Ervin v. Florida Department of Revenue
Bruce ERVIN v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE and Hollie Starr
Attorneys
Kelly R. McNeal of McNeal Legal, LLC, Gainesville, and Caroline Picart, Gaines-ville, for Appellant., Hollie Starr, pro se, Appellee.
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
Appellant appeals an amended downward modification order concerning his child support obligation, raising five issues. We reverse in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Background
In 2008, Appellantās marriage to Appel-lee was dissolved. The parties had one minor child. The amended final judgment adopted the marital settlement agreement entered into by the parties and awarded Appellee $869.58 in monthly child support. The lower court later entered an arrearage order, finding that, as of August 26, 2010, Appellant was in arrears in child support payments in the amount of $11,774.12 plus interest. The court ordered Appellant to make his monthly child support payment and, commencing on September 22, 2010, ordered Appellant to pay $25.17 in arrear-age payments, continuing monthly until the total arrearage was eliminated.
The Department of Revenue (DOR), on behalf of Appellant, filed a supplemental petition for downward modification, alleging a substantial change in circumstance. At the child support modification hearing, Appelleeās counsel admitted that Appellantās child support obligation would adjust downward, but noted that Appellee was requesting an upward departure from the guideline minimum amount based upon the evidence, and also that Appellee was requesting the support obligation be extended beyond the childās high school graduation date, because of the childās alleged developmental disabilities.
In presenting its case, DORās counsel called both Appellant and Appellee to testify. Appellant testified to his income and also admitted that he had not exercised his right to overnight visitation with the child
A DOR representative testified that, at the time of the hearing, the current ar-rearage per the Clerk of Court was $6,230.47, not including interest. DORās counsel submitted its child support guidelines worksheet, asserting that based on its calculations, the downward departure was $376 per month, and asked that the modification be granted retroactive to when Appellantās supplemental petition was filed on November 6, 2013. ' DORās counsel asserted that its calculation did not take timesharing into consideration, because Appellant admitted that he had been unable to exercise his overnight visitations. Appelleeās counsel submitted her guidelines worksheet. The court, noting a substantial difference between the two calculations, stated it would make a decision after reviewing the documents and hearing closing arguments. Appelleeās counsel requested the opportunity to put on his clientās case, but the lower court declined to allow further evidence.
The court stated that it was granting a downward modification of $400 per month, stating that the figure it came up with was the best that it could from an equitable and subjective standpoint, not from a mathematical standpoint. Additionally, as part of its discretion, the court granted Appelleeās request to increase the amount by 5%. The court also added a $65 monthly addition to the child support. The court also awarded a breakdown of the uncovered medical expenses to be borne by Appellant in the amount of 43% and by Ap-.pellee in the amount of 57%. The court also extended Appellantās child support obligation for two and a half years beyond the childās high school graduation date.
The court entered its order granting the downward modification, establishing the child support guidelines amount to be $400 per month, based on the child support guidelines provided by both DOR and Ap-pelleeās attorney. The order notes that the amount was then deviated upward by 5% at the courtās discretion, resulting in a total of $420 per month. The court then increased this amount by an additional $65 per month due to the childās extraordinary medical expenses, resulting in a total obligation of $485 per month. The order found that as of January 16, 2014, Appellant owed $6,230.47 in arrearages, but found that he was entitled to a credit of $779.66 in retroactive modified support from November 6, 2013 through January 21, 2014, resulting in Appellantās total ar-rearages of $5,450.81. The court ordered Appellant to pay $115 per month until this amount was eliminated. Appellant was also ordered to pay 43% of the childās reasonable and necessary health expenses incurred that were not covered by insurance. The order also required Appellant to provide health insurance for the minor child.
Appellant first asserts that the lower court erred in awarding child support based upon what it deemed equitable and on a subjective figure instead of calculating the amount based upon the statutory guidelines and factors. We note that, as a separate issue in this appeal, Appellant also asserts that the lower court erred in calculating the child support by failing to include Appelleeās additional income from her business. We find that these two issues are intertwined and reversal is appropriate as to both.
āChild support decisions are typically discretionary.ā Finney v. Finney, 995 So.2d 579, 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citing Glasgow v. Wolfe, 873 So.2d 483, 484 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)). āHowever, a trial courtās discretion concerning child support is subject to the statutory guidelines set forth in section 61.30, Florida Statutes.ā Id. (citing Kareff v. Kareff, 943 So.2d 890, 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)). āWhether a trial court has complied with the guidelines is a question of law to be reviewed de novo.ā Id.
Section 61.30, Florida Statutes (2013), provides the starting point for determining the child support amount in both an initial proceeding and a modification proceeding. Pursuant to the statute, ā[t]he child support guideline amount determined by this section presumptively establishes the amount the trier of fact shall order as child support ... in a proceeding for modification of an existing order for such support, whether the proceeding arises under this or another chapter.ā § 61.30(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013).
In determining child support, a trial court is required to first determine each parentās gross monthly income. See § 61.30(2), Fla. Stat. (2013). Gross income includes:
Business income from sources such as self-employment, partnership, close corporations, and independent contracts. āBusiness incomeā means gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary expenses required to produce income.
See § 61.30(2)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2013). After calculating the gross income, a trial court must determine each parentās net income by subtracting the statutorily-specified allowable deductions from the parentās gross monthly income. See § 61.30(3)(a)-(g), Fla. Stat. (2013); § 61.30(4), Fla. Stat. (2013). The trial court must then determine the parentsā combined monthly net income. See § 61.30(5), Fla. Stat. (2013). Next, a trial court must determine the child support needed by utilizing the statutorily-provided schedules. See § 61.30(6), Fla. Stat. (2013). Then a trial court must determine each parentās percentage share of the child support needed by dividing each parentās monthly net income by the combined monthly net income. See § 61.30(9), Fla. Stat. (2013). Finally, a trial court must determine each parentās dollar share of the child support needed by multiplying the minimum child support needed by each parentās percentage share. See § 61.30(10), Fla. Stat. (2013).
As held by the Florida Supreme Court in Finley v. Scott, 707 So.2d 1112, 1117 (Fla.1998):
To assist trial courts in making this fact-intensive decision in future cases, we expressly point out that a trial court is to begin its determination of child support by accepting the statutorily mandated guideline as the correct amount. The court is then to evaluate from the record the statutory criteria of the needs of the child, including age, station in life, and standard of living, the financial status and ability of each parent, and any other relevant factors. If the trial court*1265 then concludes that the guideline amount would be unjust or inappropriate and also determines that the child support amount should vary plus or minus five percent from the guideline amount, the trial court must explain in writing or announce a specific finding on the record as to the statutory factors supporting the varied amount. Absent an abuse of discretion as to the amount of the variance, the trial courtās determination will not be disturbed on appeal if the calculation begins with the guideline amount and the variation is based upon the statutory factors.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the hearing transcript reflects that the lower court failed to start with a calculation as to the child support guidelines amount. Instead, the lower court made clear that the $400 figure was not based on the mathematical calculation required by the guidelines, but was based on an equitable and subjective standpoint. The lower court also failed to take into account Appelleeās gross income from her bartending business, even if this was a nominal amount. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the lower court to make a determination as to the downward modification of child support awarded based upon an application of section 61.30, Florida Statutes. On remand, the court may receive any additional evidence it deems necessary for the proper resolution of this issue.
With respect to the child 'support modification, Appellant also alleges that the lower court erred in increasing the child support award by $65 per month due to the childās extraordinary medical expenses. On appeal, Appellee asserts that she never stated that there were āextraordinary medical expensesā involved in the care of their son. Accordingly, we reverse this portion of the order awarding $65 per month. We note that this does not change the portion of the order concluding that Appellant is. responsible for 43% of the childās reasonable and necessary health expenses not covered by insurance, which has not been challenged on appeal.
Appellant also asserts that the amended downward modification order was erroneous, as it required that he provide health insurance for the child. Appel-lee concedes that this portion of the order was erroneous, as she has paid for the childās health insurance since his birth and will continue to do so until she is unable. This concession was proper. We reverse and remand for the amended order to be corrected based upon this concession. With respect to the two other issues raised by Appellant on appeal, we affirm without comment.
Finally, we note that Appellant requested attorneyās fees within a paragraph contained in his amended initial brief. Attorneyās fees must be requested by filing a separate motion. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.400(b); see also McCreary v. Fla. Residential Prop. & Cas. Joint Underwriting Assān, 758 So.2d 692, 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Accordingly, Appellantās request for attorneyās fees is denied.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.