence of 32 years in prison. The State
       counters that the record clearly reveals that the circuit court considered the factors.
       The State asserts that, when defendant was sentenced, Illinois courts already
       recognized the relevance of the factors found in section 5-4.5-105(a): (1) a
       defendant’s youth, with all its attendant characteristics, at the time of the offense
       (People v. Holman, 

, overruled on other grounds, People v.
       Wilson, 

 (“We have long held that age is not just a
       chronological fact but a multifaceted set of attributes that carry constitutional
       significance.”); People v. Miller, 

 (2002) (recognizing youth
       as mitigating because of juvenile defendants’ relative immaturity)), as well as any
       cognitive or developmental disability that the defendant had (730 ILCS 5/5-5-
       3.1(a)(13) (West 2016) (“intellectual disability” is mitigating); People v. Peeples,
       

 (2002) (recognizing “cognitive deficits” as mitigating);
       People v. Maxwell, 

 (1996) (recognizing “intellectual and
       developmental deficits” as mitigating)); (2) whether the defendant was subjected to
       any outside pressures that might have led him to commit the offense (730 ILCS
       5/5-5-3.1(a)(5) (West 2016) (listing as mitigating factor that defendant’s “criminal
       conduct was induced or facilitated by someone other than the defendant”); People
       v. Jones, 

 (1991) (recognizing evidence that defendant was
       susceptible to peer pressure as mitigating); People v. Ruiz, 

       (1989) (same with evidence that defendant was “ ‘more a follower than a leader’ ”
       and got involved in gangs due to “neighborhood pressure to join”); People v.
       Adkins, 

 (1968) (sentencing court should consider “the stimuli
       which motivate [the defendant’s] conduct”); (3) his family, educational, and social
       background, including whether he suffered parental neglect, physical abuse, or
       other childhood trauma (730 ILCS 5/5-3-1, 5-3-2(a)(1) (West 2016) (sentencing
       court must consider PSI, which must address defendant’s “family situation and
       background”); Adkins, 

 (sentencing court should consider
       defendant’s “social environments” and “family”); see People v. Towns, 

 (1998) (recognizing evidence that defendant had “troubled childhood”
       and suffered from “parental abuse and neglect” as mitigating)); (4) his
       rehabilitative potential (People v. Wilson, 

 (1991) (recognizing



                                                - 30 -
       defendant’s rehabilitative potential as mitigating); see Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11
       (“All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense
       and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.”)); (5) the
       circumstances of the offense (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(b) (West 2016) (sentencing court
       must consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense”); People v. Saldivar,
       

 (1986) (same)); (6) the specific nature of his role in the
       offense (Miller, 

 (recognizing defendant’s less active or less
       culpable role in offense as mitigating)); (7) whether the defendant was
       meaningfully able to participate in his defense at trial (People v. Sandham, 

 (1996); People v. Johnson, 

 (1998)); (8) the
       extent of his prior juvenile and criminal history (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a)(7) (West
       2016) (lack of “history of prior delinquency or criminal activity” is mitigating); 

       §§ 5-3-1, 5-3-2(a)(1) (sentencing court must consider PSI, which must address
       defendant’s “history of delinquency or criminality”)); and (9) any other relevant
       and reliable evidence (People v. Richardson, 

 (2000)).

¶ 75       At sentencing, the circuit court stated that it had considered the evidence
       presented at trial, which included defendant’s age, the circumstances of the offense,
       and defendant’s degree of participation and specific role in the offense, including
       that defendant had accompanied the shooters but had not fired a weapon. The circuit
       court stated that it had reviewed defendant’s PSI report, which revealed information
       on defendant’s family, home environment, educational and social background,
       including any history of parental neglect or childhood trauma, and juvenile history.
       The circuit court thus considered that defendant, at the age of 15, attempted suicide
       by hanging himself, underwent treatment in a two-week hospitalization for
       depression, and turned 17 less than two weeks prior to the shooting in this case.
       The PSI also revealed that defendant’s mother and father ended their relationship
       when he was two years old, at which point he was raised primarily by his mother
       and grandmother, and that defendant did not graduate from elementary school and
       did not enroll in high school. The circuit court stated that it had considered the
       statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation, the financial impact of
       incarceration, the arguments of counsel, the victim impact statements, and
       defendant’s statement in allocution. These sources presented defendant’s age,
       impetuosity, level of maturity, potential for rehabilitation, circumstances of the
       offense, degree of participation, and remorse. In defendant’s statement in
       allocution, defendant indicated, at 21 years of age, that he was taking responsibility



                                               - 31 -
       for his reckless behavior as a juvenile. Defendant’s letter in allocation indicated he
       believed he was a reckless child who did not appreciate the risks involved with his
       behavior at the time of the offense and that he had matured and wanted to move
       away from Chicago, to attend college, and to live a productive life. He indicated
       that he recognized the severity of what he had done and illustrated remorse and
       accountability. Moreover, both at the initial sentencing hearing and when it later
       reduced his sentence from 46 to 32 years, the circuit court stated that it was mindful
       of defendant’s youth at the time of the offense.

¶ 76        Accordingly, we hold that the record reveals the circuit court’s consideration of
       the factors found in section 5-4.5-105(a) of the Code prior to sentencing defendant,
       and because we find no clear or obvious error, we find no plain error. “ ‘A
       reviewing court gives great deference to the trial court’s judgment regarding
       sentencing because the trial judge, having observed the defendant and the
       proceedings, has a far better opportunity to consider these factors than the
       reviewing court, which must rely on the “cold” record.’ ” People v. Alexander, 

 (2010) (quoting People v. Fern, 

 (1999)). This
       court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it
       would have weighed the factors differently. Id. at 213. Thus, we decline defendant’s
       request to remand for resentencing.


¶ 77                                     CONCLUSION

¶ 78       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment, affirming
       defendant’s convictions and sentence in the circuit court.


¶ 79      Judgments affirmed.


¶ 80      JUSTICE NEVILLE, dissenting:

¶ 81       The majority’s opinion legalizes investigative alerts and by doing so makes
       arrests by police, without a warrant issued by a judge, the official policy of the
       Chicago police. A reviewing court may take judicial notice of matters that are
       reliably verifiable from sources of indisputable accuracy or from another court’s




                                               - 32 -
       decisions, like the Appellate Court, First District’s, decisions. City of Chicago v.
       Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc., 

, 396 n.3 (2006) (courts may take judicial
       notice of proceedings in other courts). I take judicial notice of First District
       decisions, between 2007 and 2024, that discuss investigative alerts. Of 174 appeals,
       173 involve Blacks and Latinos (see infra ¶ 196 (defendant Nos. 1 to 173)); 1
       investigative alert involves a White person (see infra ¶ 196 (defendant No. 174)).
       The cases reveal that 99% of the warrantless arrests made by Chicago police that
       result in appeals involve Black and Latinx suspects. See infra ¶ 196 (defendant Nos.
       1 to 174)). I find that the First District’s decisions establish that investigative alerts
       are a systemic, racial policy or practice of Chicago police and that warrantless
       arrests are used predominantly to effectuate the arrests of Black and Latinx
       suspects. In light of the First District’s decisions, I cannot concur in the majority’s
       decision because it legalizes a systemic, racial policy or practice that authorizes the
       Chicago police to make warrantless arrests based on race. Therefore, because the
       First District’s decisions establish that the majority’s opinion will authorize
       systemic, racial policies or practices and will legalize warrantless arrests of Black
       and Latinx suspects by the Chicago police, I respectfully dissent.

¶ 82       Additionally, I dissent for the following reasons: (1) because, absent exigent
       circumstances, the United States and Illinois Constitutions do not permit
       warrantless arrests in the home but Clark, with no exigent circumstances, was
       arrested without a warrant in his home; (2) because the Illinois Constitution only
       permits warrantless arrests when there are exigent circumstances and there were no
       exigent circumstances in Clark’s case; (3) because the Illinois Constitution only
       permits a judge to make probable cause determinations and to issue warrants for a
       suspect’s arrest, but in this case the police made an extrajudicial determination
       about whether there was probable cause to arrest Clark and issued an investigative
       alert (an extrajudicial police warrant), which authorized the police to arrest Clark;
       (4) because the disparate impact of the use of investigative alerts demonstrates that
       the police ignore the constitution and treat Blacks and Latinx suspects like they
       have no rights the police must respect (see Dred Scott v. Sanford, 

       (1856)) and establish that police appear to use judicial warrants when they arrest
       White suspects, but they arrest Black and Latinx suspects in a separate but unequal
       system of using investigative alerts (see Plessy v. Ferguson, 

 (1896));
       and (5) because the First District’s decisions establish that investigative alerts are a
       policy or practice of the Chicago police where the police enforce the warrant



                                                 - 33 -
       requirement in the constitutions differently based on whether they are arresting a
       White suspect or a Black or a Latinx suspect and as a consequence of this disparate
       treatment, the Chicago police violate the 2018 consent decree (see Consent Decree,
       Illinois v. City of Chicago, No. 17-cv-6260, at 15-16 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2019),
       https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/cpb/supp_info/ConsentDecree
       Complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/78H6-YRQB]), a contract made to protect Black
       and Latinx suspects from unconstitutional arrests.


¶ 83                                    I. BACKGROUND

¶ 84       Police spoke with Cragg Hardaway shortly after a shooting incident on July 19,
       2013. Police detained Hardaway overnight on July 20, 2013, and brought him to
       testify before a grand jury on July 21, 2013. Also on July 21, 2013, based on
       Hardaway’s statements, police issued an investigative alert that told all officers they
       had probable cause to arrest Clark. Three days after the shooting, on July 22, 2013,
       police drove to Clark’s home and arrested him. Clark filed a motion to quash the
       arrest and suppress any evidence obtained as a result of the arrest. Clark claimed
       the warrantless arrest violated his rights under the fourth amendment to the United
       States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV) and article I, section 6, of the Illinois
       Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6).

¶ 85       At the hearing on the motion, Chicago police officer Patrick Kinney testified
       that on July 22, 2013, he went to Clark’s home. A man answered Kinney’s knock.
       Kinney said he had probable cause to arrest Clark. The man opened the door and
       pointed to a back bedroom, where Kinney could see Clark. Kinney, still on the
       threshold, told Clark he had “a probable cause investigative alert for his arrest.”
       Clark said, “Okay, let me get some clothes.” Kinney admitted he “did not have
       consent to go inside the house” but he entered the residence anyway because he did
       not “know what [defendant] was going to grab.” The trial court denied the motion
       to suppress, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that warrantless arrests based
       on investigative alerts do not violate either the state or the federal constitution, as
       long as police have probable cause to arrest. 

, ¶¶ 80-
       84.


¶ 86                           II. THE MAJORITY’S ANALYSIS



                                               - 34 -
¶ 87       The majority starts its analysis with a cursory dismissal of Clark’s argument
       that police violated his constitutional rights by arresting him in his home without a
       warrant, finding the argument forfeited. Supra ¶¶ 31-33. Then, applying the
       lockstep doctrine adopted in People v. Caballes, 

 (2006),
       the majority holds that United States v. Watson, 

 (1976), supplies a
       binding interpretation of the Illinois Constitution’s warrant requirement. Supra
       ¶¶ 55-63. The majority holds that, under Watson, police did not violate Clark’s
       constitutional rights because they had probable cause when they arrested Clark on
       July 22, 2013. Supra ¶ 35.



¶ 88                                      III. ANALYSIS

¶ 89       I disagree (1) with the finding that Clark forfeited his argument that police
       violated his constitutional rights by arresting him in his home, (2) with the
       majority’s conclusions that this court should follow the lockstep doctrine, and
       (3) with the holding that the Watson Court’s interpretation of the fourth amendment
       binds this court’s interpretation of article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution.

¶ 90       First, I would find the home arrest issue sufficiently preserved. Second, I find
       the State’s evidence, which the trial court explicitly found credible, shows that the
       warrantless arrest took place in Clark’s home and that the putative consent,
       following the arrest, did not validate the arrest. Third, I agree with the justices and
       commentators who reject the lockstep doctrine. Fourth, this court should reassess
       Watson and find that it misrepresents the history of the fourth amendment and
       misinterprets the amendment in a manner that subverts its fundamental purpose,
       resurrecting general warrants, under which “[p]ersons and places were not
       necessarily specified, seizure of papers and effects was indiscriminate, [and]
       everything was left to the discretion of the bearer of the warrant.” Nelson B. Lasson,
       The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
       Constitution 26 (Leonard W. Levy ed., De Capo Press 1970). Fifth, I analyze article
       I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution and find that its purpose and its history
       support a finding that police may make warrantless arrests only when there are
       exigent circumstances or when they actually witness a crime. Finally, I have
       examined the racially disparate impact of the use of investigative alerts by Chicago




                                                - 35 -
       police and find that the policy and practice violate the City of Chicago’s duties
       under the consent decree entered in federal court in 2018.


¶ 91                     A. The Warrantless Arrest of Clark in His Home
                               Violated His Constitutional Rights

¶ 92                                        1. Forfeiture

¶ 93       The majority finds that Clark forfeited his argument that the arrest in his home
       violated the United States and Illinois Constitutions. The majority does not address
       Clark’s argument that the issue of the arrest in the home falls under the
       constitutional issue exception to the forfeiture rule.

¶ 94       Constitutional issues that defense counsel raised at trial that the defendant could
       later raise in a postconviction petition are not subject to forfeiture on direct appeal.
       People v. Almond, 

.

          “[W]hen, as here, a defendant fails to raise a constitutional issue in a posttrial
          motion but the issue was raised at trial and could be raised in a postconviction
          petition ‘the interests in judicial economy favor addressing the issue on direct
          appeal rather than requiring defendant to raise it in a separate postconviction
          petition.’ ” 

 (quoting People v. Cregan, 

).

¶ 95       Almond and Cregan apply here. Clark argued in his motion to quash that his
       arrest in his home violated his constitutional right to be “secure in [his] person[ ]
       *** against unreasonable *** seizures.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6; U.S. Const.,
       amend. IV. The issue is not subject to forfeiture on direct appeal. Almond, 

.


¶ 96                                   2. Standard of Review

¶ 97       The State contends we must limit our consideration of the constitutional issue
       to plain error review. But when this court has applied the constitutional issue
       exception to the forfeiture rule, it treats the constitutional issue as preserved.
       Almond, 

; Cregan, 

. Following




                                                - 36 -
        Almond and Cregan, this court should review the constitutionality of Clark’s arrest
        under standards applicable to preserved issues.

¶ 98        Thus, under the applicable standard, this court should defer to the trial court’s
        findings of fact on the motion to quash arrest, but the court should review de novo
        the trial court’s legal conclusions. People v. Jones, 

 (2005);
        In re D.G., 

 (1991).


¶ 99                   3. No Exigent Circumstances Validate the Warrantless Arrest

¶ 100       Police arrested Hardaway, the State’s identification witness, on July 20, 2013,
        the day after the shooting. Early on July 21, 2013, Hardaway made the statements
        that, according to the majority, gave police probable cause to arrest 

. Two days after the shooting, police could not claim hot pursuit impelled them
        to arrest Clark without a warrant. See People v. Abney, 

, 170 (1980)
        (“a case involving a warrantless entry of a suspect’s residence four hours after a
        robbery *** ‘was not a case of hot pursuit, unless that term is to be stretched beyond
        all reasonable meaning’ ” (quoting Dorman v. United States, 

        (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc))).

¶ 101       Police then presented Hardaway to a grand jury on July 21, 2013, and also
        obtained an investigative alert with probable cause to arrest that same day. The
        State has not argued that exigent circumstances excused Clark’s warrantless arrest
        on July 22, 2013, three days after the shooting. I would find that the police made
        the warrantless arrest without exigent circumstances. See id. at 169-70 (exigent
        circumstances excuse a warrantless arrest if delay to obtain a warrant would impede
        investigation and provide the suspect time to avoid capture).


¶ 102                          4. Police Arrested Clark in His Home

¶ 103       Clark argues that Kinney arrested him in his home without a warrant. The State
        argues that Kinney arrested Clark on the back porch of his aunt’s apartment, in a
        public place outside Clark’s home, or, if Kinney arrested Clark in his home, that
        the arrest came after Kinney obtained consent to enter the home. We review de novo
        the trial court’s legal conclusions as to where and when the arrest occurred. People




                                                - 37 -
        v. Luedemann, 

 (2006); People v. Hill, 

 (“the fact of when an arrest occurs is a legal conclusion”); United
        States v. Tovar-Valdivia, 

 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Whether a
        particular seizure amounted to an arrest is a question of law that this court reviews
        de novo.”).

¶ 104       In determining when the police placed a person under arrest, the court should
        consider “whether a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have
        considered himself arrested or free to leave; the intent of the officer and the
        understanding of the arrestee; and whether the defendant was told he was free to
        leave or that he was under arrest.” People v. Fair, 

 (1994). For
        juveniles, like Clark, the reasonable person standard is modified to take the
        juvenile’s youth into account. In re D.L.H., 

 (citing People v.
        Braggs, 

 (2003)). That is, the court should consider whether
        a reasonable juvenile, innocent of any crime, would have considered himself
        arrested.

¶ 105       Kinney announced at the door to Clark’s home that he came to arrest Clark. A
        reasonable juvenile, innocent of any crime, would have considered himself
        arrested. “ ‘An arrest requires either physical force *** or, where that is absent,
        submission to the assertion of authority.’ ” (Emphases in original.) People v.
        Thomas, 

 (2001) (quoting California v. Hodari D., 

 (1991)). Under the Fair factors, the arrest occurred when Clark submitted
        to Kinney’s assertion of authority by saying, “Okay.” Thus, the arrest occurred
        while Kinney stood outside the house and announced the arrest, when Clark, inside
        his home, submitted to Kinney’s authority.

¶ 106       Although courts have reached differing conclusions as to whether an arrest
        across the threshold counts as an arrest in the home, the more persuasive cases find
        that the fourth amendment requires a warrant for such arrests. In United States v.
        Allen, 

 (2d Cir. 2016), police, with ample probable cause but no
        warrant, went to Allen’s home to arrest him. Allen answered the door when police
        knocked. 

. Police, outside the door, told Allen they would take him to the
        police station for processing in connection with allegations Allen committed an
        assault. 

 Allen acquiesced to the officers, and after Allen acquiesced, the officers
        went inside the home and saw evidence that led them to find a firearm. 

 Allen




                                                - 38 -
        filed a motion to quash the warrantless arrest and suppress the evidence found as a
        result of the arrest. 

 The district court denied the motion. 

.

¶ 107       The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that the United States
        Supreme Court expressly “ ‘refused to lock the Fourth Amendment into instances
        of actual physical trespass.’ ” 

 at 82 (quoting United States v. United States
        District Court, 

 (1972)). The Allen court held:

           “If the rule of Payton, and the fundamental Fourth Amendment protection of
           the home on which it is based, are to retain their vitality, the rule must turn on
           the location of the defendant, not the officers, at the time of the arrest. We
           therefore hold that irrespective of the location or conduct of the arresting
           officers, law enforcement may not cause a suspect to open the door of the home
           to effect a warrantless arrest of a suspect in his home in the absence of exigent
           circumstances.” Id. at 85.

¶ 108        Several courts and commentators have agreed with the reasoning of Allen. “[I]t
        is the location of the arrested person, and not the arresting agents, that determines
        whether an arrest occurs within a home.” United States v. Johnson, 

 (9th Cir. 1980); see Sharrar v. Felsing, 

 (3d Cir. 1997),
        abrogated on other grounds by Curley v. Klem, 

 (3d Cir.
        2007); United States v. Morgan, 

 (6th Cir. 1984); United States
        v. Reeves, 

 (10th Cir. 2008); People v. Lujano, 

 (Ct. App. 2014); Smith v. State, 

 (Md. Ct. Spec.
        App. 1987); State v. Peters, 

 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); State v.
        George, 

 (Neb. 1982); State v. Morse, 

 (N.H.
        1984); State v. Holeman, 

 (Wash. 1985) (en banc); Jennifer Marino,
        Does Payton Apply: Absent Consent or Exigent Circumstance, Are Warrantless,
        In-Home Police Seizures and Arrests of Persons Seen Through an Open Door of
        the Home Legal?, 

 (2005); Caroline Hunt, Casenote,
        Reaching Across the Threshold of the Fourth Amendment—Why Payton v. New
        York Should Be Interpreted Broadly, 

 (2017).

¶ 109       Clark stood in his home when he acquiesced to Kinney’s assertion of his power
        to arrest Clark. In accord with Allen, Johnson, and the cases and commentators who
        hold that the location of the person arrested determines whether the arrest
        constitutes an arrest in the home, I conclude that the warrantless arrest took place



                                               - 39 -
        in Clark’s home.


¶ 110                      5. The Evidence of Postarrest Consent Does
                       Not Validate the Warrantless Arrest in Clark’s Home

¶ 111       The majority claims that the warrantless arrest in Clark’s home did not violate
        the fourth amendment because Kinney obtained consent to enter Clark’s home.
        Supra ¶¶ 32-33. And the majority does not acknowledge that the putative
        consensual entry occurred only after the arrest. See Thomas, 

        (seizure occurs when a defendant yields to an officer’s assertion of authority).

¶ 112        Only voluntary consent validates a warrantless entry. People v. Simpson, 

 (1996); United States v. Reed, 

, 423 n.9 (2d Cir.
        1978). “[A]cquiescence to a claim of lawful authority” does not constitute
        voluntary consent. Bumper v. North Carolina, 

 (1968); see
        People v. Davis, 

 (2010) (“Consent is involuntary where
        it is solely the result of acquiescence or submission to the assertion of lawful police
        authority.”); People v. Johnson, 

 (1981).

¶ 113      Kinney’s testimony establishes that, after he announced that he had probable
        cause to arrest Clark, (1) the man who answered the door stepped aside, acquiescing
        to Kinney’s authority, and (2) Clark acquiesced by saying “Okay.” The alleged
        subsequent consent cannot validate this warrantless arrest.


¶ 114                  6. The Warrantless Arrest in Clark’s Home Violated the
                                State and Federal Constitutions

¶ 115       Police arrested Clark in his home without a warrant and without exigent
        circumstances, in violation of Clark’s rights under the fourth amendment to the
        United States Constitution (see Payton v. New York, 

 (1980)
        (except in exigent circumstances, a warrantless arrest in the home violates the
        fourth amendment)) and article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution (see People
        v. Williams, 

 (1994) (adopting Payton)). In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
        

 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that agents of the
        State, like the Chicago police officers here, lack authority to issue valid search or




                                                - 40 -
        arrest warrants. Therefore, this court should reverse Clark’s convictions and
        remand for retrial without any evidence obtained as a result of the unconstitutional
        arrest.


¶ 116                      B. The Use of Investigative Alerts Violates
                          Article I, Section 6, of the Illinois Constitution

¶ 117                                       1. Lockstep

¶ 118        Clark separately argues that the warrantless arrest here violated the Illinois
        Constitution because no exigency or other circumstance excused the failure to
        obtain a warrant. The majority holds that, under Watson, 

, the arrest
        did not violate the fourth amendment to the federal constitution and therefore it
        cannot violate the Illinois Constitution. Supra ¶¶ 55-63. The majority relies on
        Caballes, 

, where this court adopted the “limited lockstep” doctrine,
        holding that decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the United
        States Constitution bind this court’s interpretation of similar provisions in the
        Illinois Constitution, unless one of a small set of narrowly defined exceptions
        applies. The majority in Caballes discussed and rejected “ ‘flawed federal
        analysis’ ” (id. at 308 (quoting State v. Gomez, 

, 

, 

); id. at 312-13) as a basis for choosing not to adopt the United
        States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal constitution as a binding
        interpretation of the Illinois Constitution.


¶ 119                  a. The United States Supreme Court Has Misinterpreted
                                  the United States Constitution

¶ 120       The United States Supreme Court itself has recognized that, in a significant
        number of cases, the United States Supreme Court has misinterpreted the United
        States Constitution. The Court found that it erred in its interpretation of the
        constitution in Twining v. New Jersey, 

 (1908), overruled by Malloy v.
        Hogan, 

 (1964); Betts v. Brady, 

 (1942), overruled by
        Gideon v. Wainwright, 

 (1963); Michigan v. Jackson, 

 (1986), overruled by Montejo v. Louisiana, 

 (2009); Ohio v.
        Roberts, 

 (1980), overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 

                                                - 41 -
        (2004); Walton v. Arizona, 

 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 

 (2002); Crooker v. California, 

 (1958), overruled by
        Miranda v. Arizona, 

, 479 n.48 (1966); Wolf v. Colorado, 

        (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 

 (1961); Gitlow v. New York,
        

 (1925), overruled by Dennis v. United States, 

        (1951); Goesaert v. Cleary, 

 (1948), overruled by Craig v. Boren, 

, 210 n.23 (1976); National League of Cities v. Usery, 

 (1976),
        overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 

 (1985); Olmstead v. United States, 

 (1928), overruled by Katz v.
        United States, 

 (1967); Booth v. Maryland, 

        (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 

 (1991); Grovey v.
        Townsend, 

 (1935), overruled by Smith v. Allwright, 

, 665-
        66 (1944); Swain v. Alabama, 

 (1965), overruled by Batson v.
        Kentucky, 

 (1986); Korematsu v. United States, 

 (1944),
        overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, 

, 710 (2018); and Plessy, 

,
        overruled by Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 

 (1954).

¶ 121       The United States Supreme Court took more than 50 years to overrule the
        mistaken constitutional rulings it imposed on the country in Korematsu and Plessy.
        The United States Supreme Court never overruled its decision in Dred Scott, 60
        U.S. at 406—the citizens of this country relieved themselves of the error by
        adopting the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to the United States
        Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. XIII, XIV, XV). See Jamison v. McClendon,
        

, 397-98 (S.D. Miss. 2020). This court must not inflict the
        United States Supreme Court’s errors on the citizens of Illinois when this court has
        the power to independently interpret the Illinois Constitution.


¶ 122                   b. This Court Should Treat Federal Opinions Interpreting the
                            United States Constitution as Persuasive, Not
                                         Binding, Authority

¶ 123       For the reasons stated in my dissent in People v. Sneed, 

, ¶¶ 133-
        68 (Neville, J., dissenting), and for the reasons stated by Justice Simon, Justice
        Freeman, Justice Clark, Justice Heiple, Justice Nickels, and Justice Goldenhersh in
        the opinions I cited in that dissent, as well as the reasons stated by the scholars cited




                                                 - 42 -
        in that dissent, this court must recognize its responsibility as the final interpreter of
        the Illinois Constitution and treat United States Supreme Court decisions
        interpreting the United States Constitution as persuasive authority, following the
        United States Supreme Court when its reasoning persuades us and not following
        decisions that do not persuade us. See State v. Gaskins, 

 (Iowa
        2015); State v. Hempele, 

 (N.J. 1990); Parker v. Commonwealth,
        

 (Ky. 2014); William J. Brennan Jr., The Bill of Rights and the
        States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 

, 550-51 (1986).

¶ 124       Insofar as Caballes imposed limited lockstep on Illinois, requiring Illinois
        courts to follow United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the constitution
        in most circumstances, this court should overrule Caballes. Accordingly, this court
        should regard Watson not as a binding interpretation of article I, section 6, but as
        authority the State cites for its persuasive force.

¶ 125       Once we recognize that United States Supreme Court opinions interpreting the
        United States Constitution provide only persuasive, not binding, authority in
        interpreting cognate provisions of the Illinois Constitution, we should determine
        whether this court should adopt the Watson majority’s holding as our interpretation
        of article I, section 6.


¶ 126                      2. Watson Does Not Persuasively Interpret the
                            Illinois Constitution’s Limitation on Arrests

¶ 127                      a. The Watson Majority Misrepresented Fourth
                                       Amendment History

¶ 128       The Watson majority defended its decision as an interpretation of the intention
        of the original delegates who adopted the fourth amendment to the United States
        Constitution. Watson, 

.

¶ 129       When the United States adopted the Bill of Rights, anyone, including a peace
        officer, could arrest a person if a crime punishable by total forfeiture of the
        offender’s lands or goods or death had occurred (see 4 William Blackstone,
        Commentaries *95) and the arrester “ha[d] reasonable cause for believing the




                                                 - 43 -
        person arrested to have committed it.” Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original
        Fourth Amendment, 

, 628 (1999) (hereinafter Davies,
        Recovering).

¶ 130       In a work of sophistry, the Watson majority transmogrified the extremely
        limited common-law authorization for warrantless arrests into an extremely general
        authorization for warrantless arrests for any offense now punishable by at least one
        year in prison—because legislatures have classified such offenses as “felonies” (see
        

(1) (1970)), the same term used for the very different and far more
        limited set of crimes that justified loss of all lands or goods or imposition of the
        death penalty. See Watson, 

 (Marshall, J. dissenting, joined by
        Brennan, J.).

¶ 131       Scholars have concluded that the framers intended to restrict severely the
        authority of officers to make warrantless arrests. See William John Cuddihy, The
        Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, at civ (1990) (“[u]nless some
        emergency was involved that precluded the use of a warrant, specific warrants were
        mandatory”); Lasson, supra, at 120; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
        Fourth Amendment, 

, 396-97 & nn.443-47 (1974); Davies,
        Recovering, at 552.

¶ 132       Thus, if the Watson majority intended to interpret the fourth amendment to
        uphold the framers’ understanding of the common law at the time of the
        amendment’s adoption, the court would have held that police officers may arrest an
        individual without a warrant only if the officer saw the individual commit the
        offense or if the officer had probable cause to believe the individual committed one
        of the few crimes punishable by complete forfeiture of all one’s lands or goods or
        by death. See Shima Baradaran Baughman, The History of Misdemeanor Bail, 

, 845 n.61 (2018) (listing the common-law felonies at the time of
        the adoption of the United States Constitution); Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without
        a Warrant, 

 (1924). It should be noted that the crime at issue
        in Watson would have required a warrant under the common law, as would the
        crime at issue here. See Davies, Recovering, at 630 n.220.

¶ 133       The Watson majority then misrepresented prior holdings (see Watson, 

 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring)) and reached its conclusion that “an arrest in a
        public place for a previously committed felony never requires a warrant, a result



                                               - 44 -
        certainly not fairly supported by either history or precedent.” United States v.
        Martinez-Fuerte, 

 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by
        Marshall, J.).


¶ 134                     b. Watson Eviscerates the Fourth Amendment

¶ 135        The federal constitution’s framers adopted the fourth amendment “to safeguard
        the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
        officials.” People v. Dilworth, 

 (1996); see King v. Ryan, 

 (1992). “The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment
        accepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures
        to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy ***.”
        United States District Court, 

; see Morgan Cloud, Searching
        Through History; Searching for History, 

 (1996).

¶ 136       “The Founding generation crafted the Fourth Amendment as a ‘response to the
        reviled “general warrants” and “writs of assistance” of the colonial era.’ ”
        Carpenter v. United States, 

, 303 (2018) (quoting Riley v. California,
        

, 403 (2014)). “[T]he reason the Framers feared and banned general
        warrants was precisely because such warrants purported to confer discretionary
        authority on the officers who held them.” Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional
        Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and
        Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 

, 399 (2002) (hereinafter Davies, Fictional Character) (citing 2 Legal
        Papers of John Adams, at 140-43 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., Belknap
        Press 1965)).

¶ 137       Watson and other fourth amendment decisions “mark[ ] the continuing
        evisceration of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and
        seizures.” Martinez-Fuerte, 

 (1976) Brennan, J, dissenting. “[T]he
        assault on our basic liberties and freedoms by government itself has become a ***
        serious and potentially destructive social problem.” People v. Mitchell, 

 (1995) (Heiple, J., dissenting). “[T]he Fourth Amendment and the rest of
        the Bill of Rights were created to protect individuals from the government abuses
        of old England—abuses that have reemerged, in substantial part, because of Watson
        and Terry.” Ryan Miller, Note, The Enduring Value of the Past: Why History



                                               - 45 -
        Suggests the Supreme Court Reconsider Watson, Terry, and the Doctrine That
        Followed, 

, 484 (2024).

¶ 138      Davies summarized the effect of the Supreme Court’s fourth amendment
        decisions:

           “the practical result of the discretionary arrest authority *** is that ‘the liberty
           of every [person is placed] in the hands of every petty officer’ and every petty
           officer is positioned to ‘lord it over’ the citizen. *** [The fourth amendment
           decisions] empower[ ] petty officers to act with the sort of unfettered,
           ‘tyrannical’ power the Framers thought they had prohibited in the Fifth and
           Fourth Amendments.” Davies, Fictional Character, at 400 (quoting 2 Legal
           Papers of John Adams, at 142).

        “The type of policing enabled by Terry and its progeny resembles the general
        warrants and writs of assistance that the Framers ‘outspokenly opposed.’ ” Miller,
        supra, at 518 (quoting Watson, 

 (Powell, J., concurring)). The
        Watson decision gives police a general warrant to arrest anyone whenever police
        officers themselves conclude they have probable cause to believe the suspect
        committed a felony—Watson is the general warrant the constitution’s framers
        sought to ban.

¶ 139      Wayne LaFave aptly reflected,

           “given the pervasiveness of such minor offenses and the ease with which law
           enforcement agents may uncover them in the conduct of virtually everyone, [if
           such pretexts are allowed,] *** there exists [on the part of law enforcement
           agents] ‘a power that places the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty
           officer,’ precisely the kind of arbitrary authority which gave rise to the Fourth
           Amendment.” 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.4(e), at 123 (3d ed.
           1996) (quoting 2 Legal Papers of John Adams, at 142).

        This court should reject the Watson Court’s resurrection of general warrants and its
        subversion of the fourth amendment.


¶ 140                                  3. Article I, Section 6




                                                - 46 -
¶ 141       Because this court should find that Watson does not provide a persuasive
        interpretation of article I, section 6, this court should look to other sources for
        construction of that section. Article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970
        provides:

               “The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
           and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of
           privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other
           means. No warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit
           particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
           seized.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6.

¶ 142       We use the same general principles that apply to statutes when we interpret the
        constitution. Kanerva v. Weems, 

. We seek to “give effect to
        the common understanding of the citizens who adopted it.” Blanchard v. Berrios,
        

. We look first to the plain language used in its natural and
        popular meaning when the constitutional provision was adopted. Rowe v. Raoul,
        

. If the plain language does not answer the question presented,
        we interpret the words “ ‘in light of the history and condition of the times, and the
        particular problem which the convention sought to address.’ ” Kanerva, 

 (quoting Client Follow-Up Co. v. Hynes, 

 (1979)).


¶ 143                  a. Article I, Section 6, Does Not Expressly Answer the
                                         Question Before Us

¶ 144       In one sentence article I, section 6, bans unreasonable seizures; in the second
        sentence the section restricts the issuance of warrants. The fourth amendment has
        two similar, separate clauses in a single sentence. Neither constitutional provision
        expressly answers the question before us, namely, whether a police officer must
        obtain a warrant to render an arrest reasonable under each respective constitution—
        or, conversely, whether it is “unreasonable” to arrest a person without a warrant
        issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.

¶ 145        Ultimately, we must determine what limitations on police power the citizens of
        Illinois intended to impose when they adopted article I, section 6, of the Illinois
        Constitution. We make that determination by looking to the purpose and history of




                                                 - 47 -
        the constitutional provision, by balancing the government’s interest in the intrusion
        against the individual’s interest in protection against the intrusion, and by reviewing
        other persuasive authority. See id.; see, e.g., People v. Boeckmann, 

 (2010) (in considering constitutional issues, this court may look to the
        decisions of sister states as persuasive authority). When looking at each of these
        considerations the answer becomes clear: except in exigent circumstances, an arrest
        made without a warrant is an unreasonable seizure under article I, section 6, of the
        Illinois Constitution.


¶ 146                             b. Purpose of Article I, Section 6

¶ 147       The delegates to the constitutional convention adopted article I, section 6, “ ‘to
        safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions’ ” by
        governmental officials. People v. Colyar, 

 (quoting People v.
        McDonough, 

 (2010)). Its purpose largely matches the purpose
        of the fourth amendment. Article I, section 6, like the fourth amendment, addresses
        “standardless and unconstrained discretion [as] the evil the Court has discerned
        when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the field
        be circumscribed.” Delaware v. Prouse, 

 (1979).


¶ 148                           c. The History of Article I, Section 6

¶ 149       John Dvorak, the delegate to the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention who
        drafted article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution, explained that section 6
        introduces “no new concepts” regarding search and seizure. 3 Record of
        Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1524 (statements of Delegate
        Dvorak). Dvorak referred to Katz, 

, as established law. 3 Record of
        Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1525 (statements of Delegate
        Dvorak). The United States Supreme Court, in Katz, reasserted the general
        principle:

           “Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful
           ‘notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause,’ [citation], for
           the Constitution requires that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial
           officer . . . be interposed between the citizen and the police . . . . [Citation.] Over




                                                 - 48 -
           and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth]
           Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes, [citation], and that
           searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge
           or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject
           only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” (Internal
           quotation marks omitted.) Katz, 

.

¶ 150       In 1970, the prevailing interpretation of the Fourth Amendment applied the
        warrant requirement to nearly all searches and seizures. Silas J. Wasserstrom, The
        Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 

, 257-58
        (1984); see Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately
        Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 

, 1193 (1988).

¶ 151      In accord with the conventional interpretation of search and seizure law, as
        courts understood the law in 1970, Dvorak said that under article I, section 6,

           “for a governmental officer—a police officer—to obtain [an] *** arrest
           warrant—they have to go before a judicial officer to determine in fact that there
           is probable cause for the *** seizure, support that by affidavit, and describe the
           *** persons *** to be seized. Then, and only then, is it legal ***.” 3 Record of
           Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1524 (statements of
           Delegate Dvorak).

¶ 152       The history of article I, section 6, supports the conclusion that the delegates who
        approved the inclusion of the article in the draft constitution understood it to require
        police to obtain a warrant before making an arrest, unless exigent circumstances or
        another narrow exception to the warrant requirement excused the lack of a warrant.


¶ 153                                     d. Balancing Test

¶ 154       When this court has interpreted article I, section 6, in prior decisions, we have
        balanced the government’s interest in the intrusion against the individual’s interest
        in protection against the intrusion. “Decisions involving *** the Illinois
        Constitution’s article I, section 6, require that we carefully balance the legitimate
        aims of law enforcement against the right of our citizens to be free from




                                                 - 49 -
        unreasonable governmental intrusion.” People v. Tisler, 

 (1984).
        Like the United States Supreme Court in its application of the fourth amendment,
        we balance the competing interests on a categorical basis. Michigan v. Summers,
        

, 705 n.19 (1981) (applying balancing test categorically); see People
        v. Krueger, 

 (1996) (Illinois’s test for search and seizure is like the
        United States Supreme Court’s balancing test).


¶ 155                         i. Police Warrants—Investigative Alerts

¶ 156       Chicago Police Department (CPD) Special Order S04-16, issued December 18,
        2018, shows that the CPD officially makes a practice of arresting on the basis of
        investigative alerts. See Chi. Police Dep’t, Investigative Alerts, Special Order S04-
        16 (eff. Dec. 18, 2018), https://directives.chicagopolice.org/#directive/public/6332
        [https://perma.cc/NJ3T-TDYM]; People v. Smith, 

        (Chicago police officer testified that he did not try to obtain an arrest warrant
        because “ ‘it is not common practice’ ”). Accordingly, this court should apply the
        balancing test to the practice of arresting individuals on the basis of investigative
        alerts, without seeking approval of a neutral magistrate prior to the arrest. The court
        should determine “whether the needs of citizens for privacy *** may not be better
        protected by requiring a warrant before” the arrest. United States District Court,
        

.


¶ 157                           ii. Exigent Circumstances Exception

¶ 158       The State argues that requiring warrants, except in exigent circumstances, will
        substantially undermine the State’s ability to enforce the law. The State and amici
        do not address the effect of Illinois laws permitting police officers to obtain judicial
        warrants quickly. The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides:

            “The arrest warrant or summons may be issued electronically or
            electromagnetically by use of electronic mail or a facsimile transmission
            machine and any such arrest warrant or summons shall have the same validity
            as a written arrest warrant or summons.” 725 ILCS 5/107-9(h) (West 2022).




                                                 - 50 -
¶ 159       The State and amici do not contend that the process for obtaining investigative
        alerts takes less time than the process for obtaining warrants electronically as
        permitted by section 107-9(h). Courts have responded quickly to electronic requests
        for warrants. See Tracy Hresko Pearl, On Warrants & Waiting: Electronic
        Warrants & the Fourth Amendment, 

, 2-3 (2023). “It can take up to a
        full day for a supervisor to approve the request for an investigative alert.” People
        v. Bass, 

, ¶ 68, aff’d in part & vacated in part, 

. I do not see any timing benefit, or any other clear benefit (supra ¶ 54), to
        the people of Illinois from the practice of using investigative alerts, issued by police
        officers, instead of arrest warrants issued by courts, when police effectuate arrests.


¶ 160                             iii. Benefits of Judicial Warrants

¶ 161       I find that the people of Illinois would benefit from a general practice of
        requiring judicially approved warrants for arrests. See Johnson v. United States,
        

 (1948). The United States Supreme Court’s explanation of the
        fourth amendment also explains Illinois’s constitutional warrant requirement:

               “The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
           officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
           which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring
           that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
           being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
           ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a
           magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify
           the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment
           to a nullity and leave the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police
           officers. *** When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of
           search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or
           government enforcement agent.” 

.


¶ 162                         e. Postarrest Judicial Review Does Not
                        Sufficiently Protect Citizens’ Constitutional Rights




                                                 - 51 -
¶ 163       The State contends citizens do not need the protection afforded by judicial
        approval of an arrest warrant prior to the arrest as long as judges can review the
        evidence after the arrest to determine whether police acted reasonably. In Katz, the
        case Representative Dvorak cited as authority on search and seizure law, the United
        States Supreme Court forcefully and persuasively rejected the argument now
        advanced by the State:

           “[The Government] argues that *** [it] should be exempted from the usual
           requirement of advance authorization by a magistrate upon a showing of
           probable cause. We cannot agree. Omission of such authorization

               bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of
               probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an
               after-the-event justification for the . . . [seizure], too likely to be subtly
               influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment. [Citation.]

           And bypassing a neutral predetermination of the scope of a [seizure] leaves
           individuals secure from Fourth Amendment violations only in the discretion of
           the police.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Katz, 

.

        See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 

, 912-13 (1991) (noting the problem of ex post bias in suppression rulings).

¶ 164       Thus, the use of warrants issued by neutral magistrates for all arrests in
        nonexigent circumstances provides important protections, against overreaching by
        police officers, for the individual’s constitutional rights to security and privacy.
        “[P]rosecutors and policemen simply cannot be asked to maintain the requisite
        neutrality with regard to their own investigations ***.” Coolidge, 

.
        The people of Illinois suffer a significant detriment from the lack of judicial
        supervision prior to arrests in nonexigent circumstances. The State has shown no
        significant advantage the people of Illinois gain from the use of investigative alerts
        to counter that detriment. Balancing the government’s interest in the investigative
        alert procedure against the people’s interest in security and their right to privacy, I
        find no justification for the use of investigative alerts as a basis for arrest.




                                                - 52 -
¶ 165                  f. Persuasive Authority Supports a Warrant Requirement for
                               Arrests in Nonexigent Circumstances

¶ 166       The United States Supreme Court, in many persuasive cases before Watson,
        repeated the basic constitutional requirement that, except in exigent circumstances,
        police must obtain a judicial warrant before making any arrest. See, e.g., McDonald
        v. United States, 

 (1948); Coolidge, 

.

¶ 167       Some courts have rejected Watson and found that state constitutions required
        warrants for arrests unless exigencies excused the lack of a warrant. The Supreme
        Court of New Mexico, interpreting constitutional language similar to the language
        of the Illinois Constitution, found that the Watson majority did not control the New
        Mexico court’s interpretation of the New Mexico Constitution. The court held:

           “[F]or a warrantless arrest to be reasonable the arresting officer must show that
           the officer had probable cause to believe that the person arrested had committed
           or was about to commit a felony and some exigency existed that precluded the
           officer from securing a warrant.” Campos v. State, 

, ¶ 14, 

, 

.

        See State v. Short, 

 (Iowa 2014) (“By involving a neutral
        magistrate, the warrant requirement ensures that probable cause is evaluated not by
        overzealous law enforcement officers.”); State v. Elison, 

, 

, 

; People v. Avasino, 

 (Crim. Ct. 1972);
        Commonwealth v. McMahon, 

, ¶ 3; State v. Berrios, 

 (Tenn. 2007).

¶ 168       Applying the persuasive reasoning of the New Mexico Supreme Court’s
        opinion in Campos, along with the decisions of the courts of Iowa, Montana, New
        York, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee, and adopting the words of Delegate Dvorak,
        this court should hold that the Illinois Constitution requires police to obtain a
        warrant for any arrest unless police can show that exigent circumstances—
        insufficient time to obtain a judicial warrant—excused the failure to obtain a
        warrant.




                                               - 53 -
¶ 169                  g. No Long-Standing State Tradition Permits Warrantless
                              Arrests in Nonexigent Circumstances

¶ 170       The majority cites five cases decided before 1970 for its assertion that “long-
        standing state tradition is to allow warrantless arrests based on probable cause.”
        (Emphasis in original.) Supra ¶ 56. The majority implies that the cases support
        warrantless arrests even when no exigency excuses the failure to obtain a warrant.
        One of the cited cases, People v. Henneman, 

 (1940), held that
        police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant and did not discuss exigency.
        Three of the other cases fall under the general rule restated in People v. Mahaffey,
        

 (1995). In that case an informant gave police “detailed information
        regarding the offenses and the offenders, and, prior to the defendant’s arrest, the
        officers were able to verify a number of facts related to them by the informant. In
        addition, there was the likelihood that the defendant would flee if he were not
        apprehended quickly.” 

 The Mahaffey court held that exigent circumstances
        excused the failure to obtain a warrant. 

 The majority’s cited cases, People v.
        Jones, 

 (1959), People v. Tillman, 

 (1953),
        and People v. Bambulas, 

 (1969), all exemplify the general
        rule: if a source gives police reason to further investigate and in the course of
        investigation the police obtain probable cause to arrest the suspect, exigent
        circumstances may excuse the failure to obtain a warrant.

¶ 171       The majority also cites three cases decided after Watson had completely altered
        the landscape of fourth amendment analysis, People v. Grant, 

, People v. Jackson, 

 (2009), and People v. Montgomery,
        

 (1986). Those cases do not show an Illinois tradition unaffected
        by the Watson Court’s errors.

¶ 172       The statement of facts in the majority’s final case, People v. Swift, 

 (1925), does not expressly show exigency. Notably, the drafters of the Illinois
        Constitution of 1970 did not refer to Swift (or any of the other cases the majority
        cites) in the discussion of article I, section 6. The sponsor of the amendment
        expressly relied on Katz, 

, the case in which the United States
        Supreme Court persuasively held “the Constitution requires ‘that the deliberate,
        impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be interposed between the citizen and
        the police’ ” (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 

 (1963)).




                                                - 54 -
        The majority has not shown that a long-standing Illinois tradition justifies removal
        of the requirement that, except in exigent circumstances, police must obtain a
        warrant issued by an impartial judicial officer before making an arrest.


¶ 173                          4. Section 107-2(1) Does Not Support
                                        Warrantless Arrests

¶ 174       The majority also claims that section 107-2(1) of the Code of Criminal
        Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/107-2(1) (West 2022)) supports application of the
        Watson Court’s interpretation of the fourth amendment to the Illinois Constitution.
        Supra ¶ 36. This court interpreted section 107-2 in 1980, when it provided, “A
        peace officer may arrest a person when *** [h]e has reasonable grounds to believe
        that the person is committing or has committed an offense” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977,
        ch. 38, § 107-2(c)). See Abney, 81 Ill. 2d at 167-68. This court held that, to uphold
        the constitutionality of the statute, “the principles of the exigent-circumstances rule
        *** have been judicially engrafted upon the statute. The statute, as construed, is
        thus in compliance with the constitutional guidelines.” Id. at 168.

¶ 175       Section 107-2 does not support applying the Watson Court’s interpretation of
        the fourth amendment to the Illinois Constitution. Section 107-2, in accord with
        article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution, requires police to obtain a warrant
        for any arrest, except in exigent circumstances. Id.

¶ 176       The Illinois Constitution establishes the warrant requirement as a basic
        protection against the abuse of police power. The warrantless arrest of Clark in
        nonexigent circumstances violated his rights under article I, section 6, of the Illinois
        Constitution. Because police made a warrantless arrest based on an investigative
        alert, when no exigency excused the failure to obtain a judicial warrant, this court
        should reverse the appellate court’s judgment and remand the case to the circuit
        court for a trial without the evidence obtained as a result of the unconstitutional
        warrantless arrest.


¶ 177                          5. The Majority’s Decision Approves a
                                  Racially Discriminatory Practice




                                                 - 55 -
¶ 178       Under the majority’s ruling, police have unfettered discretion to decide whether
        they have probable cause to arrest anyone. This court should recognize the practical
        effect of such unfettered discretion. As one scholar wrote, “The dirty little secret of
        policing is that the Supreme Court has actually granted the police license to
        discriminate.” Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the
        Age of Colorblindness 130 (rev. ed. 2011). People of color, especially Blacks, feel
        the pain of the boundless discretion granted to the police when deciding whom to
        arrest on an investigative alert. Recently, in large part due to the availability of
        video evidence, the wider public has become aware of, or at least no longer able to
        ignore, the disparate treatment between Whites, Blacks, and Latinx individuals by
        the CPD. In the wake of the Chicago police shooting of Laquan McDonald, both
        the City of Chicago and the Department of Justice undertook investigations into
        CPD policies and practices.

¶ 179       CPD’s own data spotlighted the disparate treatment. Of the 250,000 traffic stops
        in the summer of 2014 not leading to an arrest, 72% of those stopped were Black,
        compared to 17% Latinx and 9% White. Police Accountability Task Force,
        Executive Summary, Recommendations for Reform: Restoring Trust Between the
        Chicago Police and the Communities They Serve 10 (2016), https://www.chicago
        patf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF_Final_Report_Executive_Summary_
        4_13_16-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/42ER-JP3Q] (hereinafter Executive Summary). In
        predominantly White neighborhoods, Blacks fared even worse. Police
        Accountability Task Force, Report, Recommendations for Reform: Restoring Trust
        Between the Chicago Police and the Communities They Serve 37 (2016),
        https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF_Final_Report_4_13_
        16-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YAX3-PCLL] (hereinafter Report). In District 18,
        Blacks accounted for 57.7% of all stops even though Blacks made up only 9.1% of
        the population. Id. In District 19, Blacks accounted for 51.1% of all stops even
        though Blacks made up only 6.6% of the population. Id.

¶ 180       Black and Latinx drivers were searched approximately four times as often as
        White drivers, yet contraband was found on White drivers twice as often as Black
        and Latinx drivers. Executive Summary, supra, at 9. In a 2015 survey, nearly 70%
        of young Black males reported being stopped by police in the prior 12 months. Id.
        at 10. The disparate treatment in policing is seen in areas other than police stops.




                                                - 56 -
        From 2008 to 2013, CPD set up 84% of driving under the influence checkpoints in
        predominantly Black and Latinx police districts. Report, supra, at 40.

¶ 181       The Police Accountability Task Force, in its executive summary, found that
        there was “substantial evidence that people of color—particularly African-
        Americans—have had disproportionately negative experiences with the police over
        an extended period of time.” Executive Summary, supra, at 14. “There is also
        substantial evidence that these experiences continue today through significant
        disparate impacts associated with the use of force, foot and traffic stops and bias in
        the police oversight system itself.” Id.

¶ 182       A 2022 report by the City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, titled Report
        on Race- and Ethnicity-Based Disparities in the Chicago Police Department’s Use
        of Force, confirms that the racially disparate treatment continues:

               “The quantitative evidence from investigatory stop and traffic stop data
           shows an overwhelming disparity in the rates at which Black and non-Black
           people were stopped by the police. The overrepresentation of Black people
           among those stopped by the police was consistent across traffic stops and
           investigatory stops, and it was persistent across every CPD District,
           notwithstanding differences in District crime rates and the demographic
           composition of District populations.” Office of Inspector Gen., City of Chi.,
           Report on Race- and Ethnicity-Based Disparities in the Chicago Police
           Department’s Use of Force 31 (2022), https://www.igchicago.org/wp-content/
           uploads/2022/02/Use-of-Force-Disparities-Report.pdf        [https://perma.cc/
           7NLG-7PVK].

¶ 183       As discussed in the introduction to this dissent, my review of appellate court
        cases dealing with investigative alerts is consistent with the disparate treatment
        established by these statistics.

¶ 184       With these practical realities in mind, I am unwilling to legalize warrantless
        arrests as reasonable under the Illinois Constitution. “Discrimination on the basis
        of race, odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the administration of
        justice.” Rose v. Mitchell, 

 (1979). And racial discrimination that
        is “more covert and less overt” is no less offensive to the Illinois Constitution where
        the results are the same for affected communities. See Flowers v. Mississippi, 588




                                                - 57 -
        U.S. 284, 296 (2019). “[R]andom and degrading stops and searches of [Black]
        youth tell kids that they are pariahs, that no matter how hard they study, they will
        remain potential suspects.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 

. The racial impacts of policing and the criminal justice system, so devastating
        to the Black and Latinx communities, have for too long been relegated to
        irrelevancy in court decisions.

¶ 185        Take, for instance, Whren v. United States, 

 (1996), where the
        United States Supreme Court held that a traffic stop is reasonable under the fourth
        amendment even if the subjective reason for the stop was the suspect’s race. As
        long as officers spotted any minor traffic infraction, they could effectuate a stop
        and search for more serious criminal activity. See 

 (“the Fourth
        Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in
        certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent” (emphasis in original)). The
        Court concluded that, while “the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of
        the law based on considerations such as race,” “the constitutional basis for objecting
        to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause,
        not the Fourth Amendment.” 

. But the equal protection clause provides
        little relief for communities affected by systemic racial disparities in policing. Even
        where a system is clearly turning out racially disparate results, a defendant “must
        prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.”
        (Emphasis in original.) McCleskey v. Kemp, 

 (1987).

¶ 186       The result of these investigative alert cases is simple. Police are given expansive
        discretion to stop, search, and arrest individuals of color. “Unbridled discretion
        inevitably creates huge racial disparities.” 

. By legalizing
        police discretion, the courthouse doors are closed to “all claims by defendants and
        private litigants that the criminal justice system operates in a racially discriminatory
        fashion.” 

¶ 187       As Justice Sotomayor explained in her dissent in Utah v. Strieff, 

,
        252 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), police have already been given an “array of
        instruments to probe and examine” individuals. “When we condone officers’ use of
        these devices without adequate cause, we give them reason to target pedestrians in
        an arbitrary manner. We also risk treating members of our communities as second-




                                                 - 58 -
        class citizens.” 

¶ 188                    6. Arrests Based on Investigative Alerts Violate the
                                           Consent Decree

¶ 189       In 2017 the State of Illinois sued the City of Chicago in federal court, seeking
        to enjoin the CPD “ ‘from engaging in a repeated pattern of using excessive force,
        including deadly force, and other misconduct that disproportionately harms
        Chicago’s African American and Latino residents.’ ” Illinois v. City of Chicago,
        No. 17-cv-6260, 

, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 1, 2019). The parties
        resolved the case in 2018, with the approval of the federal court, by entering into a
        consent decree, which provided:

            “CPD will provide police services to all members of the public without bias and
            *** without reference to stereotype based on race, color, ethnicity, *** or
            criminal history.

                                                ***

                *** CPD will *** ensure that its policies and practices prohibit
            discrimination on the basis of *** race [or] color ***. ***

              *** CPD will continue to require that all CPD members interact with all
            members of the public in an unbiased, fair, and respectful manner. ***

               *** CPD will prohibit officers from using race, ethnicity, [or] color ***
            when making routine or spontaneous law enforcement decisions ***.” Consent
            Decree, Illinois v. City of Chicago, No. 17-cv-6260, at 15-16 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31,
            2019),         https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/cpb/supp_info/
            ConsentDecreeComplete.pdf [https://perma.cc/78H6-YRQB].

¶ 190       The consent decree is both a contract between the parties and an order of the
        court. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 

 (1992); Williams
        v. Vukovich, 

 (6th Cir. 1983) (A consent decree is both “a
        voluntary settlement agreement which could be fully effective without judicial
        intervention” and “a final judicial order [Citations.] Judicial approval of a
        settlement agreement places the power and prestige of the court behind the




                                                - 59 -
        compromise struck by the parties.”). Courts may exercise their contempt powers to
        enforce consent decrees. Spallone v. United States, 

 (1990)
        (“ ‘courts have inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders
        through civil contempt’ ” (quoting Shillitani v. United States, 

        (1966))).

¶ 191       A pattern or practice of continuing racial discrimination in law enforcement
        violates the consent decree. “Where gross statistical disparities can be shown, they
        alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of
        discrimination.” Hazelwood School District v. United States, 

        (1977). The police department’s statistics show that police, left with unbridled
        discretion to arrest, exercise that discretion in racially discriminatory ways.

¶ 192       I have taken judicial notice of the 183 criminal cases in Cook County published
        in the Illinois Appellate Court reports or resolved by a Rule 23 order between 2007
        and 2024 involving investigative alerts (see infra ¶ 196 (defendant Nos. 1 to 174
        and Nos. 175 to 183)). In 154 of those cases, the alerts targeted Black men and
        women for arrest (see infra ¶ 196 (defendant Nos. 1 to 154)), 19 alerts named Latinx
        men (see infra ¶ 196 (defendant Nos. 155 to 173)), and 1 named a White woman
        (see infra ¶ 196 (defendant No. 174)). I could not obtain arrest photographs of the
        persons named for arrest in 16 cases, but in 7 of those cases, witnesses described
        the arrested suspect as Black (see infra ¶ 196 (defendant Nos. 146 to 152)).
        Although I believe the remaining nine cases involved arrests of Blacks (based on
        descriptions of the persons involved and the locations of the incidents), I do not rely
        on those arrests for my conclusions (see infra ¶ 196 (defendant Nos. 175 to 183)).
        The First District’s decisions involving investigative alerts from 2007 until 2024
        further show that the use of alerts fosters racial discrimination in arrests, and
        therefore, the continuing practice violates the 2018 consent decree.


¶ 193                                   IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 194       In sum, the majority’s blind obedience to Watson and its approval of warrantless
        arrests constructs a court-erected bridge around the constitution and confers on the
        police when there are no exigent circumstances (1) the judicial power to determine
        probable cause to arrest, (2) the judicial power to issue police warrants
        (investigative alerts) with no expiration date and nationwide effect, and (3) the



                                                - 60 -
        power to arrest without a judicial warrant. The bridge around the constitution here
        has the especially pernicious effect of approving the warrantless arrest of Clark, a
        juvenile, in his home. This court should not authorize police to discretionarily arrest
        individuals with no independent judicial probable cause determination. An arrest is
        the most damning restriction on an individual’s liberty outside of imprisonment.
        For such a drastic infringement of the constitutional right to liberty, a judge should
        make the independent decision that probable cause exists to arrest.

¶ 195       Therefore, until this court holds that the only time it is reasonable for police to
        make a warrantless arrest is when there are exigent circumstances, communities of
        color in Illinois will return to the days of Dred Scott (Blacks and Latinx have no
        rights a police officer must respect) and Plessy (it is permissible for police officer
        to have separate and unequal interpretations of the warrant clause in the
        constitution—one for Whites and one for people of color). See Dred Scott, 

; Plessy; 

. I will not interpret article I, section 6, of the Illinois
        Constitution in a way that deprives people of color of their rights. The majority’s
        decision will ensure an unfair and unequal application of the Illinois Constitution
        by the police. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.




                                                - 61 -
¶ 196                                     APPENDIX

                     (Most photos via Department of Corrections Internet Inmate Status,
                            https://idoc.illinois.gov/offender/inmatesearch.html)

                                         Black Males

        1. People v. Myrick, 

. People v. Thornton, 

. People v. Noble, 

        4. People v. Miller, 

        5. People v. Burke, 

. People v. Hodrick, 

. People v. Chatmon, 

. People v. Stephenson, 

. People v. Braswell, 

. People v. Robertson, 

        11. People v. Moore, 

. People v. Lee, 

        13. People v. Fleming, 

        14. People v. Walker, 

        15. People v. Starks, 

. People v. Boyd, 

. People v. Parker, 

        18. People v. Hilliard, 

                                              - 62 -
         19. People v. Wimberly, 

 (2011) (table) (unpublished order under
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23)

       20. People v. Hardaway, 

. People v. Stitts, 

. People v. Baldwin, 

. People v. Butler, 

. People v. Thompson, 

. People v. Pulliam, 

. People v. Brown, 

. People v. Clark, 

. People v. Little, 

. People v. Dossie, 

. People v. Baker, 

. People v. Thomas, 

       32. People v. Muhammad-Ali, 

. People v. Harris, 

. People v. Cross, 

. People v. Johnson, 

. People v. McGraw-Anderson, 

. People v. Brown, 

. People v. Scott, 

. People v. Clark, 

                                              - 63 -
       40. People v. Robinson, 

. People v. Barnes, 

       42. People v. Phillips, 

       43. People v. Garner, 

. People v. Adams, 

       45. People v. Brown, 

. People v. Ollie, 

. People v. Higgs, 

. People v. Mohamed, 

       49. People v. Stepney, 

. People v. Thompson, 

 (defendant Cedryck Davis)

       51. People v. Gunn, 

       52. People v. Yates, 

. People v. Williams, 406 Ill. App. 3d (2011) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 23)

       54. People v. Silas, 

       55. People v. Thompson, 

 (defendant Deandre Thompson)

       56. People v. Stanley, 

       57. People v. Caples, 

. People v. Hyland, 

. People v. Simmons, 

. People v. Bass, 

                                               - 64 -
61. People v. Brookins, 

62. People v. McGee, 

. People v. Jordan, 

64. People v. Baldwin, 

65. People v. Sallis, 

66. People v. Quick, 

67. People v. Henderson, 

68. People v. Pigram, 

69. People v. Hubbard, 

70. People v. Ross, 

71. People v. Nixon, 

72. People v. Minor, 

73. People v. Rice, 

74. People v. Lynch, 

75. People v. Harris, 

76. People v. Levi, 

-UB

77. People v. Buchanan, 

78. People v. Polk, 

79. People v. Reed, 

80. People v. Williams, 

81. People v. Lemon, 

                                       - 65 -
       82. People v. Pernell, 

       83. People v. McCall, 

       84. People v. Sanders, 

. People v. Anderson, 

       86. People v. Barner, 

. People v. Swift, 

       88. People v. Jackson, 

       89. People v. Lewis, 

. People v. Gibbs, 

       91. People v. Johnson, 

       92. People v. Brock, 

. People v. Peters, 

. People v. Smith, 

       95. People v. Davison, 

       96. People v. Beasley, 

       97. People v. Nugen, 

 (1st Dist. 2010)

       98. People v. Wilson, 

. People v. Selvie, 

       100. People v. Tatum, 

      101. People v. Dunn, No. 

 (2011) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 23)

       102. People v. Randall, 

                                              - 66 -
103. People v. Clark, 

104. People v. Cotton, 

 (1st Dist. 2009)

105. People v. Williams, 

. People v. Lewis, 

107. People v. Cox, 

 (1st Dist. 2007)

108. People v. Stewart, 

. People v. Wiley, 

110. People v. Henderson, 

111. People v. Harris, 

. People v. House, 

113. People v. Lee, 

114. People v. Johnson, 

115. People v. Baker, 

. People v. Bradley, 

. People v. Carter, 

 (defendant Kelvin Carter)

118. People v. Davis, 

. People v. Dorsey, 

. People v. Erwin, 

. People v. Gill, 

. People v. Hawkins, 

. People v. Jackson, 

                                       - 67 -
124. People v. Massey, 

. People v. Murphy, 

. People v. Randall, 

127. People v. Spencer, 

. People v. Streater, 

. People v. Tyler, 

. People v. Ward, 

. People v. Wilson, 

132. People v. Wimberly, 

. People v. Charles, 

. People v. Ivy, 

. People v. Joseph, 

. People v. McCray, 

. People v. Mohamed, 

. People v. Pierce, 

. People v. Rush, 

140. People v. Smith, 

 (defendant Aaron Smith)

141. People v. Starks, 

. People v. Walker, 

. People v. Washington, 

. People v Wright, 

                                       - 68 -
145. People v. Smith, 

 (defendant Rashawn Smith)

                   No Picture; Witness in Case Identified Defendant as Black

146. People v. Carter, 

 (defendant Anton Carter)

147. People v. Williams, 

. Van Buren v. City of Chicago, 

149. In re J.A., 

 (minor defendant)

150. In re Antoine H., 

 (minor defendant)

151. People v. Thomas, 

. People v. Ferguson, 

                                           Black Females

153. People v. Moore, 

. People v. Carr-McKnight, 

                                           Latinx Males

155. People v. Garcia, 

. People v. Velez, 

157. People v. Lerma, 

. People v. Perez, 

. People v. Cano, 

. People v. Bahena, 

. People v. Ruiz, 

. People v. Resendiz, 

. People v. Alicea, 

                                         - 69 -
164. People v. Sepulveda, 

165. People v. Rodriguez, 

. People v. Andrade, 

167. People v. Ascencio, 

168. People v. Soto, 

169. People v. Castillo, 

170. People v. Aguilar, 

 (1st Dist. 2009)

171. People v. Gomez, 

. People v. Davila, 

. People v. Petatan, 

                                      White Female

174. People v. Wright, 

             No Picture, No Witness Identification, Crime in Black Neighborhood

175. People v. Holmes, 

176. People v. Jones, 

. People v. Rankin, 

. People v. Alexander, 

179. People v. Dennis, 

-UB

180. People v. Henderson, 

181. People v. Allen, 

182. People v. McGee, 

-UB

183. In re Dante W., 

 (1st Dist. 2008) (minor defendant)




                                          - 70 -
               Black Males

1. People v.
Myrick, 

                                    Y20791 - MYRICK, DAVID A.
                   Parent Institution:         DIXON CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                   Offender Status:            IN CUSTODY
                   Location:                   DIXON CORRECTIONAL CENTER




                   PHYSICAL PROFILE
                  Date of Birth:               03/31 /1983
                  Weight:                      250 lbs.
                  Hair:                        Black
                  Su :                         Male
                  Height:                      5 ft. 09 in.
                  Race:                        Black
                  Eyvs:                        Brown




2. People v.
Thornton,

                                               ...... \
                               Y19115 - THORNTON, CHARLES E.
                   Partnt ln1tftutlon:          MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                   O,,_nder Status:             IN CUSTOOY
                   Location:                    MENARD
                                         Sex Offender Registry Required



                   PHYSICAL PROFILE
                   Da19ol8irth:                 03/13/1979
                   Weight:                      168 1bs.
                   Hair:                        Black
                   Sex:                         Male
                   Height:                      Sft. 07 In.
                   Race:                        Black
                   Eyes:                        Brown




                  - 71 -
3. People v.
Noble, 

                                                                            \.
                                          Y34032 - NOBLE, DEONTA
                    Parent ln■titution:          HILL CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                    Ofl9nder Status:             IN CUSTODY
                    Location:                    HILL




                    PHYSICAL PROFILE
                    Date of Birth:              05/25/1994
                    Weight:                     153 lbs.
                    Hair:                       Blad<
                    Sex:                        Male
                    Height:                     5ft. 09 in.
                    Race:                       Black
                    Eyes:                       Brown



4. People v.
Miller, 

                  ~,Status:
                  L-n:
                            L                 -
                                     M37504 - MILLER, CHARLES
                  Pel'Oftt Institution:        MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                                               IN CUSTODY
                                               MENARD
                                                                                 \


                  PHYSICAL PROFILE
                  Date al Blflft:              02/21/1988
                  Wolgl,t:                     280 tbs.
                  Hair:                        Blad<
                  Sox:                         Mete
                  Height:                      6 tl 01 In.
                  Race:                        Blad<
                  Eyoa:                        Brown




                          - 72 -
5. People v.
Burke, 

                                        N80531 - BURKE, DWAYNE
                      Parent Institution:     STATEVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                      Ollendor Starus:        PAROLE
                      Location:               PAROLE DISTRICT 1




                      PHYSICAL PROFILE
                      Dato of ■11th:          03/26/1968
                      Weight:                 190 Ibs
                      Hair:                   81ack
                      Sex:                    Male
                      Height:                 5ft.11 In.
                      Raco:                   Black
                      EyH :                   Brown




6. People v.
Hodrick, 

                                Y31929 - HODRICK, DOMINIQUE
                 Parent Institution:         MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offend., Status:            IN CUSTODY
                 Location:                   MENARD




                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Date of ■lrth:              05/28/1981
                 Weight:                     160 lbs.
                 Hair:                       Blac:I<
                 Sax:                        Male
                 Height:                     5ft. 07 In.
                 Race:                       Black
                 El,llls:                    Brown




                            - 73 -
7. People v.
Chatmon, 

                                    M31356 - CHATMAN, VICTOR
                   Parenl ln11ituli011:   McNARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                   <m.nar Status:         INCUSTOOY
                   Loeolion:              MENARD




                   PHYSICAL PROFILE
                  Date ol llirth:         01/10/1992
                  Weight:                 1991bs.
                  Hair:                   Black
                  Sex:                    Male
                  Haight:                 6ft. 05 In.
                  Race:                   Black
                  Eyes:                   Brown



8. People v.
Stephenson,

                             874904 - STEPHENSON, ANTHONY
                 Parent lnstttuUon:        LAWRENCE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offllnder Status:         IN CUSTODY
                 Location:                 LAWRENCE CORRECTIONAL CENTER



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 D119 of Birth:           03/19/19TT
                 Weight:                  200 Iba.
                 Hair:                    Black
                 Sex:                     Male
                 Height:                  6 ft. 01 In.
                 Race:                    Black
                 Eyes:                    Brown




                            - 74 -
9. People v.
Braswell, 

                                  ~ '-   / '                              ,,
                                   Y25777 - BRASWELL, JAMAL
                  Parent Institution:          DANVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                  Offender Status:             IN CUSTODY
                  Location:                    DANVILLE



                  PHYSICAL PROFILE
                  Date of Birth:           10/20/1991
                  Weight:                  165 lbs.
                  H air:                   Black
                  Sex:                     Male
                  l-leigM:                 6 fl. 00 in.
                  Race:                    Black
                  Eyes:                    Brown



10. People v.
Robertson,

                             R30809 - ROBERTSON, KENYADA
                 Parent Institution:       DANVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Status:          IN CUSTODY
                 Location:                 DANVILLE



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Date of Birth:           09/12/1985
                 Weight:                  215 lbs.
                 Hair:                    Black
                 Su:                      Male
                 Height:                  5 ft. 09 In.
                 Rae■:                    Black
                 Eyas:                    Brown




                             - 75 -
11. People v.
Moore, 

                                       •                 FINAL. AC>PROVA~




12. People v.
Lee, 

                                      850137 - LEE, TERRIN
                Parent Institution:       MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                Offender Status:          IN CUSTODY
                Location:                 MENARD




                PHYSICAL PROFILE
                Date of Blrth:            12/14/1973
                Weight:                   272 lt>s.
                Heir:                     Black
                Sex:                      Male
                Height:                   6 ft. 04 In.
                R■ce:                     Black
                Eyes:                     Brown




                             - 76 -
13. People v.
Fleming, 

                                      K71444 - FLEMING, RUBEN
                   Parent Institution:      SHERIDAN CORRECTIONAL CENT.ER
                   Offender Status:         IN CUSTODY
                   Location:




                   PHYSICAL PROFILE
                   Data of Bll'ltl:         09/27/1977
                   Weight:                  215 lbs.
                   Hair:                    Blacl<
                   Sex:                     Male
                   Height:                  5ft. 10 in.
                   Race:                    Black
                  Eyes:                     Brown


14. People v.
Walker, 

                             -:t
                                      M32755 - WALKER, JUSTIN
                Parent Institution:         PINCKNEYVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                Offender Status:            IN CUSTODY
                Locatioo:                   PINCKNEYVILLE




                PHYSICAL PROFILE
                Data of Birth:              10/15/1990
                Weight:                     180 lbs.
                Hair:                       Brown
                Sex:                        Male
                Height:                     6 fl 04 In.
                Race:                       Black
                Eyas:                       Brown




                               - 77 -
15. People v.
Starks, 

                                     M27220 - STARKS, BRANDON
                    Parent lrn1tllutioi1:   MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                    Offender Sllltus:       IN CUSTODY
                    Location:               MENARD




                    PHYSICAL PROFILE
                    Date of Birth:          04/30/1987
                    Weight:                 165 lbs.
                    Hair:                   Black
                    Sex:                    Male
                    Haight:                 6ft. 00 in.
                    Rae.t:                  Black
                    Eyas:                   Brown



16. People v.
Boyd, 

                                     M37106 - BOYD, LAWRENCE
                  Parent Institution:       HILL CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                  Oftlender Status:         IN CUSTODY
                  Lceatioft:                HILL




                  PHYSICAL PROFILE
                  Oat. of 81rth:            08/18/1989
                  W.igllt:                  2601bs.
                  Hair:                     Blacl.
                  Sex:                      Male
                  Height:                   5 ft. 11 In.
                  Race:                     Blad!
                  Eyn:                      Brown




                                - 78 -
17. People v.
Parker, 2021
IL App (1st)
                                                ..:.=r :, ~~~ ~'":
                                                :ri:.:
173093-U




                                                              R


                                                                                    ,.
                                                                            \-~-i •o,,
                                                                            t!f~·.-.' 'tiil
                                                                            ~       C~h

                                                                            .$1-:.1 ~Iii ~lj ♦
                                                                        -   ' -'i:ih-~i:I~ ....
                                                                            ~'-- •u1o
                                                           .•.,   .\)
                                                 -<:. ~"t; ~,\~\f'.\\
                                        ·" ~t     ~ ' - (l ( , ~                \




18. People v.
Hilliard, 

                                    M47043 - HILLIARD, ANDRE
                 Parent 111-tltution:                       JOI.IET TREATMENT CENTER
                 Offender Statue:                           IN CUSTODY
                 Location:



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Date of 81rth:                             12/05/1994
                 Weight:                                    164 lbs .
                 Hair:                                      Black
                 Sex:                                       Male
                 Height:                                   6ft 00 In.
                 Race:                                     Black
                 Eyes:                                     Brown




                                  - 79 -
19. People v.
Wimberly, 

 (2011)
(table)
(unpublished
order under
Illinois
Supreme Court
Rule 23)                           R50509 - WIMBERLY, DARRELL
                  Parent lnstitutlon:      SHERIDAN CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                  Offender Sta1us:         IN CUSTODY
                  Lecatton:




                  PHYSICAL PROFILE
                  Date of Birth:           11/20/19!!5
                  Weight:                  185 lbs.
                  Hair:                    Black
                  Sex:                     Male
                  Haight:                  5 ft. 08 in.
                  Raca:                    Black
                  Eyes:                    Brown


20. People v.
Hardaway,

                              859247 - HARDAWAY, MAURICE
                 Parent Institution:       MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Status:          IN CUSTODY
                 Locltlon:                 MENARD



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Date of Birth:            01/1 1/1973
                 Weight:                   249lba.
                 1 ■.-:                    llad<
                 Su:                       Male
                 Height:                   5ft. 06 in.
                 Race:                     Black
                 Eyes:                     Brown




                                  - 80 -
21. People v.                                             F Nl\l APPR VAl.
Stitts, 

                                                              t ~ .•
                                                              1J\rl   :r,
                                                              l• .,m      v~
                                                              I: .,...i. H~
                                                              !;>"'° i-i-1'.f"',I '.-
                                                              \1,wJo.r'r.,... -l,f'l' •u
                                         ,
                                         I
                                         I




22. People v.
Baldwin, 

                                   R28266 - BALDWIN, DERRICK
                  Parent Institution:          BIG MUDDY CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                  Offender Statua:             IN CUSTODY
                  lccatlon:                    BIG MUDDY RIVER
                                        Sex Offender Registry Required


                  PHYSICAL PROFILE
                  Date of Birth:               10/05/1979
                  We ight:                     159 lbs.
                  Hair:                        Black
                  Sex:                         Male
                  Haight:                      5 ft. 10 In.
                  Race:                        Black
                  Eyes:                        Brown




                                   - 81 -
23. People v.
Butler, 

                             _,,,,,,,._  '-
                                   M05574 - BUTLER, DONQUILA
                  Parent Institution:            SHAWNEE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                  Offander Status:               IN CUSTODY
                  Location:                      SHAWNEE
                                          Sex Offender Registry Required



                  PHYSICAL PROFILE
                  Date of Birth:                 03/18/1979
                  Waight:                        :>19 lbs.
                  Hair:                          Black
                  Sex:                           Male
                  Height:                        5 ft. 08 in.
                  Race:                          Blacl<
                  Eyes:




                                                                                                     -
                                                 Brown


24. People v.
Thompson,
                                                                                                     -=--
                                                                                                       - --
2021 IL App                                                 rJ I I0-1-?ll 1'                     .,:.'. 111.
(1st) 182371-U
                                                                ir cr.·
                                                                H·O ;\~
                                                                lha,-,,..~y,::;
                                                                fl-l::'t l- 11•
                                                                l:111.1 :-!11; !-:-,i-•
                                                                IJ!:(I J'l'I Ccic•,~;c:~1.· I\




                                   Identity cross-checked using date of arrest.




                                   - 82 -
25. People v.
Pulliam, 

                                   Y21867 - PULLIAM, DORIAN
                Parent Institution:            H ILL CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                Offender Status:               IN CUSTODY
                Location:                      HILL
                                        Sex Offender Registry Required


                PHYSICAL PROFILE
                !>ate of Birth:                04/14/1980
                Neight:                        195 lbs.
                ◄air:                          Black
                Sex:                           Male
                ieight:                        5 ft. 05 in.
                bee:                           Black
                !yes:                          Brown


26. People v.
Brown, 

                                                  I
                                          r--...
                                      R64720 - BROWN, DANIEL
                  Parent Institution:           MENARD CORRECTONAL CENTER
                  Off•nller Status:             lt-JCUSTOOY
                  Location:                     MENARD




                  PHYSICAL PROFILE
                  Data of Birth:                02/15/1989
                  Weight:                       178 lbs.
                  Hair:                         !!lack
                  Sex:                          Male
                  Height:                       Sf!. 09 in.
                  Raca:                         Black
                  Eyes:                         Brown




                             - 83 -
27. People v.
Clark, 

                                        Y26608 - CLARK, ANGELO
                    Parent lnstiilltlen:     HIU CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                    Offender Stalus:         IN CUSTODY
                    Location:                HILL




                    PHYSICAL PROFILE
                   Date of Birth:            07/10/1996
                   Weight:                   185 lbs.
                   Hair:                     Black
                   Sex:                      Male
                   Height:                   5 ft. 11 in.
                   Raca:                     Black
                   Eyes:                     Brown


28. People v.
Little, 

                                                       l
                                     Y31393 - LITTLE, DIAMOND          '
                                              MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                  Parent Institution:
                  Offender Status:            IN CUSTODY
                  Location:                   MENARD



                  PHYSICAL PROFILE
                  Date of Birth:              01/10/1994
                  Weight:                     145 lbs.
                  Hair:                       Black
                  Sex:                        Male
                  Height:                     5 ft. 04 in.
                  Race:                       Black
                  Eyes:                       Brown




                                - 84 -
29. People v.                                                PIIIOBABI.I! CA U!II': APPROVl<D

Dossie, 

                                                                    1   Q,..,~<s ~lw
                                                                        S1';•
                                                                        IJ~     C!::!m.x!:m




30. People v.
Baker, 

                                       q
                                           ~✓


                                 N93480- BAKER, MARSHALL
                 Parent Institution:            MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 O'"nder Status:                IN CUSTODY
                 Location:                      MENARD
                                       Sex Offender Registry Required


                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 0aM of Birth:                  09104/1961
                 Weight:                        124 lbs.
                 Hair:                          Black
                 Su:                            Male
                 Haight:                        5~04in.
                 Race:                          Black
                 Eye■:                          Brown




                           - 85 -
31. People v.
Thomas, 

                                  Y14076 - THOMAS, DJUAN
                Parent Institution:          ILLINOIS RIVER CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                Offender st1.1tus:           IN CUSTODY
                Location:                    IULINOIS RIVER



                PHYSICAL PROFILE
                Date of Blrih:               06/24/1998
                Weight:                      175 lbs.
                Hair:                        Black
                Sex:                         Male
                Height:                      5 fl. OG in.
                Race:                        Black
                Eyes:                        Brown


32. People v.
Muhammad-
Ali, 

                                         J
                          Y22039 - MUHAMMAD-All, SOLOMON
                Parent IRStitutlon:          SHAWNEE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                Offender Statu,:             IN CUSTODY
                Location:                    SHAWNEE
                                      Sex Offender Registry Required


                PHYSICAL PROFILE
                Date of Birth:               12/18/1981
                Weight:                      2201bs.
                Hair:                        Black
                Sex:                         Male
                Haight:                      5ft. 07 in .
                Race:                        Black
                Eyes:                        Brown




                            - 86 -
33. People v.
Harris, 

                                  R68630 - HARRIS, THOMAS M.
                  Parent Institution:    STATEVILLE C':ORRE'C':TIONAL CENTER
                  Offender Status:       PAROLE
                  locatlo11:             PAROLE D ISTRICT 2




                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Date of Birth:          01/19/1987
                 Weight:                 380 lbs.
                 Hair:                   Black
                 S.x:                    Male
                 H1tlght:                6ft. 11 in.
                 Rae.:                   Black
                 Eyes:                   Brown



34. People v.
Cross, 

                                  M43498 - CROSS, TAQUELL
                Perwnt Institution:      PINCKNEYVIU.E CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                Offender Status:         PAROLE
                location:                PAROLE DISTRICT 1




                PHYSICAL PROFILE
                Date of Birth:           10/31/1994
                Weight                   1521bs.
                Hair:                    Black
                Seit:                    Male
                Haight:                  5 ft. 06 In.
                Race:                    Black
                Eyes:                    Bfown




                            - 87 -
35. People v.                                      FINAL APPROVAL
Johnson, 

                                        -
                   ·-
                                         ••



                  ·- ·- ,




36. People v.
McGraw-
Anderson,

-
U



                             Y31315-ANDERSON, TRAMELL
                Pamn Institution:    PONTIAC CORRECTlmlAL CENTER
                Offender Statua:     IN CUSTODY
                Local~:              PONTIAC



                PHYSICAL PROFILE
                DawofBll1tl:         01/1511991
                Weight:              201 lbs.
                Hair:                81aek
                S.x:                 Male
                Height:              6 ft 00 In.
                RKt,;                Black
                Eyes:                Brown



37. People v.
Brown, 

                            - 88 -
38. People v.
Scott, 

                                    M23748 - SCOTT, ANTONIO
                 Parent Institution:      SHERIDAN CORR£CTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Sll!fus:        IN CUSTODY
                 Location:



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 llal,a of Birth:         04/16/1991
                 Weigltt:                 150 lbs.
                 Hal,:                    81e0k
                 Sax:                     Male
                 H•lght:                  5 ft. 08 In.
                 Rae.:                    Blad<
                 Eyes:                    Brown



39. People v.
Clark, 2020 IL                                        ~INAL APPROVAi.                      a•
                                                                                            I~.

App (1st)                                            JU\Jl!>llLE ol!POtmo.s                ·1t•M.
                                                                                           , o.
182533
                                                                                    l,'.V",i,IJ'' t 4


                                                         ...,.
                                            ·a#.sr.~ N l ; , _

                                          --             tJi)O
                                                         OM...
                                                         l.f,Jbt

                                                         ...... ..,~,
                                                         DIC--,11l~~

                                                         O:t.;>'!IC(l,.., 1--Jair
                                                         t','\<
                                                         ~tJr.;..,,...
                                                         CQ1n,1e.,1on




                             - 89 -
40. People v.
Robinson,

                                 R21491 - ROBINSON, KEVIN
                Parent Institution:          PO~ITIAC CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                Ofrender Status:             IN CUSTODY
                Location:                    PONTIAC
                                      Sex Offender Regls1ry RequlnJd


                PHYSICAL PROFILE
                Data of Birth:               12123/1983
                Weight:                      2151bs.
                Hair:                        Brown
                Sex:                        Male
                Heoghl:                     5ft. OS In.
                Race:                       Black
                e:.,..,                      Brown


41. People v.
Barnes, 

                                    M50483 - BARNES, AARON
                Parent Institution:           LAWRENCE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                Ofiendor St!ltus:             IN CUSTO)Y
                Loc~tion:                     LAWRENCE CORRECTIONAL GENTER




                PHYSICAL PROFILE
                Dal< of Birth:                08/J2/199,
                Weight:                       170 lbs.
                H;iir:                        Black
                s~x:                          Mae
                Height:                       5ft. 11 in.
                Ra.ct:                        Blacl<
                Eyes:                         Br(!Wn




                           - 90 -
42. People v.
Phillips, 

                                     M27060 - PHILLIPS, JAMES E.
                 Parent Institution:             TAYLORVIU.E CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Ollenller Statua:               IN CUSTODY
                 Loeatlofl:                      TAYLORVILLE
                                          Sex Offender Registry Required


                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Dat8 of &ll'th:                 05117/1974
                 Weight:                         160 Iba.
                 Haii1:                          Black
                 Su:                             Male
                 Haight:                         5ft. 07 in.
                 Race:                           Black
                 E1111s:                         Brown


43. People v.
Garner, 

                                         Y32973 - GARNER, JABRIL
                    Parent 1n,tltuti0n:           MENARD CORRECTICt,IAL CENTER
                    Offefldet Cbtu•:              tN CUSTODY
                    loe-atton:                    MENARD



                    PHYSICAL PROFILE
                    Di11t.G of 8 irlh:           10/11/1903
                    WtiQht:                      22311>!.
                    Hair:                        Bla:k
                    !lox:                        Mara
                    Height:                      6 ft. 01 in.
                    Rice:                         8100:
                    EY90:                        BroNn




                                 - 91 -
44. People v.
Adams, 

                            .......          ..._
                                   803660 - ADAMS, ANTHONY
                Parem Institution:             PINCKNEYVIU E CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                Off0naar Status:               IN CUSTODY
                Location:                      PINCKNEYVILLE




                PHYSICAL PROFILE
                Dam of lli,th:                 09/19/1983
                Waight:                        185 lbs.
                Hair:                          Brown
                Sax:                           Mate
                Haight:                        511.091n.
                ~:                             Blact
                E~s:                           Haz,it


45. People v.
Brown, 

                                          M18929 - BROWN, KJAR
                  Parent ln1tltutlot1:              PONTIAC CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                  Oflendo, Stolus:                  IN CUSTODY
                  Loeallon:                         PONTIAC




                  PHYSICAL PROFILE
                  D:'lted8il1:h:                    0~/11/1991
                  W•lght:                       1 79 lbs.
                  H•lr.                         Black
                  Stx:                          Male
                  Holght:                       5tt. 11 in.
                  Race:                         Black
                  E\IH:                         Br:iwn




                                 - 92 -
46. People v.
Ollie, 

                                                                              -~

                                                                        845444 - OLLIE, JIMMIE
                              Parent Institution:                            DANVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENlER
                              Olll!nder Status:                              INCUSTOOY
                              Loutioft:                                      DANVILLE



                              PHYSICAL PROFILE
                              Data of 81,tll:                                09109/1972
                              Weight:                                        282Ibs.
                              Hair:                                          Black
                              Sn:                                            Male
                              Mel,ht:                                        6 ft. 02 in.
                              Raea:                                          Black
                              Eyas:                                          Brown



47. People v.     (tiM:AgQ~l(i& aE,A.trn>tHT
                                                                                            ;.1NAL APPIIO'IA~

Higgs, 2021 IL        ~Jllt!ST REPO RT
                       ·-ti·, i.•~:111w... •-L<1tC"~41r\M ; fit,j3
                      .A.:., ~       ...... :-.~• - • " - - -(',.',,I
App (1st)         :.!IC,n \.W-f""'<l. '"'i

                 i:·~~a~~:~:~{(";;;}7::_~~~~~.: ~ ..: •. ,.il1~~t."~~t1'~                                     :~~---   •··-
191620-U              • ~ :                                                   iom •          ., ,~
                 I·                                                                          ••
                                                                                             14/lh-.
                                                                                             $ro,.,,m £:,,»
                                                                                                                                          ;:: .:,. : .
                                                                                             Sl;idl~,-                                        '-t ...-..
                                                                                             C-317'1 Rowt ~., SMe
                                                                                                                                -..:-.:
                                                                                             ~ lri~m)i!:.:'Wl
                                                                                                                              ;.. .        . 1-.
                                                                                                                                             .,.. ·. •.
                                                                         0                                                           •             X
                                                                                                                              .,.,..:.,____....._.%:_,..




                                                      - 93 -
48. People v.
Mohamed,

                                          P■nRt lnstftutlem:              HILL CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                                          Ofhndar Status:                 INCUSTOOY
                                          Locllllon:                      HILL



                                          PHYSICAL PROFILE
                                          Date of Birth:                  01/1511992
                                         Weight:                          180 lbs.
                                         H•lr:                            eiact
                                         Sell:                            Male
                                         H•ight:                          5 ft. 09 In.
                                         Raeo:                            Blaek
                                         Eyu:                             Brown


49. People v.    (;filC-¥,9 PGl.lCE Ol:PART.,F.NT
Stepney, 2020    ARREST REPO RT
                 3!101. .l:l'M, ~ .e.-.-" . Ci<l1-..o,.,ut,,;o.- 4'iU
IL App (1st)         .. , ; • • .......
                     'lt'=l,~-••Ml l "• • ,   ~n,••1rl •p<' " -'• " \ •
                                          ~




180616-U
                                                                                          :)'6 1'
                                                                                          2~0 Clo
                                                                                         !U•C\'1'\1 >f"'"
                                                                                         ;z, a(,;.;.1µ
                                                                                         : :cj:\::•t Ht:111 Ji l}IU
                                                                                         ;,..ill!th.r11f.'. 1t~'I , 1~ia 11




                                                               - 94 -
50. People v.
Thompson,

(defendant
Cedryck
Davis)


                                     M27481 - DAVIS, CEDRYCK
                Parent l nstJtutlon:          JOUET TREATMEm CENTER
                Olle•dar Status:              IN CUSTODY
                Loeallon:



                PHYSICAL PROFILE
                Oaie of Birth:                0Z/18/1991
                W1tighl:                      16<1 lbs.
                Mair:                         e1ac1<
                Sox:                          Male
                Helgllt:                      Sit. 11 in.
                Race:                         Blad<
                Eyei:                         8IO'M1



51. People v.
Gunn, 

                                          Y19505- GUNN, OMAR
                   Partflt l nsltu11on:       MENARDCORRECT!ONAl CE~TEf<
                   OfhndarSbtUI:              INCUSTODY
                   L4cothrn:                  MENM.0



                   PHYSICAL PROFILE
                   0 ... ofliirth:            03,01/1~90
                   'NalQllt:                  1o4t>S.
                   Mail:                      81ac1:
                   le:w:                      Male
                   N•lgtc:                    5 ft041n.
                   Raca:                      Black
                   l!y. .:                    Brown




                               - 95 -
52. People v.
Yates, 

                                            (

                                         ' J,/
                                     M01860- YATES, ANDRE A.
                 P;)r1t1t lnstltulk>n:           DIXON CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Ststuo:                IN CUSTODY
                 Lccoiion:                       DIXON CORRECTIONAL CENTER



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 0ale of !Birth:                 06/17/1990
                 Weight:                         189 lbs.
                 Hair.                           Blad<
                 S.x:                            Male
                 Height:                         5ft. 06 in.
                 Rlleli:                         Blad<
                 Eyes:                           Brown


53. People v.
Williams, 406
Ill. App. 3d
(2011) (table)
(unpublished
order under
Illinois
Supreme Court
Rule 23)                                 R68853 - WILLIAMS, JESSIE
                                                  PINCKNEYvlLLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                    P8NR1 l•atllutiOn:
                    Ofl'efltlar sraua:            '"CUS100Y
                    Loeatiioft:                   PINCKNEY\,lLLE



                    PHYSICAL PROFILE
                    0a1o of llflh:                11/18/1933
                    W.i9ht;                       ~12 b o.
                    ttllr:                        Black
                    SU:                           Mate
                    Woolg~t:                      tft. 02 In.
                    Race:                         Black
                    r~•:                          8fOY.YI




                               - 96 -
54. People v.                                                                                CHICAGO ~ POLICE:
Silas, 2020 IL
App (1st)                         Mr il'iiitffri t I
191320-U                          Oetails
                                  Arrest

                                                  f'IAME   t vERt~'!e T S.U,.A$
                                                   AGE     ~
                                             ca~.:         113•ru~

                                              AARESTIO     ,r1c11y. h~y 13, l01G 7:05 Pt.I
                                    AM~STI..OCATION        3GOOW1~Tl1ST
                                   ARRESTING AGaJCY        CHICAGO P0LJcE OEPARTt.lENT
                                   REL&AlW:>.(A~'t         friow/. Mil)' 13, l()1f 11:39P),I
                                   DnvaK>.tt.b,!;&(l'J()

                                             BONO TYPE     l &QIC)
                                           101WAM0'UNT S2.IXIO
                                             ilO~OOATf     21,)~0t.~ 13




                  Identity cross-checked using publicly available arrest history and details from the
                 order in Silas, 

. Silas was arrested on S. Trumbull Ave.
                  on August 4, 2014, and November 2, 2016, on unrelated charges. In 2017, he was
                 stopped for a traffic violation and subsequently arrested pursuant to an investigative
                 alert in connection with an armed robbery at the same S. Trumbull Avenue address.
                  At trial, the State indicated Silas resided there, that there were four other criminal
                 complaints allegedly involving Silas, and that all five incidents occurred within the
                                      span of eight days in a hallway at that address.

55. People v.
Thompson,

(defendant
Deandre
Thompson)

                                                 M18143-THOMPSON, DEANDRE
                                  P.,.nt 1"'11!ution:                          PINCIOIIEYV1LLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                                  Oflltlldilr S1atua:                          IN CUSTODY
                                  l.«alon:                                     Pl~JCIOIIEY\/lllE



                                  PHYSICAL PROFILE
                                 Oala of 8Irth:                                08/24/1992
                                 Weight                                        171 Iba.
                                 Hair.                                         Blsck
                                 Sex:                                          Mala
                                 Height:                                       5 ft 08 In.
                                 Rac:9:                                        Bleck
                                 El/U:                                         Brown




                                             - 97 -
56. People v.
Stanley, 

                                         M46171 - STANLEY, KEVIN
                  Parent ln1titU1ion:          MENARD CORRECTIONAL CEIIITER
                  Offender Slalus:             IN CUSTODY
                  Loc,illon:                   MENARD



                  PHYSICAL PROFILE
                  Date ol lli'lh:              0 1/04/1983
                  Wolgllt:                     330 1bs.
                  Hair.                        Blad<
                  Sex:                         Male
                  Haight:                      611.0Sln.
                  Aaee:                        Blad<
                  Eyao:                        Brown


57. People v.
Caples, 

                                    Y13956- CAPLES, STEPHAN
                Pa,..,,, ,.,.tltutlon:         BIG MUDDY CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                Ollender Status:               IN CUSTOOY
                Loatlon:                       BIG MUDDY RIVER



                PHYSICAL PROFILE
                Dala of Birt~:                01/lll/1991
                w.lght:                       227 lbl,
                Hair:                         Black
                Sall:                         Male
                Haight:                       5 ft. 06 In.
                lllace:                       Black
                Eyes:                         Biown




                               - 98 -
58. People v.                                                                                              Photo via mugshots.com. Identity
Hyland, 2012                                                                                                   cross-checked using details
IL App (1st)                                                                                              regarding Hyland’s gang affiliation
110966                                                                                                      and tattoos. See Hyland, 

 (“Officer Lara
                                                                                                            then asked defendant if he was a
                                                                                                            member of a gang and defendant
                                                                                                          said he was a ‘70s Babies GD.’ ”);
                                                                                                         id. ¶ 10 (“After being asked whether
                                                                                                          he had any gang tattoos, defendant
                                                                                                           showed the officers two tattoos on
                M..;~wcti.~cn,: 1-f-l?~
                co-: N.:-ee• : r:-e-:                                                                    his stomach and left forearm. Officer
                P.:t~! :t''H-~t O"" • =.: ; ·:~.5=:" . .:.ce-?::: - :. ,;._ : :·..- ;:;
                lw··~S!3!'-6: •, :.: ..      s-.:::.                                                         Lara was also shown a photo of
                ~~1fo.-,,: ::.::s·:-...:-:- ..
                e:,:t-d3re. :- z~·;;:-~
                \l,'<!#1 ;·;; ;: ·;: ,;
                                                                                                         defendant in which he identified two
                H:fr· CO c1. ~ oe:-<
                                                                                                          teardrop tattoos below defendant’s
                                                                                                                       right eye.”).

59. People v.
Simmons, 

                                                                           R12863- SIMMONS, DONELL
                                                 ,.er.nt lnstltuUon;                      SHERIOA~J CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                                                 Offenchr 8ta1U1:                         IN CUSTODY
                                                 Leellllan:



                                                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                                                 Date of liltrlll:                        07/1511981
                                                 W.lglrt:                                 235 lbs.
                                                 "-Ir:                                    Blacl
                                                 Sex:                                     Male
                                                 Height:                                  5 ft. 11 in.
                                                 Ra~:                                     Black
                                                 Eyff:                                    Brown




                                                                   - 99 -
60. People v.                 Details
Bass, 2019 IL                Arrest


App (1st)                                            NA.Ml       ::c~.-,c:..L - $M-~
160640
                                                      AGE        21
                                            e 1 Nl.iMII"         1,".19~,42t9

                                             A~f'tl l'TI.D       " -'~•1 1· .,,; 1 J•: P,;•~1., • • ;.., , ,: : .:-, ;,,.; t
                                  AJUlt: lT !;.0(:;ATIO~         1;~, · :: I,~l;':•1' ;1-r:: ~r,
                               ANRIHINQ AGI NCV                  Ch,:.;.:;,:, F•)_1,~::_ :=.~.. ~ "i, 1::• -
                               Jl:11..J .A.SlO (.iGINC)J         " i",( ,A:.·. •'iJ.:ll~ .i :: ·J , : . J ,.
                              o,r . NT/ 0,I,; Jl'.&Cli,.fr''f)

                                         I QN0 1V~i
                                       I0~0 AIIOUNT
                                         i ~OOAU


                                                e:&TIUC1         :C?




                  Identity cross-checked with details in the State’s brief in Bass, 

. “Defendant was arrested following an August 2014 traffic stop, during
                     which police ran a ‘name check’ and discovered an ‘investigative alert with
                  probably cause for [his] arrest.’ In September 2014, defendant was charged with
                    criminal sexual assault.” “The testimony at the hearing on defendant’s motion
                 established that he was the front-seat passenger in a van that failed to stop for a red
                              light during the early morning hours of August 13, 2014.”

61. People v.
Brookins, 

                                                           859388- BROOKINS, LARRY E.
                                Pannt 11111fflullon:                                            SHERIDAN CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                                Offender Btlltua:                                               PAROLE
                                Lccatlon:                                                       PAROLE DISTRICT 1



                                PHYSICAL PROFILE
                               Dale of lllrtt,:                                                 07A)5/1958
                               W.lghl:                                                          237 1bs.
                               Hair.                                                            Bl11ct
                               S.11:                                                            Male
                               Height:                                                          5 fl.091n.
                               R9et:                                                            Black
                               Eyes:                                                            Brown




                                                    - 100 -
62. People v.
McGee, 

                                          Jo.                              '·,   -
                                  K63835 - MCGEE, ANTHONY
                 Parent Institution:            DANVILLE CORRECTIONAi. CENTER
                 Offtnder Siatua:               IN CUSTODY
                 Locatien:                      DANVILLE



                PHYSICAL PROFILE
                Date of llirth:                 05/11/1980
                W.lgh1:                         170 lbs.
                Mair:                           8lacl<
                s ..,                           Male
                Meigltt:                        Sft. 07 in,
                RAco:                           61ack
                Ey-.:                           Brown



63. People v.
Jordan, 

                                  B66331 -JORDAN, DONALD
                P.,.nt lnstllu1lon:              PONTI.AC CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                Olfolnder Sbtua:                 INCUSTOOY
                Locallon:                        PONTI.AC
                                       Sex Offender Registry Required


                PHYSICAL PROFILE
                Data of Bl"":                    05/07/1978
                Weight:                          275 lbs.
                Hair:                            Black
                Sax:                             Male
                Height:                          8ft. 00 Ill.
                Rae.:                            Black
                lyee:                            Brown




                            - 101 -
64. People v.
Baldwin, 

                                    R28266 - BALDWIN, DERRICK
                    Parent Institution:          BIG MUDDY CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                    Offender Status:             IN CUSTODY
                    Location:                    BIG MUDDY RIVER
                                          Sex Offender Registry Required


                    PHYSICAL PROFILE
                   Date of Birth:                10/05/1979
                   Weight:                       159 lbs.
                   Hair:                         Black
                   Sex:                          Male
                   Haight:                       5 ft. 10 In.
                   Raea:                        Black
                   Eyes:                        Brown



65. People v.
Sallis, 

                                    K72398 - SALLIS, TIMOTHY
                  Pantnt Institution:           HILL CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                  Offfilder Status :            IN CUSTODY
                  Location:                     H ILL




                  PHYSICAL PROFILE
                  Omofilrtfl:                   09J0811963
                  W.lght:                       200 lbs,
                  Hair:                         BIJ!dc
                  Sex:                          Mala
                  Height                        sn. 10 1n.
                  Race:                         Bl21clc
                  Eye■:                         Bmwn




                                - 102 -
66. People v.    Details
Quick, 2018 IL   Arrest

App (1st)
                                      HAlllE    Jf.~.;E. 1 ::UiCK
152432-U                               AGE
                                ca Mt..t.EER
                                                4~
                                                U!~79)

                            AARESTEO           S!:lutt.~ ¼lo T 2-)i4 8 >0AA1
                     ARP.EST LOCAOOJi          -12o;s..-ca:.s.s:r
                   ARRE:fflHG AotNCY           CK~ ?O"~ICE :.!A:Jllf.\El'~-
                   R{l,.g,_~..Q.t_~~           Si.11d3>•. .U.: J 201.:. t:·M.:.J;
                 Dl!Ji.!l.fi~JfAe!L"fJO
                                60N.C-T'IPt!
                           601:0 Al.iOUIIT
                                BOHO OA'1!

                                     AREA      ~. Cut:.,;
                                  O!STACT      GO.
                                      BeAT     Ci~5




                 ;'.ltlflC'.$
                 ~C..'M.t.;..1




67. People v.
Henderson,

                                           R40853 - HENDERSON, SHAUN
                       Pa,..nt Institution:                         LAWRENCE CORRECTIONAL CE NTER
                       Ollendor statua:                             IN CUSTODY
                       Loeation:                                    LAWRENCE CORRECTIONAL CENTER



                       PHYSICAL PROFILE
                      Dito of &irth:                                1:lr,4/1982
                      W.igllt:                                      125Ibs.
                      H•lr:                                         Siad<
                      Sax!                                          Male
                      Halgllt:                                      5 lt.05 in.
                      Race:                                         Black
                      E-:                                           Brown




                                       - 103 -
68. People v.
Pigram, 

                                              M04287 - PIGRAM, FREDERICK
                           Paronl laatl!ulicn:                           MEMARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                           Off9ndar Slaluw:                              IN CUSTODY
                           Loc311on:                                     ME~JARD



                          PHYSICAL PROFILE
                          Dalo ol Birth:                                 09/1 1/1975
                          Weigllt:                                       1n 1bs.
                          Hair:                                          Blac:1<
                          S..:                                           Mate
                          Height:                                        5 ft. 06in.
                          Raco:                                          Black
                          EyH:                                           8rOWTI



69. People v.   Details
Hubbard, 

                          -~ME
                                    "-CE
                                             v' ~C J llllU:.P.0
                                             st
                          CB Mi.JUEIEA       tU.2 « ❖:a

                           AAFii:Slt:u       i1.1Mci.Jf J.,r.E, 11. 1 )?9 :':27 ?f."
                  AAAf lT LOCA.TION          lt.14.'•/! ll~RD ST
                A;' 8E Sl1ff0 4Gai,C'(      Ctt,o..GJKLCf D5='~n~ur
                ei1t.WEP.,{d.~9.            •,, :~f"=''!d4,.'. Ju,e '.2. .iJla f.:33 A).I
                PE[E;fl~~a.u;l}

                          R<\~~T'fP!
                     l:!CUiC. AW'IUNT
                          OOl.ODAT;-

                                ARe;.       : • S"-.1\
                            Ci STP.~T       (t;;r
                                  o!!AT     UH

                l["""';




                                           - 104 -
70. People v.
Ross, 

                                     M07835 - ROSS, DETRIC
                  P-1 Institution:        MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                  O&nder Status:          IN CUSTODY
                  Location:               MENARD



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Dalo of Birth:           10/13/1986
                 Welg~t                   208 lbs.
                 Hair:                    Black
                 Sax:                     Male
                 H•lght:                  61t.00 In.
                 Raee:                    Bisel<
                 Eyea:                    Brown



71. People v.
Nixon, 

                                  K69321 - NIXON, MARCUS
                 P-1-.uon:                DIXON CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Ollo111Mr Slalua:
                 ~.,                      PAROLE
                                          PAROl.E DISTRICT 1



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 0 . of B11111:           07/07/1977
                 Weight:                  165 lbs.
                 Hair:                    Slack
                 .....,,,
                 Sa:                      Male
                                          511. 11 In.
                 Rae.:                    Siad<
                 l!yn:                    Brown




                            - 105 -
72. People v.
Minor, 

                                                     R52353 - MINOR, DEANDRE
                          Parent lnstitution1:                            PONTIAC CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                          Offefldor St,tus:                               IN CUSTODY
                          Location:
                                                              Sex Offender Registry Required


                          PHYSICAL PROFILE
                          Data ol Birth:                                  10/1011984
                         Weight:                                          207 lbs.
                          Hair:                                           Brown
                         Sn:                                              Male
                         Haight:                                          6ft. 00 in.
                         Race:                                            Bla,cl(
                         l!yes:                                           Brown



73. People v.    Details
Rice, 2019 IL
App (1st)
                                                  •t•r· ~.,... .. ,.,.f
162652-U
                                     M Uf
                                       N:.r .:t
                             G(". ~L~.« M         I ~:H:.-

                            ;.1u=rE<tTEO         .S-.;-;,t- ,~~ .. .:.: i.:    .. ~
                    A~~lS'"" tc'rc. •1..:;."     -••••       · . k . . ~. ,t
                  AAi~ S.T~C.J.~i<ii. :'t        fr · :-,: . ~:.. ·t :v.;.1· "'f ►;­
                  .1 lJ"iiJ:-,',.af.i--j,,:')!   - ""•· J t- d I :J1; . J .._.!.I
                 .i>:'Tf'-'"'c.~ 1'.A:n:rv.

                            ar•t11\l'Cc
                         BClhbilHVlilit-
                           P~'li\f.A-t

                                     it.RCA       1, · •fll.'.1
                                 ci:i:n:;;c-     (1.:
                                      !Eiiri""   ·r ::




                                            - 106 -
74. People v.                                LYNCH, TOl.4MIE l

                  ...,.,_
                  AINl:11~):


Lynch, 2012 IL                               1/5/1950



                  -·
                  AH11:11Daa(1):


App (1st)
                                             s·oa·      -'Ght:              11911».
                  _,                         27\S WW HAA.IUSON ST


103296-U
                                             CHICAGO, L60612




                                             YtCTIMI WA51J VIAU 0, AGE
                                             om:NOUI. WAS G ATTHI TIMI C, TWI OFFINSI

                                             FELONY Co-NICTION AFTER 7ti/2011
                                             AGGR.AVAHO CRIMINALSEXUAi. A8LBE.NICTIM <13
                                             J:AJlU!tE TO 11.EPORT CMANG! 0~ ADDRESS
                                             FAILURE TO REPORT ANNUAl.LV/2+
                                             FAJLUR! TO MP()RT A CHANGE Of AOOIUSS/EMPI.OVMENT




75. People v.
Harris, 

                                                                     t·
                                                             I .\
                                         K81111 ~ HARRIS, CARL
                 Pa,wnt Institution:                             STATEVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 0ffeml. stattn:                                 P.ECEPTION
                 Location:                                       NORTHERN RECEPTION CENTER
                                             Sex Offender Registry Required


                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Date ot llrtti:                                 10/11/1979
                 Weight                                          187 lbs.
                 Hair:                                           8Jadc
                 Sa:                                             Male
                 H■lght:                                         6 ft. 00 In.
                 Aaca:                                           Blade
                 l!Y9S:                                          Brown




                                   - 107 -
76. People v.
Levi, 

-UB




                                       R22724 - LEVI, RAPHAEL
                 Parent lns11tu!lon:        SHERIDAN CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 011,tnder Status:          IN CUSTODY
                 Loeatlon:



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Dato al i irlh:            08/17/1931
                 Weight:                    260 lbs.
                 "lair:                     Blacl<
                 Sax:                       Male
                 l!alght:                   6ft. 02 in.
                 Race:                      Blacl<
                 EYH:                       Brown



77. People v.
Buchanan,

                                   B40627 - BUCHANAN, BRIAN
                 Parent Institution:        WESTERN ILLINOIS CORRECTIONAi. CENTER
                 011,tniler Status:         IN CUSTODY
                 Loeatioft:                 WESTERN ILLINOIS



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Dato of llrth:             1~~7/1963
                 W.lght:                    ~ lbs.
                 Hair:                      Black
                 Sex:                       Male
                 Meight:                    5ft. 07 In.
                 Rae•:                      Black
                 Ey•:s:                     6 rown




                              - 108 -
78. People v.
Polk, 

                                   M04867 - POLK, DARNELL
                Parent IMtttution:       MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                Offender Status:         IN CUSTODY
                Location;                MENARD



                PHYSICAL PROFILE
                Date of Birth:          05108/1990
                W.igM:                  197 lbs.
                H11ir:                  Black
                Su:                     Male
                Height:                 5 ft. 09 in.
                Race:                   B1'1d<
                Eyo:                    Btt>1>11




79. People v.
Reed, 

                                   M53810 - REED, MICHAEL
                Par•nt Institution:     MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                Offender St\itus:       IN CUSTODY
                Loe:,tia,:              MENARD



                PHYSICAL PROFILE
                Data ofllrth:           06/22/1993
                Waight :                176 lbs.
                Hair:                   Black
                Sa:                     Malo
                Holght:                 5 fl 09 in.
                .._,
                Raeo:                   Black
                                        Bmwn




                             - 109 -
80. People v.
Williams, 

                                  B63728 - WILLIAMS, NASHON
                 Parent Institution:        WESTERN ILLINOIS CORRECTIONAL CEN7'ER
                 Offender Status:           IN CUSTODY
                 Location:                  WESTERN ILLINOIS



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Dalltoflil'lh:             10/01/1975
                 W41gl!t:                   2.20 lbs.
                 liair:                     Black
                 s.,.,                      ~ale
                 Height:                    5 ft. 06 in.
                 Ra.Cl!                     Black
                 Eyes:                      Brown


81. People v.
Lemon, 

                                      R41049 - LEMON, DERRICK
                    Parent lnstttutian:      MEtlARD CORRECllONAL CENTER
                    Offeodor Slaw,:          INCUSTOD'f
                    ~ioo:                   NEfJARD




                    PHYSICAL PROFILE
                    0allt ofllrth:          07/13/1!::t~
                    Wtlgt,t:                161 lb!.
                    Ha1f ;                  Bodi
                    Ekx:                    tJale
                    *•o"t:                  ~ft.. 11in.
                    AAee:                   lllod<
                    Eyes:                   &wn




                             - 110 -
82. People v.
Pernell, 

                                    M41160 - PERNELL, MIKEL
                Parent lntil2:utle.i:        MENARD CORRECTIONAL CEmER
                Ofbnderstatus:               IN CUSTODY
                Looatlon:                    MS:MARO




                PHYSICAL PROFILE
                0..1" of 8h1h:               09/02/1979
                W.i!Jl,t:                    27411>s.
                Hair:                        Black
                Sax.:                        Mala
                Hoight:                      5ft. Dain.
                Rau:                         Black
                Eyn:                         Brown


83. People v.
McCall, 

                                 ~ ,,,,......:_                        .~
                                 R59845 - MCCALL, DEAJUANN
                Parent Institution:          SHAWNEE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                Off«ider Statue:             INCUSTOOY
                Loc1Uon:                     SMAWNEE



                PHYSICAL PROFILE
                Data of lirth:               '2/1411987
                Wlolght:                     '651t,:s.
                Hair:                        Blad<
                Sax:                         Male
                Holoht:                      5 ft. 07 In.
                Raee:                        Blad<
                Eyea:                        BIDcl<




                            - 111 -
84. People v.
Sanders, 

                                                        J                ~
                                      M40607 - SANDERS, ERICK
                 Pa....t Institution:        WESTERN ILLINOIS CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Status:            INCIIJSTODY
                 Location:                   WEST£RN ILLINOIS



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Date of llrth:              04107/1995
                 Waight:                     218 "'"·
                 Hair.                       Black
                 So:                         Male
                 Melljht:                    5ft. 10 in.
                 Race:                       Black
                 Eyea:                       Brown



85. People v.
Anderson,

                                        R63562 - ANDERSON, MARK
                     P•rent 11\Jtlluiion:      SHERIDAN OORRECTIO\lli. CEIITER
                     Ofilwrlrchr Stalut:       INCUSTOOY
                     ......
                         ,at.... ,




                     PHYSICAL PROFILE
                     0a1" of Ii.th:           12/26/1980
                     Wolgllt                  155 lbs.
                     ttaJr:•                  1;:nacli
                     So:                       M.!ile
                     Haight:                   S ft. 09 l'I.
                     Raco:                     Sli:ld
                     El/OS:                    B"""1




                              - 112 -
86. People v.
Barner, 

                                       N14389 - BARNER, JOHN
                 Pare,,t 1n1t1Mlon:             SHERIDAN CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 ~llder S!etus:                 IN CUSTODY
                 t..ocatlon:
                                         Sex Offender Registry Required


                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Date <If 11111h:               0911)1/1955
                 Weight:                        185 lbs.
                 Hair:                          Black
                 Sex:                           Male
                 Height:                        5ft. 09 in.
                 Rec•:                          Black
                 Eyn:                           Brown


87. People v.
Swift, 

                                       M13598 -SWIFT, DANZEL
                 Par•nt Institution:            PINCV.NEYVILLE CO.~ECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Statua:               IN CUSTODY
                 Locat'6n:                      PINCV.NEYVILLE



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 l>•le of Ill.th:               07/1Bl19Q1
                 Weight:                        148 lbs.
                 Hair:                          Black
                 Sex:                           Male
                 Height:                        5ft.10 1n.
                 Race:                          Black
                 Eyu:                           Bmwn




                               - 113 -
88. People v.
Jackson, 

                                M40957 - JACKSON, TAVARIS M.
                 Plllr•nl lilS11tulloA:        SHeRIDAN CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 °"""oor Sta1us:               PAROLE
                 Local!on:                     PAROLE DISTRICT 1



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Date of Blrttl:               07/15/1995
                 Weigh!:                       270 lbs.
                 Hai,:                         Block
                 s.,.,                         Male
                 H•igllt:                      5ft.081n.
                 Ra<:8:                        Black
                 El/h:                         Brown



89. People v.
Lewis, 

                                             / '---                         J.
                                          M33598 - LEWIS, SAMUEL
                   Parent tnalltutiOn:           KEWANEE LIFE SKILLS RE-ENTRY CENTER
                   Offender S!atut :             IN CUSTODY
                   Loqtlcfl:                     KEWANEE



                   PHYSICAL PROFILE
                  Dale of llrt~:                03/23/1976
                  Weight:                       216 Iba.
                  Hair:                          61ad<
                  Sa:.::                        Male
                  Haight:                       6ft. 01 in.
                  Raca:                         f lad<
                  Eyos:                         f rown




                               - 114 -
90. People v.
Gibbs, 

                                                             "\,
                                            M50043 - GIBBS, MARIO
                      Parent Institution:           WESTERN ILLINOIS CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                      Offwndor Status:              IN CUSTODY
                      Location:                     WESTI:RN ILLINOIS



                      PHYSICAL PROFILE
                      oat. ol llilth:               01,;6/1991
                         Weight:                    265 ll>s.
                      Hair:                         Bleck
                      Sox:                          1,4ole
                      "-l!Jhl:                      6ft. 04 in.
                      Raee:                         Bleck
                      Eyo,s:                        Brown


91. People v.
Johnson, 

                                 M43807 - JOHNSON, MICHAEL A.
                 1'11,.,,t lnstllutien:          STATEVILLE COARECTIONAL CENTER
                 Ofbnder St.itus:                IN CUSTODY
                 ~ion:                           STATEVILLE
                                          Sex OffenCMr Registry Required


                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Date t>f 811th:                 09/05/1935
                 W.lgh1:                         23/i Iba.
                 Hair:                           Bladt
                 !a,c:                           M!lle
                 Height:                         8 ft. 0311\.
                 Raea:                           Blaclt
                 l!yn:                           Brown




                               - 115 -
92. People v.                                "'°°'"'"'


                                             --
                                             "'°°'"""'
Brock, 

                  -
                  Dllte .. llrlk
                  Al'- Del(t~




                    en-..........
                                             2N1NS


                                             ,.,.
                                             OOC,OO. ~ tmlll
                                                                          ,., ...


                                             YtCTIM WAS 11 YIAltS 0, MIi
                                             O"INDUl WAS 31 ATTMI TIMI o, THI Oll'FINSI

                                             ~WIU TO M.PO«T CHANGE Of ADORCSS
                                             FAlt.UIU: lO M:PC>fn CHANG( Of ADOUSS
                                             iHOICINf i.MlmlS WITH A Cl«.OiSD
                                             Nl.ONVC<»MCnONNT01/1/'llJ11
                                             IHOKIHl uwmu WITH A CHt\.MVC
                                             AG<i!WMT(O CIUt.WW.. S£XlW. ASSALlT/WfAPON
                                             SVI OfftNOUl llEGIST(ltlNG/fAlSE NO
                                             AAil TO REPORT OfANGf Of ADOllSS/lMP\.OVM(NT/2HO

                  (OUfltyofComkdotr.         Cool:




93. People v.
Peters, 

                                        ' -. , _ ; ~

                                         \
                                        817213- PETERS, JERRY
                  Parwnt lnsCftutlon:                      MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                  Offender Statu1:                         INCUSTOOY
                  Location:                                IVENARD
                                             Sex Offender Registry Required


                  PHYSICAL PROFILE
                  Date of llirth:                          07/1511959
                  Weight:                                  198 lbs.
                  llllr.                                   '!lack
                  Sex:                                     Mala
                  Height:                                  5 ft. OIi in.
                  Race:                                    818ck
                  !ya:                                     Bllllm




                            - 116 -
94. People v.
Smith, 

                                  876423 - SMITH, ANTONJUAN
                 Parent Institution:       VIENNA CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 OINndor Status:           IN CUSTODY
                 Location:                 VIENNA



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Date of Blrlh:            12/15/1976
                 Waigh.t                   199 lbs.
                 Hair;                     Slack
                 Sa>:                      Male
                 Height:                   61l 00 In.
                 Race:                     Black
                 El/tll'                   Brown



95. People v.
Davison, 

                                     R70904 - DAVISON, TERELL
                   ParaRt l~llt:utloo:      LAWRENCE CORRECTIOIIAI. CENTER
                   O!i9fld8t'Sta1t.ls:      IN CUSTODY
                   Location:                LAWRENCE CORRECTIOIIAL CENTER



                   PHYSICAL PROFILE
                   D.atoof817tfl:           06/:27J1Q87
                   Wilg'-:                  201 11>3.
                   Mal,:                    91ar,k
                   s.;.,                    Male
                   Maioht:                  5 ft. 07 In.
                   !<ace:                   Black
                   Eye,,:                   Brcwn




                            - 117 -
96. People v.
Beasley, 

                                     N95478 - BEASLEY, LARRY
                   Parent Institution:          WESTERN ILLINOIS CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                   Offender St-atuo:            IN CUSTODY
                   Loeotion:                    WESTERN ILLINOIS
                                         Sex Offender Registry Required


                   PHYSICAL PROFILE
                   Daw of lirth:                12/15/1970
                   Weight:                      2.301bs.
                   Hair.                        81acl:
                   Sex:                         Mate
                   H eight:                     511. 11 In.
                   Ra ..,                       Blad(
                   Eyt1:                        l!TQwn



97. People v.
Nugen, 

(1st Dist. 2010)



                                                     l
                                    R62320 - NUGEN, WARDELL
                    l'anntln~on:                 WESTERN IWNOIS CORRECTIONAL CENT ER
                    Offudtr 11atu11:             IN CUSTODY
                    Lcea.Clon:                   WESTERN ILLINOIS




                    PHYSICAL PROFILE
                    0attollll1h:                 10/12/1964
                    Weight:                      187 lbs.
                    Hair:                        Bleck
                    la:                          Male
                    Mllghl:                      5ft. oa 1n.
                    Race:                        81aet
                    Eyu:                         Brou.-n




                           - 118 -
98. People v.
Wilson, 

                                     M18400 - WILSON, RAYVONNE
                    Pannt lnsttlutlon:       WESTERN ILLINOIS CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                    Offender Status:         IN CUSTOOY
                    Loeallon:                WESTERN ILLINOIS




                    PHYSICAL PROFILE
                    Dote of Birth:           0Sf.22/1968
                    Weight:                  185 lbs.
                    Hair.                    Black
                    Sex:                     Male
                    Mal9hl:                  5fl. 11in.
                    Race:                    Black
                    Eyu:                     sro,.-vn



99. People v.
Selvie, 

                                     B34016 - SELVIE, MICHAEL
                  Pa,.nt Institution:       PINCKNEYVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                  01'19ndtr Status:         I N CUSTODY
                  Location:                 PINCKNEYVILLE




                  PHYSICAL PROFILE
                  Date ofBlfth:             09/03/tsn
                  W.lgM:                    315 ba.
                  Hair:                     Black
                  Sex·                      Male
                  Nolght                    511.09 1n.
                  Race:                     Black
                  Eyos:                     Brown




                            - 119 -
100. People v.
Tatum, 

                                   Y15638 - TATUM, SYLVESTER
                  Parent lnatttution:     MIU CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                  Offender Slotuo:        IN CUSTODY
                  Loc1ti0t1:              HIU




                  PHYSICAL PROFILE
                  Dalt of Birth:          12/03/1979
                  Weight:                 310 lbs.
                  Hair:                   Black
                  Sex:                    Male
                  Haight:                 5ft. 10 in.
                  Raco:                   Black
                  Eyu:                    Brown



101. People v.
Dunn, 

(2011) (table)
(unpublished
order under
Illinois
Supreme Court              / .,,,,                                  \ '\
Rule 23)                           M01226- DUNN, DEMARCUS
                 Pa,...,! Institution:    DANVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offwnder St.CU■ :        IN CUSTODY
                 Location:                DANVILLE




                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Dale of Birth:           0912711988
                 Weight!                  1721ba.
                 H•lr:                    Blade
                 Sa:                      Male
                 Height:                  &ft. 01 In.
                 Race:                    Bladt
                 l!:y.a:                  Brown




                             - 120 -
102. People v.
Randall, 

                                                     ~
                                                   1~
                                                     \_
                                   K72456 - RANDALL, TERRELL
                  Pantl"li tnetitutiQn:       PONTIAC CORRECTIONAL CEMTER
                  CW.ftder St:rtus:           IN CUSTODY
                  Loeation:                   PONTIAC



                  PHYSICAL PROFILE
                  Dato of Birth:              06/17/1979
                  Weight:                     160 lbs.
                  Holr:                       Black
                  Sex:                        Male
                  Holgllt:                    511. 04 In.
                  Ra~:                        Black
                 Eyes:                        Brown


103. People v.
Clark, 2012 IL
App (1st)
1000066-U




                                          M10831 -CLARK, RICO
                 ParenC lntlllltltlon:        MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender statua:             IN CUSTODY
                 Loeetion:                    MENARD




                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Daia of Birth:               11/25/1987
                 Weight                       180 lbs.
                 Hair:                        Blad<
                 Sa:                          Male
                 Haight                       5 ft. 06 In.
                 Roce:                        Bladt
                 Eyn:                         Brown




                              - 121 -
104. People v.
Cotton, 

(1st Dist. 2009)




                                     B37458 - COTTON, LAVELLE
                   Parent lnstttutlan:        LAWRENCE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                   Offender Status:           IN CUSTODY
                   Leeation:                  LAWRENCE CORRECTIONAL CENTER




                   PHYSICAL PROFILE
                   Dale of Birth:             11/2111971
                   ~ight:                     176 lbs.
                   Hair:                      Blad<
                   Sc:                        Male
                   H4ighl:                    5ft. 07 In.
                   R.lce:                     810CI<
                   Eyu:                       erown


105. People v.
Williams, 

                                                             -
                                                              ~
                                          /                          \ ·\
                                    K73192 -WILLIAMS, JEFFREY
                   , _ , 1..1tltlltlon:       OANVIUE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                   Offeftder Statua:          INCUSTOOY
                   l.ocalion:                 OANVlUE




                   PHYSICAL PROFILE
                   Dalooflllrth:              10/13/1980
                   Weight:                    140 Iba.
                   Hair.                      Blad<
                   !a:                        Male
                   Melgl,t:                   5 ft. 09 In.
                   Raao:                      Bllld<
                   £ya:                       Blown




                                - 122 -
106. People v.
Lewis, 

                                         N54072 - LEWIS, ANDRE
                   Parent Institution:        STATEVlLLE CORRECTIONAL CEN'TER
                   Offender Statue:           IN CUSTODY
                   Location:                  STATEVILLE



                   PHYSICAL PROFILE
                   Oat.of Birth:              10/25/1966
                   Weight:                    160 lbs.
                   H.air:                     Blacl;
                   S..:                       Male
                   Height:                    5 ft. 10 in.
                   Race:                      Black
                   l!Yff:                     BroWl'l


107. People v.
Cox, 

(1st Dist. 2007)




                                         JA
                                       R47029 - COX, QUENTION
                   Parent ln1tllutlon:        HILL CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                   Offfflder SlalUS:          WRIT
                   Locallon:                  COURT



                   PHYSICAL PROFILE
                   Dalo of Birth:             07/11/1987

                   ...
                   Weight:
                   H;alr:
                       ,
                   Hoighl:
                   11a..,
                                              140 lbs.
                                              B!adc
                                              Male
                                              5 11.07 h.
                                              B!adc
                   l!yos:                     Blacl<




                               - 123 -
108. People v.   Details
Stewart, 2020    An-est

IL App (1st)                     ).L:).,.iE   ROm-..=:'' E ~TI:'l..i!.J ff

170250-U                           AGE
                            C6 NUMBER
                                              41
                                              lt315 l1S-

                             ARRESTED         9..n:::r], il>~.r; 22 '.2l'.!18-4.45Ftw
                    ARRE ST LOC,..\TtON       ~~3 t-·e·~~~E ST
                  A~ES11NG A.GENCV            Qi.CL.GO POL.i'CE. JEPAJTTLE~r
                  J:l.~~J!..f;$1ll;;,l,~Y,    l.~o<io, M,,, 23, 2016 6;"' CJ~
                 PU#iJJQN~JJJr:tl
                            OO!WTVPE
                          BONO AMOUl,T
                            BOHO DATE

                                  AREA        3. ~..cr.t1
                               OiSTqc-J       01~
                                  SEAT        :~3




109. People v.
Wiley, 

                                              M41951 - WILEY, MUHAMMAD
                     hr•nt lnwfflutlon:                                CENTRALIA CORRECTIONAL CHITER
                     Offender Status:                                  IN CUSTODY
                     Localion:                                          CENTRALIA



                     PHYSICAL PROFILE
                     Data of Blrth:                                     09/W/1995
                     Weight:                                           2201bS.
                     Halr:                                              Black
                     Su:                                                Male
                     Haight:                                            511. 07 In,
                     Race:                                              BIIICk
                     EYN:                                               Black




                                     - 124 -
110. People v.
Henderson,

                                                                   ''
                                M46170 - HENDERSON, RONALD
                 Paretti 1"3titution:       STATEVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 O!fonder Status:           IJIICUSTODY
                 Location:                  STATEVILLE



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Dale of Birth:             05/19/19SO
                 Weight:                    167 lbs.
                 Hair:                      Black
                 Sax:                       Male
                 H<ili!lhl:                 5 R 11 in.
                 Rae.:                      Slack
                 Eyes:                      Brown


111. People v.
Harris, 

                                      M44405 - HARRIS, KYJUANZI
                      Puent l natliuticn:    WESTERM ILLINCtS CORRECTIONAL t,"EN-rEI<
                      Oi'el1$rS1a1,1:        IN CUSTODY
                      Location:              WESTERN IL.INOIS



                      PHYSICAL PROFILE
                     DateofBrtil:            02/a"J/19a6
                     'Nelgh.t                17511>S.
                     H,1Jr:                  Brown
                     SC.:                    Pl'EIC
                     H11gtr1:                5rt Ol! In.
                     Reeo:                   Blad<
                     !yn:                    Brol/lTI




                                - 125 -
112. People v.
House, 

                                        R43611 - HOUSE, JAMES
                 Parent lnstl'tuflOn:                   MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Olfe•der Stalus:                       IN CUSTODY
                 Locotlo•:                              MENARD



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Date ol Birth:                         07121/1977
                 Weight:                                192 lbs.
                 Hair:                                  Blad<
                 Sex:                                   Male
                 Height:                                5 ft. 11 in,
                 Race:                                  Blad<
                 Eyn :                                  Brown


113. People v.
                     l.11•.!lim-<-t:

Lee, 2013 IL         Oolt'>f 5-111

                     ' '"'O:iEJ!-.:
App (1st)            ~tl:t/11:
                     ,...,_                H,,·~ ....


111795-U                                   . fll t- ;.11-,:,0•;




                    ---                    Y\CTIW'tlt.£ t ;: 'TEAll!tOf .-CE.
                                           :•AE..el!Jt ,V.\t tolilf t,,ll fll,ll(lll f Nf ti,9,IHU

                                           .w:~~....,,e~~=rJ'l'l. SEiQJ,l.L •Ea
                                           .,,W~ '"O 'lll'>:RI'J. CIW-t~E CF ,lJXf;;t:r,,'3.9 ,'Pt.C/l 'U :WT
                                           ~1'1u.lF.'f:"t:. :a:l'l.:KI J.Ctwt~to(:f-,>J).l\l:$'3.':/NU,,/T.<1 ,..1
                                           •,~ 11.Jf';: Tr.P.Ff>ffH ,1 ('.K\•;O: tl~ <Jff,l'fh f i.•fl ,-,.~..N




                                 - 126 -
114. People v.
Johnson, 

                                  R43615 - JOHNSON, JAMES
                 Parent Institution:     LAWRENCE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Off,,nder Status:       IN CUSTODY
                 location:               LAWRENCE CORRECTIONAL CENTER



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 DatoofBli11t:           10/21/1980
                 W<Olghl:                1751b._
                 Holr:                   Black
                 Sax:                    Male
                 Haight:                 5 ft. 07 In.
                 Race:                   Blael<
                 Eyes:                   Brown



115. People v.
Baker, 

                                    R29601 -BAKER,DWAYNE
                  Parent lnstllutlon:     MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                  Olftnd« Statua:         IN CUSTODY
                  Location:               MENARD



                  PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Oate ofBlnh:             09/2311982
                 Weight                   2131bs.
                 Hair.                    Brown
                 Stx:                     Male
                 Htlght:                  8ft 01 In.
                 Rice;                    Black
                 Ey"5:                    erov,,,




                            - 127 -
116. People v.
Bradley, 

                                   Y35713 - BRADLEY, ANTHONY
                    Parent tnstltution:       STATEVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                    Offtnd•r Status:          PAROLE
                    Location:                 PAROLE DISTRICT 1




                    PHYSICAL PROFILE
                    OattofBlrth:              08/0611990
                    Weight:                   222 lbs.
                    Hair:                     8/aek
                    S.x:                      Mele
                    Height                    Sft. 11 in,
                    Race:                     Black
                    Eyes:                     Brown


117. People v.
Carter, 

(defendant
Kelvin Carter)



                                        K57777 - CARTER, KELVIN
                 P91'8nt ln,titution:         l-'IN<.:-<NE:YVILLE CORRECTl01'A- CENTER
                 Offender Status:             IN CUSTODY
                 Location:                    PINCKNE'NILLE



                 Date of Bintl:               '0/13!1978
                 Weight:                      ·sa 1t~.
                 Hair:                        Black
                 Sex:                         Msle
                 Height:                      5 ft. 08 in.
                 Race:                        Black
                 Eyes:                        Rrown




                              - 128 -
118. People v.
Davis, 

                                       M27481 - DAVIS, CEDRYCK
                 Parent Institution:           JOLI ET TREATMENT CENTER
                 Offender Status:              IN C U STODY
                 Location:



                 Date of Birth :               02/18/ 1991
                 Weight:                       164Ibs.
                 Hair:                         Black
                 Sex:                          Male
                 Height:                       5ft. 11 in.
                 Race:                         Black
                 Eyes:                         Brown


119. People v.
Dorsey, 

                                         Y41003 - DORSEY, JERRELL
                        Parent Institution:     PINC KNEYVILLE CORRECTIONAL :'.:ENTER
                     Offender Statuo:           IN CUSTODY
                        Location:               PINCKNEYVILLE




                     Date Of Birth:            UV'I0/1966
                     Weight:                   160 lbs.
                     Hair.                     Rl.sr:k
                     Sex:                      Male
                     Height                    5ft. 09 in.
                     Race:                     Back
                     Eyes:                     B·OIM'l




                                    - 129 -
120. People v.
Erwin, 

                                       R57260 - ERWIN, DEAUNTE
                 Parent Institution:          DIXON CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Status:             IN CUSTODY
                 Location:                    DIXON




                 Date of Birth:               09/04/1978
                 Weight:                      190 1bs.
                 Hair:                        Black
                 Sex:                         Male
                 Height:                      5ft. 06in.
                 Race:                        Black
                 Eyes:                        Brown


121. People v.
Gill, 

                                           Y41866 - GILL, ERICK
                     Parent Institution:       WtS I tKN ILLINOIS CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                     Offender Statu•:          IN CUSTODY
                     Loc.ation:                WESTERN ILLINOIS




                    l>.lto of Birth:           11/14/1991
                    Wel!llt:                   :l501bs.
                    Hair~                      Black
                    Sex:                       M~
                    Height:                    6ft. 06 ii'.
                    Race:                      Black
                    Eyes:                      Brown




                               - 130 -
122. People v.
Hawkins, 

                                   M01180 - HAWKINS, TERRY
                 Parent Institution:          CENTRALIA CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Status:             IN CUSTODY
                 Location:                    CENTRALIA
                                       Sex Offender Registry Required




                 Date of Birth:               09/04/1969
                 Weight                       190 lbs.
                 Hair:                        Black
                 Sex:                         Male
                 Height:                      5ft.08in.
                 Race:                        Black
                 Eyes:                        Brown


123. People v.
Jackson, 

                                   Y40207 - JACKSON, JOVAN
                 Parent Institution:          JOLIET TREATMENT CENTER
                 Offender Status:             IN CUSTODY
                 Location:




                 Date of Birth:               06/06J1991
                 Wei.ght:                     2001bs.
                 Hair:                        Brown
                 Sex:                         Male
                 Height                       5ft.07in.
                 Race:                        Black
                 Eyes:                        Brown




                             - 131 -
124. People v.
Massey, 

                                                            ....._._ ... 'I.
                                       Y14682 - MASSEY, CLINT
                 Parent Institution:        WESTERN ILLINOIS CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Status:           IN CUSTODY
                 Location:                  WESTERN ILLINOIS




                 Date of Birth:             02/18/1997
                 Weight:                    155 Ibs.
                 Hair:                      Black
                 Sex:                       Male
                 Height                     5 ft. 08 in.
                 Race:                      Black
                 Eyes:                      Brown


125. People v.
Murphy, 

                                       R71059- MURPHY, JAMELL
                    Parent Institution:      LAWRENCE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                    Offender $t3tus:         II\ CUSTODY
                    Lceation:                LAWRENCE CORRECTlmlAL CENTER




                    Date of Birth:           06/08/1980
                    Weight:                  275 lbs.
                    Hair:                    Black
                    Sex:                     Male
                    Height:                  6 lt.01 in .
                    Race:                    Black
                    Eyes:                    Brown




                              - 132 -
126. People v.
Randall, 

                                   K72456 - RANDALL, TERRELL
                 Parent Institution:      MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Status:         IN CUSTODY
                 Location :               MENARD




                 Date of Birth:           08/17/1979
                 Weight:                  165 lbs.
                 Hair:                    Black
                 Sex:                     Male
                 Height:                  5 ft. 04 in.
                 Race:                    Black
                 Eyes:                    Brown


127. People v.
Spencer, 

                                   Y41721-SPENCER,EUGENE
                  Parent Institution:     PONTIAC CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                  Offender Status:        IN CUSTODY
                  Location:



                                    PRGfl[E
                  Date of Birth:          09/24/199'1
                  Weight                  2171bs.
                  Hair:                   Black
                  Sex:                    Male
                  H•lght:                 6 ft. 00 in.
                  Race:                   Black
                  Eyes:                   Brown




                             - 133 -
128. People v.
Streater, 

                                  R03820 - STREATER, WILLIE
                 Parent Institution:          PONTIAC CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Status:             IN CUSTODY
                 Location:                    PONTIAC
                                       Sex Offender Registry Required




                 Date of Birth:               08/19/1962
                 Weight:                      193 lbs.
                 Hair:                        Black
                 Sex:                         Male
                 Height:                      5ft. 08 in.
                 Race:                        Black
                 Eyes:                        Brown


129. People v.
Tyler, 

                                                                            l
                                  Y30672 - TYLER, MATTHEW
                 Parent Institution:          WESTERN ILLINOIS CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Status:             IN CUSTODY
                 Location:                    WESTERN ILUNOIS




                 Date of Birth:               11/16/1989
                 Weight:                      185 lbs.
                 Hair:                        Brown
                 Sex:                         Male
                 Height:                      5ft. 10 in.
                 Race:                        Black
                 Eyes:                        Brown




                            - 134 -
130. People v.
Ward, 

                                    Y34150 -WARD, MICHEAIL
                  Parent Institution:                 PONTIAC CORRECTI ONAL CENTER
                  Offender Status:                    IN CUSTODY
                  Location:                           PONTIAC



                  ~~---~;"I             "",.,.·•-I!
                      l.~. ""-           ,.,.:..::...a_ .
                  Date of Birth:                       08/09/1994
                  Weight:                              219 lbs.
                  Hair:                               Black
                  Sex:                                Male
                  Height:                             5 ft. 09 in.
                  Race:                               Black
                  Eyes:                               Brown


131. People v.
Wilson, 

                                    Y41192-WILSON , QAWMANE
                   Parent Institution:                 HILL CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                                                                                  '
                   Offender Status:                    IN CUSTODY
                   Location:                           HILL




                   Date of Birth:                      12/03/1989
                   Weight:                             126 lbs.
                   Hair:                               Brown
                   Sex:                                Male
                   Height:                             5 ft. 03 in.
                   Race:                               Black
                   Eyes:                               Not Available




                              - 135 -
132. People v.
Wimberly, 

                                  R50509-WIMBERLY, DARRELL
                 Parent Institution:            PINCKNEYVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Status:               IN CUSTODY
                 Location:                      PINCKNEYVILLE




                                                E
                 Date of Birth:                 11/20/1985
                 Weight:                        185 lbs.
                 Hair:                          Black
                 Sex:                           Male
                 Height:                        5 ft. 08 in.
                 Race:                          Black
                 Eyes:                          Brown


133. People v.
Charles, 

                                      M54753-CHARLES, JAMAAL
                    Parent Institution:          LAWRENCE CORRECTIONAL CEr-JTER
                    Offender Status:             IN CUSTODY
                    Location:                    LA'NR::NCE CORRECTIONAL CENITER
                                          Sex Offender Registry Requ ired




                    Date of B irth:              03115/1907
                    Weight:                      180 lbs.
                    Hair:                        Blsct
                    Sex:                         Male
                    Height:                      5ft. 07 in.
                    Race:                        eI~ct
                    Eyes:                        Brown




                              - 136 -
134. People v.
Ivy, 

                                              K96604 - IVY, TERRELL
                 Parent Institution:                      LAWRENCE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Status:                         IN CUSTODY
                 Location:                                LAWRENCE CORRECTIONAL CENTER


                 ....,..
                 ".I   ..c.l ;_   •• ~~~'Ii   I   \' · ~ - -

                 Date of Birth:
                 Weight:
                 Hair:
                 Sex:
                 Height:
                 Race:
                 Eyes:


135. People v.
Joseph, 

                                       Y22155 - JOSEPH, LEONDO
                   Parent Institution:                    LAWRENCE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                   Offender Status:                       WRIT
                   Location:                              COURT
                                              Sex Offender Registry Required




                   Date of Birth:                         08/06/1976
                   Weight:                                180 lbs.
                   Hair:                                  Black
                   Sex:                                   Male
                   Height:                                5 ft. 10 in.
                   Race:                                  Black
                   Eyes:                                  Brown




                                  - 137 -
136. People v.
McCray, 

                                  R63745 - MCCRAY, NATHANIEL
                 Parent Institution:            STATEVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Status:               IN CUSTODY
                 Location:                      STATEVILLE




                 Date of Birth:                 12/29/1980
                 Weight:                        200 lbs.
                 Hair:                          Black
                 Sex:                           Male
                 Height:                        6 ft. 03 in.
                 Race:                          Black
                 Eyes:                          Brown


137. People v.
Mohamed,

                            /           ,   '
                                   M19608 - MOHAMED, ELEMO
                  Parent Institution:           HILL CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                  Offender Status:              IN CUSTODY
                  Location:                     HILL




                  Date of Birth:                01/15/1992
                  Weight:                       160 lbs.
                  Hair:                         Black
                  Sex:                          Male
                  Height:                       5 ft. OG in .
                  Race:                         Black
                  Eyes:                         Brown




                             - 138 -
138. People v.
Pierce, 

                                    R61521 - PIERCE, SHAROD P.
                 Parent Institution:                                 STATEVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Status:                                    IN CUSTODY
                 Location:                                           STATEVILLE




                 Date of Birth:                                      06/2711987
                 Weight:                                             173 lbs.
                 Hair:                                               Black
                 Sex:                                                Male
                 Height:                                             6 ft. 00 in.
                 Race:                                               Black
                 Eyes:                                               Brown


139. People v.
Rush, 

                                            (
                                     R70896- RUSH, TERRANCE
                 Parent Institution:                                 MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Status:                                    IN .CUSTODY
                 Location:                                           MENARD



                 -.-~----:;·Y;:r ~~, -- ..,_
                 .....        ,I-   _ ...   ,J.: '"-" ~   bi -   -           ,,._
                 Date of Birth:                                      04/06/1984
                 Weight:                                             199 lbs.
                 Hair:                                               Black
                 Sex:                                                Male
                 Height:                                             6ft. 02in.
                 Race•:                                              Black
                 Eyes:                                               Brown




                            - 139 -
140. People v.
Smith, 

(defendant
Aaron Smith)


                                          ~

                                         Y35418 - SMITH, AARON
                  Parent Institution:         HILL CORRECTIONAL CFNTF.R
                  Offender Status:            IN CUSTODY
                  Location:                   HILL




                  Date of Birth:              12/30/1985
                  Weight:                     202 lbs.
                  Hair:                       Brown
                  Sex:                        Male
                  Height:                     5 ft. 08 in.
                  Race:                       Black
                  Eyes:                       Brown


141. People v.
Starks, 

                                    M27220 - STARKS, BRANDON
                   Parent Institution:        MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                   Offander Status:           IN CUSTODY
                   Location:                  MENARD




                   Date of Birth:             04/3011987
                   Weight:                    177 lbs.
                   Hair:                      Black
                   Sex:                       Male
                   Height:                    6 ft. 00 in.
                   Race:                      Black
                   Eyes:                      Browr




                               - 140 -
142. People v.
Walker, 

                                         M32755 - WALKER, JUSTIN
                 Parent Institution:                 PINCKNEYVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Status:                    IN CUSTODY
                 Location:                           PINCKNEYVILLE



                 ~-~-Jj-~;--:r--1                     .
                  ,..   .l'i.."-    -   ~-I... . .
                 Date of Birth:                      10/15/1990
                 Weight:                             180 lbs.
                 Hair:                               Brown
                 Sex:                                Male
                 Height:                             6 ft. 04 in.
                 Race :                              Black
                 Eyes:                               Brown


143. People v.
Washington,

                                   R32363-WASHINGTON, TERRELL
                    Parent Institution:               SHERIDAN CO~RECTIONAL CCNTER
                    Offender Status:                  IN CUSTODY
                    Location:                         SHERIDAN




                   Date of Birth:                     09/10/1980
                   Weight:                            178 lbs.
                   Hair:                              Black
                   Sex:                               Male
                   Height:                            5 ft. 11 in.
                   Race:                              Black
                   Eyes:                              Bro'Nn




                                   - 141 -
144. People v.
Wright, 

                                                    A51322 -WRIGHT, HARVEY
                 Parent Institution:                                               PONTIAC CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Status:                                                  IN CUSTODY
                 Location:                                                         PONTIAC
                                                            Sex Offender Registry Required


                  --~-,,-.,,--,,-
                  1       ~' -          ~ ....__• • t       s.-.         •   ;~~                     '


                 Date of Birth:                                                    05/13/1957
                 Weight:                                                           187 lbs.
                 Hair:                                                             Black
                 Sex:                                                              Male
                 Height:                                                           5   n. 11 in.
                 Race:                                                             Black
                 Eyes:                                                             Brown


145. People v.
Smith, 

(defendant
Rashawn
Smith)


                                              M27168 - SMITH , RASHAWN T.
                 Parent Institution:                                               WESTERN ILLIN OIS CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Status:                                                  IN CUSTODY
                 Location:                                                         WESTERN ILLINOIS



                  ..... T....,.. ... __....,.--:r
                  ..
                 Date of Birth:
                                                    - -..
                                                        .
                                                                   ,,.        ·~
                                                                                   -
                                                                                   12/27/1993
                                                                                             -   .. "'
                 Weight:                                                           221 lbs.
                 Hair:                                                             Black
                 Sex:                                                              Male
                 Height:                                                           5 ft. 11 in.
                 Race:                                                             Black
                 Eyes:                                                             Brown




                                        - 142 -
                          No Picture—Witness in Case Identified Defendant as Black

146. People v. Carter, 

 (defendant Anton Carter)

147. People v. Williams, 

. Van Buren v. City of Chicago, 

149. In re J.A., 

 (minor defendant)

150. In re Antoine H., 

 (minor defendant)

151. People v. Thomas, 

. People v. Ferguson, 

                                                    Black Females

153. People v.
Moore, 2019 IL
App (1st)                                                                s;...,- ti':: F.lf~ l .'C ;,.Rf.
                                                                         ~e
180735-U
                                                     ,>.l'I   ~t 0             ·1:.i      =" .... . ~-~ ~, o;. -..;• J'·, ,
                                         .t,"1F.! S l.Ot:..TlCl"1        ~ uv· : 1'.'l~.--:. ,:-
                                       um:!:71 S ffi!~\                  c.n r: -s: ~.. .,;;;;:_~.- .--r ·E:-i
                                       l:l[l ey;;+;:-r,i(i;,Sf"l         7t,~ . i'l'."1   j   't ::.; ~   1 ,_ I l - •
                                     i;fTr1tf/.~..., ·• FAi:.t-_f1"I'•

                                                    91:'!;.i; , r;,:;
                                               B'Cm[) JillniJIJ~i
                                                    W t,mr:i,r.7c:

                                                              AAEA       ;; • : ·«
                                                        o·sr tr          q ,.
                                                              t£41       ·.:,~~




                                                                  - 143 -
154. People v.
Carr-
McKnight, 

                           Y12536 - CARR-MCKNIGHT, AMELIA
                 Pafeflt Institution:    LOGAN CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offendor Status:        IN CUSTODY
                 Loc:ation:              LOGAN



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Date of Birth:          04126/1972
                 Weight:                 213 lbs.
                 Hair:                   Blaci<
                 So:                     Female
                 Haight:                 5 ft. 02 In.
                 Race:                   Bi-Racial
                 Eyu:                    Blacl<




                               - 144 -
                     Latinx Males

155. People v.
Garcia, 

                                    Y38670 - GARCIA, GIOVANNI
                   Parent ltlllliulion:        PONTIAC CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                   Offllflffr Status:          IN CUSTODY
                   Leeatlon:                   PONTIAC



                   PHYSICAL PROFILE
                  Date of Birth:               11/11/1995
                  Weight:                      205 lbs..
                  Mair:                        Slack
                  Su:                          Male
                  Height:                      5ft. 11 In.
                  Race:                        Hlspartc
                  EY9s:                        Srown


156. People v.
Velez, 

                                         R50938 - VELEZ, VICTOR
                 Pantnt l113tltutic:m:        HILL CORRECTIONAL CE.NTER
                 Offendar talus:              IN CUSTODY
                 Lo1:111ion:                  HI L



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Date of lrth:                0211711982
                 Wei ht:                      170 lbs.
                 ~Ir.                         Black
                 s,,.:                        Male
                 M lght:                      5ft.041n.
                 r:tac.:                      Hli;panlc
                 Ey 1:                        Brown




                            - 145 -
157. People v.
Lerma, 

                                                M28860 - LERMA, EDUARDO
                          Parent IMtilutiofl:                        MENARO CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                          Offe•der Status:                           IN CUSTODY
                          LoeatN>n:                                  MENARO



                          PHYSICAL PROFILE
                          Cala ofBllth:                              01/2911979
                          Wolght:                                    170 lbs.
                          Hair:                                      Black
                          So:                                        Male
                          Holghl:                                    5ft. 09 In.
                          Ra.ca:                                     ltiiSQanlc
                          Eyes:                                      Brown


158. People v.   Details
Perez, 2021 IL   A/fe5i

App (1st)                           HAMI!      VICTOA "'-P.S
181400-U                              AGf
                            CB NtR.1BER
                                               ::,,
                                               :s,~25e9

                           AARHT'fD            Sdu,r,ti~ UCf."ffOl!1 1.C ~ IS 11-M j:.JII
                    ~ARf5TI.OCAOON             2"1 WUJ~'-UtOZM~HORU
                  AF.RU'llhG AGEHC"t           CH:c,;.oo P«.I« :,ep,.:..;m,1tt,-
                  .flfl.W.;QJ.4~               Sul~;. fbtt.:'fibtt 15. 2Ulj L-OOA.}l
                 ~ll&lo:JJ
                            BOND TI-PE
                          80~ -...OUj(f
                            80M01:¥il!

                                    ARU.       l-::C..,V
                                0 1.f'l'AICT   ('14
                                    8UT        142,




                                        - 146 -
159. People v.
Cano, 

                                       M40291 - CANO, SAMMY
                 Parent Institution:          BIG MUDDY CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Olleftder Stllut :           JNCUSTOOY
                 Lcealion:                    BIG MUOOY RIVER
                                       Sex Offenr.Nr Registry Required


                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 0ate of 8 irtll:             09/0511973
                 W•lght,                      1581bs.
                 Hair:                        Brown
                 Se~:                         Male
                 ~ight:                       5 ft. 03 in,
                 Raee:                        Hispanic
                 £y,,a:                       Brown


160. People v.
Bahena, 

                                    Y26870 - BAHENA, SERGIO
                 Parent Institution:          LAWRENCE CORRECTIO~JAL CENTER
                 Oflende, Status:             INCUSTOOY
                 Location:                    LAWRENCE CORRECTIONAL CENTER



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Cate of 811'1!1:             09/2111992
                 Weight:                      235 lbs.
                 Hair:                        BJac'i<
                 Sax:                         Male
                 Holglll:                     5 It. 08 in.
                 Raca:                        Hispanic
                 Eyao:                        Brown




                              - 147 -
161. People v.
Ruiz, 

                                         Y21829- RUIZ, MARTIN
                   Parent Institution:          HILL CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                   Offender Status:             INCUSTOOY
                   Location:                    HILL



                   PHYSICAL PROFILE
                   Data of 8ir1h:               08/1711988
                  Weight:                       240 lbs.
                  Hair:                         Black
                  Sax:                          Mate
                  Height:                       5ft. 03in.
                   Race:                        Hispanic
                   Eyes:                        Brown



162. People v.
Resendiz, 

                                              •
                                    Y16452- RESENDIZ, JOSE
                 Par...i lnstlllltlon:          ILLINO!S RNER CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 OW&. ., St1tu1:                IN CUSTODY
                 L-IOn:                         ILLINO!S RNER
                                         Sex Offender Registry Required


                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Oata oflllth:                  011/21/1972
                 W.lgllt:                       150 lbs.
                 Mair:                          Black
                 Sa:                            Male
                 ...lght:                       S ft 02 ln.
                 llaca:                         Hlapanlc
                 i!yes:                         BIOWTI




                             - 148 -
163. People v.
Alicea, 

                                                                           ...
                                   v...;v·o:.s.-:o- ..:.5f£::~:
                                   DCC ~ 1.omcet :              •;;,.:, s-?


                                   Mr11!':!5:~!us: ,._ : •_:--::
                                   Loca~or          ..:.. ·.: .... _.:..
                                   B'nti OCl!e ~;: 2- ~;:-
                                   'l}.?e-igrn . ~:5 i: - : .::;,
                                    t"racr Ceo, :- a:-..
                                   C"'l!!".O:r . . ,; =~
                                   t-,1!:·g,..! : E .. - 5 -
                                   Rat~~$:::-- :
                                   E}'f'Cc.o, ~·: · ,.
                                   Adf'l"i£.SOr"I ~le - ;.c, z;:~
                                   P·o~e, -:td PJ--cle ::a"!c! : ~ · :: 2:~5
                                   L~t Pd"'O e-!! Oa~ ;
                                   P•o_ec edDsctta,;eo~ , ·.: 2:,:
                                   S! .11'1 / >.-4.!lfh I Tattocs




164. People v.
Sepulveda,

                              M55253- SEPULVEDA, SALVADOR
                  Parent Institution:                           SHAWNEE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                  Offender Statue:                              IN CUSTODY
                  Location:                                     SHAWNEE
                                          Sex Offender Registry Required



                  PHYSICAL PROFILE
                  Dat.oflillrth:                                0&02/1969
                  Weight:                                       1701bs.
                  Hair:                                         Blade
                  Sex:                                          Male
                  Height:                                       5ft. 04 1n.
                  Ra..:                                         Hispanic
                  Eyu:                                          Brown




                        - 149 -
165. People v.
Rodriguez,

                                  K76536 - RODRIGUEZ, DANIEL
                 PaNnt lns111U1:Jon:         MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 OffGlndar statua:           IN CUSTODY
                 UXatlon:                    MENARD




                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Data of Birih:              03/27/1982
                 IIUalght:                   175 lbs.
                 Hair:                       Black
                 &ex:                        Male
                 Htlght:                     5ft. 08 in.
                 Race:                       Hispanic
                 Eyu:                        BrO\M'l


166. People v.
Andrade, 

                                        ~-
                                  M27374 - ANDRADE, CARLOS
                 Pa.rent Institution:        CENTRALIA CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Ollender Sla1us:            INCUSTOOY
                 Loeollon:                   CEmRAllA




                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Dato of llrlh:              11/20/1990
                 Weight:                     236 lbs.
                 Mair:                       Blacl<
                 S..:                        Male
                 Holght:                     5 ft. 09 in.
                 Raca:                       Hispanic
                 El/91:                      Brown




                             - 150 -
167. People v.
Ascencio, 

                               M05248 - ASCENCIO, RICHARD
                 Pt1rent Institution:          EAST MOLINE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Slatu1:              PAROLE
                 Loeallon:                     PAROLE OISTRICT 1
                                        Sex Offender Registry Required


                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Dalo of Birth:                011/11/1990
                 Weight:                       150 lbs.
                 Hair:                         Block
                 Sex:                          Male
                 Height:                       5ft. 05111,
                 Race:                         Hispanic
                 l!yoo:                        Brown


168. People v.
Soto, 

                                        M38274 - SOTO, JAVIER
                 Parent lnsfflution:           HILL CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offondar Sta!us:              IN CUSTOOY
                 location:                     HILL



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Date of Birth:                02/2.U1988
                 Weight:                       225 lbs.
                 Hair:                         Blad<
                 Su:                           Male
                 Haight:                       Sil. 05in.
                 Ra~:                          Hispanic
                 Eyes:                         Brown




                             - 151 -
169. People v.
Castillo, 

                                     M30929 - CASTILLO, MIGUEL
                   Parent tnatltutiott:          HILL CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                   Offender Status:              IN CUSTODY
                   Laeatk,n!                     HU I
                                          Sex Offender Registry Required


                   PHYSICAL PROFILE
                   D•ta of lllrth:               08128/1968
                   W.lghl:                       160 lbs.
                   Hair:                         Brown
                   Sex:                          Male
                   Holght:                       5 ft. 07 in.
                   Race:                         Hispanic
                   !yas:                         Brown


170. People v.
Aguilar, 

(1st Dist. 2009)




                                      R66488 - AGUILAR, EFREN
                   Pannt ln ■titu1Jon:           MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                   Offendtr Status:              IN CUSTODY
                   Location:                     MENARD




                   PHYSICAL PROFILE
                   Dat. of Birth:                02/16/1987
                   Weight                        177 lbs.
                   Hair:                         Brown
                   Sex~                          Mate
                   Height:                       611.011n.
                   Rae•:                         Hispanic
                   Eyu:                          Brown




                               - 152 -
171. People v.
Gomez, 

                      -      ----~                           J
                                       M09190 - GOMEZ, GEORGE
                  Parent Institut ion:       HILL CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                  Offender Status:           IN CUSTODY
                  Location:                  HILL




                  Date of Birth:             06/12/1986
                  Weight:                    150 lbs.
                  Hair:                      Black
                  Sex:                       Male
                  Height:                    5ft.09in .
                  Race:                      Hispanic
                  Eyes:                      Brown


172. People v.
Davila, 

                                     Y35715 - DAVILA, ARCADIO
                 Parent Institution:        STATEVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 Offender Status:           PAROLE
                 Location:                  PAROLE DISTRICT 1




                 Date of Birth:             11/07/1988
                 Weight:                    268lbs.
                 Hair:                      Brown
                 Sex:                       Male
                 Height:                    5ft. 06in.
                 Race:                      Hispanic
                 Eyes:                      Brown




                               - 153 -
173. People v.
Petatan, 

                                        M38074- PETATAN, ODILON
                      Paienl Institution:       PONTIAC CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                      Offender Status:          IN CUSTODY
                      Loeatlen:                 PONTIAC




                      PHYSICAL PROFILE
                      O■te of Bl rth:           09/2811983
                      Weight:                   147 lbs.
                      Hair:                     Black
                      Sex:                      Male
                      Height:                   6ft. 07 In.
                      Race:                     Hispanic
                      Eyes:                     Bl'DW!'I



                                   White Female

174. People v.
Wright, 

                                        R87672 - WRIGHT, KRISTY
                 Parent fnstitutiori:         LOGAN CORRECTIONAL CENTER
                 OR~nder Stat1;1.::           IN CUSTODY
                 location:                    LOGAN



                 PHYSICAL PROFILE
                 Date of Bi,rth:              06/2311987
                 W~ight;                      1791b~.
                 H;,ir:                       Brown
                 sex:                         Female
                 l'lel~ht:                    5 ft. 08 in.
                 Rae~:                        White
                 Eye5 :                       Ha,;el




                                - 154 -
                      No Picture, No Witness Identification, Crime in Black Neighborhood

175. People v. Holmes, 

176. People v. Jones, 

. People v. Rankin, 

. People v. Alexander, 

179. People v. Dennis, 

-UB

180. People v. Henderson, 

181. People v. Allen, 

182. People v. McGee, 

-UB

183. In re Dante W., 

 (1st Dist. 2008) (minor defendant)




                                                   - 155 -