Full Opinion (html_with_citations)

                                SUPERIOR COURT
                                       OF THE
                              STATE OF DELAWARE
PAUL R. WALLACE                                                    LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
     JUDGE                                                             500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 10400
                                                                        WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801
                                                                               (302) 255-0660




                            Submitted: September 14, 2023
                             Decided: December 13, 2023

    Mr. Michael D. Chambers                      Todd E. Conner, Esquire
    SBI# 246261                                  Chief Deputy
    James T. Vaughn Correctional Center          Dawn M. Williams, Esquire
    1181 Paddock Road                            Assistant Public Defender
    Smyrna, DE 19977                             Office of Defense Services
                                                 Carvel State Office Building
    Abigail E. Rodgers, Esquire                  820 North French Street, 3rd Floor
    Chief Prosecutor – New Castle County         Wilmington, Delaware 19801
    Department of Justice
    Carvel State Office Building
    820 North French Street, 7th Floor
    Wilmington, Delaware 19801

         RE:      State v. Michael D. Chambers
                  I.D. No. 0311009491A

Dear Mr. Chambers and Counsel:

       The Court has reviewed Mr. Chambers’ latest pro se filing docketed
September 14, 2023, through which he asserts he is due a certificate of eligibility
to seek review of his sentence under Title 11, Section 4214(f) and that the Court
should order the Office of Defense Services (ODS) to further assist him in his
efforts to obtain relief under § 4214(f).1 At bottom, Mr. Chambers suggests that
the Court should grant him a certificate of eligibility because he has maximized
his rehabilitative efforts and believes he now meets the eligibility requirements
for such extraordinary relief.2

1
      D.I. 151.
2
   Id. at 2 (positing that if he “were sentenced today [he] wouldn’t even be declared an
Habitual Offender, or if so would not have received a 25 year sentence for 1447A”).
State v. Michael D. Chambers
I.D. No. 0311009491A
December 12, 2023
Page 2 of 5


       The legislation enacting Section 4214(f) called for this Court to establish
procedural rules to govern the filing of and proceedings on certain sentence
modification petitions. The Court has adopted Special Rule of Procedure
2017-1 for that purpose. That rule provides that pro se applications will not be
considered unless the Court expressly grants a petitioner permission to proceed
pro se. The Court has not granted Mr. Chambers such permission, but it appears
his latest filing is instigated by ODS’s notification that it cannot file a request for
a certificate of eligibility on his behalf.3

      For the sake of completeness, the Court has reviewed: Mr. Chambers’
request; the record in his case; and, the applicable law and Court rules. Those
materials were examined to see if he might arguably satisfy the exacting threshold
requirements for § 4214(f) eligibility4 thus warranting any further ODS
involvement. Mr. Chambers does not.

       After a three-day jury trial, Mr. Chambers was convicted of drug and
firearms charges he committed in November 2003.5 At the time he committed
these crimes, Mr. Chambers had at least three prior felony convictions and was
subject to sentencing enhancement as a habitual criminal offender.6 So, prior to
his sentencing, the State filed a petition to declare him a habitual criminal
offender.7 The Court granted that motion and sentenced Mr. Chambers
accordingly.8

      Resultingly, Mr. Chambers is serving, inter alia, a sentence of 25 years
imprisonment imposed under the Habitual Criminal Act. The individual
components of Mr. Chambers’ current cumulative sentence are:

3
    D.I. 150.
4
   See State v. Lewis,
2018 WL 4151282
, at *1-2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2018), aff’d,
2019 WL 2157519
 (Del. May 16, 2019) (describing the requirements that must be met before the
Court will issue a certificate of eligibility to seek relief via 11 Del. C. § 4214(f)).
5
    D.I. 29.
6
    See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214(a)(2003) (providing that a person who has been thrice
previously convicted of a felony and is thereafter convicted of another felony may be declared
a habitual criminal).
7
    D.I. 38.
8
    D.I. 47-48.
State v. Michael D. Chambers
I.D. No. 0311009491A
December 12, 2023
Page 3 of 5


            - Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony
              (PFDCF) (IN06-05-0449)—25 years at Supervision Level V
              (to be served under the then-extant provisions of 11 Del. C.
              § 4214(a));
            - Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine (IN06-05-0447)—
              Two years at Supervision Level V, suspended in whole for
              two years at Supervision Level IV, suspended after serving
              six months at Supervision Level IV for 18 months at
              Supervision Level III;
            - Use of a Dwelling for Keeping Controlled Substances (IN06-
              05-0448)—One year at Supervision Level V, suspended in
              whole for one year at Supervision Level III; and
            - Illegal Possession of Alazopram (IN06-05-0453)—costs of
              prosecution.9

The effective date of Mr. Chambers’ sentence is January 26, 2007.10

       Since then, Mr. Chambers’ convictions and sentence were affirmed on
direct appeal11 and he has filed various unsuccessful motions seeking vacatur of
his convictions and sentence. This includes no less than seven motions for
postconviction relief,12 a motion for sentence modification,13 and three state
habeas petitions. 14

       The Court now turns to his latest volley and whether Mr. Chambers
satisfies the exacting threshold requirements for § 4214(f) eligibility.

9
    Sentencing Order, State v. Michael D. Chambers, ID No. 0311009491A (Del. Super. Ct.
Jan. 26, 2007) (D.I. 49).
10
     Sentencing Order, at 1.
11
     D.I. 60.
12
   D.I. 52, 56; D.I. 63, 69; D.I. 71, 74; D.I. 79, 85; D.I. 97, 99; D.I. 103, 106; D.I. 113, 115;
and D.I. 122, 125.
13
     D.I. 111-112.
14
     D.I. 129, 132; D.I. 134, 137; and 138, 141.
State v. Michael D. Chambers
I.D. No. 0311009491A
December 12, 2023
Page 4 of 5


      “[T]o be eligible to petition for sentencing relief under § 4214(f), an inmate
serving a sentence (or sentences) imposed under the pre-2016 Habitual Criminal
Act must meet both a type-of-sentence and the time-served requirement.”15
Mr. Chambers may meet the first in regard to the PFDCF conviction for which
he was sentenced as a habitual criminal, but he doesn’t satisfy the second.

       Mr. Chambers was sentenced to the minimum required for his PFDCF
conviction—25 years of imprisonment under the then-extant four-strikes
provision of the Habitual Criminal Act.16 One might become time-served eligible
for § 4214(f) relief only “after [he] has served a sentence of incarceration equal to
any applicable mandatory sentence otherwise required by th[e current provisions of
the Habitual Criminal Act] or the statutes describing said offense or offenses,
whichever is greater.”17

      Under either of the current provisions of the Habitual Criminal Act applicable
to Mr. Chambers and his PFDCF conviction—§ 4214(c) or (d)—the habitual
criminal portion of his sentence for that crime would be no less than the minimum
mandatory term of 25 years of unsuspended imprisonment he is currently serving.18

15
    Yelardy v. State,
2022 WL 9632128
, at *2 (Del. Oct. 14, 2022) (emphasis added) (citations
and quotation marks omitted); State v. Harris,
2022 WL 472518
, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb.
14, 2022).
16
    See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214(a)(2003) (“[A]ny person sentenced pursuant to this
subsection shall receive a minimum sentence which shall not be less than the statutory
maximum penalty provided elsewhere in this Title for the fourth or subsequent felony which
forms the basis of the State’s petition to have the person declared to be an habitual criminal
except that this minimum provision shall apply only when the fourth or subsequent felony is a
Title 11 violent felony, as defined in § 4201(c) of this title.”).
17
     Id. at § 4214(f) (2023).
18
    See id. at § 4214(c) (providing habitual criminal sentenced for a triggering fourth felony,
when that felony is a Title 11 violent felony and at least one of his priors was a Title 11 violent
felony, must receive the statutory maximum for that triggering Title 11 violent felony); id. at
§ 4214(d) (providing one sentenced under this provision also must receive a minimum sentence
of the statutory maximum penalty provided elsewhere in Title 11 for the triggering felony that
form the basis of the habitual criminal petition). When Mr. Chambers committed his crimes
in 2003, PFDCF was a class B violent felony with a statutory maximum of 25 years
imprisonment. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §1447A, 4201(c) and 4205(b)(2)(2003). And
Mr. Chambers no doubt had by then amassed no less than three prior convictions for Title 11
violent felonies. See D.I. 38 (State’s habitual criminal petition evidencing Mr. Chambers’ 1995
conviction for first-degree assault, 1999 conviction for second-degree robbery, and 2000
State v. Michael D. Chambers
I.D. No. 0311009491A
December 12, 2023
Page 5 of 5


Simply put, he is nowhere close to time-served eligibility for release.

      Accordingly, to the extent Mr. Chambers’ filing that he entitles an
application for “Affirmative Relief” is deemed a pro se certificate of eligibility
under Del. Super. Ct. Spec. R. 2017-1(c) it must be DENIED, with prejudice.
He is manifestly ineligible for relief under 11 Del. C. § 4214(f) and the Court
need not enlist ODS to pursue an application for relief that is going nowhere.19

       IT IS SO ORDERED.



                                                     Paul R. Wallace, Judge

cc:    Prothonotary-Criminal
       Investigative Services Office




conviction for second-degree assault); see also Sentencing Transcript, at 4-6 (D.I. 126)(the
State laying out those prior convictions during the habitual criminal hearing and
Mr. Chamber’s response: “There’s no objection on my part to the State’s offer, Your Honor.”).
Mr. Chambers’ mistaken belief that today his PFDCF would not be considered a triggering
Title 11 violent felony seems to be a product of his errant reliance on current 11 Del. C.
§ 3901(d). That statute only governs which violent felonies mandate consecutive sentencing.
It does nothing to remove PFDCF from 11 Del. C. § 4201(c)’s list of violent felonies. PFDCF
is now and always has been defined as a Title 11 violent felony. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4201(c) (1996); id. (2023). So, it would still count as a trigger when figuring Mr. Chambers’
habitual criminal eligibility and slotting under the current Habitual Criminal Act. Id. at
§ 4214(c) (2023); id. at § 4214(d)(2023).
19
    See, e.g., Clark v. State,
2018 WL 1956298
 (Del. Apr. 24, 2018) (this Court does not err
by denying appointment of counsel when an inmate clearly does not meet § 4214(f)’s eligibility
requirements); State v. Rowan,
2022 WL 896260
, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct Mar. 28, 2022).