People v. Clark
Citation248 N.E.3d 1087, 2024 IL 130364
Date Filed2024-09-19
Docket130364
Cited18 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
2024 IL 130364
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 130364)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
CARLOS CLARK, Appellee.
Opinion filed September 19, 2024.
JUSTICE OāBRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White,
Cunningham, and Rochford concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
Ā¶1 This appeal involves article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963
(Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)). In particular, the appeal involves the
amendments to the Code made by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly
referred to as the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act
(Act) or the Pretrial Fairness Act, along with Public Act 102-1104 (eff. Jan. 1,
2023). The Act abolished monetary bail in favor of a presumption of pretrial release
on personal recognizance or with conditions of release. 725 ILCS 5/110-1.5, 110-
2(a) (West 2022). Enforcement of the Act began on September 18, 2023. See Rowe
v. Raul, 2023 IL 129248, Ā¶ 52. Under the Code, pretrial release may be denied in
certain situations, and a defendant may be held in pretrial detention, if the State
files a verified petition and the circuit court finds that the State has satisfied its
burden at an evidentiary hearing. See 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a) (West 2022). The
petition is subject to section 110-6.1(c)(1) of the Code (id. Ā§ 110-6.1(c)(1)), which
governs when a petition to detain must be filed.
Ā¶2 In this case, the State filed a criminal complaint against defendant, Carlos Clark,
on August 23, 2023. In an ex parte hearing, the State appeared before a judge and
obtained a warrant for defendantās arrest. Defendant was taken into custody on
September 16, 2023, and brought before a judge two days later (on September 18,
2023, the date enforcement of the Act began). At that hearing, the State filed a
petition to detain defendant. Over defendantās objection, the Cook County circuit
court held a hearing, granted the Stateās petition, and ordered defendantās pretrial
detention.
Ā¶3 A divided panel of the appellate court reversed the circuit courtās order. The
majority found section 110-6.1(c)(1) of the Code required the State to file its
petition when it made its ex parte appearance before a judge. See 2023 IL App (1st)
231770. Therefore, the court held that the Stateās petition was untimely because it
filed the petition after it made its first appearance. For the reasons that follow, we
reverse and remand the judgment of the appellate court.
Ā¶4 BACKGROUND
Ā¶5 On August 23, 2023, prior to the date enforcement of the Act began, the State
filed a felony complaint charging defendant with aggravated vehicular hijacking
(720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(1) (West 2022)). 1 That same day, the circuit court issued a
warrant for defendantās arrest, fixing his bail at $100,000.
1
The State would later amend the complaint to add additional charges, but those charges are not
relevant to this appeal.
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Ā¶6 On September 16, 2023, defendant was arrested on the warrant. On September
18, 2023āthe date enforcement of the Act beganādefendant appeared before a
judge for the first time, and the State filed a petition to detain defendant. Defendant
objected to the petition. He claimed the Code did not permit the State to file its
petition because the court already set his monetary bail when it issued the warrant
for his arrest. According to defendant, only he could seek to review the set
conditions of release. The circuit court disagreed and held a detention hearing.
Following the hearing, the court determined that defendant posed a real and present
threat to the safety of any person or persons or to the community based on the
specific articulable facts of the case. The court granted the Stateās petition and
denied pretrial release.
Ā¶7 Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal requesting the reversal of the circuit
courtās order. Using the standard form approved for Illinois Supreme Court Rule
604(h) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023) appeals by defendants, defendant checked the box for
āOtherā and raised two issues: (1) he ādid not want to avail himself under the [Act]
and wished to post the previously set bondā and (2) ā[t]he Court did not sufficiently
articulate the correct factors in ordering detention and the court failed to make
adequate findings under the statute.ā
Ā¶8 Defendantās appointed counsel filed a memorandum pursuant to Rule 604(h), 2
which argued in relevant part that the Stateās petition was untimely because it was
not filed at āthe first appearance before a judge,ā as required by section 110-
6.1(c)(1) of the Code. According to defendant, the term āfirst appearanceā included
the Stateās ex parte appearance on August 23, 2023, when the trial court issued an
arrest warrant fixing defendantās bail at $100,000. Because the State did not file its
petition to detain until defendant appeared in court on September 18, 2023,
defendant claimed the Stateās petition was untimely.
Ā¶9 The majority of a divided panel of the appellate court reversed the circuit courtās
detention order. 2023 IL App (1st) 231770. The majority observed that section 110-
6.1(c) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c) (West 2022)) contained two subsections, one
2
During the pendency of this appeal, this court received and approved the report and
recommendations of the Pretrial Release Appeals Task Force. The recommendations are reflected
in several amendments to the Illinois Supreme Court rules, including the requirement that a
defendant file a motion for relief in the circuit court as a prerequisite to an appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R.
604((h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). These amendments do not affect our decision in this case.
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governing the time for filing a petition to detain (id. Ā§ 110-6.1(c)(1)) and the other
governing the time for holding a detention hearing (id. Ā§ 110-6.1(c)(2)). 2023 IL
App (1st) 231770, Ā¶ 14. It found the different use of the term āappearanceā in each
of the two subsections significant. Subsection (c)(1) requires the petition to be filed
at ā āthe first appearance before a judgeā ā (id. (quoting 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(1)
(West 2022))), while subsection (c)(2) requires the hearing to be held within a
certain time frame after ā ādefendantās first appearanceā ā if a continuance is
requested (id. (quoting 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(2) (West 2022))). The majority
believed the use of different wording suggests a distinction between the terms,
which did not support the Stateās view that āfirst appearanceā as used in subsection
(c)(1) must mean defendantās first appearance. Id.
Ā¶ 10 In the majorityās view, āthe legislature envisioned a process where the State and
trial court need not wait for a defendantās appearance before considering whether
to detain that person without setting bail.ā Id. Ā¶ 16. The majority noted the general
definition of āappearanceā included the parties to the litigation (id. Ā¶ 17 (citing
Blackās Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019))) and noted that the State failed to point to
anything āin the text of the Code supporting an interpretation of āappearanceā that
excludes the Stateās actual appearance before a trial judge to begin the prosecution
and seek bailā (id.). It concluded that under subsection (c)(1) the term āfirst
appearance before a judgeā included āan ex parte appearance by the State to begin
the prosecution by filing a felony complaint and then seek an order setting bail.ā
Id. Therefore, the court held that the Stateās petition, filed after it made an ex parte
appearance, was untimely under subsection (c)(1). Id. Ā¶ 20.
Ā¶ 11 The dissent believed the āmost reasonable construction of the āfirst appearance
before a judgeā language in subsection (c)(1) is that it means the first appearance
before a judge at which the defendant is present.ā Id. Ā¶ 35 (Tailor, J., dissenting).
According to the dissent, the ex parte proceeding in which the circuit court issued
the arrest warrant bore none of the āhallmarks of a detention hearing because,
among other reasons, [defendant] was not present and was not given the opportunity
to testify, present witnesses, or offer information by proffer or otherwise.ā Id. Ā¶ 37.
In fact, the dissent believed the trial court could not have ruled on a petition had the
State filed one at the ex parte proceeding because the court would have lacked the
necessary information to engage in the analysis that a detention hearing demands.
Id.
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Ā¶ 12 We granted the Stateās timely petition for leave to appeal on February 14, 2024.
Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Dec. 7, 2023).
Ā¶ 13 ANALYSIS
Ā¶ 14 Section 110-6.1(c)(1) of the Code sets forth the time limitations that control
when the State may file a petition for pretrial detention. See 725 ILCS 5/110-
6.1(c)(1) (West 2022). The timing of the petition depends on whether defendant is
entitled to notice. Id. The issue here is the timing requirement for a petition for
pretrial detention without notice to defendant. In this scenario, section 110-
6.1(c)(1) provides ā[a] petition may be filed without prior notice to the defendant
at the first appearance before a judge.ā (Emphasis added.) Id. In resolving this
issue, we must determine the meaning of the term āthe first appearanceā as used in
section 110-6.1(c)(1).
Ā¶ 15 Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, subject to de novo review.
People v. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, Ā¶ 13. The primary objective when construing
a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and give effect to that intent.
People v. Molnar, 222 Ill. 2d 495, 518 (2006). The best means of accomplishing
this objective is through the statutory language itself, given its plain and ordinary
meaning. People v. Woods, 193 Ill. 2d 483, 487 (2000). When interpreting a statute,
a court must āview all provisions of an enactment as a whole,ā taking care not to
isolate words and phrases but reading them āin light of other relevant provisions of
the statute.ā Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493,
504 (2000). With these principles in mind, we begin by reviewing the relevant
provisions of the Code.
Ā¶ 16 Section 109-1 of the Code sets forth the procedures that must take place upon
arrest. See 725 ILCS 5/109-1 (West 2022). Generally, ā[a] person arrested with or
without a warrant for an offense for which pretrial release may be denied *** shall
be taken without unnecessary delay beforeā a judge. Id. Ā§ 109-1(a). Section 109-
1(b) imposes certain duties upon the court when defendant is brought before a judge
for the first time. Id. Ā§ 109-1(b). At this āinitial appearanceā hearing, the judge shall
appoint counsel to represent defendant if defendant is indigent, admit defendant to
pretrial release, or upon verified petition of the State, proceed with the setting of a
detention hearing in accordance with section 110-6.1. Id. Ā§ 109-1(b)(2), (4).
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Ā¶ 17 Section 109-1(f) requires defendantās physical presence at any hearing in which
conditions of pretrial release are determined,
āunless the accused waives the right to be present physically in court, the court
determines that the physical health and safety of any person necessary to the
proceedings would be endangered by appearing in court, or the chief judge of
the circuit orders use of that system due to operational challenges in conducting
the hearing in person.ā Id. Ā§ 109-1(f).
In addition, ā[d]efense counsel shall be given adequate opportunity to confer with
the defendant prior to any hearing in which conditions of release or the detention
of the defendant is to be considered.ā Id. Ā§ 109-1(g).
Ā¶ 18 Article 110 of the Code governs pretrial release and detention. Id. art. 110.
Section 110-2(a) provides that ā[a]ll persons charged with an offense shall be
eligible for pretrial release before conviction.ā Id. Ā§ 110-2(a). āIt is presumed that
a defendant is entitled to release on personal recognizance on the condition that the
defendant attend all required court proceedings and the defendant does not commit
any criminal offense, and complies with all terms of pretrial release.ā Id. However,
pretrial release may be denied for persons charged with certain enumerated offenses
and only after the court has held āa hearing under Section 110-6.1.ā Id.
Ā¶ 19 Section 110-6.1 sets forth the procedures governing the denial of pretrial
release. Section 110-6.1 defines the offenses for which pretrial release may be
denied. Id. Ā§ 110-6.1(a)(1)-(8). The State must file a verified petition stating the
āgrounds upon which it contends the defendant should be denied pretrial release,
including the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the
community, based on the specific articulable facts or flight risk, as appropriate.ā Id.
Ā§ 110-6.1(d)(1). If the State files a second or subsequent petition, it is required āto
present a verified application setting forth in detail any new facts not known or
obtainable at the time of the filing of the previous petition.ā Id. Ā§ 110-6.1(d)(2).
Once the State files a timely petition to deny pretrial release, āthe court shall
immediately hold a hearing on the petition unless a continuance is requested.ā Id.
Ā§ 110-6.1(c)(2). The court āmay deny or grant the request for continuance,ā and if
it grants a continuance, āthe hearing shall be held withinā 24 to 48 hours of
ādefendantās first appearance,ā depending on the offense charged. Id.
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Ā¶ 20 Prior to the hearing, the State must provide defendant with ācopies of the
defendantās criminal history available, any written or recorded statements, and the
substance of any oral statements made by any person, if relied upon by the State in
its petition, and any police reports in the prosecutorās possession at the time of the
hearing.ā Id. Ā§ 110-6.1(f)(1). Like section 109-1, section 110-6.1 requires the
hearing to be conducted in person, 3 defendant also has the right to be represented
by counsel (id. Ā§ 110-6.1(f)(3)), and counsel āshallā be given adequate opportunity
to confer with the defendant before any hearing at which conditions of release or
detention are considered (id.). Defendant is permitted to testify, present witnesses,
and cross-examine witnesses at the hearing. Id. Both the State and defendant āmay
present evidence at the hearing by way of proffer based upon reliable information.ā
Id. Ā§ 110-6.1(f)(2). The State bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that (1) the proof is evident or presumption great that defendant
committed a detainable offense; (2) defendant poses a real and present threat to any
person, persons, or the community or is a flight risk; and (3) no conditions could
mitigate this threat or risk of flight. Id. Ā§ 110-6.1(a), (e).
Ā¶ 21 āDecisions regarding release, conditions of release, and detention prior to trial
must be individualized, and no single factor or standard may be used exclusively to
order detention. Risk assessment tools may not be used as the sole basis to deny
pretrial release.ā Id. Ā§ 110-6.1(f)(7). In making this determination, the circuit court
is to consider certain factors including, but not limited to, the nature and
circumstances of the offense; the history and characteristics of the defendant; the
identity of any person or persons to whose safety the defendant is believed to pose
a threat and the nature of the threat; any statements made by, or attributed to, the
defendant, together with the circumstances surrounding them; the age and physical
condition of the defendant; the age and physical condition of the complaining
witness; whether the defendant is known to possess or have access to any weapon
or weapons; whether, at the time of the current offense or any other offense or
arrest, the defendant was on probation, parole, aftercare release, mandatory
supervised release or other release from custody pending trial, sentencing, appeal
3
Due to the statewide operational challenges posed by the Act, this court entered an order
temporarily permitting the chief judges of the circuit courts to allow the use of two-way audiovisual
communication systems to conduct detention hearings when necessary. See Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 31888
(eff. Aug. 30, 2023).
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or completion of sentence for an offense under federal or state law; and any other
factor including those listed in section 110-5 of article 110 (id. Ā§ 110-5) deemed by
the court to have a reasonable bearing upon the defendantās propensity or reputation
for violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior, or lack of such behavior. Id. Ā§ 110-
6.1(g)(1)-(9). If the court finds that the State has met its burden, it shall enter an
order for detention. Id. Ā§ 110-6.1(h).
Ā¶ 22 In interpreting the above provisions, we must be mindful that a court of review
should consider the reason for the law, the problems to be remedied, and the objects
and purposes sought by the law. People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 171-72 (2003).
To that end, the Code provides that the provisions governing pretrial release and
detention are to
ābe liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of relying on pretrial release
by nonmonetary means to reasonably ensure an eligible personās appearance in
court, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, that
the person will not attempt or obstruct the criminal justice process, and the
personās compliance with all conditions of release, while authorizing the court,
upon motion of a prosecutor, to order pretrial detention of the person under
Section 110-6.1 when it finds clear and convincing evidence that no condition
or combination of conditions can reasonably ensure the effectuation of these
goals.ā 725 ILCS 5/110-2(e) (West 2022).
Our review of the above provisions reveals an emphasis on two important elements
of a pretrial detention hearing: defendantās presence and the courtās duty to make
an informed decision regarding pretrial release or detention. The purpose for this is
readily apparent. It ensures defendant is provided with the procedural safeguards
provided by the Code, such as the right to counsel. Defendantās presence also
allows defendant to challenge the Stateās evidence and present their own evidence
relevant to the factors the court should consider. Subjecting the petition to this type
of adversarial testing ensures that the circuit court is provided with enough
information to make an informed, individualized decision. See id. Ā§ 110-6.1(f)(7).
Ā¶ 23 With this in mind, we return to the specific question presented in this appeal:
under section 110-6.1(c)(1), when must the State file its petition to deny pretrial
release without notice to defendant? To answer this question, we are required to
determine the meaning of the term āfirst appearanceā as used in section 110-
-8-
6.1(c)(1). Defendant and the appellate court take the broad view of the term āfirst
appearance,ā interpreting it to mean the first appearance by any party, including the
Stateās ex parte appearance before the court when it filed the criminal complaint
and sought a warrant for defendantās arrest. The State, by contrast, takes the narrow
view that the first appearance is limited to the first time a defendant is brought
before a judge. We agree with the State.
Ā¶ 24 As noted above, section 110-6.1(c)(1) provides that ā[a] petition may be filed
without prior notice to the defendant at the first appearance before a judge.ā Id.
Ā§ 110-6.1(c)(1). It does not define the term āfirst appearance,ā so it is appropriate
to look to the dictionary for a definition. See People v. Brooks, 221 Ill. 2d 381, 390-
91 (2006). Section 110-6.1(c)(1) is also written in the passive voice, leaving it
unclear who is making the āfirst appearance.ā The absence of an identified subject
in the statute, however, does not mean it should be assigned the dictionaryās general
definition of the term āappearance.ā See 2023 IL App (1st) 231770, Ā¶ 17 (majority
opinion) (citing Blackās Law Dictionary (11th ed. (2019) for the definition of
āappearance,ā which is any party coming into court as a party or interested person,
or as a lawyer on behalf of a party or interested person). Instead, the use of the
passive voice indicates the legislature intended the term to focus on the occurrence
of a specific event, rather than any partyās appearance in general. See generally,
Miller v. Department of Agriculture, 2024 IL 128508, Ā¶ 41; Rubin v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 479 (7th Cir. 2016) (āa legislatureās use of the
passive voice sometimes reflects indifference to the actorā). In this context, the
event is a particular stage in the proceedings, namely bail proceedings or, in our
case, pretrial release and detention proceedings. In the realm of bail proceedings,
the āinitial appearanceā is an event defined as a ācriminal defendantās first
appearance in court to hear the charges read, to be advised of his or her rights, and
to have bail determined.ā Blackās Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). This definition
is consistent with the āinitial appearanceā hearing defined in section 109-1 (725
ILCS 5/109-1(a) (West 2022)), which is an event that occurs when a defendant is
first brought before a judge. Despite the legislatureās use of the word āfirstā in
section 110-6.1(c)(1) and the word āinitialā in section 109-1, we believe the
legislature intended the terms to have the same meaning because this is the only
interpretation that is consistent with the other relevant provisions governing pretrial
release.
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Ā¶ 25 ā[U]pon initial appearance of a person before the court,ā the court is required
to appoint counsel, if necessary, and the court admits defendant to pretrial release
or, upon verified petition of the State, proceeds with the setting of a detention
hearing. Id. Ā§ 109-1(b)(2), (4). If the State files its petition at this stage, the
detention hearing is to be set and held āimmediatelyā upon the Stateās verified
petition under section 110-6.1(c)(2) (id. Ā§ 110-6.1(c)(2)). In that case, the court
holds a detention hearing at defendantās first appearance before a judge. A hearing
held in this manner satisfies the requirement that defendant is physically present
and provides defendant with the benefit of counsel. It also provides defendant with
a meaningful opportunity to subject the petition to adversarial testing because it
allows defendant to challenge the Stateās evidence and present his own evidence in
opposition. The result of this process ensures the court makes an informed,
individualized decision regarding pretrial detention. This is what the legislature
envisioned.
Ā¶ 26 By contrast, the appellate courtās interpretation requires the State to file a
petition to deny pretrial release when it files a criminal complaint and seeks an
arrest warrant. This would lead to the absurd result of allowing ex parte detention
hearings. To illustrate, if the State filed a petition at an ex parte proceeding, then
the court would be required to hold the detention hearing āimmediatelyā as required
by section 110-6.1(c)(2) (id.). The legislature could not have intended this absurd
approach because the Code prohibits the court from holding any hearing to deny
pretrial release in defendantās absence. See Brucker v. Mercola, 227 Ill. 2d 502,
514 (2007) (we presume the legislature did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or
injustice). A hearing held in this manner also denies defendant the benefit of
counsel and a meaningful opportunity to challenge the Stateās petition. We
recognize section 110-6.1(c)(2) permits the court to grant a continuance, in which
case the hearing is to be held within 24 to 48 hours of ādefendantās first appearanceā
depending on the charged offense. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(2) (West 2022).
However, there is nothing in the Code that requires the State to request a
continuance, and likewise there is no requirement that a continuance be granted.
Moreover, defendant is placed in the same position regardless of when the State
filed the petition because defendant is not entitled to notice of the petition. In either
case, defendant will not have received or reviewed the petition until he makes his
first appearance in court. Thus, we see no reason for the petition to be filed before
defendant is taken into custody and brought before a judge. Therefore, we conclude
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that āfirst appearanceā must mean defendantās first appearance under section
6.1(c)(1).
Ā¶ 27 In reaching this conclusion, we reject defendantās argument that the use of the
term āfirst appearanceā in section 110-6.1(c)(1) and the term ādefendantās first
appearanceā in section 110-6.1(c)(2) signals a distinction between the two terms.
According to defendant, if āfirst appearanceā always meant a defendantās first time
physically in court, then the use of the term ādefendantās first appearanceā in
section 110-6.1(c)(2) is superfluous. We can discern no reason why the minor
differences in the statutory phrases āfirst appearanceā and ādefendantās first
appearanceā should require different interpretations. As explained, the appellate
courtās interpretation permits ex parte detention hearings, which are prohibited by
the Code. Additionally, such a hearing defeats the legislatureās intent that the court
make a fully informed, individualized detention decision.
Ā¶ 28 We also reject the appellate court and defendantās reliance on the prior version
of the Code. The appellate court believed that the Actās amendments to the Code,
ātrack[ ] the longstanding practice of seeking a āno bond arrest warrantā for certain
defendants.ā 2023 IL App (1st) 231770, Ā¶ 16. Defendant contends the prior version
of the Code is instructive because it provided that a āno bailā petition āmay be filed
without prior notice to the defendant at the first appearance before a judgeā and
ā[t]he hearing shall be held immediately upon the defendantās appearance before
the court.ā According to defendant, the prior version illustrates the distinction
between a āfiling of the āno bailā petition that does not require notice to the
defendant or the defendantās physical presence and the āno bailā hearing that must
occur when a defendant appears in court.ā Defendant claims that, because the
current version of the Code uses substantially similar language, it should be
interpreted in the same way as the prior version of the Code.
Ā¶ 29 To begin with, relying on practices under the prior version of the Code is
misplaced because the Act ādismantled and rebuilt Illinoisās statutory framework
for the pretrial release of criminal defendants.ā See Rowe, 2023 IL 129248, Ā¶ 4.
Additionally, defendant failed to cite any authority to support his interpretation of
the prior version of the Code. Therefore, the use of similar language in both
versions of the Code, standing alone, provides no support for defendantās claim that
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the term āfirst appearanceā means anything different than its common usage in the
realm of bail proceedings.
Ā¶ 30 Moreover, even if we assume defendantās interpretation of the prior Code is
correct, there is a subtle but significant distinction between the language used in
each version of the Code. The prior version required the hearing to ābe held
immediately upon the defendantās appearance before the court.ā (Emphasis added.)
725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(2) (West 2020). However, the current version of the Code
requires the court to āimmediatelyā hold a detention hearing ā[u]pon filingā of the
petition. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(2) (West 2022). While both versions permit the
petition to be āfiled at the first appearance,ā the timing of the hearing on the petition
for each version is conditioned on different events (defendantās appearance versus
the filing of the petition). This change can mean one of two things. One, the
legislature realized that it used the term āfirst appearanceā incorrectly and modified
the language accordingly so as not to suggest that āno bondā warrants were
permitted. Or, two, the legislature intended to clarify that the petition should be
filed at defendantās first appearance because filing a petition to deny pretrial release
before defendantās arrest served no purpose given that a hearing could not be held
until defendant appeared in court. In either case, the plain language of the current
version of the Code is clear that the filing of a petition to deny pretrial release and
a hearing on the petition occur simultaneously at defendantās first appearance
before the court.
Ā¶ 31 Accordingly, we find the Stateās petition to deny pretrial release to defendant
in this case, which it filed on the same day defendant made his first appearance
before a judge, complied with the timing requirements of section 110-6.1(c)(1).
Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court. We express no
opinion on the merits of the additional issues raised by defendant in the appellate
court. The appellate court resolved the appeal solely on the ground that the petition
was untimely under section 110-6.1(c)(1). Having reversed that decision, we
remand the matter to the appellate court to consider the alternative issues raised by
defendant.
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Ā¶ 32 CONCLUSION
Ā¶ 33 For the above reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court. The
matter is remanded to the appellate court to consider the alternative issues raised
by defendant.
Ā¶ 34 Appellate court judgment reversed.
Ā¶ 35 Cause remanded.
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