People v. Mikolaitis
Citation2024 IL 130693
Date Filed2024-11-21
Docket130693
Cited22 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
2024 IL 130693
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 130693)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
CHRISTIAN P. MIKOLAITIS, Appellant.
Opinion filed November 21, 2024.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Cunningham, Rochford,
and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Christian P. Mikolaitis, appealed the circuit court of Will County’s
order denying him pretrial release pursuant to section 110-6.1 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)), as amended
by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness
Act (Act). See also Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending various
provisions of the Act); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (setting the Act’s
effective date as September 18, 2023). Defendant argued the State failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions
could mitigate any safety threat he posed. The appellate court affirmed the circuit
court’s order granting the State’s verified petition to deny pretrial release. 2024 IL
App (3d) 230791, ¶ 13. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On December 12, 2023, defendant was charged with attempt (first degree
murder) (Class X) (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(2) (West 2022)) and aggravated
battery (id. § 12-3.05(f)(1), (h)). The State subsequently filed a verified petition to
deny pretrial release, alleging defendant was charged with a forcible felony and that
his release posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or
the community under section 110-6.1(a)(1) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1)
(West 2022)).
¶4 In the petition, the State provided a factual basis in support of pretrial detention
as follows:
“On December 10[ ], 2023, at approximately 8:30 p.m., Lockport Police
Officer’s [sic] responded to Challenge Fitness for a victim, Alec Geibel, who
had been stabbed multiple times. Alec was located at Challenge Fitness in
Lockport, taken by the paramedics to Silver Cross Hospital, and subsequently
transported to a [h]ospital in Chicago as a trauma 1 transport. Alec was heavily
medicated but gave a brief statement while at Silver Cross Hospital. Alec stated
that [defendant] had stabbed him and was driving a gray Hyundai Elantra with
red trim. At 10:49 p.m., Charlene Mikolaitis called 911 and stated her son
[defendant] told her he had stabbed Alec while in Lockport. Charlene also stated
he would be driving a gray Hyundai Elantra. At 12:39 a.m., Kaitlyn Dunagan,
[defendant’s] girlfriend, called 911 and stated that she had just met [defendant]
at a gas station. [Defendant] stated he had just stabbed someone and told her
exactly how he did it. Kaitlyn further stated that he picked up Alec, who was
going to buy Percocet from him. [Defendant] parked the car and pretended to
look for his cell phone in the back seat. [Defendant] then opened the passenger
door and stabbed Alec multiple times. Alec left the vehicle bleeding and
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[defendant] drove away. [Defendant] also stated he hated the kid. At 1:31
a.m.[,] [defendant] was arrested (west bound I-80) by State Troopers and
Grundy County Deputies. [Defendant] was in the gray Hyundai Elantra and the
front passenger seat had knife punctures.”
¶5 Pretrial services completed a pretrial risk assessment, but it contained limited
information because defendant declined to participate in the assessment.
Defendant’s criminal history information indicated that he had a pending case for
failure to notify of a damaged or unattended vehicle.
¶6 On December 18, 2023, the circuit court held a pretrial detention hearing on the
State’s verified petition to deny pretrial release. At the hearing, the court stated that
it reviewed the State’s pleading along with the proffer and then asked the State if it
wished to argue anything else. The State presented argument for detention, stating:
“Your Honor, I would first like to point out the nature and circumstances of
the offense charged. Your Honor, this is a violent offense and the defendant’s
actions as alleged were violent in nature. Your Honor, I would point to the
identity of a person or persons whose safety the defendant is believed to pose a
threat and the nature of that threat. Your Honor, I would point to the alleged
victim in this matter, Mr. Alec Geibel. Your Honor, this defendant did stab
allegedly this individual multiple times and left that individual in that state.
Your Honor, if this defendant were to be released, I would pose that individual’s
safety is at risk.
Your Honor, I point to any statements made by the defendant and the
circumstances surrounding them. Your Honor, this defendant did allegedly tell
other people what happened. He said that he had just stabbed someone and told
individuals exactly how he did it. Your Honor, I would point to the defendant
having—or having access or possessing weapons. Your Honor, while this
defendant didn’t necessarily have a gun, he had a knife and he used that knife
to stab this individual multiple times.
Your Honor, I would ask that you take into account everything put forth in
our petition. I would ask that you take into account the argument made today,
and I ask that you grant the State’s petition to deny pretrial release.”
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¶7 Following the State’s argument, defense counsel asked for defendant to be
released from custody and placed on electronic monitoring, noting that defendant
was 19 years old; had no criminal history; and had been “previously diagnosed with
depression, anxiety[,] and bipolar disorder for which he takes antipsychotics—for
which he has been prescribed antipsychotics.” The court asked whether defendant
was currently taking his antipsychotic medicine, to which defendant said no.
Defense counsel indicated the last time defendant took his medication was in
September when he “had an admission for mental health.”
¶8 After reviewing the State’s proffer and the parties’ arguments, the circuit court
found the proof was evident that defendant committed a detainable offense, he
posed a real and present threat to the safety of Geibel, and no release conditions
could mitigate the real and present safety threat defendant posed. When addressing
that there were no conditions that could mitigate the safety threat defendant posed,
the court stated,
“I understand the concept of mental illness, but it does not appear as if the
defendant was taking his medicine which was previously prescribed to him in
order to combat his antipsychotic behavior along with his bipolar, so that is a
greater concern to me and it certainly poses a question as to whether or not he
would be in a position where he could abide by the conditions of pretrial release.
As such, I will find that the defendant here does meet the dangerousness
standard and he shall remain detained.”
The court subsequently entered a written detention order.
¶9 Defendant appealed the circuit court’s order granting the State’s verified
petition to deny pretrial release, arguing the State failed to show by clear and
convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate
any threat he posed. 2024 IL App (3d) 230791, ¶ 9.
¶ 10 The appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s order granting the State’s
verified petition to deny pretrial release. Id. ¶ 15. The court found the State provided
argument and evidence regarding the factors set forth in section 110-5 of the Code
(725 ILCS 5/110-5 (West 2022)) and that those factors provided the evidentiary
corollary to the potential conditions of release. 2024 IL App (3d) 230791, ¶¶ 12-
13. The court stated, “[i]t is unclear what evidence the dissent would require the
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State to present to meet its burden as to the conditions of release.” Id. ¶ 12. The
court further determined, because defense counsel indicated that defendant was not
taking his prescribed medication for his mental health issues, the circuit court “did
not err in finding that the defendant’s failure to abide by his doctor’s directives
indicated that he would not follow the conditions placed on him by the court.” Id.
¶ 13.
¶ 11 Justice Brennan specially concurred, writing separately to express his
disagreement with the dissent’s suggestion that the Code obligates the State to
argue and prove why each condition or combination of conditions set forth in
section 110-10(b) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-10(b) (West 2022)) cannot mitigate
the threat a defendant poses to a particular victim. 2024 IL App (3d) 230791, ¶ 18
(Brennan, J., specially concurring). The special concurrence stated that, while
section 110-6.1(e) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022)) requires the
State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination
of conditions can mitigate the threat posed by a defendant, the State’s burden can
be satisfied
“in a variety of ways: from the presentation of evidence, to be sure, but also by
common sense consideration of the factors listed in section 110-5(a)(1)-(7),
including the nature of the offense, the strength of the case, the defendant’s
mental condition, the defendant’s criminal history, the defendant’s compliance
with mandatory supervised release (MSR) or probation, and several others.”
2024 IL App (3d) 230791, ¶ 20.
The special concurrence further provided,
“[t]he State’s burden does not obligate it to specifically address the efficacy of
every conceivable condition or combination of conditions. Rather, it is the trial
court that must ultimately consider all it has heard and, if ordering detention,
make written findings explaining ‘why less restrictive conditions would not
avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the
community.’ ” Id. (quoting 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(h) (West 2022)).
¶ 12 Presiding Justice McDade dissented, finding
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“[t]he distinction between sections 110-5 and 110-10 [of the Code] is important
because the State’s explicit burden under section 110-6.1(e)(3) of the Code is
that it must establish by clear and convincing evidence, in relevant part, that ‘no
condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section
110-10 of this Article can mitigate’ either the safety risk the defendant poses or
the risk of his or her ‘willful flight,’ depending on the basis for the State’s
detention request.” Id. ¶ 27 (McDade, J., dissenting) (quoting 725 ILCS 5/110-
6.1(e)(3) (West 2022)).
Specifically, the dissent asserted that “[s]ection 110-5 provides guidance for the
court when considering whether conditions exist that would, in part, ‘reasonably
ensure the appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person
or the community.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 25 (quoting 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)
(West 2022)). “In contrast to section 110-5, section 110-10 addresses the actual
conditions that can be imposed on pretrial release.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 26
(citing 725 ILCS 5/110-10 (West 2022)). Thus, the dissent determined the “plain
language of section 110-6.1(e)(3) makes it clear that the State cannot meet its
burden under section 110-6.1(e)(3) by merely presenting evidence relevant to the
factors the court is required to consider under section 110-5 when reaching its
ultimate pretrial release decision.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 27.
¶ 13 Ultimately, the dissent would reverse the circuit court’s decision and order
defendant’s release. Id. ¶ 29. Specifically, the dissent concluded,
“the State presented no evidence regarding any condition or combination of
conditions that could mitigate the safety threat posed by Mikolaitis. Even
though it may have presented evidence relevant to the factors the court is
required to consider under section 110-5, the State could not meet its burden
under section 110-6.1(e)(3) by presenting nothing more than that evidence.
Because the State failed to present any evidence related to its burden under
section 110-6.1(e)(3), it has failed to meet its burden and has essentially
conceded that there are adequate conditions.” (Emphases in original). Id.
¶ 14 This court granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a)
(eff. Dec. 7, 2023).
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¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 Under the amended Code, every person charged with an offense is presumed
eligible for pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 6.1(e) (West 2022). The State
must file a verified petition requesting the denial of pretrial release, and the circuit
court shall hold a hearing on the petition. Id. § 110-6.1(a). When seeking denial of
pretrial release, the State bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that (1) the proof is evident or presumption great that the defendant
committed a detainable offense; (2) the defendant poses a real and present threat to
the safety of any person, persons, or the community, based on the specific,
articulable facts of the case; and (3)
“no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section
110-10 of this Article can mitigate (i) the real and present threat to the safety of
any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts
of the case, for offenses listed in paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (a),
or (ii) the defendant’s willful flight for offenses listed in paragraph (8) of
subsection (a).” Id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3).
Section 110-10(b) provides a list of pretrial conditions that may be imposed. Id.
§ 110-10(b).
¶ 17 Defendant appeals arguing the State failed to meet its burden as to the third
element contained in section 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3) of the Code. Specifically, defendant
maintains that the State offered no evidence and made no argument regarding
possible conditions of release that could mitigate any risk posed by his release.
Thus, the issue before this court is whether the State met its burden to prove, by
clear and convincing evidence, that no condition or combination of conditions
could mitigate any threat defendant posed.
¶ 18 In this instance, defendant posits the State cannot meet its burden to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions can
mitigate any threat he poses, when the State fails to present any argument and any
evidence regarding conditions of release contained within section 110-10(b). See
id. § 110-10(b). Defendant argues the State must at least address relevant and
potential conditions based on the individualized facts of the case. Defendant also
contends that, although it was not his burden, defense counsel argued defendant
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should be released from custody and placed on electronic monitoring, based on his
lack of criminal history and his mental health issues for which he was prescribed
antipsychotics. Defendant maintains that the circuit court improperly relied on
information from defense counsel about defendant’s mental health issues to
conclude defendant would not “abide by the conditions of pretrial release.”
¶ 19 In response, the State argues (1) the circuit court properly found that no
conditions could mitigate the safety threat posed by defendant and (2) section 110-
6.1(e)(3) of the Code requires only that the State present clear and convincing
evidence that establishes that no conditions can mitigate the safety threat and does
not, as defendant suggests, require any argument.
¶ 20 We hold that, while section 110-6.1(e)(3) of the Code places the burden of proof
on the State, the State’s burden of proof does not require it to specifically address
every conceivable condition or combination of conditions and argue why each
condition does not apply. Absent from the statutory language outlining what the
State must prove in order to detain defendant is any language requiring argument
as to specific matters or language dictating what evidence or argument the State
must present in attempting to meet its burden. Id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3). Rather, the
State must meet its burden and present sufficient evidence regarding the specific
scenario presented by each case, such as the nature and circumstance of the offense,
the defendant’s criminal history, the defendant’s risk assessment score, and other
considerations known to the State at the time of the hearing (see id. §§ 110-
6.1(f)(7), 110-10(b)), that allows the circuit court to determine whether pretrial
release is appropriate.
¶ 21 To the extent defendant argues that the State cannot meet its burden by offering
evidence and argument based on the statutory factors in section 110-5 of the Code,
we disagree. Section 110-6.1(e)(3) of the Code does not preclude the State from
presenting evidence as to the statutory factors in section 110-5 to clearly and
convincingly establish that no conditions can mitigate the safety threat posed by a
defendant’s release. See id. § 110-6.1(e)(3). It comports with logic that the State
will present evidence as to the statutory factors in section 110-5 of the Code because
those factors guide the circuit court in its consideration of whether conditions exist
that would in part reasonably ensure the appearance of a defendant as required or
the safety of any other person or the community. See id. § 110-5.
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¶ 22 Moreover, there is no language prohibiting the circuit court from considering
evidence that may come from a source other than the State. In fact, section 110-
6.1(f)(2) of the Code specifically states that “[t]he State or defendant may present
evidence at the hearing by way of proffer based upon reliable information.” Id.
§ 110-6.1(f)(2). Thus, it only makes sense that the court would consider all
evidence before it that is relevant and helpful in determining whether the State has
met its burden.
¶ 23 Here, the record shows that at the pretrial detention hearing the State presented
evidence regarding the statutory factors to be considered in determining which
conditions of pretrial release, if any, will reasonably ensure the appearance of the
defendant, the safety of any other person, the safety of the community, and
compliance by the defendant. See id. § 110-5. That evidence included the nature
and circumstances of the offense, the weight of the evidence, and the seriousness
of the threat posed by defendant’s potential release. Specifically, the State argued
that defendant should be detained because (1) defendant committed a violent
offense, (2) the victim was a specific person to whom defendant posed a safety
threat if released, (3) defendant told others how the offense occurred, and
(4) defendant had access to and possessed a weapon, being a knife. Based on the
evidence known to the State at the time of the pretrial detention hearing, the State
proved by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of
conditions of release could mitigate the safety threat defendant’s pretrial release
posed to Geibel. Defendant fails to explain how the State was expected to address
mitigating conditions on the undisclosed issue of his mental health.
¶ 24 Ultimately, it is up to the circuit court to review the evidence presented and
determine whether conditions of release would mitigate the safety threat posed by
a defendant. See id. §§ 110-5, 110-6.1(g). Here, the circuit court heard all the
evidence and determined that, because defendant failed to comply with his doctor’s
directives to take his prescribed medication, he would not comply with conditions
of release. Accordingly, we find the circuit court did not err in granting the State’s
petition to deny pretrial release.
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¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 26 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting the State’s verified petition to
deny pretrial release.
¶ 27 Judgments affirmed.
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