Wilkerson v. State

FINAL COPY

             S19G0472. WILKERSON v. THE STATE.


     BLACKWELL, Justice.

     After he was tried by an Early County jury and found guilty of

ten aggravated assaults, Jason Edwin Wilkerson filed a motion for

new trial. The trial court granted his motion as to three of the

assaults, concluding that the evidence was legally insufficient to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Wilkerson was guilty of those

assaults, and concluding as well that a new trial was warranted

upon the “general grounds.” The State appealed, and in State v.

Wilkerson, 

 (

) (2018), the Court of

Appeals reversed the determination that the evidence was legally

insufficient, see 

 (1), and vacated the grant of a new

trial on the general grounds. See 

 (2). With respect to

the general grounds, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that a trial

court has substantial discretion to award a new trial under the

general grounds, see 

 (2), but it concluded that the trial
court abused its discretion by improperly conflating the standard for

the general grounds and the distinct standard by which the legal

sufficiency of the evidence is assessed. See 

 (2). We issued

a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals as

to the general grounds, and we now reverse.1

      The Court of Appeals was right to note that the general

grounds and a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence

present distinct issues. As we explained in White v. State, 

 (1), (2) (

) (2013):

      [When we] assess the legal sufficiency of the evidence . . .
      , we apply the familiar standard of Jackson v. Virginia,
      

 (

, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), asking
      whether any rational trier of fact could find beyond a
      reasonable doubt from the evidence adduced at trial that
      [the defendant] is guilty of the crimes of which he was
      convicted. As to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we
      view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
      verdict, and we put aside any questions about conflicting
      evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight of the
      evidence, leaving the resolution of such things to the
      discretion of the trier of fact. . . . Even when the evidence
      is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction, a trial judge
      may grant a new trial if the verdict of the jury is “contrary

      1 We decide nothing about the determination of the Court of Appeals that

the State presented evidence at trial that was legally sufficient to sustain the
verdict.
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     to . . . the principles of justice and equity,” OCGA § 5-5-
     20, or if the verdict is “decidedly and strongly against the
     weight of the evidence.” OCGA § 5-5-21. When properly
     raised in a timely motion, these grounds for a new trial —
     commonly known as the “general grounds” — require the
     trial judge to exercise a broad discretion to sit as a
     “thirteenth juror.” In exercising that discretion, the trial
     judge must consider some of the things that she cannot
     when assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence,
     including any conflicts in the evidence, the credibility of
     witnesses, and the weight of the evidence.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) But absent some indication in

the record to the contrary, we generally presume that trial judges

understand this distinction, see Wilson v. State, 

(II) (a) (

) (2017), and here, the record gives us no reason

to conclude that the trial court erroneously conflated the general

grounds and the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Indeed, in its order

granting the motion for new trial, the trial court cited Jackson for

the standard by which the legal sufficiency of the evidence is to be

assessed, and it cited OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 for the standard

under the general grounds. Separately applying these distinct

standards, the trial court concluded that the motion should be

granted under both standards: “The Court finds that the convictions

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for Counts 6, 7, and 8 are strongly against the weight of the evidence,

are contrary to the evidence and the principles of equity and justice,

and there was not sufficient evidence to allow a rational trier of fact

to find [Wilkerson] guilty of these Counts.” That the trial court

announced its separate conclusions in one sentence does not show

legal error.

      There is nothing in the record to support the determination of

the Court of Appeals that the trial court erroneously conflated the

standards for the general grounds and the legal sufficiency of the

evidence and did not, therefore, properly exercise its discretion

under the general grounds.2 To the extent that the Court of Appeals

vacated the grant of a new trial on the general grounds, its judgment

is reversed.

      Judgment reversed in part. All the Justices concur.




      2 It is unclear to us whether the State even challenged the grant of the

motion for new trial on the general grounds in the Court of Appeals. Although
we need not resolve this uncertainty to decide this case, because the general
grounds are distinct from the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we caution
lawyers who seek to raise both issues to raise them separately and distinctly.
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     BETHEL, Justice, concurring.

     At the argument of this case, the State suggested that

affirming the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the trial court’s grant of

a motion for new trial on the general grounds was warranted

because the trial court “got it wrong.” Because this argument echoes

arguments advanced by the State in recent cases before this Court,

see, e.g., State v. Beard, 

 (

) (2019), I write

separately in hopes of briefly clarifying the history, role, and proper

review standard applicable to the general grounds.

     Since the advent of our collective sovereignty, the people of

Georgia have entrusted Judges of the Superior Court with great and

extensive powers. From the earliest days of statehood, those powers

have included the power to grant a new trial when the judge finds

the verdict to be “contrary to evidence and the principles of justice

and equity.” Robert Watkins and George Watkins, 1799 Watkins

Digest of Statutes 707-708 (1800). Indeed, prior to codification, it

appears this authority had its roots in the common law. 3 William

Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 387 (1768)

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(judge authorized to grant new trial “if it appears by the judge’s

report, certified by the court, that the jury have brought in a verdict

without or contrary to evidence, so that he is reasonably dissatisfied

therewith”). This authority now can be found in OCGA § 5-5-20,

which provides that trial court judges may grant new trials “when

the verdict of a jury is found contrary to evidence and the principles

of justice and equity.” This power was exercised by Judges of the

Superior Court without any independent appellate review prior to

the establishment of this Court in 1845.

     During the earliest terms of this Court’s jurisprudence, we had

occasion to examine the extent and nature of this power. And we did.

See Peck v. Land, 

 (1847) (affirming trial court’s denial of

new trial); Hall v. Page, 

 (1848) (holding that trial

courts were only allowed to set aside a jury verdict if it was “clearly

against evidence, or manifestly without evidence”) (emphasis

omitted); Stroud v. Mays, 

 (1849) (reversing grant

of new trial where trial court deemed verdict contrary to evidence);

Flournoy v. Newton, 

 (1850) (same); Walker v. Walker,

                                  6


 (1852) (same); Powell v. Bigley, 

(1853) (same); Williamson v. Nabers, 

 (1853) (same,

explaining that trial judges cannot set aside verdicts against the

weight of evidence “unless the preponderance be so great as to shock

the understanding and moral sense” because to do so infringed on

the right to trial by jury). Following this earliest appellate

consideration of the then-existing statute, the General Assembly, in

1854, buttressed this rule through the enactment of additional

language now found in OCGA § 5-5-21, which provides that “[t]he

presiding judge may exercise a sound discretion in granting or

refusing new trials in cases where the verdict may be decidedly and

strongly against the weight of the evidence even though there may

appear to be some slight evidence in favor of the finding.” See also

Ga. L. 1853-1854, p. 47, § 3. Collectively, OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-

21 are commonly called the “general grounds” and have been

referred to as the “thirteenth juror” rule by the bench and bar of this

State. These rules create a weighty and longstanding power

designed to provide the trial court with an opportunity to avoid an

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injustice. As this Court has noted, the general grounds ask whether

the trial judge is personally “satisfied” with the jury’s verdict.

Manuel v. State, 

 (

) (2011). See also

Mills v. State, 

 (4) (

) (1939)

(describing motions asserting the general grounds as “an appeal to

[the judge’s] judicial conscience”). Trial judges retain “the strongest

of discretions” when reviewing motions based on the general

grounds. Manuel, 

.

     A trial court properly exercises its discretion when it “weigh[s]

the evidence and consider[s] the witnesses’ credibility and

evidentiary conflicts before [exercising] its discretion as the sole

arbiter of the general grounds.” Martin v. State, 

(

) (2019). As this Court explains again in this case,

when a trial court properly articulates and applies the legal

standard governing the general grounds, we afford great deference

to the decision of the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Denson, 

 (

) (2019); Morton v. State, 

 (

) (2019); State v. Hamilton, 

 (

)

                                  8
(2016). Cf. Manuel, 

 (merely issuing an order in

response to a motion predicated on the general grounds does not

fulfill this requirement when “the language in the order fails to

indicate that the trial court . . . exercis[ed] its discretion under the

applicable standard”). The general grounds authorize a trial court to

grant a new trial even if the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain

the verdict, and trial courts err when they conflate these two

concepts. State v. Holmes, 

 (

)

(2018); White v. State, 

 (

) (2013);

Manuel, 

.

      This deference flows from a proper consideration of the nature

of proper appellate review and not from a lack of appreciation for the

severity and attendant costs associated with the exercise of this

power to grant a new trial. Indeed, we have consistently recognized

that trial courts ought to be exceptionally wary of undoing the work

of a jury. See White, 

. But, because this authority

is vested in the trial court and necessarily involves questions of fact

and the independent weighing of evidence, we must decline to

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substitute our judgment for the judgment of the trial court.




                     DECIDED DECEMBER 23, 2019.
       Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 

.

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     Christina R. Cribbs, Veronica M. O’Grady, for appellant.
     T. Craig Earnest, District Attorney, Thomas S. Bishop,
Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.




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