People v. Molina

                                        IN THE
                               SUPREME COURT
                                           OF
                         THE STATE OF ILLINOIS




                                   (Docket No. 129237)

               THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
                        VINCENT MOLINA, Appellant.


                             Opinion filed December 5, 2024.



        JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Justices Overstreet, Cunningham, and Rochford concurred in the judgment and
     opinion.

        Justice O’Brien dissented, with opinion, joined by Chief Justice Theis.

        Justice Holder White took no part in the decision.



                                        OPINION

¶1      The issue presented in this case is whether a police officer’s detection of the
     odor of raw cannabis coming from a vehicle provides the officer with probable
     cause to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle. Illinois State Police trooper
     Ryan Wagand conducted a search of the vehicle Vincent Molina was a passenger
     in based solely on the odor of raw cannabis coming from the vehicle. Wagand
     suspected that there was cannabis in the vehicle that was not in an odor-proof
     container, which is a requirement of section 11-502.15 of the Illinois Vehicle Code
     (625 ILCS 5/11-502.15(c) (West 2020) (prohibiting the possession of cannabis in
     a motor vehicle upon a highway unless it is stored in a “sealed, odor-proof, child-
     resistant cannabis container”)). Wagand’s search uncovered improperly stored
     cannabis, and Molina was charged with a violation of section 11-502.15 of the
     Vehicle Code.

¶2      Molina filed a motion to suppress the cannabis. The circuit court of Whiteside
     County granted Molina’s motion to suppress the evidence, and the State appealed.
     The appellate court reversed and remanded for trial, holding that the odor of raw
     cannabis, standing alone, gave police probable cause to search the automobile in
     which Molina was a passenger. 

, ¶¶ 44-58.

¶3       We allowed Molina’s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme
     Court Rule 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). We also allowed the American Civil Liberties
     Union, ACLU of Illinois, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
     and the Illinois Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers to file an amicus curiae
     brief on behalf of Molina’s position. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). For
     the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.


¶4                                          I. BACKGROUND

¶5       On December 3, 2020, Trooper Wagand saw a car speeding on Interstate 88 in
     Whiteside County. See 625 ILCS 5/11-601(f)(1.5) (West 2020) (setting the
     “maximum speed limit” at “70 miles per hour upon any interstate highway”).
     Wagand effectuated a traffic stop. 1 After Wagand smelled the odor of raw cannabis
     coming from the car, he searched the car. Wagand found that Molina, a passenger
     in the car, possessed several “joints” of cannabis. Prosecutors charged Molina with
     misdemeanor possession of cannabis by an automobile passenger. 

 § 11-

         1
          Molina conceded in the circuit court that the initial stop was valid. The validity of the stop has
     never been at issue, and therefore, we need not discuss it further.




                                                     -2-
       502.15(c) (“No passenger may possess cannabis within any passenger area of any
       motor vehicle upon a highway in this State except in a sealed, odor-proof, child-
       resistant cannabis container.”).


¶6                                        A. Circuit Court

¶7         Molina filed a motion to suppress the cannabis. At the hearing on the motion,
       Wagand testified that Molina was the front-seat passenger in a vehicle he stopped
       for speeding. Wagand approached on the passenger side, and the passenger-side
       window was lowered. Wagand initially testified that he smelled the strong odor of
       burnt cannabis coming from inside the vehicle. However, after being shown his
       police report, Wagand corrected his testimony and stated that he detected a strong
       odor of fresh cannabis. Wagand testified that he had training and experience in the
       discernment of the difference between the odor of burnt and raw cannabis.

¶8         Wagand testified that he decided to search the vehicle based on the odor of fresh
       cannabis coming from the vehicle. Wagand found several rolled joints in a small
       cardboard box in the center console. Wagand also found suspected cannabis in a
       clear plastic container with an attached and sealed lid in the glove box.

¶9         The circuit court granted the motion to suppress. The court held that the odor
       of raw cannabis, without more, is insufficient as a matter of law to establish
       probable cause to search a vehicle. The court noted that a contrary holding would
       place Illinois citizens over the age of 21 in the untenable position of exercising their
       rights under the Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act (Regulation Act) (410 ILCS
       705/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)) while simultaneously forfeiting their constitutional
       right to be free from unreasonable searches.

¶ 10      The State filed an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule
       604(a)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) with a certificate stating that the order substantially
       impaired its prosecution of the case (see People v. Truitt, 

       (1997)).




                                                -3-
¶ 11                                   B. Appellate Court

¶ 12       The appellate court reversed, holding that “the smell of raw cannabis, without
       any corroborating factors, is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a
       person’s vehicle.” 

, ¶ 52. The court recognized the
       “recent changes in the law legalizing possession of small amounts of cannabis” but
       also noted that there remain “(1) illegal ways to transport it, (2) illegal places to
       consume it, and (3) illegal amounts of it to possess.” Id. ¶ 43.

¶ 13       Based on the current regulatory state of cannabis, the court was unpersuaded
       that the “legal landscape” had changed in such a way as to render this court’s
       opinions in People v. Stout, 

 (1985), and People v. Hill, 

, inapplicable. 

, ¶ 43. The court concluded that

          “an officer who smells cannabis in a vehicle he has just stopped is almost certain
          to discover a violation of the Vehicle Code because the law clearly states that
          when cannabis is transported in a private vehicle, the cannabis must be stored
          in a sealed, odor-proof container—in other words, the cannabis should be
          undetectable by smell by a police officer.” (Emphasis in original) 

 ¶ 44
          (citing 625 ILCS 5/11-502.15(c) (West 2020)).

       We allowed Molina’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Oct. 1,
       2021).


¶ 14                                     II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15       The sole issue before this court is whether Trooper Wagand had probable cause
       to search the vehicle Molina was a passenger in after Wagand smelled the odor of
       raw cannabis coming from the vehicle. If the answer is yes, the search was valid,
       and the motion to suppress should have been denied. If the answer is no, the search
       violated Molina’s constitutional rights, and the motion to suppress was correctly
       granted.




                                               -4-
¶ 16                                  A. Standard of Review

¶ 17       We review the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress under the two-part
       standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Ornelas v. United
       States, 

 (1996). Hill, 

, ¶ 14. “Factual findings
       by the trial court will be reversed only if they are against the manifest weight of the
       evidence, but the ultimate legal determination as to whether suppression is
       warranted is reviewed de novo.” People v. Salamon, 

.


¶ 18              B. Constitutional Prohibitions Against Unreasonable Searches

¶ 19       The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right
       of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
       unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
       issue, but upon probable cause ***.” U.S. Const., amend. IV. The Illinois
       Constitution similarly provides: “The people shall have the right to be secure in
       their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches
       ***. No warrant shall issue without probable cause ***.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
       § 6. “[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
       judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
       subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz
       v. United States, 

 (1967).

¶ 20       One well-established exception is for searches of automobiles. See Carroll v.
       United States, 

 (1925); People v. Webb, 

       (“There are recognized exceptions to the general rule, however, including an
       exception for searches of vehicles.”). The automobile exception is justified because
       of an automobile’s “transient nature,” which “often renders it impracticable to
       secure a warrant before the automobile escapes the jurisdiction in which the warrant
       must be sought.” Hill, 

, ¶ 21. “Under the automobile exception, law
       enforcement officers may undertake a warrantless search of a vehicle if there is
       probable cause to believe that the automobile contains evidence of criminal activity
       that the officers are entitled to seize.” People v. James, 

 (1994).




                                                -5-
¶ 21                               C. Probable Cause to Search

¶ 22       Probable cause exists where the evidence known to the officer raises a “fair
       probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
       place.” Illinois v. Gates, 

 (1983); see 

 at 243 n.13 (“[P]robable
       cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an
       actual showing of such activity.”). “Whether the necessary probability exists is
       governed by commonsense considerations that are factual and practical, rather than
       by technical rules.” People v. Manzo, 

. “[P]robable cause does
       not require an officer to rule out any innocent explanations for suspicious facts.”
       Hill, 

. “Instead, it requires only that the facts available to the
       officer—including the plausibility of an innocent explanation—would warrant a
       reasonable man to believe there is a reasonable probability” that a search of the
       automobile will uncover contraband or evidence of criminal activity. 

 “A court
       must examine the events leading up to the search or seizure, and then decide
       whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively
       reasonable law enforcement officer, amount to probable cause.” People v. Jones,
       

 (2005).


¶ 23                    D. Evolution of Cannabis Law—Prelegalization

¶ 24       Because cannabis law has evolved over the last decade, we briefly address the
       evolution of statutes dealing with cannabis and the caselaw analyzing whether
       probable cause exists based on an officer’s detection of the odor of cannabis coming
       from a vehicle. And because probable cause is predicated on the inculpatory and
       exculpatory facts known to the officer after the stop and the likelihood that a search
       will produce contraband or evidence of criminal activity, we address the state of
       cannabis laws at the time of the stop in December 2020.

¶ 25       Prior to 1971, marijuana was classified as a narcotic and punished accordingly.
       See People v. McCabe, 

 (1971) (per curiam) (observing that the
       legislature had recently removed marijuana from the Narcotic Drug Act (Ill. Rev.
       Stat. 1969, ch. 38, ¶ 22-1 et seq.)). In 1971, the legislature enacted the Cannabis
       Control Act (Control Act). See Pub. Act 77-758, § 1 (eff. Aug. 16, 1971) (adding




                                               -6-
       Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 56½, § 701 et seq.). 2 The Control Act provided: “It is
       unlawful for any person knowingly to possess cannabis.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch.
       56½, § 704. The Control Act set penalties between a Class C misdemeanor for the
       possession of not more than 2.5 grams of any substance containing cannabis and a
       Class 3 felony for the possession of more than 500 grams of any substance
       containing cannabis. Id. In Stout, 

, this court held that “additional
       corroboration” was not required to establish probable cause for a warrantless search
       “where a trained and experienced police officer detects the odor of cannabis
       emanating from a defendant’s vehicle.”

¶ 26       In 2013, the General Assembly passed the Compassionate Use of Medical
       Cannabis Pilot Program Act (Medical Act). See Pub. Act 98-122, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1,
       2014) (adding 410 ILCS 130/1 et seq.). The Medical Act made it lawful for certain
       individuals with debilitating medical conditions to possess and use cannabis. 410
       ILCS 130/10(t), 25(a) (West 2014). Nevertheless, the Vehicle Code prohibited the
       use of cannabis in a motor vehicle upon a highway (625 ILCS 5/11-502.1(a) (West
       2014)), and if it was possessed in a motor vehicle, the cannabis had to be stored in
       a “sealed, tamper-evident medical cannabis container” (id. § 11-502.1(b), (c)).

¶ 27      In 2016, the Control Act was amended, and the possession of not more than 10
       grams of any substance containing cannabis was made a civil law violation with a
       minimum fine of $100 and a maximum fine of $200. 720 ILCS 550/4(a) (West
       2018); see Pub. Act 99-697, § 40 (eff. July 29, 2016). Possession of more than 10
       grams of a substance containing cannabis remained criminal, with penalties ranging
       from a Class B misdemeanor to a Class 1 felony. 720 ILCS 550/4(b)-(g) (West
       2018).

¶ 28      While the legal landscape was evolving—the legalization of medical cannabis
       and the decriminalization of the possession of a small amount of cannabis—this
       court decided Hill, 

. In Hill, this court decided the propriety of a


           2
             Among the legislative findings were that cannabis was “widely used and pervasive among the
       citizens of Illinois” and that previous laws on cannabis had “unnecessarily and unrealistically drawn
       a large segment of our population within the criminal justice system.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 56½,
       § 701. The General Assembly declared its intent to “establish a reasonable penalty system which is
       responsive to the current state of knowledge concerning cannabis and which directs the greatest
       efforts of law enforcement agencies toward the commercial traffickers and large-scale purveyors of
       cannabis.” Id.




                                                      -7-
       search that occurred on May 29, 2017. Id. ¶ 5. The defendant was pulled over based
       on the officer’s belief that the passenger was a fugitive. Id. The defendant drove a
       few blocks before pulling over, which the officer testified was indicative of
       someone in the car concealing or destroying contraband or producing a weapon. Id.
       The officer approached the passenger side and immediately smelled the strong odor
       of raw cannabis. Id. The passenger admitted that he smokes cannabis and that he
       had smoked earlier that day. Id. ¶ 10. The officer also saw a “bud” in the back seat
       of the car. Id.

¶ 29       This court first declined to address the “narrow legal issue” of whether Stout
       remained good law because, unlike the officer in Stout, the officer relied on more
       than the odor of cannabis. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18. In a footnote we stated: “Although we do
       not reach whether the odor of cannabis, alone, is sufficient to establish probable
       cause, the smell and presence of cannabis undoubtedly remains a factor in a
       probable cause determination.” Id. ¶ 18 n.2.

¶ 30       This court then analyzed the changes in Illinois’s cannabis law. Id. ¶¶ 27-31.
       We rejected the defendant’s argument that decriminalization of small amounts of
       cannabis affected the probable cause analysis because the possession of cannabis
       remained unlawful. See id. ¶¶ 31 (“the decriminalization of possessing small
       amounts of cannabis did not alter the status of cannabis as contraband”). Regarding
       the Medical Act, we noted that, “[w]hile the mere presence of cannabis for medical
       users may no longer be immediately attributable to criminal activity or possession
       of contraband, such users must possess and use cannabis in accordance with the
       [Medical] Act.” Id. ¶ 34 (citing the Vehicle Code’s requirement that a medical
       user’s possession of cannabis within a motor vehicle had to be in a “sealed, tamper-
       evident medical cannabis container” (625 ILCS 5/11-502.1(b), (c) (West 2016))).
       With the legal framework laid, this court found that the officers had probable cause
       to search the defendant’s vehicle based on (1) the defendant’s delay in pulling over
       and the officer’s testimony that a delay often means the car’s occupants are hiding
       contraband or retrieving a weapon, (2) the passenger stating that he smokes
       cannabis and had done so that day, (3) the officer’s observation of a loose “bud” in
       the back seat, and (4) the smell of a strong odor of cannabis, which “together”
       indicated that cannabis was in the car and, likely, not properly contained. Id. ¶ 35.




                                               -8-
¶ 31                    E. Public Act 101-27: Control Act Amended and
                                    Regulation Act Enacted

¶ 32        On June 25, 2019, the General Assembly passed Public Act 101-27 (eff. June
       25, 2019), which amended the Control Act, amended the Vehicle Code, and created
       the Regulation Act. We pause here because the validity of parts of the statutory
       scheme at issue in this case is subject to dispute. Two provisions cover the
       possession of cannabis within a motor vehicle. Each provision contains distinct
       requirements. See 410 ILCS 705/10-35(a)(2)(D) (West 2020) (requiring cannabis
       possessed in a vehicle to be in a “reasonably secured, sealed container and
       reasonably inaccessible while the vehicle is moving”); 625 ILCS 5/11-502.15(b),
       (c) (West 2020) (requiring cannabis possessed in a motor vehicle to be in a “sealed,
       odor-proof, child-resistant cannabis container”). We are asked to determine if both
       provisions were valid at the time of the stop or, if only one provision was valid,
       which one.


¶ 33                         1. Principles of Statutory Interpretation

¶ 34       “This court has frequently restated the basic principles of statutory
       interpretation.” People v. Lane, 

. “The most fundamental rule
       in statutory construction is to give effect to the legislative intent.” Murray v.
       Chicago Youth Center, 

 (2007). “The language of the statute is
       the best indication of the legislature’s intent.” 

 “If the language of a statute is
       clear, this court must give effect to its plain and ordinary meaning without resort to
       other aids of statutory construction.” 

 We review issues of statutory interpretation
       de novo. Doe v. Burke Wise Morrissey & Kaveny, LLC, 

, ¶ 20.


¶ 35                  2. Provisions Legalizing Use and Possession of Cannabis

¶ 36      In Public Act 101-27 (eff. June 25, 2019) and Public Act 101-593 (eff. Dec. 4,
       2019), the General Assembly amended section 4 of the Control Act to provide:
       “Except as otherwise provided in the Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act and the
       Industrial Hemp Act, it is unlawful for any person knowingly to possess cannabis.”
       The Control Act maintained the same penalty structure regarding the possession of
       cannabis: the possession of not more than 10 grams of a substance containing




                                                -9-
       cannabis remained a civil law violation, and the possession of more than 10 grams
       was penalized ranging from a Class B misdemeanor to a Class 1 felony. See 720
       ILCS 550/4(a)-(g) (West 2020).

¶ 37       In the same Public Act 101-27 (eff. June 25, 2019), the General Assembly
       enacted the Regulation Act (410 ILCS 705/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)), the most
       comprehensive and detailed legislation regarding the use and possession of
       cannabis in the State of Illinois. 3 In what could be described as the legalization
       clause, section 10-5 of the Regulation Act provides:

           “Beginning January 1, 2020, notwithstanding any other provision of law, and
           except as otherwise provided in this Act, the following acts are not a violation
           of this Act and shall not be a criminal or civil offense under State law or the
           ordinances of any unit of local government of this State or be a basis for seizure
           or forfeiture of assets under State law for persons other than natural individuals
           under 21 years of age:

                     (1) possession, consumption, use, purchase, obtaining, or transporting
                  cannabis paraphernalia or an amount of cannabis for personal use that does
                  not exceed the possession limit[ 4 ] under Section 10-10 or otherwise in
                  accordance with the requirements of this Act[.]” 

 § 10-5(a)(1).

¶ 38       Two clauses in section 10-5 stand out. The first is the “notwithstanding” clause.
       As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “in construing statutes, the use
       of *** a ‘notwithstanding’ clause clearly signals the drafter’s intention that the
       provisions of the ‘notwithstanding’ section override conflicting provisions of any
       other section.” Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 

 (1993). Our

           3
               The legislative findings for the Regulation Act include the following:

            “In the interest of allowing law enforcement to focus on violent and property crimes, generating
            revenue for education, substance abuse prevention and treatment, freeing public resources to
            invest in communities and other public purposes, and individual freedom, the General
            Assembly finds and declares that the use of cannabis should be legal for persons 21 years of
            age or older and should be taxed in a manner similar to alcohol.” 410 ILCS 705/1-5(a) (West
            2020).
            4
              Section 10-10 defines the possession limit “for a person who is 21 years of age or older and a
       resident of this State” as “(1) 30 grams of cannabis flower; (2) no more than 500 milligrams of THC
       contained in cannabis-infused product; [and] (3) 5 grams of cannabis concentrate.” 410 ILCS
       705/10-10(a)(1)-(3) (West 2020).




                                                        - 10 -
       appellate court has similarly recognized that the term “ ‘notwithstanding’ ” means
       “ ‘in spite of’ ” and the use of the phrase “ ‘[n]otwithstanding the other provisions
       of this Article’ ” in one section means that that section controls over any conflicting
       section within the same article. Waliczek v. Retirement Board of Firemen’s Annuity
       & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 

, 36 (2000) (quoting 40 ILCS 5/5-
       136.1 (West 1998)). In short, the “notwithstanding” clause means that the
       Regulation Act prevails over any conflicting “provision of law.”

¶ 39       The second is the “except as otherwise provided in this Act” clause. The phrase,
       as simply understood, means that the forthcoming proposition holds unless an
       exception is expressly provided in the Regulation Act. See Crosby v. United States,
       

 (1993) (holding that the use of the phrase “ ‘except as otherwise
       provided by this rule’ ” (emphasis omitted) was a “limiting phrase” that marked as
       “exclusive” the list of situations where a trial court could depart from the general
       rule (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 (eff. Aug. 1, 1987))).

¶ 40        These two clauses, taken together, provide (1) that the forthcoming proposition
       applies in spite of any conflicting “provision of law” and (2) that any exception to
       the forthcoming proposition must be expressly provided for in the Regulation Act.
       The forthcoming proposition, 5 in laymen’s terms, is that it is legal for an Illinois
       citizen who is over the age of 21 to use or possess up to 30 grams of cannabis. The
       proposition prevails over any other provision of law unless the Regulation Act
       expressly provides for an exception.


¶ 41                    3. Requirements to Possess Cannabis in a Motor Vehicle

¶ 42      Relevant here, the Regulation Act includes two exceptions to the general
       proposition that it is legal for an Illinois citizen who is over the age of 21 to use or



           5
            The legalization clause is expressed in broader terms in section 10-25, titled “Immunities and
       presumptions related to the use of cannabis by purchasers,” which provides:

               “A purchaser who is 21 years of age or older is not subject to arrest, prosecution, denial of
           any right or privilege, or other punishment *** based solely on the use of cannabis if (1) the
           purchaser possesses an amount of cannabis that does not exceed the possession limit under
           Section 10-10 ***.” 410 ILCS 705/10-25(a)(1) (West 2020).




                                                     - 11 -
       possess up to 30 grams of cannabis. Section 10-35, titled “Limitations and
       penalties,” provides:

              “(a) This Act does not permit any person to engage in, and does not prevent
          the imposition of any civil, criminal, or other penalties for ***

                  ***

                  (2) possessing cannabis:

                                               ***

                      (D) in a vehicle not open to the public unless the cannabis is in a
                  reasonably secured, sealed container and reasonably inaccessible while
                  the vehicle is moving[.]” 410 ILCS 705/10-35(a)(2)(D) (West 2020).

¶ 43      Section 10-35 further provides: “(a) This Act does not permit any person to
       engage in, and does not prevent the imposition of any civil, criminal, or other
       penalties for *** (3) using cannabis *** (D) in any motor vehicle *** [or] (F) in
       any public place[.]” 

 § 10-35(a)(3)(D), (F).

¶ 44       A plain reading of the Regulation Act would indicate that section 10-35 sets the
       outer bounds of conduct that can subject an individual to civil or criminal penalty.
       In other words, if an individual’s conduct conforms to section 10-35, then that
       individual is immune from any punishment for the use or possession of cannabis,
       civil or criminal.

¶ 45       Yet, within the same public act that created the Regulation Act, the legislature
       amended the Vehicle Code to prohibit the possession of cannabis in a motor vehicle
       unless it is stored in a “sealed, odor-proof, child-resistant cannabis container.” 625
       ILCS 5/11-502.15(b), (c) (West 2020). The State concedes, and we agree, that the
       Vehicle Code contains an “additional requirement” beyond the possession
       requirements in the Regulation Act: namely, that the cannabis be stored in an odor-
       proof container.




                                               - 12 -
¶ 46                       4. The Provisions of the Regulation Act and
                               Vehicle Code Can Be Harmonized

¶ 47       Molina contends (1) that the two provisions cannot be harmonized, (2) that the
       Regulation Act is both more specific and more recently enacted, and (3) that the
       odor-proof container requirement is, therefore, invalid. Conflicting statutory
       provisions would typically necessitate a determination of which statute controls.
       However, utilizing numerous long-standing methods of statutory interpretation, we
       reject Molina’s argument that the odor-proof container requirement is invalid.

¶ 48       First, we have long held that “statutes passed, approved and to take effect on
       the same day, and relating to the same subject matter, will be assumed to have been
       enacted at the same time and are to be construed as one act.” People ex rel. Funk v.
       Hagist, 

 (1948); People ex rel. Little v. Peoria & Eastern Ry. Co.,
       

 (1943) (“A rule of construction, long established, requires that acts
       enacted at the same session of the General Assembly must be considered
       in pari materia, so that both acts must, if possible, be given effect.”). Under this
       rule of construction, it is rational to interpret section 10-5 of the Regulation Act’s
       use of the phrase “except as otherwise provided in this Act” to include the
       contemporaneous amendments to the Vehicle Code. In other words, section 11-
       502.15 of the Vehicle Code, enacted in the same public act that created the
       Regulation Act, serves as an exception to section 10-5’s general grant of immunity.

¶ 49       Added support for a harmonized reading of the Regulation Act and Vehicle
       Code is the rule of construction that repeals by implication are not favored. See
       In re Hernandez, 

 (“The repeal or amendment of statutes by
       implication is not favored.”). “Courts presume that the legislature envisions a
       consistent body of law when it enacts new legislation.” Lily Lake Road Defenders
       v. County of McHenry, 

 (1993). We would be ignoring our rules of
       statutory construction if this court were to presume that the legislature intended to
       simultaneously enact and invalidate the odor-proof container requirement. See
       People v. Hanna, 

 (2003) (declining to interpret a regulation by
       its plain language where, to do so, the court would have to attribute “nonsensical
       intentions” to the Department of Public Health); Public Citizen v. United States
       Department of Justice, 

, 453 n.9 (1989) (declining to interpret a statute
       in a way that would attribute an “outlandish” intent to Congress).




                                               - 13 -
¶ 50       For the aforementioned reasons, we agree with the appellate court’s holding
       that the

           “legislature did not intend to modify, repeal, or supersede the requirement of
           sections 11-502.1 and 11-502.15 of the Vehicle Code that cannabis be stored in
           an odor-proof container during transport in a vehicle when it mandated in the
           Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act and Medical Act that cannabis be ‘reasonably
           secured’ during such transport.” 

, ¶ 38. 6


¶ 51                          F. Trooper Wagand Had Probable Cause to
                                    Conduct a Warrantless Search

¶ 52       With our holding that the Vehicle Code’s odor-proof container requirement was
       valid at the time of the stop, the result in this case is based on our precedent. As we
       stated in Hill, although cannabis may no longer be contraband in all circumstances,
       “users must possess and use cannabis in accordance with” our laws. Hill, 

. Wagand, an officer trained to distinguish between burnt and raw
       cannabis, smelled the odor of raw cannabis coming from the vehicle, and the
       officer’s training and experience would create at least a reasonable belief or fair
       probability that raw cannabis was in the vehicle stored in a container that was not
       odor-proof. See id. ¶ 24; Gates, 

.

¶ 53       We recognize the difference in our probable cause analysis based on the odor
       of burnt cannabis (see People v. Redmond, 

) and the odor of
       raw cannabis. In Redmond, we held that “the odor of burnt cannabis, alone, is
       insufficient to provide probable cause for police officers to perform a warrantless
       search of a vehicle.” 

 In doing so, we compared the odor of burnt cannabis to the
       odor of alcohol because the possession of both cannabis and alcohol is lawful under


           6
             Even if we were to find an ambiguity on the question of whether the odor-proof container
       requirement is valid, which we do not, suppression of the evidence would not be warranted. It is
       reasonable for a police officer to enforce a substantive law enacted by the legislature even if the
       substantive law is later determined to be invalid by a court. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 

 (1979) (upholding an arrest as reasonable where an officer relied on a statute later
       determined to be invalid); People v. Holmes, 

 (relying on DeFillippo for the
       proposition that “probable cause would not be retroactively invalidated by the subsequent
       invalidation of the statute upon which probable cause was based at the time of the arrest”).




                                                     - 14 -
       some circumstances and unlawful under other circumstances. Id. ¶ 48. There is a
       key distinction between the odor of alcohol and the odor of cannabis; namely,
       alcohol, unlike cannabis, does not have a raw and burnt form.

¶ 54       The comparison between the odor of alcohol and the odor of burnt cannabis was
       appropriate in Redmond because both strongly indicate that the substances have
       been or are being consumed. And while the odor of alcohol might indicate the
       current unlawful possession of alcohol (see 625 ILCS 5/11-502(b) (West 2020)
       (providing that “alcoholic liquor within any passenger area of any motor vehicle
       upon a highway in this State” must be possessed “in the original container and with
       the seal unbroken”)), that probability is significantly reduced when an officer has
       ruled out impaired driving. See State v. Stevenson, 

 (Kan. 2014)
       (“Country common sense would likewise lead one to believe that an intoxicated
       person would be more likely to have an open container in the vehicle from which
       he or she had been drinking than a sober person who had passed the field sobriety
       tests.”).

¶ 55       On the other hand, the odor of raw cannabis coming from a vehicle strongly
       indicates the current presence of cannabis. And when the odor of raw cannabis
       comes from a vehicle driven on an Illinois highway, it is almost certain that the
       cannabis is being possessed in violation of the Vehicle Code’s odor-proof container
       requirement. It is unclear what other inference an officer could draw upon the
       detection of the odor of raw cannabis other than that the odor is coming from
       cannabis currently possessed in the vehicle. In short, while cannabis is legal to
       possess generally, it is illegal to possess in a vehicle on an Illinois highway unless
       in an odor-proof container. The odor of raw cannabis strongly suggests that the
       cannabis is not being possessed within the parameters of Illinois law. And, unlike
       the odor of burnt cannabis, the odor of raw cannabis coming from a vehicle reliably
       points to when, where, and how the cannabis is possessed—namely, currently, in
       the vehicle, and not in an odor-proof container.

¶ 56      In sum, different inferences arise depending on whether the odor of burnt or
       raw cannabis is detected. The odor of burnt cannabis suggests prior or current
       cannabis use, and the odor of raw cannabis suggests that cannabis is currently
       possessed in the area where the odor is detected. Different laws are implicated
       based on those inferences. The inference of current or prior use implicates the




                                               - 15 -
       prohibition on the use of cannabis within a motor vehicle on an Illinois highway
       (625 ILCS 5/11-502.15(a) (West 2020) (“No driver may use cannabis within the
       passenger area of any motor vehicle upon a highway in this State.”)), and the
       inference of current possession implicates the prohibition on the possession of
       cannabis within a motor vehicle on an Illinois highway unless the cannabis is in an
       odor-proof container (id. § 11-502.15(c) (prohibiting the possession of cannabis in
       a motor vehicle upon a highway unless it is stored in a “sealed, odor-proof, child-
       resistant cannabis container”)). Therefore, the two distinct odors cannot be treated
       as equals in a probable cause analysis.

¶ 57       We also disagree with the trial court’s reliance on the “many innocent reasons”
       a person or vehicle may smell like raw cannabis. The trial court found, without
       evidence in the record, that the officer did not have probable cause because a person
       (1) may work at a cannabis cultivation facility or a dispensary or (2) cultivate plants
       for medical use. While we discussed in Hill an officer’s duty to consider “the
       plausibility of an innocent explanation,” we also made it clear that “probable cause
       does not require an officer to rule out any innocent explanations for suspicious
       facts.” Hill, 

. Here, there was no evidence that Trooper
       Wagand discovered any innocent explanation for the odor of raw cannabis. And
       based on Hill, he was not required to rule out the possibility of hypothetical
       innocent explanations before proceeding to search the vehicle Molina was in.

¶ 58       It should be noted that we reach the result in this case based on the stringent
       “odor-proof” container requirement in the Vehicle Code. See 625 ILCS 5/11-
       502.15(c) (West 2020). The only other place in our cannabis statutes where an
       “odor-proof” container is required is for entities packaging a product containing
       cannabis for sale. See 410 ILCS 705/55-21(c) (West 2020) (“Any product
       containing cannabis shall be packaged in a sealed, odor-proof, and child-resistant
       cannabis container consistent with current standards ***.”). In other words, in order
       for a recreational user to possess cannabis in a motor vehicle on a highway, the
       user’s possession of cannabis must comply with the same rigid standards required
       of those packaging cannabis products for sale.

¶ 59      It is the General Assembly that makes the laws and regulates the use and
       possession of cannabis. We are mindful that the legislature has considered




                                               - 16 -
       amending 7 the Vehicle Code, but it might also consider amending the Regulation
       Act, as both statutes govern how an individual may possess cannabis within a motor
       vehicle on an Illinois highway. Because both the Vehicle Code and Regulation Act
       regulate the possession of cannabis in a motor vehicle on a highway, consistency
       between the two laws is essential so users of cannabis know how to possess
       cannabis without violating the laws and so police officers know when they have
       probable cause to enforce the laws.


¶ 60                                     III. CONCLUSION

¶ 61       In sum, we hold that the odor of raw cannabis coming from a vehicle being
       operated on an Illinois highway, alone, is sufficient to provide police officers, who
       are trained and experienced in distinguishing between burnt and raw cannabis, with
       probable cause to perform a warrantless search of a vehicle. See Hill, 

, ¶ 18 n.2 (“the smell and presence of cannabis undoubtedly remains a factor
       in a probable cause determination”). Our finding of probable cause is consistent
       with the Vehicle Code’s odor-proof container requirement. In other words, an
       officer trained and experienced in distinguishing between burnt and raw cannabis
       who smells the odor of raw cannabis in a vehicle stopped on the highway would
       logically suspect that there is cannabis in the vehicle that is not properly contained
       as required by the Vehicle Code. See 625 ILCS 5/11-502.15(b), (c) (West 2020).
       Therefore, the circuit court erred when it granted the motion suppressing the raw
       cannabis confiscated from Molina. Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court’s
       decision reversing the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence seized in the
       warrantless search of Molina’s car.




           7
             We are mindful of pending legislation where (1) the Senate has proposed an
       amendment to section 11-502.15 of the Vehicle Code that would provide: “The odor of
       burnt or raw cannabis in a motor vehicle by itself shall not constitute probable cause for
       the search of a motor vehicle or person.” 103d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Bill 125 2023 Sess.
       (introduced January 24, 2023, by Senator Rachel Ventura); and (2) the House has proposed
       an amendment eliminating the odor-proof container requirement from the Vehicle Code.
       103d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 1206, 2023 Sess. (introduced January 17, 2023, by
       Representative Curtis J. Tarver II).



                                                 - 17 -
¶ 62      Appellate court judgment affirmed.

¶ 63      Circuit court judgment reversed.

¶ 64      Cause remanded.


¶ 65      JUSTICE O’BRIEN, dissenting:

¶ 66       I agree with much of the analysis employed by the majority in tracking the
       evolution and statutory construction of cannabis law in Illinois. I disagree, however,
       that this analysis leads to the conclusion reached by the majority that, in this narrow
       context, the odor of raw cannabis should be distinguished from the odors of burnt
       cannabis or an alcoholic beverage. I dissent from the majority opinion simply to
       point out the absurdity of this inconsistency. It makes no sense to treat raw cannabis
       as more probative when the odor of burnt cannabis may suggest recent use, whereas
       the odor of raw cannabis does not suggest consumption. If the crime suggested by
       the odor of burnt cannabis is not sufficient for probable cause, then certainly the
       crime suggested by the odor of raw cannabis cannot be either. For the reasons that
       follow, I would find that the odor of raw cannabis coming from a vehicle, standing
       alone, does not give a police officer probable cause to conduct a warrantless search
       of the vehicle and would, therefore, reverse the judgment of the appellate court and
       affirm the circuit court’s order granting defendant’s motion to suppress.

¶ 67       As the majority acknowledges, in a case that was previously consolidated with
       the instant case, People v. Redmond, 

, we held that the odor
       of burnt cannabis, standing alone, was insufficient to provide probable cause for a
       warrantless search of a vehicle. We reached that conclusion after acknowledging
       that Illinois cannabis law has evolved and that the use and possession of cannabis
       has been legalized in numerous situations, so that “the smell resulting from that
       legal use and possession is not indicative of the commission of a criminal offense.”
       

 “[T]he odor of burnt cannabis in a motor vehicle, standing alone, is not a
       sufficiently inculpatory fact that reliably points to who used the cannabis, when the
       cannabis was used, or where the cannabis was used.” 

 In reaching that
       conclusion, we compared the odor of burnt cannabis to the odor of alcohol and
       relied on the proposition that “more is needed to establish probable cause than the
       odor of alcohol.” Id. ¶ 48.




                                               - 18 -
¶ 68       Here, the appellate court below rejected the comparison to alcohol on the basis
       that alcohol is regulated differently than cannabis; specifically, there is no similar
       requirement in the Illinois Vehicle Code that alcohol be in an odor-proof container.
       

, ¶ 51. However, the odor of alcohol emanating from a
       motor vehicle could indicate a violation of the Vehicle Code, such as driving while
       intoxicated or transporting alcohol with a broken seal. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1)
       (West 2020) (illegal to drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle while
       over the legal limit); 

 § 11-502(a), (b) (illegal to transport alcohol in the
       passenger area of a vehicle, unless in the original container and with the seal
       unbroken). Even so, we have concluded that the odor of alcohol, absent any other
       factor, is insufficient to establish probable cause to search the vehicle. See
       Redmond, 

; see also People v. Smith, 

 (1983)
       (probable cause was based on the odor of alcohol and the visible bottle of liquid
       that appeared to be beer); People v. Gray, 

 (1981) (probable
       cause based on odor of alcohol plus observation of two open beer bottles); People
       v. Corrigan, 

 (1977) (probable cause based on furtive
       movements, unusual liquid dripping from the glove compartment, and odor of
       alcohol).

¶ 69       In an attempt to explain why our approach to raw cannabis is different than our
       approach to alcohol or burnt cannabis, the majority distinguishes the odors of burnt
       cannabis and alcohol from the odor of raw cannabis on the basis that the former
       odors “strongly indicate that the substances have been or are being consumed”
       (supra ¶ 54), while the latter odor “strongly indicates the current presence of
       cannabis” (supra ¶ 55). The Vehicle Code prohibits not only the possession of
       cannabis in a vehicle unless it is in an odor-proof container but also prohibits the
       use of cannabis in any vehicle. 625 ILCS 5/11-502.1(b), (c); 11-502.15(b), (c)
       (West 2020). It defies logic to conclude that an odor that indicates consumption or
       use does not suggest the reasonable probability of a crime while an odor that
       indicates simply the transport of that same substance does.

¶ 70       Because a finding of probable cause requires facts that would warrant a
       reasonable person to believe there is a reasonable probability that certain items may
       be contraband or evidence of a crime, the odor of a legal substance alone is not
       sufficient. Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the provisions of
       the Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act (410 ILCS 705/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)) and




                                               - 19 -
       the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-502.1(a) (West 2020)) can be harmonized,
       requiring “ ‘that cannabis be stored in an odor-proof container during transport in a
       vehicle’ ” (supra ¶ 50 (quoting 

, ¶ 38)), the odor of
       cannabis alone would not warrant a reasonable person to believe there is criminal
       activity afoot. The relevant inquiry is the degree of suspicion that attaches to
       particular types of noncriminal acts. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 

,
       61 (2018). Because cannabis, both raw and burnt, is legal notwithstanding multiple
       restrictions, there is a low degree of suspicion that attaches to its odor. The majority
       opinion gives greater weight to the restrictions placed on the transportation of raw
       cannabis and in so doing elevates the suspicion that attaches to the odor of raw
       cannabis over that which attaches to the odor of alcohol or burnt cannabis. The
       result, whether intentional or not, is to continue to stigmatize the use of cannabis
       despite the legislative efforts to legalize the use of cannabis. Thus, I disagree with
       the majority’s conclusion that the odor of raw cannabis emanating from defendant’s
       vehicle, absent any other factors, is a suspicious fact that creates a “reasonable
       belief” or “fair probability” that raw cannabis was in the vehicle stored in a
       container that was not odor-proof. Supra ¶ 52.

¶ 71       The same “ ‘[c]ountry common sense’ ” cited by the majority for the
       proposition that it is unlikely for a sober person to be consuming alcohol in a vehicle
       also dictates that the smell of raw cannabis signals only that the person, and/or his
       belongings, has recently come into contact with raw cannabis. See supra ¶ 54
       (quoting State v. Stevenson, 

 (Kan. 2014)). Organic matter smells.
       That is a matter of common sense. It can easily permeate one’s hair and clothing in
       a manner similar to a burnt compound of the same material. So, common sense
       would indicate that a sober person can come into contact with an alcoholic beverage
       through drinking it or having some spill on his clothing and that odor would remain
       with him for a period of time. The same is true of raw cannabis. A person coming
       into contact with raw cannabis, through touch or simple proximity, or possibly by
       opening and resealing the odor-proof container, would also carry that odor with him
       for a period of time even if the person did not possess the raw cannabis on his
       person or in his vehicle in violation of the odor-proof requirement. Cf. Marci J.
       Gracey, Growing Pains: Using Racketeering Law to Protect Property Rights From
       State-Sanctioned Marijuana Operations, 

, 443 (2020)
       (“Descriptions of marijuana’s pungent odor include phrases such as ‘skunk-like’




                                                - 20 -
       and lemon-like odors mixed with sulfur. *** Growing or storing marijuana in large
       quantities magnifies the odor ***.”).

¶ 72       We have concluded that neither the odor of alcohol nor the odor of burnt
       cannabis, absent any other factor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to search
       a vehicle. Redmond, 

. We should reach the same
       conclusion as to raw cannabis: the odor of raw cannabis, absent any other factor, is
       not a sufficiently inculpatory fact that reliably points to when, where, or how the
       cannabis was possessed.

¶ 73      For these reasons, I dissent.

¶ 74      CHIEF JUSTICE THEIS joins in this dissent.


¶ 75       JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of
       this case.




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