People v. Quezada

2024 IL 128805 • 2024-12-19

Citation2024 IL 128805

Date Filed2024-12-19

Docket128805

Cited14 times

StatusPublished

Full Opinion (html_with_citations)

2024 IL 128805




                                         IN THE
                                SUPREME COURT
                                             OF
                          THE STATE OF ILLINOIS




                                    (Docket No. 128805)

               THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
                         OLVAN QUEZADA, Appellee.


                             Opinion filed December 19, 2024.



        JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Justices Neville, Overstreet, Rochford, and O’Brien concurred in the judgment
     and opinion.

        Justice Holder White specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Chief Justice
     Theis.



                                         OPINION

¶1       Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Lake County, the defendant, Olvan
     Quezada, was convicted of attempted murder of a police officer (720 ILCS 5/8-
     4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2016)), aggravated discharge of a firearm (id. § 24-1.2(a)(3)),
     unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member (id. § 24-1.8(a)(1)), and
     possession of a defaced firearm (id. § 24-5(b)). On appeal, the appellate court
     reversed Quezada’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang
     member based on insufficient evidence and reversed his remaining convictions
     based on the cumulative effect of two unpreserved trial errors.

2022 IL App (2d) 200195

. For the reasons that follow, we affirm that part of the appellate court’s
judgment that reversed Quezada’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm
by a street gang member and reverse that part of the appellate court’s judgment that
reversed Quezada’s remaining convictions.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 Quezada’s convictions arose from events that took place on June 17, 2016.
Police officers from the Waukegan Police Department responded to a report of a
domestic disturbance at the Briarwood Apartments complex in Waukegan. After
the dispute was resolved, one of the responding officers, Officer John Szostak,
reported he heard gunshots. When additional officers responded to the apartment
complex to investigate the gunshots, more shots were fired in the direction of the
officers. Following an investigation, Quezada was arrested, and a gun was
recovered under the cushion of a couch on which he had been sleeping. The
following testimony was presented at trial.

¶4 Elise Salas testified she lived at the Briarwood Apartments complex with her
fiancé, Jonathan Cardona, his sister and her children, and his mother. On June 17,
2016, Salas returned home from work to find Cardona, William Servin, Dominic
Longmire, and Quezada in the apartment. Salas knew Servin and Longmire but had
never met Quezada. Salas remembered she saw a gun at one point in the apartment
that night but could not remember who had it. She did not know who brought the
gun to the apartment or who removed it from the apartment. At some point, there
was an argument between Cardona and his sister, and the police were called.
Quezada left the apartment before the police arrived. The police spoke to Cardona
and told him that either he or his sister needed to leave the apartment. Because his
sister had her children at the apartment, Cardona left with Longmire and Servin.

¶5 Salas remained at the apartment and was with Cardona’s mother when they
heard a gunshot. They went outside to see what was happening and saw Cardona

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and Servin running back to the apartment. The two men were arrested before they
reached the apartment. As Salas watched the arrest, she heard a second round of
gunshots.

¶6 Salas later went to the police station and identified Cardona, Servin, and
Quezada from photo lineups. When shown a photograph depicting the gun found
under the couch cushion on which Quezada had been sleeping, she testified that she
was not 100% sure it was the same gun she saw in her apartment. In rebuttal, Salas
acknowledged a written statement, in her handwriting, that indicated Quezada had
a gun in his waistband while at her apartment. The statement also said that Quezada
ran from the apartment when he heard the police being called. However, Salas
testified she did not remember writing the statement.

¶7 Officer Szostak testified he went to the Briarwood Apartments complex in
response to a domestic disturbance call. When he arrived at the apartment, he met
with Cardona, Servin, and Longmire. After Cardona agreed to leave the apartment,
Officer Szostak determined the issue was resolved, and no one was arrested.
Cardona left the apartment with Servin and Longmire. Officer Szostak returned to
his car to write his report about the incident. From his location in his car on the
corner of Arthur Court and Caryn Lane, he heard two gunshots. He called dispatch
to report the gunshots and then began to walk back down Arthur Court in the
direction of where he thought the gunshots originated.

¶8 As he walked, Officer Szostak heard people laughing and running toward him.
He recognized them as Cardona, Servin, and Longmire. Officer Szostak ordered
the group to stop and get on the ground, but none of them complied. Cardona and
Longmire ran between nearby cars while Servin started walking toward Officer
Szostak. Officer Szostak ordered the men to come out, and Servin told them, “It’s
cool, it’s the same officer.” Cardona came out, but Longmire ran away. Officer
Szostak ordered Cardona to approach him with his hands up. As Cardona complied,
Officer Szostak heard and saw a copper-colored, spent shell casing fall from
Cardona’s T-shirt. Officer Jason Lau later joined Officer Szostak, and together the
officers arrested Cardona and Servin and put them in police cars.

¶9 Officer Szostak left the area where the police cars were parked and went around
the corner to see if the person who had been detained by other officers was
Longmire. Officer Szostak then heard several gunshots and took cover. After the

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shooting, Officer Szostak was called to Longmire’s apartment, where he identified
Longmire as the person who ran from him when he ordered the group of three men
to stop. He placed Longmire under arrest and took him away from the apartment to
await transport to the police station.

¶ 10 Officer Lau testified he went to Arthur Court in response to Officer Szostak’s
call for assistance. Officer Lau testified that he and the other officers who
responded were in uniform and driving squad cars. As the officers stood around
discussing the shell casing that had fallen from Cardona’s shirt, Officer Lau heard
four or five gunshots and felt projectiles going over the officers’ heads. The
situation was “pretty tense” and chaotic. He testified that, before the shots were
fired, he heard someone shout something, although he could not hear what was said.
Officer Lau thought the shots came from the west, in the direction of the pool, but
he was not sure; because of the layout of the buildings and parking lot, the sound
could have come from anywhere. Eventually, in response to information coming in
on the police radio, Officer Lau and Detective Brian Maschek ran in pursuit of a
suspect. They did not apprehend anyone, and Officer Lau then returned to his squad
car and put Servin in Officer Angela Divirgilio’s car for transport to the station.

¶ 11 Officer Divirgilio testified she originally responded to the domestic disturbance
call but left the area after the situation was resolved. She returned when she received
a call of shots fired. By the time she returned, Officers Szostak and Lau were in the
process of handcuffing two individuals. Officer Maschek later arrived to collect
evidence. As he and the other officers stood together, Officer Divirgilio heard
someone yell something indistinct, and then shots were fired. She took cover and
started scanning the area. From her position, she thought the shots came from the
pool and basketball court area, northwest of where the officers were. The area was
not well lit, but she saw a person running, wearing what may have been a white
tank top. Officer Divirgilio could not identify the person and did not know if the
person was ever apprehended. After the shooting, she took custody of the two
individuals who had been placed under arrest and transported them to the
Waukegan police station.

¶ 12 Officer Maschek testified that he was assigned as the shift evidence technician
and was tasked with collecting evidence following the first shooting. After his
arrival at the scene, he met with Officers Divirgilio and Lau and was shown the

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evidence he was to collect. As the officers stood in a circle facing one another, with
Officer Maschek facing west, he heard somebody yell, “F*** the police,” which
was followed by the sound of five gunshots. Officer Maschek heard what sounded
like whistling in the air, which he thought was a projectile going over his head, and
then heard a loud ding as if a bullet hit a steel pipe.

¶ 13 Officer Maschek took cover behind a vehicle in the dimly lit parking lot and
looked west to where he thought the shots originated. When the shooting stopped,
Officer Maschek checked on his fellow officers and Servin and Cardona, then he
radioed for additional assistance. After additional officers responded, Officer
Maschek began processing the scene for evidence, collecting bullet casings, and
taking photographs of cars that sustained damage in the shooting. From the impact
of the bullets, Officer Maschek determined the direction of the bullets was toward
the officers.

¶ 14 After he processed the scene, Officer Maschek was directed to an apartment by
Sergeant Brian Bradfield to process evidence. The apartment belonged to Tara and
Dominic Longmire. In the apartment, Officer Maschek was directed to a couch,
where he found a KelTech P11 9-millimeter handgun. He photographed the gun
and took it into evidence. As he did so, he noticed the serial number was not clear.
He also recovered two pairs of wet tennis shoes.

¶ 15 Officer Christopher Llenza testified he responded to Officer Maschek’s calls
for assistance after the shooting. Upon arriving at the apartment complex, Officer
Llenza went east of the complex to the corner of East Drive and Westwaukee Road,
where Sergeant John Spiewak, Officer Fleming, 1 and Officer Szostak were taking
cover. Officers Llenza and Spiewak then moved to a fence line on the corner of
East Drive and George Street to watch for anyone running past from the direction
where the initial calls of the shots came from. Officer Llenza heard a male voice
talking to someone and then saw Quezada peek over the fence. Officer Spiewak
shined his flashlight on Quezada and identified himself as a police officer. Quezada
said “s***,” dropped from the fence, and took off. The officers gave chase but were
unable to catch him. The path of the chase went over wet, swampy ground, causing
Officer Llenza’s feet and the bottom of his pants to get wet. Officer Llenza later
accompanied other officers to Longmire’s apartment, where Officer Llenza saw

1
Officer Fleming’s first name does not appear in the record.

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Quezada and identified him as the person from the chase. Officer Llenza noted that
the bottoms of Quezada’s jeans were wet and covered with grass.

¶ 16 Sergeant Bradfield testified he was working as the patrol sergeant on June 17,
2016, when he received the call that shots had been fired at police officers. When
Sergeant Bradfield arrived, he joined Officer Szostak in the search for the shooter
and evidence of the shooting. As the officers were collecting evidence, Sergeant
Bradfield received a call from Sergeant Elias Agalianos, who was conducting
interviews at the police station. Sergeant Agalianos informed him there were two
people involved in the shooting who were not in custody and directed him to the
Longmire apartment to search for the suspects.

¶ 17 Sergeant Bradfield, Officer Szostak, and other officers went to the apartment
and found Longmire and Quezada. Officer Szostak identified Longmire as the
person who ran from him. Sergeant Bradfield called Sergeant Spiewak to the
apartment, and Sergeant Spiewak identified Quezada as the person who ran from
him. Sergeant Bradfield then spoke to Tara Longmire and searched the couches in
the living room, where he found a black handgun under the cushion of a couch with
two cushions. Sergeant Bradfield directed Officer Maschek to retrieve the gun and
place it into evidence.

¶ 18 Tara Longmire, Dominic Longmire’s mother, testified she was studying when
Longmire returned home with a young Hispanic man. Tara told them they could
not stay and offered to drive the young man home. She went back to her room,
leaving the two in the living room, and told them to let her know when they were
ready to leave. When she left the living room, the young man was sitting on a
loveseat with two cushions. Tara returned to her room and fell asleep. A short while
later, she woke up to find police officers at her door asking if they could search her
apartment. Tara consented to the search. After the search, the police showed her a
gun recovered from her couch. Tara testified she did not own any guns and had
never seen a gun in her house before.

¶ 19 Dominic Longmire testified he went to Cardona’s apartment on June 17, 2016,
to hang out. Cardona and Salas began arguing, and the police were called. While
the police were talking to Cardona outside, Longmire felt it was time to leave, and
he went home alone. Quezada had left before the police arrived. Longmire was
about halfway home when he heard a gunshot. He called Salas, Cardona, and

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Quezada to see if everyone was alright. None of the people he called answered their
phones, so he started walking back to the apartment complex. When he got back,
the police were arresting Cardona and Servin. Longmire then called Quezada and
arranged to meet with him. Longmire was asked whether he was under the influence
of any drugs or alcohol at the time, and he testified he could not remember.

¶ 20 After meeting up, Longmire and Quezada decided to walk to Longmire’s
apartment with the understanding that Longmire would take Quezada back to his
home in Zion. Longmire testified he was walking behind Quezada when he saw
Quezada point a gun in the air and shoot it. Longmire testified that, up to that point,
he had not seen a handgun. After Quezada shot the gun, they ran to Longmire’s
apartment. Quezada brought the gun into the apartment. Longmire testified his plan
was to take Quezada home but that he decided to make a root beer float first.
Longmire and Quezada eventually fell asleep on the couches in Longmire’s living
room because it was late.

¶ 21 Longmire woke up when the police arrived at the apartment and arrested him.
Longmire testified that he thought he was questioned by police for two to three
days. When asked if he told the police that Quezada was known as “Hombre,”
Longmire denied knowing Quezada by that name and insisted he only knew him as
“O” and “Skunk.” Longmire testified he remembered circling Quezada’s face in
the police photo lineup, but he did not remember writing “Shot his pistol. I know
him from mutual friends, D-L,” because he was scared at the time of the
identification. He further testified that, although he identified the gun in a picture
and indicated “Hombre shot the gun,” he also told the police he did not really get a
good look at the gun.

¶ 22 On cross-examination, Longmire testified Quezada did not yell anything before
firing the shot, which he aimed in the air above a building. From their location when
Quezada fired the gun, Longmire could not see the police. After Quezada fired the
gun, Longmire told him they had to leave the area because he did not want them
hanging around in light of the police presence. Longmire intended to take Quezada
home to Zion because he did not want him to get into trouble.

¶ 23 Longmire testified he told the detectives the truth during his interview.
Longmire first told the police he was not with Quezada when the first shot was
fired; he was with Cardona and Servin. However, Longmire testified that, when he

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started to tell the truth, the detectives interrupted him and told him that was not the
truth. At one point, a detective told Longmire that, if the detectives thought he was
lying, they could have him charged with attempted murder and have his mother
lose her house. The detectives also told Longmire they knew he was lying because
his statements did not align with what other witnesses were telling the police.
Longmire received a 20-minute break where the detectives gave him a cigarette and
told him “We’re going to let you think about this for a while. You have one more
chance to tell us what we want to hear.” When the detectives returned, Longmire
began to tell them what they wanted to hear because they “basically threatened”
him. This was when he began to write statements on the pictures the detectives
presented, identifying Quezada as “Hombre” and that he shot the gun. Longmire
denied telling the police that anyone shouted “F*** the police.” Throughout cross-
examination, defense counsel questioned Longmire about additional statements he
made to the detectives and their conduct during the interrogation. During his
testimony, Longmire acknowledged he had a recent felony conviction for robbery.

¶ 24 Sergeant Agalianos testified he and Detective George Valko interrogated
Longmire about the shooting. The interrogation consisted of two interviews
conducted in two rooms at the police station. Sergeant Agalianos explained that
during the interview process, if there was a photographic lineup, they used
independent police officers or detectives to show the interviewee the lineup. This
procedure was designed to ensure independent identification where the detectives
could not be accused of influencing an identification. Sergeant Agalianos testified
this was the procedure used when Longmire was asked to view photo lineups during
his interrogation.

¶ 25 Sergeant Agalianos identified a flash drive containing the video recordings of
the Longmire interviews. The State then asked to admit the video recordings into
evidence. The court stated the videos would be admitted, and defense counsel
stated, “No objection, Judge.” The State published the videos to the jury. In the
videos, Longmire, who was not wearing a shirt, socks, or shoes, appeared draped
in a blanket. Over the course of the interrogation, the detectives accused Longmire
of lying and told him they would charge him with attempted murder unless he
cooperated and was truthful. Sergeant Agalianos raised his voice at times as he
spoke to Longmire. Eventually, Longmire told the police that Quezada fired the
shots and that, before firing, Quezada declared he was going to shoot at the police.

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¶ 26 After the jury watched the videos, Sergeant Agalianos continued his testimony.
He explained that he was initially briefed about the case by other officers before he
interviewed Cardona. A different detective interviewed Servin, and the two later
conferred before Sergeant Agalianos called Sergeant Bradfield and directed him to
Longmire’s apartment to look for him. Sergeant Agalianos further advised Sergeant
Bradfield to look for a “male Hispanic, approximately five-seven, five-eight with a
blown out hairstyle,” who had tattoos, wearing a black shirt and blue jeans.
Longmire and Quezada were brought to the station shortly after.

¶ 27 Sergeant Agalianos explained his interview strategy over his 20-year career
included evaluating the interviewee and determining whether he was truthful,
cooperative, or withholding information. Depending on the situation, Sergeant
Agalianos would sometimes raise his voice or yell to get the interviewee’s attention.
He compared this to catching a child, spouse, or friend in a lie and “call[ing] them
out on it.” Sergeant Agalianos explained that a parent may keep asking difficult
questions of a child and explaining the consequences of being untruthful until the
parent has the absolute truth.

¶ 28 On cross-examination, Sergeant Agalianos was asked if he raised his voice
during the interview and whether he told Longmire “[i]f we think you’re lying, I
can have you charged with everything, including attempted murder.” He
acknowledged that he did and that he also told Longmire his mother could lose her
house, explaining that he wanted Longmire to realize the seriousness of the
situation and the potential consequences. Sergeant Agalianos agreed Longmire
changed his story throughout the interview but attributed it to Longmire giving up
more information through the interview process. He denied he suggested the phrase
“I’m going to shoot the police” to Longmire, and he testified that the interviewing
detectives “had to extract” the phrase from Longmire. Sergeant Agalianos further
agreed that Detective Valko told Longmire, “If I were you, I would tell you
whatever I want to hear to get out of that chair.” However, Sergeant Agalianos
added the statement could mean different things depending on how it was
interpreted.

¶ 29 Detective Rigoberto Amaro testified he had been a detective with the Waukegan
Police Department gang intelligence unit for approximately 11 years, where he
conducted gang, narcotics, shooting, and violent crime investigations. He was

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called to the police station to assist with the investigation into the shootings that
took place on June 17, 2016. After being briefed by Sergeant Agalianos, Detective
Amaro interviewed Servin. Later, when Quezada was brought to the station,
Detective Amaro performed a gunshot residue test on Quezada’s hands. Detective
Amaro noticed that the lower parts of Quezada’s pants were wet and that he had
wet, muddy shoes. Quezada also had a tattoo on his arm, wore a blowout style
haircut, and had a fresh cut on his right palm.

¶ 30 Detective Amaro testified that he was proficient in understanding the gangs in
and around Waukegan and that he had been qualified as an expert witness with
regard to gangs a few times. As an expert, he had opined as to whether a person
was in a specific gang and testified as to the nature of gangs and the differences
between different gangs. The State asked the court to accept Detective Amaro as
an expert in gangs. The court responded that defense counsel was “shrugging his
shoulders,” and the court therefore declared Detective Amaro an expert in the field
of gangs.

¶ 31 Detective Amaro opined that Quezada was affiliated with the Spanish Gangster
Disciples street gang. He based his opinion on observations he made of Quezada, a
conversation he had with Servin, and a review of reports in the case. On cross-
examination, Detective Amaro explained that he formed his opinion without
speaking to Quezada because Quezada did not wish to speak to him. Detective
Amaro noticed a cover-up tattoo on Quezada’s arm that covered a street gang tattoo.
He asked Quezada if he was a member of the Serrano street gang, and Quezada did
not answer.

¶ 32 Detective Amaro further explained that, during the investigation, Servin
introduced Quezada as “Shorty Folks” to other people, which was a term used to
describe a young member or a person that is affiliated with the Folks Nation street
gang. Defense counsel objected to this testimony because Detective Amaro had not
provided a foundation for the conversation Servin had with other people. The court
sustained the objection but also found defense counsel had opened the door to the
testimony.

¶ 33 On redirect examination, Detective Amaro testified street gang members do not
introduce people as street gang members unless they were actually members of the
gang. He explained that the Folks Nation consisted of multiple different gangs and

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that the Spanish Gangster Disciples street gang was one of the gangs under the
Folks Nation. It was not uncommon for members of the gangs to introduce
themselves as “Folks” and make statements such as “That’s my Folks right there.”
Members would also introduce each other as “Folks” to let someone know the
introduced person was one of them. Detective Amaro testified that a “shorty” was
a newer member of the gang who had not really been around that much.

¶ 34 Officer Michael Sliozis testified that he collected cell phones and a video
recording from the apartment complex where the shooting occurred. The video
recording was from cameras that faced the pool area and north from a maintenance
shed at the apartment complex. A redacted version of the maintenance shed video
was played before the jury, and Officer Sliozis testified the video depicted a man
who raised and fired a gun.

¶ 35 Officer Sliozis also collected a pair of jeans and a pair of shoes from Quezada
when Quezada was in custody. Officer Sliozis opined that, from the clothing
Quezada was wearing, he was the person depicted in the maintenance shed video.
However, on cross-examination, Officer Sliozis acknowledged that the clothes the
person in the video was wearing were not particularly distinctive.

¶ 36 Scott Rochowicz testified that he worked for the Illinois State Police’s
microscopy and trace chemistry section, where he performed analyses for the
identification of gunshot residue. Rochowicz tested Quezada’s and Longmire’s
hands for gunshot residue and received negative results. Rochowicz explained that
gunshot residue particles are easy to remove and can be removed by environmental
factors such as rain and wind or by washing with soap and water.

¶ 37 Anthony Spadafora testified as an expert witness on firearms. He conducted a
series of tests on the bullet casings and bullet fragments recovered from the scenes
of the first and second shootings and concluded they were fired from the gun
recovered in Longmire’s apartment. No usable DNA or fingerprint evidence was
recovered from the gun.

¶ 38 In closing argument, the State summarized the evidence it presented and
contended it was overwhelming “even if you take Dominic Longmire out of here.”
Defense counsel, in his closing argument, asserted that the State’s case was
speculative and that the State’s best witness, Longmire, could not be trusted.

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Counsel noted that Longmire changed his statements to the police denying any
involvement in identifying Quezada as the shooter because of the police threatening
him. Counsel urged the jury to “[w]atch that video carefully because it’s kind of
horrifying to see what two experienced detectives who’ve been doing it 18 years, I
want to say 20 years, they know how to manipulate a witness.” Counsel further
argued that the evidence that Quezada was in a gang was insufficient because there
was no testimony that he was an active gang member and because the opinion
linking him to a gang was based on a conversation with no specific details.

¶ 39 Following deliberations, the jury found Quezada guilty on all counts. The trial
court sentenced Quezada to 27 years’ imprisonment for attempted murder, 19
years’ imprisonment for aggravated discharge of a firearm, 10 years’ imprisonment
for the unlawful possession of a firearm by a gang member, and 5 years’
imprisonment for defacing a firearm, with the sentences to be served concurrently.
Quezada filed a motion to reconsider his sentences, which was denied. He then
appealed.

¶ 40 On appeal, Quezada argued, among other things, that the evidence was
insufficient to prove that he was a member of a street gang, as required to sustain
his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member.

2022 IL App (2d) 200195, ¶ 69

. Quezada further argued that the trial court committed
plain error when it admitted the entirety of the videos of Longmire’s police
interview and when it admitted the gang evidence and that trial counsel was
ineffective for not objecting to the admission of those two pieces of evidence. Id.
¶¶ 54, 63. Finally, Quezada argued that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors
denied him a fair trial. ¶ 73.

¶ 41 The appellate court accepted the State’s concession that the evidence was
insufficient to convict Quezada of unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang
member and therefore reversed his conviction for that offense outright. Id. ¶ 77. 2
Regarding the admission of the entirety of the Longmire videos and the admission
of the gang evidence, the appellate court found that the trial court had erred in
admitting each. Id. ¶¶ 50-67. However, the appellate court then held that neither
error, by itself, amounted to plain error, under either prong one or prong two of the
plain error doctrine. For each error, the appellate court found that the evidence of

2
This ruling is not at issue in this court.

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guilt was not closely balanced and that the integrity of the judicial process had not
been compromised. Id.

¶ 42 The appellate court also rejected Quezada’s contention that trial counsel was
ineffective for not objecting to the admission of those two pieces of evidence. Id.
¶¶ 54, 63. With respect to the admission of the Longmire videos, the appellate court
found that defense counsel’s decision not to object was arguably a result of trial
strategy to emphasize Longmire’s inconsistencies and the police interrogation
tactics. Id. ¶ 59. The appellate court also concluded that counsel “clearly sought to
discredit Longmire’s testimony” using the videos. Id.

¶ 43 After reaching the above conclusions, the appellate court ended its opinion with
a section titled “Cumulative Error.” See id. ¶ 72. In this section, the appellate court
again stated that the trial court erred in admitting the Longmire videos and the gang
evidence. Id. ¶ 73. Applying the cumulative error doctrine, the court then concluded
“that the erroneous admission of both Longmire’s interrogation videos and the gang
evidence, while not individually reversible *** cumulatively deprived him of a fair
trial.” Id. ¶ 75. On this basis, the appellate court reversed Quezada’s remaining
convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial. Id. ¶ 76.

¶ 44 We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff.
Oct. 1, 2021).

¶ 45 ANALYSIS

¶ 46 Before this court, the State contends the appellate court erred in its application
of the cumulative error doctrine. That doctrine states, in general, that individual
trial errors that do not entitle a defendant to appellate relief may do so if the errors,
when considered in the aggregate, “have the cumulative effect of denying [the]
defendant a fair trial.” People v. Speight,

153 Ill. 2d 365

, 376 (1992); see People v.
       Albanese,

102 Ill. 2d 54, 83

 (1984) (“it is true that trial errors may have a cumulative
       effect when considered together”); United States v. Sepulveda,

15 F.3d 1161, 1196

       (1st Cir. 1993) (“a column of errors may sometimes have a logarithmic effect,
       producing a total impact greater than the arithmetic sum of its constituent parts”).
       Cumulative error can arise only from actual trial errors. People v. Franklin,

135 Ill. 2d 78, 105

 (1990) (where none of the points relied upon by a defendant constitute




                                                - 13 -
       error, “logic dictates that there cannot be cumulative error”). Further, as its name
       suggests, cumulative error can occur only when there is more than one error. United
       States v. Moore,

641 F.3d 812, 830

 (7th Cir. 2011).

¶ 47       The State does not dispute that the cumulative error doctrine applies to trial
       errors that have been properly preserved. In this case, however, the two trial errors
       considered by the appellate court in its cumulative error analysis were both
       forfeited. Thus, the question this court must address is how the cumulative error
       doctrine applies to trial errors that have not been properly preserved.

¶ 48       One possible answer to this question would be to say that the cumulative error
       doctrine does not apply to forfeited errors at all—that only preserved errors may be
       component parts of a cumulative error claim and analysis, and that unpreserved
       errors may only be reviewed for plain error on an individual basis. The difficulty
       with that approach, however, is that it is at odds with the fundamental principle that
       forfeiture is “an admonition to the parties, not a limitation upon the jurisdiction of
       the reviewing court” (Hux v. Raben,

38 Ill. 2d 223, 224

 (1967)), and reviewing
       courts are not absolutely barred from reviewing procedurally defaulted claims (Ill.
       S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967)). A reviewing court always has the power to
       grant relief—regardless of a defendant’s forfeiture—in instances where clear or
       obvious trial error has rendered a trial fundamentally unfair and undermined the
       integrity of the judicial process or where the reviewing court concludes that trial
       error has resulted in the conviction of an innocent person. People v. Sebby,

2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48

 (discussing the plain error rule); People v. Herron,

215 Ill. 2d 167, 186

 (2005).

¶ 49       To hold that the cumulative error doctrine does not apply at all to forfeited
       errors would turn this understanding of forfeiture on its head. Adopting such a rule
       would mean that, even in those cases where a reviewing court is firmly convinced
       that the cumulative effect of multiple, unpreserved trial errors has resulted in a
       fundamentally unfair trial and that the judgment must be reversed to protect the
       integrity of the judicial process, or that the errors have resulted in the conviction of
       an innocent person, the court would nevertheless be powerless to act. In other
       words, adopting such a rule would turn forfeiture from a limitation on the defendant
       into an absolute bar on the reviewing court’s ability to grant relief, regardless of the
       cumulative effect of the trial errors or the potential injustice done. Since such a




                                                - 14 -
       result is plainly contrary to long-settled principles concerning forfeiture, we must
       reject the proposition that the cumulative error doctrine may not be applied to
       forfeited errors under any circumstances.

¶ 50        At the opposite extreme, a second possible answer to the question of how to
       apply the cumulative error doctrine to unpreserved trial errors would be to find that
       forfeiture concerns should simply be disregarded whenever a defendant raises a
       claim of cumulative error. The State contends this is the approach adopted by the
       appellate court in this case. The State notes that neither of the errors addressed by
       the appellate court in its cumulative error analysis had been properly preserved. The
       State further notes that, despite this fact, the appellate court made no reference to
       plain error in its cumulative error analysis and did not acknowledge that the errors
       at issue had been forfeited. Instead, the court simply addressed the two errors as if
       they had been properly preserved. The State contends this was error and that the
       appellate court could not do “what it did here, which is review these two forfeited
       claims of error de novo simply because they’ve been packaged together and
       presented under the umbrella of a due process claim of cumulative error.” We agree.

¶ 51       To overcome forfeiture on appeal, a defendant has the burden of establishing
       plain error, under either the closely balanced evidence prong or the substantial
       rights prong of the plain error test. Sebby,

2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48

. To hold that
       forfeiture concerns may be completely set aside in a cumulative error claim would
       effectively negate this plain error framework and would improperly relieve the
       defendant of his burden of persuasion to show that reversal is required.
       Accordingly, we reject the notion, advanced by the appellate court in this case, that
       forfeiture concerns play no role in a cumulative error claim and analysis of
       unpreserved trial errors.

¶ 52       The State offers a third approach to addressing cumulative error and forfeiture.
       The State contends that the appropriate way to address a cumulative error claim
       involving unpreserved errors is simply to place the cumulative errors within the
       plain error framework. According to the State, “only when a cumulative-error claim
       based on unpreserved components is itself reviewable as plain error” can the
       reviewing court consider “unpreserved components that were not individually
       reviewable as plain error.” In other words, according to the State, to overcome the




                                              - 15 -
       forfeiture, the defendant must establish that the cumulative effect of the
       unpreserved errors rises to the level of plain error. 3

¶ 53        In support of this contention, the State cites People v. Blue,

189 Ill. 2d 99

       (2000), a decision in which this court reversed the defendant’s murder conviction,
       despite overwhelming evidence of guilt, based on the cumulative effect of multiple
       trial errors, not all of which had been properly preserved. The State explains:

           “Blue reviewed the defendant’s cumulative-error claim under ‘the same test that
           this [C]ourt uses whenever it applies the second prong of the plain error test,’

id.

 at 138 (citing Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a)), and granted relief because the cumulative
           effect of the component errors so undermined the integrity of the judicial
           process that ‘a new trial [wa]s necessary in order to preserve the trustworthiness
           and reputation of the judicial process,’

id. at 139

. See Herron,

215 Ill. 2d at 187

           (citing Blue as second-prong plain-error case). In other words, because the
           defendant’s cumulative-error claim relied on unpreserved components not
           reviewable as plain error, Blue did not review the cumulative-error claim
           de novo, like the appellate court here did, but for plain error.”

       During oral argument before this court, the State further explained the reasoning of
       Blue:

           “Blue is indeed a case about a due process claim of cumulative error but more
           specifically it’s a case about reviewing a due process claim of cumulative error
           that is based on unpreserved components, and what Blue did was review that
           claim expressly under second prong plain error, looking to see whether those




            3
             The State also at times asserts in its briefs that “an unpreserved error cannot be considered as
       a component of a due process claim of cumulative error unless it rises to the level of plain error.”
       This contention is inherently contradictory. If an individual trial error is, by itself, plain error, that
       error would require reversal. See People v. Keene,

169 Ill. 2d 1, 17

 (1995) (all plain errors are
       reversible errors). An individual plain error could therefore never be a “component of a due process
       claim of cumulative error” because the cumulative error claim would never be reached. See
       Willingham v. Mullin,

296 F.3d 917, 935

 (10th Cir. 2002) (“This rationale, taken on its face, would
       render the cumulative error inquiry meaningless, since it indicates that cumulative error may be
       predicated only upon individual error already requiring reversal.”). Notably, although mentioned in
       its briefs, the State did not pursue this line of reasoning at oral argument before this court,
       abandoning it in favor of the argument discussed above.




                                                        - 16 -
          component errors, when viewed cumulatively, rose to the level of second prong
          plain error.”

       We agree with the State’s analysis of Blue. See People v. Smith,

2017 IL App (1st) 143728, ¶¶ 45, 77-79

 (describing Blue in similar terms).

¶ 54       We also find instructive our appellate court’s decision in People v. Darr,

2018 IL App (3d) 150562

. In Darr, the defendant identified eight alleged trial errors that
he maintained required reversal of his convictions under the cumulative error
doctrine. Id. ¶ 45. Although the errors had not been preserved, the defendant
asserted that this fact was “ ‘irrelevant to a cumulative-error claim.’ ” Id. ¶ 46. The
appellate court rejected this argument, stating there was no authority “to support
the contention that, by combining multiple unpreserved, forfeited errors, a
defendant may transform his claim into one that is preserved or not forfeited.” Id.

¶ 55 The appellate court then analyzed the defendant’s cumulative error argument
within a plain error framework. Id. ¶¶ 47-51. The court emphasized that, because
the defendant was raising a plain error argument, the burden rested with him to
show that reversal was required. Id. ¶ 48. The court further noted that the defendant
was invoking the second prong of the plain error doctrine and contending that the
accumulation of errors resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial, warranting reversal.
Id. ¶ 51. The appellate court then stated:

“Thus, our analysis must proceed as follows. First, we must determine which
of the eight alleged errors actually constitute ‘clear or obvious’ errors.
Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. Then, we must determine whether the cumulative
impact of those errors ‘affected the fairness of the trial and challenged the
integrity of the judicial process.’ Sebby,

2017 IL 119445, ¶ 50

.”