State v. Elder

• 2023-12-18

Date Filed2023-12-18

Docket1512017983

JudgeKarsnitz R.J.

Cited0 times

StatusPublished

Full Opinion (html_with_citations)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
) Def. I.D. # 1512017983
v. )
)
)
DAVID ELDER, )
)
Defendant. )

Submitted: November 9, 2023
Decided: December 18, 2023

On Remand from the Supreme Court of Delaware
For Evidentiary Hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Proceed Pro Se
on Appeal of Denial of Motion for Postconviction Relief

ORDER

Casey L. Ewart, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 13 The
Circle, Georgetown, DE 19947; Attorney for State of Delaware.

Natalie S. Woloshin, Esquire, Woloshin Lynch & Associates, P.A., 3200 Concord
Pike, Wilmington, DE 19803; Attorney for Defendant David Elder.

David L. Elder, SBI # 00227109, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, 1181
Paddock Road, Smyrna, DE 19977

KARSNITZ, R. J.
Procedural Background

On December 15, 2017, after a second jury trial,1 David Elder (“Petitioner” or

“Mr. Elder”) was convicted of First Degree Rape, Second Degree Rape, First Degree

Burglary, and wearing a disguise during the commission of a felony. On January 26,

2018 he was sentenced to life on the first three charges and five years at Level 5 on

the last charge. On December 3, 2018, his conviction was upheld by the Delaware

Supreme Court on direct appeal.

On December 12, 2018, Mr. Elder filed a pro se Rule 61 Motion and a

supporting Memorandum. After a delay occasioned by the COVID pandemic and

the appointment of Postconviction Counsel, on November 14, 2022, I allowed Mr.

Elder to file a pro se Supplemental Petition and Appendix (the Rule 61 Motion, the

Memorandum, and the Supplemental Petition and Appendix, collectively, the “Pro

Se Motion”), even though at that time he was represented by Postconviction

Counsel.2

On November 30, 2022, Postconviction Counsel filed an Amended Rule 61

Petition (the “Motion”).

1
The first trial resulted in a hung jury.
2
Mr. Elder filed a number of submissions with this Court despite the fact that he was represented by
counsel (e.g., his pro se Motion to Amend his Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, which he filed on
or about February 1, 2020 despite the fact that Postconviction Counsel had already been appointed on
his behalf). I forwarded these pro se filings on to Postconviction Counsel.

2
On March 27, 2023, Mr. Elder filed a pro se request for an evidentiary hearing,

which I forwarded to Postconviction Counsel.

The State’s Answer was filed on May 30, 2023.

On July 10, 2023, Mr. Elder filed a pro se Reply to the State’s Answer, which

I forwarded to Postconviction Counsel.

The Reply from Postconviction Counsel was filed on August 17, 2023.

On September 13, 2023, I denied Mr. Elder’s Rule 61 Motion and his request

for an evidentiary hearing.

Mr. Elder timely filed an appeal of my decision with the Delaware Supreme

Court. Before the filing of his opening brief, Mr. Elder filed a motion and affidavit

asking to discharge his attorney and to represent himself in the appeal,

notwithstanding his right to counsel.3 Mr. Elder requested that the matter be

remanded to this Court for an evidentiary hearing so that he might demonstrate

that his request was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.4 On October

19, 2023, the Supreme Court granted Mr. Elder's request for a remand for an

3
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(2).
4
Mr. Elder understands that there will be no further action taken on his appeal until the matter
is returned by this Court to the Supreme Court from remand.

3
evidentiary hearing concerning his request to proceed pro se and returned the case

to me,5 with jurisdiction retained, to make specific inquiries of Mr. Elder6

Evidentiary Hearing – Findings of Fact

On November 9, 2023, upon notice to Mr. Elder, I held the evidentiary

hearing required by the Supreme Court. Both the Deputy Attorney General

representing the State and Postconviction Counsel for Mr. Elder were present. I

asked Mr. Elder all the questions mandated by the Supreme Court, and ascertained

the following facts:

(1) Mr. Elder has not retained private counsel to represent him

on appeal.

(2) Mr. Elder is indigent.

(3) Mr. Elder’s educational background and personal

experience have given him a good understanding of the

criminal justice system, including the trial process. Specifically,

Mr. Elder understands his right to court-appointed counsel to

assist him on appeal.

(4) Mr. Elder understands that he must either accept

5
Supreme Court Rules 19(c) and 26(d)(iii).
6
These are the inquiries the State found relevant in Watson v. State,

564 A.2d 1107

(Del. 1989).
4
representation on appeal by his present postconviction counsel or

proceed pro se.

(5) Mr. Elder freely, knowingly, and voluntarily waives his right

to the assistance of his postconviction counsel. He explained that

he has no negative feelings about his postconviction counsel;

however, she is legally and ethically constrained from making

certain arguments and raising certain issues on appeal, and he is

not. In connection with this latter inquiry, I determined the

following:

(a) Mr. Elder has not consulted with any other person,

including any other attorney, in making his decision to

waive his right to counsel.

(b) Mr. Elder understands that the appellate process

involves the application of rules and procedures that

may prove difficult for a non-lawyer to understand.

legal training, he will be required to comply with all

pertinent rules of the Supreme Court.

(d) Mr. Elder understands that noncompliance with

5
pertinent rules of the Supreme Court may delay or

prejudice his appeal.

(e) Mr. Elder understands that the allowance of oral

argument is discretionary with the Court, and that the

Court’s practice in criminal cases is not to grant oral

argument to pro se litigants.

(f) Mr. Elder understands that, if his waiver of counsel is

accepted, he will not thereafter be permitted to interrupt

or delay the appellate process to secure the assistance

of court-appointed counsel simply because he has

changed his position.

I also made additional inquiries of Mr. Elder, and ascertained the

following additional facts:

(1) Mr. Elder has been treated at the Delaware Psychiatric Center for

depression. Although he initially had a psychotic reaction to

medication there, he is now doing well on Wellbutrin.

(2) Mr. Elder used cocaine in the past but has been “clean and sober” for

the last ten years.

(3) Mr. Elder has no issues with alcohol.

(4) Mr. Elder was married for over five years. He has six grown children
6
by six different mothers.

Analysis – Conclusions of Law

Both Delaware and Federal cases7 agree that the key test for voluntary

waiver of counsel is not whether the defendant is well versed in the substantive

law and procedural rules of Rule 61 and appellate practice. As a non-lawyer, by

definition, Mr. Elder is not. Rather, the key question is whether, with his

background, experience and conduct, Mr. Elder understands the consequences

of proceeding pro se, particularly the disadvantages.

The seminal case on the constitutional right to proceed pro se is Paretta v.

California.8 The majority held that a defendant in a State criminal trial has a

constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to proceed without counsel

when he voluntarily and intelligently chooses to do so, and the State may not

force a lawyer upon him when he insists that he wants to conduct his own

defense.

In addition to Watson, the Delaware courts have consistently permitted

pro se representation in criminal cases. In Briscoe v. State,9 the defendant

requested new counsel on the eve of trial, and the Superior Court permitted him

7
Some of these cases address the right to proceed pro se at trial. However, the same core principles
should apply by extension to pro se representation on appeal.
8

422 U.S. 806

 (1975).
9

606 A.2d 103

 (Del. 1982).
                                                 7
to proceed pro se without advising him of the hazards of self-representation. His

conviction was reversed by the Delaware Supreme Court, which held that the

defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. The

invalid waiver was not cured by permitting court-appointed counsel to continue

in his role as standby counsel.

       In Stigars v. State,10 the Superior Court denied the defendant the right to

defend himself. Our Supreme Cort stated that, although the right to self-

representation in a criminal proceeding is fundamental, the exercise of that right

is not unqualified. In this case, however, the colloquy with the trial judge had

established the defendant’s voluntary waiver of counsel and his understanding

of the risks of self-representation. The Court therefore reversed defendant’s

conviction and remanded for retrial.11

       A Third Circuit case is quite helpful in defining the parameters of the colloquy

that must precede the acceptance of a request for self-representation. In United States

v. Peppers,12 the Court referenced the Federal Judicial Center’s Benchbook for U.S.

District Court Judges, § 1.02 (4th ed. 2000) and posited 14 potential questions for

such a colloquy:

1. Have you ever studied law?


10

674 A.2d 477

 (Del. 1996).
11
   See also Hartman v. State,

918 A.2d 1138

 (Del. 2007).
12

302 F.3d 120

(3d Cir. 2002).
8
2. Have you ever represented yourself in a criminal action?

3. Do you understand that you are charged with these crimes: [state the crimes with
which the defendant is charged]?

4. Do you understand that the U.S. Sentencing Commission has issued sentencing
guidelines that will be used in determining your sentence if you are found guilty?

5. Do you understand that if you are found guilty of the crime charged in Count 1,
the Court must impose an assessment of $___, and could sentence you to as many
as ___ years in prison and fine you as much as $ ___? [Ask defendant this question
for each count of the indictment or information.]

6. Do you understand that if you are found guilty of more than one of these crimes,
this Court can order that the sentences be served consecutively, that is, one after
another?

7. Do you understand that if you represent yourself, you are on your own? I cannot
tell you—or even advise you—as to how you should try your case.

7a. Do you know what defenses there might be to the offenses with which you are
charged? Do you understand that an attorney may be aware of ways of defending
against these charges that may not occur to you since you are not a lawyer? Do you
understand that I cannot give you any advice about these matters?

8. Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of Evidence?

8a. Do you understand that the Federal Rules of Evidence govern what evidence may
or may not be introduced at trial and that, in representing yourself, you must abide
by those rules?

9. Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure?

9a. Do you understand that these rules govern the way a criminal action is tried in
federal court? Do you understand that you must follow these rules?

10. Do you understand that you must proceed by calling witnesses and asking them
questions, and that, except when and if you yourself testify, you will not be permitted
to tell the jury matters that you wish them to consider as evidence?

9
10a. Do you understand that it may be much easier for an attorney to contact
potential witnesses, gather evidence, and question witnesses than it may be for you?

11. I must advise you that in my opinion a trained lawyer would defend you far better
than you could defend yourself. I think it unwise of you to try to represent yourself.
You are not familiar with the law. You are not familiar with court procedure. You
are not familiar with the rules of evidence. I strongly urge you not to try to represent
yourself.

12. Now, in light of the penalties that you might suffer if you are found guilty, and
in light of all of the difficulties of representing yourself, do you still desire to
represent yourself and to give up your right to be represented by a lawyer?

13. Are you making this decision freely, and does it reflect your personal desire?

14. Do you have any questions, or do you want me to clarify or explain further
anything that we have discussed here?

Although some of these questions are inapplicable to a Delaware criminal appeal, at

the November 9, 2023 evidentiary hearing I asked some variation of all of the

pertinent questions and adapted others for this case. Based on Mr. Elder’s answers,

I find that, under applicable law, he is voluntarily waiving his right to counsel on

appeal and understands the risks of self-representation.

Conclusion

Based on my colloquy with Mr. Elder at the evidentiary hearing and the facts

elicited therein, and based upon my conclusions of law, I find that Mr. Elder’s

10
request to represent himself is freely, knowingly, and intelligently made, and that he

understands the consequences of proceeding on appeal pro se.13

This case is returned to the Supreme Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Craig A. Karsnitz

cc: Prothonotary
Lisa A. Dolph, Clerk of Delaware Supreme Court

13
For the record, postconviction counsel has expressed her willingness to act as back-up counsel
for Mr. Elder if the Supreme Court deems it necessary or appropriate.
11