Joseph Cammarata and Judy Cammarata v. State Farm Florida Insurance Company
Joseph CAMMARATA and Judy Cammarata, Appellants, v. STATE FARM FLORIDA INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee
Attorneys
George A. Vaka and Nancy A. Lauten of Vaka Law Group, Tampa, and Kelly L. Kubiak of Merlin Law Group, Tampa, for appellants., Paul L. Nettleton of Carlton Fields, P.A., Miami, for appellee.
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
The insureds appeal a final summary judgment finding that their bad faith action was not ripe. They argue that because the insurerâs liability for coverage and the extent of their damages has been determined, their bad faith action was ripe. The insurer argues that because the insurerâs liability for breach of contract has not been determined, the insuredsâ bad faith action was not ripe. Based on Florida Supreme Court case law, we are compelled to agree with the insuredsâ argument. We hold that an insurerâs liability for coverage and the extent of damages, and not necessarily an insurerâs liability for breach of contract, must be determined before a bad faith action becomes ripe. Thus, we reverse and remand for reinstatement of the insuredsâ bad faith action in this case.
In this opinion, we first present the policy claimâs chronology. Second, we present the bad faith actionâs history, including discussion of our case law. Third, we examine Florida Supreme Court precedent which compels our reversal and our need to recede from one of our recent opinions.
The Policy Claimâs Chronology
October 2005 â The insureds sustained damages to their home as a result of Hurricane Wilma.
September 2007 â The insureds filed a claim for benefits under their homeownersâ policy.
October 2007 â The insurer notified the insureds that it had inspected their home, estimated the amount of their damages to be lower than the policy deductible, and owed no payment to them as a result.
April 2008 â The insureds requested the insurer to participate in the policyâs appraisal process. The insuredsâ request identified their appraiser.
May 2008 â The insurer identified its appraiser and requested the insuredsâ appraiserâs damage estimate.
June 2008 â The insuredsâ appraiser submitted a damage estimate which was higher than the policy deductible.
July 2008 â The insurerâs appraiser submitted a damage estimate which was lower than the policy deductible.
August 5, 2008 â The insurer filed a petition requesting the circuit court to appoint a neutral umpire pursuant to the policy.
August 15, 2008 â The insureds filed a petition requesting the circuit court to appoint a neutral umpire pursuant to the policy.
October 2008 â The circuit court appointed a neutral umpire.
October 16, 2009 â The umpire issued a damage estimate in an amount lower than the insuredsâ appraiserâs estimate but higher than the insurerâs appraiserâs estimate. The estimate was higher than the policy deductible.
October 27, 2009 â The insurerâs appraiser agreed to the umpireâs damage estimate.
December 2009 â The insurer paid the insureds the umpireâs damage estimate minus the policy deductible.
April 2010 â The circuit court entered an agreed order dismissing with prejudice the partiesâ petitions to appoint a neutral umpire.
The Bad Faith Actionâs History
After the circuit court entered the agreed order dismissing with prejudice the partiesâ petitions to appoint a neutral umpire, the insureds filed their action against the insurer for not attempting in good faith to settle their claim. See § 624.155(l)(b)l., Fla. Stat. (2011) (âAny person may bring a civil action against an
The insurer filed a motion for summary judgment, and the insureds responded. In support of their positions, the insurer and the insureds each cited a different opinion from this court. We will discuss the motion, the response, and the cited opinions in detail because of the apparent discrepancy between our opinionsâ holdings.
The insurerâs motion argued, among other things, that because the insurerâs liability for breach of contract had not been determined, the insuredsâ bad faith action was not ripe. In support, the insurer relied on this courtâs opinion in Lime Bay Condominium, Inc. v. State Farm Florida Insurance Co., 94 So.3d 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).
In Lime Bay, a dispute arose between the insured and the insurer over the amount of a claim for property' damage suffered during Hurricane Wilma. The insured filed a complaint for. breach of contract against the insurer. The breach of contract action later was abated when the parties engaged in the appraisal process. The appraisal process resulted in an award closer to the amount of the insuredâs damage claim. The insurer paid the appraisal award to the insured. The insured then filed an action against the insurer for not attempting in good faith to settle the claim. The insurer filed a motion to dismiss the bad faith action, arguing that there had not been a final- determination of liability and maintaining that it intended to dispute liability in the breach of contract action. The circuit court agreed with the insurer and dismissed the bad faith action as prematurely filed.
We affirmed. Id. at 699. We reasoned that the insured âdid not, and could not, allege that there had been a final determination of liability since the [insuredâs] breach of contract case was still pending.â Id. (citation omitted). We directed the circuit court to âfirst resolve the issue of [the insurerâs] liability for breach of contract, as well as the significance, if any, of the appraisal award.â Id. (citation omitted).
In response to the insurerâs reliance on Lime Bay in this case, the insureds argued that only an insurerâs liability for coverage and the extent of damages, and not for breach of contract, must be determined before a bad faith action becomes ripe. In support, the insureds relied on this courtâs more recent opinion in Trafalgar at Greenacres, Ltd. v. Zurich American Insurance Co., 100 So.3d 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).
In Trafalgar, a dispute arose between the insured and the insurer over the amount of a claim for property damage suffered during Hurricane Wilma. The insured filed a complaint for breach of contract against the insurer. The insurer invoked the appraisal provision of the contract. The appraisal process resulted in
We reversed. Id. at 1157-68. We held that an appraisal award which occurred after the insured filed suit for breach of contract, âconstitute[d] a âfavorable resolutionâ of an action for insurance benefits, so that [the insured] ... satisfied the necessary prerequisite to filing a bad faith claim.â Id. at 1158. We reasoned that the circuit courtâs summary judgment in the insurerâs favor on the breach of contract action was based on the insurerâs compliance with the contract after the appraisal process. Id. at 1157. Thus, we concluded that âthe appraisal award was tantamount to a âfavorable resolutionâ necessary to proceed with a bad faith action.â Id. at 1157-58 (citation omitted). We rejected the insurerâs argument that the summary judgment in its favor on the breach of contract action precluded the insuredâs ability to pursue the bad faith action. Id. at 1158. Citing our supreme courtâs precedent, we reasoned that â[a] judgment on a breach of contract action is not the only way of obtaining a favorable resolutionâ necessary to proceed with a bad faith action. Id. (citing Dadeland Depot, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 945 So.2d 1216 (Fla.2006) (an arbitration award establishing the validity of an insuredâs claim satisfies the condition precedent required to bring a bad faith action)). However, our opinion in Trafalgar did not mention its apparent discrepancy with Lime Bay.
After considering the partiesâ arguments in this case, the circuit court granted the insurerâs motion for summary judgment. In support of its decision, the circuit court relied on Lime Bay.
After the circuit court entered a final judgment, this appeal followed. As in the circuit court, the insureds argue that because the insurerâs liability for coverage and the extent of their damages has been determined, their bad faith action was ripe. The insurer again argues that because the insurerâs liability for breach of contract has not been determined, the insuredsâ bad faith action was not ripe.
Our review is de novo. See Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071, 1074 (Fla.2001) (âThe standard of review governing a trial courtâs ruling on a motion for summary judgment posing a pure question of law is de novo.â) (footnote omitted).
Supreme Court Precedent Compelling Our Reversal
Based on our supreme courtâs precedent, we are compelled to agree with the
In Blanchard, the insureds filed a breach of contract action against their insurer in state court. The insureds won a verdict against the insurer. The insureds then filed an action against the insurer in federal court for bad faith failure to settle. The insurer moved to dismiss the bad faith action. The insurer argued that the insureds had to assert their bad faith action along with the breach of contract action in state court. The federal district court granted the motion to dismiss.
On review, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals certified to our supreme court the following question: âDoes an insuredâs claim ... under section 624.155(l)(b)l., Florida Statutes, for allegedly failing to settle the ... claim in good faith accrue before the conclusion of the underlying litigation for the contractual ... benefits?â Blanchard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 903 F.2d 1398, 1400 (11th Cir.1990).
In response, our supreme court answered:
[A]n insuredâs underlying first-party action for insurance benefits against the insurer necessarily must be resolved favorably to the insured before the cause of action for bad faith in settlement negotiations can accrue. It follows that an insuredâs claim ... for failing to settle the claim in good faith does not accrue before the conclusion of the underlying litigation for the contractual ... benefits. Absent a determination of the existence of liability ... and the extent of the [insuredâs] damages, a cause of action cannot exist for a bad faith failure to settle.
Blanchard, 575 So.2d at 1291.
Reading Blanchard â certified question and answer in a vacuum, without the knowledge of the procedural context in which it arose â the pre-existence of a breach of contract action â the reader logically might assume that an insured must have filed a breach of contract action, and then obtained a favorable resolution of the breach of contract action, before a bad faith action accrues. However, no language in Blanchard expressly states that an insured must have filed any breach of contract action before a bad faith claim accrues. Rather, another interpretation of Blanchard is that: (1) the insured need only obtain a âdetermination of the existence of liability ... and the extent of the [insuredâs] damagesâ on the underlying claim âbefore the cause of action for bad faith in settlement negotiations can accrueâ; and (2) Blanchardâs references to the âunderlying first-party action for insurance benefitsâ and âunderlying litigation for the contractual ... benefitsâ being âresolved favorably to the insured before the cause of action for bad faith in settlement negotiations can accrueâ related only to the procedural context under which Blanchard arose.
The latter interpretation of Blanchard appears to have been articulated by our supreme courtâs later opinion in Vest. In Vest, the insured demanded her insurer to pay its policy limits on her claim. After the insurer did not pay its policy limits, the insured filed an action claiming that the insurer refused to settle and acted in bad faith in failing to pay its policy limits. The insurer later paid its policy limits to the insured. The insurer then filed a motion for summary judgment on the bad faith
However, our supreme court quashed the district courtâs decision with direction that the insuredâs bad faith action be allowed to proceed. Vest, 753 So.2d at 1276. The supreme court reasoned:
We understand that [Blanchard â ] language, âAbsent a determination of the existence of liability ... and the extent of the plaintiffs damages, a cause of action cannot exist for a bad faith failure to settle,â ... may be so broadly stated that our holding could be read as the district court has read it. For that reason we will here clarify.
First, we point out that Blanchard arose in the context of a certified question arising out of an issue as to whether the failure to pursue a bad-faith action for violation of section 624.155(1)(b)l [.] in an action for breach of the underlying insurance contract for nonpayment of benefits was the improper splitting of a cause of action. We held that it was not. Our decision in that case had to do with the timing of the bringing of causes of actions and not as to what claims could be pursued when a claim for bad faith ripened.
Second, we expressly state that Blanchard is properly read to mean that the âdetermination of the existence of liability ... and the extent of the [insuredâs] damagesâ are elements of a cause of action for bad faith. Once those elements exist, there is no impediment as a matter of law to a recovery of damages for violation of section 624.155(l)(b)l[.] dating from the date of a proven violation.
Therefore, in this case, the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that there was no claim for bad faith for acts which occurred prior to the approval of the settlement .... An action prior to that settlement was premature and was subject to dismissal without prejudice. However, upon that settlement, the claim for bad-faith damages accrued from the date the violation of section 624.155(l)(b)l[.] ripened because at that time the final element of the cause of action occurred.
In sum, we expressly hold that a claim for had faith pursuant to section 624,.155(l)(h)l[.J is founded upon the obligation of the insurer to pay when all conditions under the policy would require an insurer exercising good faith and fair dealing towards its insured to pay. This obligation on the part of an insurer requires the insurer to timely evaluate and pay benefits owed on the insurance policy. We hasten to point out that the denial of payment does not mean an insurer is guilty of bad faith as a matter of law. The insurer has a right to deny claims that it in good faith believes are not owed on a policy. Even when it is later determined by a court or arbitration that the insurerâs denial was mistaken, there is no cause of action if the denial was in good faith. Good-faith or bad-faith decisions depend upon various attendant circumstances and usually are issues of fact to be determined by a fact-finder.
We continue to hold in accord with Blanchard that bringing a cause of action in court for violation of section 624.155(l)(b)l[.] is premature until there is a determination of liability and extent of damages owed on the first-party insurance contract.
Id. at 1275-76 (emphasis added).
In reaching the foregoing holding in Vest, the supreme court cited with approv
The supreme court has recently held that to state a cause of action for first party bad faith there must be an allegation that there has been a determination of the insuredâs damages. Imhof v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 643 So.2d 617 (Fla.1994). The court did not, however, require that the damages be determined by litigation, that there be an allegation of a specific amount of damages or that the damages be in excess of the policy limits. The court was not faced with the circumstance presented here where the policy limits are subsequently tendered by the insurer. The insured in Imhof received an award of damages through arbitration of an amount less than the policy limits. The amount or extent of damages was held not to be determinative of whether an insured could bring a first party bad faith claim; the purpose of the allegation concerning a determination of damages was to show that âImhof had a valid claim.â Id. at 618.
We hold that the payment of the policy limits by the insurer here is the functional equivalent of an allegation that there has been a determination of the insuredâs damages. It satisfies the purpose for the allegation â to show that the insured had a valid claim.
Neither in Blanchard nor more recently in Imhof does the supreme court suggest that the required resolution of the insuredâs underlying claim must be by trial or arbitration .... However, as noted in Blanchard, a resolution of some kind in favor of the insured is a prerequisite. There was a favorable resolution here.
Vest, 753 So.2d at 1273-74 (quoting Broo-kins, 640 So.2d at 112-13) (emphasis added).
Based on Vestâs clarification of Blanchard and reliance on Brookins, we are compelled to hold that an insurerâs liability for coverage and the extent of damages, and not an insurerâs liability for breach of contract, must be determined before a bad faith action becomes ripe. To paraphrase Vest, the determination of the existence of liability and the extent of the insuredâs damages are the conditions precedent to a bad faith action, along with the notice requirement of section 624.155(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2011). Those first two. conditions may be established when a settlement determines the existence of liability and the extent of the insuredâs damages. As stated in Brookins, and as approved in Vest, that settlement does not require the damages to be determined by litigation.
Applying the foregoing principles here, the partiesâ settlement via the appraisal process, which determined the existence of liability and the extent of the insuredâs damages, established the first two conditions precedent of a bad faith action. Put another way, the appraisal award âeonstitute[d] a âfavorable resolutionâ of an action for insurance benefits, so that [the insured] ... satisfied the necessary prerequisite to filing a bad faith claim.â Trafalgar, 100 So.3d at 1158. Thus, the circuit court erred in finding that, because the insurerâs liability for breach of contract had not been determined, the insuredsâ bad faith action was not ripe.
We have considered the insurerâs arguments for affirmance. We conclude, with
Based on the foregoing, we reverse and remand for reinstatement of the insuredsâ bad faith action. We take no position on whether the bad faith action has merit.
Because of the conflict between this courtâs opinion in Lime Bay versus (1) the supreme courtâs opinion in Vest, (2) this courtâs opinion in Trafalgar, and (3) todayâs opinion, we are compelled to recede from Lime Bay to the extent it held that an insurerâs liability for breach of contract must be determined before a bad faith action becomes ripe, even though the insurerâs liability for coverage and the extent of the insuredâs damages already have been determined by an appraisal award favoring the insured.
However, we stand by our numerous prior opinions holding that, where the insurerâs liability for coverage and the extent of damages have not been determined in any form, an insurerâs liability for the underlying claim and the extent of damages must be determined before a bad faith action becomes ripe. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Tranchese, 49 So.3d 809, 810 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (quashing order denying motion to abate bad faith action âbecause the final determination of coverage and damages for the underlying claim has not been made, which must precede a- statutory bad faith actionâ).
Reversed and remanded.