People v. Williams
Citation2024 IL 127304
Date Filed2024-12-19
Docket127304
Cited21 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
2024 IL 127304
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 127304)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee,
v. TOROLAN WILLIAMS, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 19, 2024.
JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, and O’Brien concurred in
the judgment and opinion.
Justice Cunningham specially concurred, with opinion.
Justice Holder White took no part in the decision.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant Torolan Williams was convicted of the first degree murder of five
victims (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2008)) and sentenced to a mandatory term of
natural life imprisonment under section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code of
Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 2008)). The judgment was
affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Williams, 2017 IL App (1st) 142733, ¶ 55.
Defendant then filed a pro se postconviction petition in which he claimed for the
first time that the sentence violates his rights under the proportionate penalties
clause of the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. The petition alleged
that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to defendant because evolving brain
science supports treating emerging adult defendants as juveniles for sentencing
purposes and defendant committed the offenses when he was only 22 years old.
Defendant framed his postconviction claim in terms of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel and appellate counsel for not pursuing the issue. The Cook County circuit
court summarily dismissed the petition, and a divided panel of the appellate court
affirmed. 2021 IL App (1st) 190535, ¶ 36.
¶2 The appellate majority held that the petition was frivolous and patently without
merit because defendant did not “allege any facts particular to his case.” Id. We
agree. Although a postconviction petitioner must allege only a limited amount of
factual detail, defendant failed to allege any facts specific to his circumstances,
besides his age, as an arguable basis that section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) violates the
proportionate penalties clause as applied to him. Id. ¶¶ 35-36. Thus, defendant’s
attorneys were not ineffective for failing to raise the meritless issue at sentencing
or on direct appeal. We affirm the judgments of the appellate court and circuit court.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A jury found defendant guilty of five counts of first degree murder and one
count of armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2008)) based on the 2008
shooting deaths of Donovan Richardson, Reginald Walker, Anthony Scales,
Whitney Flowers, and Lakesha Doss in Richardson’s home. Defendant personally
shot two of the victims. His friend, Michael King, shot the other three. Defendant
and King ransacked the home and took the victims’ belongings to defendant’s home
with the help of another friend, Arthur Brown.
¶5 Defendant’s multiple murder convictions were punishable by a mandatory
natural life sentence under section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Code, which provides
“the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment when
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the death penalty is not imposed if the defendant, *** irrespective of the
defendant’s age at the time of the commission of the offense, is found guilty of
murdering more than one victim.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 2008).
¶6 At sentencing, the circuit court noted that defendant’s presentence investigative
report (PSI) contained only defendant’s criminal background because defendant
had refused to cooperate with the officer assigned to the report. Defendant and the
State each declined to add anything to the PSI, but the State submitted victim impact
statements. Defendant declined to say anything in allocution. The court imposed
the mandatory natural life sentence for the murders, as well as a consecutive 20-
year prison term for armed robbery, which is not at issue. On direct appeal,
defendant raised several evidentiary issues but did not challenge his sentence, and
the judgment was affirmed. Williams, 2017 IL App (1st) 142733, ¶ 55.
¶7 In 2018, defendant filed an initial pro se postconviction petition that is the
subject of this appeal. Defendant alleged, inter alia, “[a]ppellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to argue that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue
that the sentencing statute is constitutional [sic] as-applied to him.” The underlying
claim of sentencing error is that applying section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) to defendant
violated the proportionate penalties clause because “the [sentencing] court had no
discretion to consider any factors such as [defendant’s] age, his minimal criminal
history, his actual involvement in the crime and the hallmark features of his youth.”
¶8 The petition cited several United States Supreme Court decisions for the
principle that juveniles are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing
purposes and less deserving of the most severe punishments. And, the petition
alleged, “there has been a growing consensus that the brain research on which these
cases relied has itself evolved to demonstrate that the brains of young adults
continue to develop into their mid-20s.”
¶9 The petition cited literature generally describing the ongoing maturation of
young adults’ brains, including areas that control impulsivity and judgment. A
separate claim in the petition mentioned that defendant was 22 years old at the time
of the shootings. However, the petition did not allege anything else about
defendant’s background or the circumstances of the shootings that might
demonstrate that his youth and immaturity played a role in the murders. Defendant
attached his own affidavit concerning claims unrelated to the proportionate
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penalties clause, but he did not otherwise attach any affidavits, records, or other
evidence to the petition to support the sentencing claim. Nevertheless, the petition
concluded that allowing defendant “to die in prison shocks the moral sense of the
community, and violates the proportionate penalties clause as-applied to him.” The
petition requested a new sentencing hearing for the circuit court to consider
defendant’s youth and rehabilitative potential.
¶ 10 The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition, and a divided panel of the
appellate court affirmed the dismissal. The appellate majority concluded that a
young adult defendant who claims that Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012),
protects him from a mandatory life sentence “must allege ‘how the evolving science
on juvenile maturity and brain development *** applies to [his] specific facts and
circumstances.’ ” 2021 IL App (1st) 190535, ¶ 28 (quoting People v. Harris,2018 IL 121932, ¶ 46
). The majority determined that defendant had not sufficiently
invoked Miller because the petition did not allege any facts specific to defendant,
besides his age, that if proved would render him more akin to a juvenile than an
adult when he committed his offenses. Id. ¶¶ 28, 31.
¶ 11 The dissenting justice concluded that defendant had satisfied the low threshold
for advancing to the second stage of postconviction review. Id. ¶¶ 45-46 (Mikva,
P.J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned that a pro se petitioner like defendant should
not be expected to allege anything besides his age, especially where the record
contained no additional facts to support his claim because the petitioner has no
reason to offer those facts at sentencing. Id. The dissent concluded that “[h]is
argument—that as applied to him the statute mandating that he receive a natural
life sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
Constitution—has an arguable basis in law and is not positively contradicted by the
record in this case.” Id. ¶ 47. We allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal.
Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 A. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act
¶ 14 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) provides a means for individuals
serving criminal sentences to assert that their convictions resulted from a substantial
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denial of their constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018); People
v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 18. Postconviction proceedings are commenced by
the filing of a petition, which must, among other things, “clearly set forth the
respects in which petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated.” 725 ILCS 5/122-
2 (West 2018).
¶ 15 The Act prescribes a three-stage process for adjudicating petitions. Hilliard,
2023 IL 128186, ¶ 19. Defendant’s petition was summarily dismissed at the first
stage, which sets a low threshold and requires only a limited amount of detail in the
petition because most petitions are drafted at this stage by defendants with little
legal knowledge or training. See People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2009). A pro se
defendant must state only the “gist” of a constitutional claim by alleging enough
facts to make out a claim that is arguably constitutional for purposes of invoking
the Act. Id. The “gist” of a constitutional claim means the petition meets the
pleading requirements of section 122-2, even if the petition lacks formal legal
arguments or citations of legal authority. Id.
¶ 16 The low threshold set at the first stage does not mean that a pro se petitioner is
excused from providing any factual detail at all surrounding the alleged
constitutional violation. Id. at 10. Section 122-2 provides that “[t]he petition shall
have attached thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its
allegations or shall state why the same are not attached.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West
2018). This supporting-evidence requirement is intended to establish that a
petition’s allegations are capable of objective or independent corroboration.
Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 10. “ ‘Thus, while a pro se petition is not expected to set forth
a complete and detailed factual recitation, it must set forth some facts which can be
corroborated and are objective in nature or contain some explanation as to why
those facts are absent.’ ” Id.(quoting People v. Delton,227 Ill. 2d 247, 254-55
(2008)).
¶ 17 The circuit court must liberally construe the allegations and accept them as true
unless the record contradicts them. Id. If the court independently determines that
the petition is “frivolous or is patently without merit,” it must dismiss the petition.
725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2018). A petition is frivolous or patently without
merit only if it has no arguable basis in law or fact, meaning that it relies on an
indisputably meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation. Hodges, 234 Ill.
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2d at 16. If the circuit court does not dismiss the petition as frivolous or patently
without merit, the petition advances to the second stage (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b)
(West 2018)), where counsel may be appointed to an indigent defendant (id. § 122-
4) and where the State shall file a motion to dismiss or an answer to the petition (id.
§ 122-5). Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 10-11. We review the circuit court’s summary
dismissal of a postconviction petition de novo. Id. at 9.
¶ 18 B. Forfeiture and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 19 The State contends that defendant forfeited any argument related to the
proportionate penalties clause because he raised it for the first time in his
postconviction petition. Notably, the petition expressly alleged a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, rooted in his trial counsel and appellate counsel
failing to assert his rights under the proportionate penalties clause. The petition
stated “appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to argue that the sentencing statute is constitutional [sic] as-
applied to him.”
¶ 20 When a postconviction petitioner asserts claims that could have been raised on
direct appeal, he can avoid the procedural bar of forfeiture by casting his claims as
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the issues on direct
appeal. People v. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 23. Here, defendant avoided potential
forfeiture by casting the proportionate-penalties claim as one of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
¶ 21 In a related argument, the State contends that defendant forfeited his ineffective
assistance claim by arguing only the underlying proportionate penalties issue on
postconviction appeal in the appellate court. Defendant replies that the State did not
raise its forfeiture argument in the appellate court either. This appeal concerns
de novo review of the petition, not the parties’ prior arguments, and any forfeiture
of those arguments is a limitation on the parties and not on this court. See People
v. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356, ¶ 26. In this case, we elect to overlook any forfeiture to
resolve the appeal.
¶ 22 Whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel is subject to the
standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People v.
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Rogers, 2021 IL 126163, ¶ 17. “ ‘To establish that a defendant was deprived of
effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish both that his attorney’s
performance was deficient and that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result.’ ”
Id.(quoting People v. Pugh,157 Ill. 2d 1, 14
(1993)). Counsel cannot be considered
ineffective for failing to make or pursue what would have been a meritless motion
or objection. Id. ¶ 32; People v. Edwards, 195 Ill. 2d 142, 165 (2001). This appeal
turns on whether the proportionate-penalties claim articulated by defendant in his
petition would have been potentially meritorious if presented at sentencing or on
direct appeal such that defendant’s attorneys were ineffective for not pursuing it.
¶ 23 C. The Proportionate Penalties Clause
¶ 24 The proportionate penalties clause states: “All penalties shall be determined
both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring
the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11.
“A statute violates the proportionate penalties clause if either the penalty is
harsher than the penalty for a different offense containing identical elements
(People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 521 (2005)) or ‘the punishment for the
offense is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to
shock the moral sense of the community’ (People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338
(2002) (Leon Miller)).” Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 20.
Defendant challenges his natural life sentence under the latter standard.
“Punishments satisfying this standard have not been delineated because, ‘as our
society evolves, so too do our concepts of elemental decency and fairness which
shape the ‘moral sense’ of the community.’ ” Id.(quoting People v. Miller,202 Ill. 2d 328, 339
(2002) (Leon Miller)). “A court reviews ‘the gravity of the defendant’s
offense in connection with the severity of the statutorily mandated sentence within
our community’s evolving standard of decency.’ ” Id.(quoting Leon Miller,202 Ill. 2d at 340
). ¶ 25 A constitutional challenge to a statute may be facial or as applied. Harris,2018 IL 121932, ¶ 38
. A facial challenge requires a showing that the statute is
unconstitutional under any set of facts, whereas an as-applied challenge is
dependent on the particular facts and circumstances of the challenging party. Id.
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The distinction is critical because defendant, by presenting an as-applied challenge
to a mandatory sentencing statute, must ultimately overcome the presumption that
the statute is constitutional by clearly establishing that the statute is invalid as
applied to him. People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 18. ¶ 26 D. Postconviction Pleading ¶ 27 Defendant’s petition cited Roper v. Simmons,543 U.S. 551, 578-79
(2005) (the
eighth and fourteenth amendments (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) prohibit
capital sentences for juveniles who commit murder), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 82 (2010) (the eighth amendment prohibits mandatory life sentences for
juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses), and Miller, 567 U.S. at 489 (the
eighth amendment prohibits mandatory life sentences for juveniles who commit
murder), for the proposition that juveniles are constitutionally different from adults
and less deserving of the most severe punishments. The petition alleged the
reasoning from those cases should be extended to his specific circumstances as a
22-year-old who was convicted of five first degree murders.
¶ 28 Defendant argues on appeal that, although he was 22 years old when he
committed the murders, he is entitled to Miller’s protection because studies have
shown that the brains of young adults, like those of juveniles, are still developing
in areas relevant to maturity and moral culpability. He contends the statute
mandating his life sentence is unconstitutional as applied to him where the
sentencing court could not fully consider the characteristics of youth or his personal
culpability.
¶ 29 We have cited People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, and Harris in stating that
“this court has not foreclosed ‘emerging adult’ defendants between 18 and 19 years
old from raising as-applied proportionate penalties clause challenges to life
sentences based on the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain
development.” People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 87. “[T]hose cases addressed
the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to
mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions,” which is what
defendant has undertaken here. (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 88. We note that
defendant was older than the defendants in Thompson and Harris, which itself casts
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doubt on the validity of his claim, but even if his underlying proportionate-penalties
claim had an arguable basis in law, it does not have an arguable basis in fact.
¶ 30 The petition asserted that defendant’s natural life sentence is excessive,
considering his criminal history, his involvement in the crime, and “the hallmark
features of his youth.” But neither the petition nor his affidavit mentioned anything
about the “hallmark features” of defendant’s youth, besides his age, that might
support a proportionate penalty challenge to his life sentence based on the evolving
science on juvenile maturity and brain development.
¶ 31 An emerging adult postconviction petitioner who simply cites his age at the
time of the offense and the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain
development does not state the gist of an as-applied claim that a mandatory life
sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.
Adopting defendant’s position that a 22-year-old serving a mandatory life sentence
can advance his petition to the second stage by citing brain research without placing
it in the context of his personal circumstances would effectively negate the factual
pleading requirements of section 122-2 of the Act.
¶ 32 Defendant relies on the principle that a postconviction petitioner must allege
only a limited amount of factual detail to avoid first-stage dismissal. But defendant
conflates factual allegations, which need to be pleaded at least partially, with legal
arguments, which do not. See Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 9 (while a pro se petitioner is
not required to make legal arguments or cite legal authority to survive first-stage
dismissal, he must still allege sufficient factual detail to place his constitutional
claims before the court). Here, the petition articulated a legal argument that is
impressively detailed for a pro se petitioner, but the legal assertions are not a
substitute for particular facts and circumstances related to defendant.
¶ 33 Defendant asks this court to remand the petition to the circuit court for the
appointment of counsel and second-stage proceedings to develop his factual
allegations. He compares his case to People v. Carrasquillo, 2020 IL App (1st)
180534, ¶ 109, where the appellate court advanced a successive postconviction
petition past the leave-to-file stage. The court observed that Carrasquillo could not
have possibly alleged an as-applied postconviction challenge to a de facto life
sentence in his initial postconviction proceeding in 1987 because he could not have
anticipated the Miller line of cases beginning in 2012 and could not have raised a
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claim based on a line of cases that had not been decided yet. Id. ¶¶ 108-09.
Carrasquillo, the court noted, was stuck in a “catch-22” because, “[w]ithout a
developed record, he cannot show his constitutional claim has merit, and without a
meritorious claim, he cannot proceed to develop a record.” Id. ¶ 109.
¶ 34 Defendant claims he was stuck in a similar catch-22 in that his eligibility for a
mandatory life sentence obviated any reason to present mitigating evidence at
sentencing. He asserts that, without a sentencing record to rely on, he could not
allege a factual basis for his proportionate-penalties argument. We disagree. To
survive first-stage summary dismissal, defendant was required only to allege—not
prove—enough facts to make out a claim that is arguably constitutional for
purposes of invoking the Act. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 9. Evidence presented in
mitigation at sentencing might have corroborated such allegations, but the omission
of mitigating evidence from the record did not preclude defendant from alleging
facts about himself in his petition. As the State noted during oral argument, a pro se
postconviction petitioner can draw from personal knowledge of his own
background when drafting the petition, regardless of whether the information was
presented at sentencing.
¶ 35 Defendant is requesting a remand for the appointment of counsel to develop
factual allegations, not to compile and present evidence to prove a claim that he
already alleged. The difference is illustrated by People v. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st)
173135, abrogated by Hilliard,2023 IL 128186, ¶ 28
, where the 22-year-old
defendant alleged that his discretionary 85-year sentence was unconstitutional
under the proportionate penalties clause as the sentencing statute applied to him.
Although Savage has been abrogated (Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 28), his
postconviction pleading provides an example of how a pro se petitioner can allege
at least some facts to support an as-applied proportionate penalties claim.
¶ 36 In stark contrast to defendant, Savage alleged that he shared certain behavioral
characteristics with juvenile offenders and those allegations were not contradicted
by the record:
“[Savage’s] petition alleges that he had been a drug addict since he was nine
years old, that he was using drugs every day at the time of the offense, and that
he was attempting to rob a drug house when the offenses at issue occurred. His
petition further alleges that his long-term addiction and his young age left him
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‘more susceptible to peer pressure’ and ‘more volatile in emotionally charged
settings.’
These allegations find support in the hospital discharge report that was filed
in connection with the preparation of the PSI. The hospital discharge report was
prepared when [Savage] was 15 and indicates that [Savage] began abusing
drugs six years earlier, or when he was 9 years old. This corroborates [Savage’s]
allegation that he began using drugs when he was nine years old. The report
states that [Savage’s] behavior deteriorated remarkably at nine years of age,
when the drug use began. The report indicates that, by the time he was 15 years
old, [Savage] was consuming ‘a considerable amount of drugs,’ with the result
that his mother was fearful of his potentially volatile behavior. Again, this
corroborates [Savage’s] allegation that his long-term addiction and young age
left him ‘more susceptible to peer pressure’ and ‘more volatile in emotionally
charged settings.’ The report also indicates that [Savage] was in special
education classes and suffered from persistent depression and a conduct
disorder.” Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶¶ 71-72.
¶ 37 Here, the dissenting justice in the appellate court determined that Savage’s
petition and defendant’s petition are comparable because neither was contradicted
by the record. 2021 IL App (1st) 190535, ¶¶ 43-44 (Mikva, P.J., dissenting). But
while Savage’s hospital discharge report corroborated his allegation that his youth
and history of drug use made him more susceptible to peer pressure and more
volatile in emotionally charged settings, defendant’s only factual allegation
pertaining to his youth and immaturity was his age. Defendant’s proportionate
penalties argument was not contradicted by the record because there was nothing
in the petition to contradict, as defendant did not allege any facts specific to him
that would be capable of objective or independent corroboration. See Hodges, 234
Ill. 2d at 10.
¶ 38 Defendant alternatively argues that the record contains facts that support his
proportionate penalties argument and “shed light on at least some of the attendant
characteristics of youth described by Miller.” Specifically, defendant cites trial
counsel’s statements to the jury that defendant, at the time of the shootings, was a
“smart aleck kid” who was “manipulated by older, wiser people who he thought he
could trust and were his friends.” However, the petition did not allege defendant
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was manipulated or acted impulsively, and it did not mention anything about his
background or the circumstances of the shootings that might support such an
assertion. And defendant did not attach anything to his petition to challenge his
sentence or state why the same was not attached. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West
2018); Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 10.
¶ 39 Moreover, even if defense counsel’s statements about immaturity and
manipulation could be attributed to defendant for purposes of postconviction
pleading, the notion that defendant committed five murders while he was the
functional equivalent of a juvenile is contradicted by the record. The jury heard
evidence that all five victims died from gunshot wounds to the head, three of the
victims were shot at close range, and defendant personally shot at least two of the
victims. Defendant planned the armed robbery of a victim’s home, solicited the
help of others, armed himself, ransacked nearly every part of the house, and stole
numerous items from the victims. The jury heard testimony that defendant laughed
as he transported the proceeds to his own home and distributed and sold them.
Defendant was the instigator of the criminal plan and a principal offender in the
unprovoked murder of five victims. The evidence at trial refutes the notion that
defendant was a “smart aleck kid” who was manipulated into committing multiple
murders.
¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 41 Defendant failed to meet the low threshold of pleading a limited amount of
factual detail particular to him that might support a claim that section 5-8-
1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Code violates his rights under the proportionate penalties clause
of the Illinois Constitution. Therefore, defendant’s postconviction petition failed to
state the gist of a constitutional claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to argue trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for not arguing that the statute is
unconstitutional as applied to defendant. We affirm the summary dismissal of the
postconviction petition.
¶ 42 Judgments affirmed.
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¶ 43 JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM, specially concurring:
¶ 44 I agree with the majority that the judgment of the appellate court, which
affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s postconviction petition, must
be affirmed. I disagree, however, with the majority’s reasoning in reaching that
result. Accordingly, I specially concur.
¶ 45 The defendant, Torolan Williams, was convicted of murdering five people.
Williams was 22 years old at the time he committed the five murders. Because he
was convicted of multiple murders, Williams was sentenced to a mandatory term
of natural life imprisonment pursuant to section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified
Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 2008)). That
provision states that “the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural life
imprisonment when the death penalty is not imposed if the defendant, ***
irrespective of the defendant’s age at the time of the commission of the offense, is
found guilty of murdering more than one victim.” Id. Williams’s convictions were
affirmed on direct appeal in the Illinois Appellate Court. People v. Williams, 2017
IL App (1st) 142733.
¶ 46 On October 24, 2018, Williams filed a pro se postconviction petition in the
circuit court of Cook County, in which he alleged that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel from both his trial and appellate attorneys when they failed to
argue that the mandatory sentencing scheme set forth in section 5-8-1(c)(2)(ii) of
the Code violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). In so arguing, Williams did not contend that the Illinois
General Assembly is prohibited from requiring a mandatory life sentence for all
defendants who commit multiple murders. Rather, his contention was that the
Illinois General Assembly was prohibited from adopting such a sentencing scheme
for “young adults” who commit multiple murders. More specifically, Williams
maintained that the Illinois General Assembly violated the proportionate penalties
clause of the Illinois Constitution when it enacted section 5-8-1(c)(2)(ii) of the
Code because the statute impermissibly removes all sentencing discretion from the
trial court, thereby prohibiting the court from considering any individual
characteristics of a “young adult” defendant, including his “age, his minimal
criminal history, his actual involvement in the crime and the ‘hallmark features of
his youth.’ ”
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¶ 47 In support of his claim that section 5-8-1(c)(2) of the Code is unconstitutional
under the Illinois Constitution, Williams cited Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460
(2012). In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that “the Eighth
Amendment [of the United States Constitution] forbids a sentencing scheme that
mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Id. at
479. Williams did not dispute that Miller’s holding was limited to juveniles, i.e.,
those under 18, but argued that the reasoning and rule of Miller should be extended
to all “young adults,” including himself, as a matter of Illinois law under the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.
¶ 48 Williams further cited cases and law review articles discussing the brain science
of “young adults” and maintained there is an emerging consensus that the brains of
“young adults” continue to develop into their mid-twenties. Relying on this science
regarding brain development, Williams asserted that the court should find the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution prohibits mandatory life
sentencing schemes for “young adults,” such as himself, who commit multiple
murders.
¶ 49 The trial court summarily dismissed Williams’s petition. The court found that,
because Williams was 22 years old when he committed the five murders, the
constitutional protections of Miller and its progeny were irrelevant to his claim. The
trial court explained that “there can be no constitutional violation by the trial court,
where the trial court was legislatively mandated to impose a mandatory life
sentence” by a constitutional statute.
¶ 50 On appeal, a majority of the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal
of Williams’s petition. 2021 IL App (1st) 190535, ¶ 36. The appellate court did so,
however, not on the basis given by the trial court but on the ground that Williams
“did not allege any facts particular to his case.” Id. According to the appellate court,
“[n]othing in the record or in [Williams’s] petition supported his allegation that the
trial court should have considered him a juvenile when he committed the offenses
as an adult.” Id. For this reason, his claim under the Illinois Constitution failed. Id.
¶ 51 Before this court, Williams again asserts that Miller’s reasoning should be
extended to “young adults” under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
Constitution and that the proportionate penalties clause prohibits mandatory life
sentencing schemes for “young adults” who commit multiple murders. Williams
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again points to cases and law review articles noting that the brains of “young adults”
are still developing and therefore are more akin to the brains of juveniles in regard
to maturity and moral culpability. And he again claims that the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution requires that the sentencing judge be
given the opportunity to consider any potentially mitigating evidence before
imposing a natural life sentence on a “young adult” who commits multiple murders.
I disagree.
¶ 52 Williams has not pointed to anything in the text or history of the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution that suggests that the Illinois General
Assembly may not set 18 as the age at which a defendant who commits multiple
murders must receive a natural life sentence. Instead, Williams’s argument is based
solely on the science regarding young adult brains.
¶ 53 This court addressed the issue of brain science in People v. Harris, 2018 IL
121932. There, this court considered the argument of the defendant in that case,
who was just over 18 years old and asserted that his mandatory sentence of 76
years’ imprisonment was unconstitutional under the eighth amendment of the
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII). Harris, 2018 IL 121932,
¶ 60. This court rejected the argument and, in so doing, noted that the United States
Supreme Court has determined that the traditional line between juveniles and adults
was set at age 18 and that scientific studies regarding young adult brains did not
change this determination. Id. We stated:
“[T]he line drawn by the Supreme Court at age 18 was not based primarily on
scientific research. The Supreme Court acknowledged its line at age 18 was an
imprecise ‘categorical rule[ ]’ but emphasized that ‘a line must be drawn.’
[Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005)]. The Court drew the line at age
18 because that ‘is the point where society draws the line for many purposes
between childhood and adulthood.’ Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. New research
findings do not necessarily alter that traditional line between adults and
juveniles.” Id.
¶ 54 This reasoning applies with equal force to the proportionate penalties clause of
the Illinois Constitution. It is well within the constitutional authority of the Illinois
General Assembly to establish 18 as the age of majority. Further, it is the
legislature’s prerogative to determine that 18 is the age at which defendants who
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commit multiple murders must receive a natural life sentence, regardless of their
individual circumstances. The Illinois General Assembly has access to the same
literature regarding evolving brain science and is, of course, free at any time to raise
the age of majority if it so chooses.
¶ 55 Apart from his argument regarding brain science, Williams offers no
explanation as to why the Illinois General Assembly is prohibited from enacting a
mandatory life sentencing scheme for “young adult” defendants, such as himself,
who commit multiple murders. Williams’s postconviction petition therefore fails as
a matter of law.
¶ 56 The majority affirms the dismissal of Williams’s petition, but like the appellate
court, it does so on the grounds that his petition lacked factual support. Supra ¶ 41.
The majority states that “even if [Williams’s] underlying proportionate-penalties
claim had an arguable basis in law, it does not have an arguable basis in fact.” Supra
¶ 29. In other words, the majority assumes—without deciding—that Williams is
correct and that the Illinois General Assembly may not enact a mandatory life
sentence scheme for “young adults” who murder multiple people. Williams’s
petition still fails, however, because, in the majority’s view, even if that premise
were true, Williams has failed to offer any factual support as to why he would not
be deserving of a natural life sentence.
¶ 57 In my view, this analysis is misplaced. Statutes are presumed constitutional.
People v. McKown, 2022 IL 127683, ¶ 29. As such, we must presume that the
Illinois General Assembly may constitutionally enact a sentencing scheme that
mandates life in prison for defendants over the age of 18 who murder multiple
people. We may not simply assume the opposite.
¶ 58 For the reasons noted above, Williams has not overcome the presumption of
constitutionality afforded the mandatory sentencing scheme set forth in section 5-
8-1(c)(2)(ii) of the Code. See id. (“the party challenging the constitutionality of a
statute has the burden of clearly establishing its invalidity”). That being the case,
Williams’s petition fails as a matter of law and was properly dismissed by the trial
court.
¶ 59 For these reasons, I specially concur.
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¶ 60 JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
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