Kellner v. AIM Immunotech Inc.

    IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

TED D. KELLNER,                       )
                                      )
            Plaintiff and             )
            Counterclaim-Defendant,   )
                                      )
      v.                              )      C.A. No. 2023-0879-LWW
                                      )
AIM IMMUNOTECH INC.,                  )
                                      )
            Defendant and             )
            Counterclaim-Plaintiff,   )
                                      )
      and                             )
                                      )
THOMAS EQUELS, WILLIAM                )
MITCHELL, STEWART                     )
APPELROUTH, AND NANCY K.              )
BRYAN,                                )
                                      )
            Defendants.               )


                                  OPINION


                      Date Submitted: December 5, 2023
                      Date Decided: December 28, 2023


John M. Seaman, Eric A. Veres & Eliezer Y. Feinstein, ABRAMS & BAYLISS
LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Jeffrey J. Lyons & Michael E. Neminski, BAKER &
HOSTETLER LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Teresa Goody Guillén, BAKER &
HOSTETLER LLP, Washington, D.C.; Marco Molina, BAKER & HOSTETLER
LLP, Costa Mesa, California; Ambika B. Singhal, BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP,
Dallas, Texas; Alexandra L. Trujillo, BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, Houston,
Texas; Counsel for Ted D. Kellner
William R. Denny, Matthew F. Davis, Nicholas D. Mozal & Caneel Radinson-
Blasucci, POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP, Wilmington, Delaware;
Stefan Atkinson, Mary T. Reale & Mason E. Reynolds, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP,
New York, New York; Michael F. Williams & Don Hong, KIRKLAND & ELLIS
LLP, Washington, D.C.; Counsel for Thomas Equels, William Mitchell, Stewart
Appelrouth, Nancy K. Bryan, and AIM ImmunoTech Inc.




WILL, Vice Chancellor
      This post-trial decision resolves an expedited action regarding the adoption

and enforcement of advance notice bylaws. It harkens back to a related case heard

last year and hints at what coming activism disputes may bring. One could say that

my holiday season was visited by litigation past, present, and future.

       In 2022, a group schemed to run a proxy contest against AIM Immunotech

Inc. A dissident nomination was submitted after a potential director candidate asked

his friend to purchase AIM shares and front the attempt. The stockholder’s notice

raised the board’s suspicion that treachery was afoot since it appeared to be a

continuation of a prior failed nomination—one orchestrated by a felon who had

meddled with AIM’s business.       Because the notice neglected to mention any

arrangement or understanding involving the broader group, as required by AIM’s

advance notice bylaws, it was rejected. The stockholder moved for a preliminary

injunction in this court, but the mandatory relief he sought was unprocurable on a

disputed factual record.

      Now, a renewed nomination attempt is before me. It is, in many ways, smarter

than the preceding effort. The nomination is being pressed by a sophisticated

investor with a substantial number of AIM shares. Perhaps understanding the high

bar to obtaining a mandatory injunction on a preliminary record, he has taken his

claims through trial. Yet his notice suffers from the same primary defect as his




                                          1
predecessor’s: it obscures obvious arrangements or understandings pertaining to the

nomination.

       The plaintiff also lodged a facial challenge to a set of amended advance notice

bylaws recently adopted amid dark skies, arguing that they threaten stockholders’

ability to make future nominations. Several of the bylaws are so shrouded in layers

of murky text that their limits are a mystery. Reviewed through the lens of enhanced

scrutiny, they are disproportionate responses to any threatened corporate objectives.

      Thus, the opinion that follows is a tale of wins and losses on both sides. As

with the past effort, the present nomination notice contravened valid bylaws. The

board’s rejection of the notice withstands inquiry. Certain bylaws, however, must

fall because they inequitably imperil the stockholder franchise to no legitimate end.

Perhaps these lessons will be heeded in matters still to come.




                                          2
I.        BACKGROUND

          The following facts were stipulated to by the parties or proven by a

preponderance of the evidence at trial.1 The trial record includes the testimony of

10 fact and 2 expert witnesses, 22 deposition transcripts, and 1,241 joint exhibits.2

          A.    AIM ImmunoTech

          AIM ImmunoTech Inc. (“AIM” or the “Company”) is an immuno-pharma

company incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Ocala,

Florida.3 Its stock is traded on the NYSE American exchange.4 AIM’s stock price

has decreased by 99% since 2016 and it has a single drug with the requisite

regulatory approvals to be commercialized.5 The Company’s lead product is an

investigational drug called Ampligen, which is in clinical trials for immune system

disorders, viral diseases, and cancers.6




1
    Joint Pre-trial Stipulation and Order (Dkt. 234) (“PTO”).
2
  Facts drawn from exhibits jointly submitted by the parties are referred to by the numbers
provided on the parties’ joint exhibit list and cited as “JX __” unless otherwise defined.
Dkt. 253. Deposition transcripts are cited as “[Name] Dep.” See Dkts. 238-40, 252. Trial
testimony is cited as “[Name] Tr.” See Dkts. 264-66.
3
    PTO ¶ 10.
4
    Id.
5
    See JX 901 at 2; JX 701 at 8.
6
    PTO ¶ 10.
                                              3
           AIM’s board of directors (the “Board”) has four members: Thomas Equels,

William Mitchell, Stewart Appelrouth, and Nancy K. Bryan.7 Equels, a lawyer by

training, is AIM’s Chief Executive Officer and has served on the Board since 2008.8

Mitchell, a physician, is a long-tenured Board member who serves as Chairman.9

He holds a Ph.D. in biochemistry and has studied Ampligen since its early

development in the mid-1980s.10 Appelrouth, an accountant, joined the Board in

2016.11 Bryan is the newest addition to the Board, having been appointed in March

2023.12 She is the President of BioFlorida, Inc., of which AIM is a member.13

           B.    Tudor’s Interest in AIM

           AIM’s stockholder base is primarily composed of retail investors. One, Franz

Tudor, began to beset AIM management with frequent communications in the

summer of 2020. On July 30, 2020, Tudor sent a Twitter direct message to AIM’s

public relations manager advising on how to “be taken seriously.”14 Tudor stated: “I



7
    Id.
8
 Id. ¶ 11; Equels Tr. 494. Equels began his tenure at the Company while it was called
Hemispherx. PTO ¶ 10.
9
    PTO ¶ 12; Mitchell Tr. 630.
10
     Mitchell Tr. 630-32.
11
     PTO ¶ 13; Appelrouth Tr. 682.
12
     PTO ¶ 14.
13
     Id.
14
     JX 45.
                                             4
now represent over 1 mil[lion] shares b[etween] the various funds [I] consult and my

own ownership. Why do you think [the] stock didn’t break 2.65 today? That was

us buying every share sub 2.70.”15

          Around the same time, Tudor contacted Equels and asked to obtain a position

as an international business development consultant for the Company.16 Equels

looked into Tudor’s background and learned that in 2009, Tudor pleaded guilty to

securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud as part of an insider

trading scheme at Galleon Group.17 Tudor is permanently enjoined from engaging

in certain activities related to penny stocks—a class of microcaps that includes

AIM.18

          On August 4, Tudor emailed Equels to thank him for the “opportunity to assist

AIM in its business development initiatives.”19          AIM “pass[ed]” on Tudor’s

proposal.20 After losing touch with Equels, Tudor attempted to contact other Board

members and the Company’s investor relations representative.21 In a September 25


15
     Id. at 2.
16
     Tudor Dep. 55-56; see JX 362 (“Equels Aff.”) ¶ 6.
17
     PTO ¶ 17.
18
     Equels Aff. ¶ 5; see also id. Ex. A.
19
  JX 47. Tudor also asked Equels if Ampligen could be shipped to his spouse’s family in
Ecuador. JX 49 at 2.
20
     JX 49 at 1.
21
     JX 56; JX 79 at 161.
                                             5
message to Appelrouth, Tudor said that he “represent[ed] some of AIM[’]s largest

shareholders” and would like to share “feedback as to how to improve operations

and drive shareholder value.”22 He requested a “group conference call” with the

Board.23 Tudor’s messages went unanswered.

         Tudor then began representing to third parties—including principal

investigators in Ampligen clinical trials and a U.S. Food and Drug Administration

lobbyist—that he was associated with AIM.24 On October 16, AIM’s counsel asked

Tudor to cease and desist representing that he was “authorized to speak on behalf of

AIM.”25 The warning was ignored.26

         In February 2021, AIM commenced litigation against Tudor in Florida state

court to prevent him from interfering with AIM’s business.27 AIM subsequently

obtained an injunction that permanently enjoined Tudor from contacting the

Company’s business relations.28




22
     JX 56 (Tudor noting that he had sent a similar message to Mitchell).
23
  Id. Tudor sent over 50 Twitter direct messages to AIM representatives between late July
2020 and early January 2021. JXs 75-76; see also JX 77 at 31.
24
     JXs 61-62; JX 66; JX 68; JX 74 at 113; see also Equels Aff. ¶ 9.
25
     JX 67.
26
     Equels Aff. ¶ 12.
27
     Id. ¶ 13.
28
     JX 92; JX 96.
                                              6
           C.    The Lautz Nomination

           Tudor was not alone in his campaign to find influence with AIM. He was

joined by his former colleague at Galleon Group, Todd Deutsch.29                     Deutsch

beneficially owns 1,716,100 shares of AIM common stock—about 3.5% of the

Company’s outstanding shares.30 He previously worked for a wealth management

services company and spent 20 years as a trader with Goldman Sachs and various

hedge funds.31 Since leaving client services in 2012, Deutsch manages his own

home office portfolio.32

           Like Tudor, Deutsch began repeatedly contacting AIM in the summer of 2020,

conveying his growing frustration with the Company’s management and his

significant losses.33 Some of his communications were strikingly similar in style

and tone to those Tudor sent at the same time—even after Tudor was enjoined from

contacting AIM.34 Other emails from Tudor were forwarded by Deutsch to Equels.35




29
     See Deutsch Tr. 161; Tudor Dep. 48-49.
30
     PTO ¶ 16.
31
     Id.
32
     Id.
33
     JXs 51-52; JX 90; JX 126; see also JX 78 at 2 (“Had your chance. . . . Idiots[.]”).
34
     Compare JX 145, with JX 146.
35
     JXs 190-93.
                                               7
         In late 2021, Tudor told fellow AIM stockholder Walter Lautz that he had a

plan to “oust[]” the Board.36 By the spring, Tudor had identified two potential

director nominees: Daniel Ring and Robert Chioini.37 Tudor had known Chioini for

years, having worked together at Rockwell Medical Technologies—a dialysis

company Chioini co-founded.38 Rockwell Medical and Chioini parted ways in 2018

after the company publicly announced that its board determined Chioini “lacked key

attributes necessary to oversee the [company’s] growth and long-term success.”39

Ring was another business acquaintance of Tudor.40

         On April 18, Tudor texted Deutsch that “[m]y BMY guy [Ring] can be on the

AIM [Board].”41 Tudor noted: “We will need a shareholder to make the nomination

and [I] will get everything together.”42 Tudor introduced Chioini to Lautz by email,

forwarded Ring’s resume to Lautz, and prepared materials for the nomination.43

Later that day, Lautz submitted a notice to AIM purporting to nominate Ring and



36
     JX 125; see JX 124; JX 131; JX 280.
37
     JX 197; JX 203; JX 199; JX 418 at 13-14.
38
     PTO ¶ 15; Chioini Tr. 8; Equels Tr. 529.
39
  JX 28. Whether Chioini “left” Rockwell of his own accord or was fired became a matter
of debate at trial. See Chioini Tr. 9, 128; JX 28.
40
     JX 418 at 31, 36.
41
     JX 197.
42
     Id.; see Deutsch Tr. 182-83.
43
     JXs 195-96; JX 198; JX 203.
                                                8
Chioini to the Board.44 The nomination notice was drafted by Tudor and untouched

by Lautz before its submission.45 The notice, however, made no mention of Tudor.46

         D.     Kellner’s Growing Interest
         Deutsch kept another major AIM stockholder, Ted D. Kellner, apprised of

these efforts. Kellner is a retired founder and portfolio manager of Fiduciary

Management, Inc., a philanthropist, and a minority owner of the Milwaukee Bucks.47

Kellner and Deutsch have known each other for over two decades.48 Kellner first

purchased AIM stock in early 2021 at Deutsch’s suggestion.49 Today, Kellner is the

record holder of 1,000 shares of AIM common stock and beneficially owns a

substantial stake.50

         Around February 2021, Deutsch began sending Kellner information from

Tudor about AIM’s stock performance, mostly by forwarding Kellner emails written

by Tudor.51        Kellner thought the Company had promise but was stunted by



44
     JX 200.
45
     Id.; JX 201; Tudor Dep. 62.
46
     See JX 200.
47
     Kellner Tr. 218-20; PTO ¶ 8.
48
     Kellner Tr. 220; Deutsch Tr. 146.
49
     Kellner Tr. 220-21; Deutsch Tr. 172.
50
     PTO ¶ 9.
51
  JXs 88-89; JX 91; JX 108. Kellner received this information either directly from Deutsch
or indirectly through his executive assistant. Compare JX 116, with JX 118.
                                            9
mismanagement.52        Like Deutsch, Kellner lost most of the value of his AIM

investment.53 By the fall of 2021, Kellner became more involved in Tudor and

Deutsch’s correspondence with the Company.54

           On April 19—one day after Lautz submitted his attempted nomination

notice—Deutsch sent Kellner an investment analysis about AIM that Tudor had

prepared.55 Kellner printed out the email and marked it up by hand.56 At the top of

the page, Kellner wrote: “48 million shares. What do we own? 15 to 18%[?]”57 The

“we” referred to Kellner, Tudor, and Deutsch.58




52
     JX 93; JX 111; Kellner Tr. 220, 222-23.
53
     Kellner Tr. 222.
54
   E.g., JX 116 at 1 (Kellner to Deutsch: “Have you and Franz drafted the letter we were
intending to send to the AIM management team?”); JX 122 (Deutsch to Kellner: “[W]e
need you[r] help[.] I have CEO and board members[’] emails.”).
55
     JX 205.
56
     Id.
57
     Id. at 1.
58
   Kellner Tr. 253-54 (“I knew that I had a 3 percent stake, roughly. I knew that Todd had
a little bit more. It was my belief that, as was conveyed over some time, that Franz Tudor
had a stake of a like amount. . . . I thought if there was one or two other shareholders, that
there could be another 2 or 3 percent[] owners in the company.”); id. at 291, 323-24.
                                               10
         E.    Preparations for a Proxy Fight

         On April 28, AIM rejected Lautz’s purported notice for non-compliance with

federal securities laws.59 It became apparent that a better prepared, advised, and

funded effort would be needed.

         Chioini sought financial support from his fellow co-founder of Rockwell

Medical, Michael Xirinachs.60 Xirinachs is a trader who pleaded guilty in 2022 to

criminal charges involving fraudulent securities trading, promotion and material

misrepresentations to investors, and misuse of funds.61 On April 29, Chioini sent

Xirinachs a copy of AIM’s bylaws and flagged the advance notice provisions.62 On

May 1, Chioini emailed Xirinachs to set up a call with Tudor regarding the “AIM

deal.”63

         By May 2, Tudor had contacted counsel from Baker & Hostetler LLP

(“BakerHostetler”) to advise on a potential proxy contest.64 On May 3, Xirinachs,

Tudor, and Chioini received a calendar invite from an attorney at BakerHostetler


59
     JX 235.
60
   Chioini Tr. 77 (“[W]ith Mr. Xirinachs, I wanted him to be part of the group to help
finance the proxy contest.”).
61
  JX 397 at 25. Xirinachs was also found to have committed wire fraud, with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) obtaining a judgment against him and his company. JX
16 at 6-9.
62
     JX 238.
63
     JX 239.
64
     JX 179.
                                           11
with the subject “Potential Engagement: Proxy Contest.”65 A few hours after the

scheduled call, Tudor sent a text message to Lautz stating: “Fyi haven[’]t given up.

Been doing lawyer calls to work out a strategy.”66

         On May 4, Deutsch forwarded Kellner an email that Tudor had sent to AIM’s

investor relations representative with the subject “AIM Needs the Right and Good

People.”67 In handwritten notes on a printout of the email, Kellner highlighted the

directors’ salaries and wrote “poor mgt!” and “[r]eplace mgt?”68 His notes-to-self

exclaimed: “Why are we picking this fight!”69 After AIM’s investor relations team

ignored Tudor’s May 4 correspondence, Tudor sent another email stating: “By

totally ignoring me and not acting professionally you now get gloves off. . . . This is

just [d]isgusting.”70

         F.     Kellner’s Surprise and Lautz’s Lament

         Tudor continued to express his frustration to Equels in early June.71 After

Deutsch forwarded one of Tudor’s emails to Kellner on June 2, Kellner


65
     JX 244. Chioini does not “recall canceling the meeting.” Chioini Tr. 73.
66
   JX 245. Although the recipient’s identity is not obvious from the face of the document,
it appears to be Lautz.
67
     JX 247.
68
     JX 248.
69
   Id. During his testimony, Kellner did not recall who the “we” mentioned in his notes
referred to. Kellner Tr. 299.
70
     JX 255.
71
     See JX 265 at 2.
                                             12
responded: “Ridiculous!! Did they have an annual meeting yet Todd?”72 Deutsch

then forwarded another email to Kellner from Tudor that said:

           If you would like to send to Ted. [sic]
           Their annual shareholder meeting for the past 2 years has been on
           Oct[ober] 7th. . . . There is a window of June 6 to July 7 to run a proxy
           battle and nominate BOD members. . . .

           I have 2 strong candidates to run and get control of the [Board]. I have
           spoken with legal counsel and it would cost an estimated $100k in legal
           fees and $50k for the proxy solicitor. If the proxy battle is won then
           the Company would reimburse the proxy battle expenses. I have a
           shareholder who is will[ing] to have their name as the lead but so far
           have not been able to find anyone to front the $150k.73
Kellner printed the email, highlighted it, and made handwritten notes to himself. 74

           Kellner subsequently learned that Tudor owned drastically fewer shares than

Kellner had believed.75 On June 4, Kellner texted Deutsch to say: “In my discussions

with Franz . . . I was frankly stunned to learn he only owned 45,000 shares of the

stock. Not a strong [text cuts off].”76 Deutsch responded: “It[’]s a huge part of his

net worth [since] he had two unfort[unate] events th[a]t almost bankrupt[ed]

him . . . I promise [you] he is as smart [as] they come in [the] space . . . So we are




72
     Id. at 1.
73
     Id.
74
     Id.
75
     Kellner Tr. 253-54.
76
     JX 433 at 1.
                                              13
aligned.”77 Deutsch went on to say that Tudor was “all in on this” and “d[idn’t] want

to let [Kellner] and [Deutsch] down.”78 Kellner responded that Tudor “doesn’t need

to worry nor you about Teddy!!![13 emojis, including thumbs up and smiley

faces].”79

           Although Tudor hoped that Lautz would be the stockholder submitting the

nomination, Lautz declined. On June 14, Lautz wrote Tudor an email with the

subject line “FYI – Potential Dirt on Me.”80 Lautz told Tudor that he “just came to

think” about the fact that he had been “fired from Merrill for ‘selling away.’”81

Lautz noted that he had been the subject of “a FINRA investigation” and “was

terminated from one of the largest brokerage houses on the planet,” which “may not

be a good look” for the nomination effort.82 Tudor sent Lautz’s email to Chioini,

who copied Xirinachs on a response offering to “have the attorney look at it.”83

           Chioini and Xirinachs kept in regular contact with one another and with

counsel at BakerHostetler throughout the summer of 2022. The two circulated



77
     Id.
78
     Id. at 2.
79
     Id.
80
     JX 274 at 1.
81
     Id.
82
     Id.
83
     Id.
                                          14
multiple iterations of a draft nomination notice (before a stockholder to submit it had

been found).84 They are jointly responsible for the legal fees associated with the

eventual 2022 nomination and related litigation in this court.85

         G.     More Surprise for Kellner
         In mid-June, AIM’s outside counsel sent correspondence to Deutsch, Kellner,

and Tudor’s counsel demanding that they comply with the requirements of Section

13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.86 AIM became concerned after

Deutsch attempted to have Tudor attend “as an undisclosed party, a telephone

conference between AIM’s [investor relations] firm,” Deutsch, and Kellner.87 The

correspondence mentioned Deutsch’s hostility towards AIM’s management, that

Tudor was convicted of insider trading, and that AIM had obtained a permanent

injunction against Tudor.88

         These revelations about Tudor surprised Kellner.89 In handwritten notes on a

copy of the letter, Kellner wrote “FRANZ TUDOR – IS A FELON?” and “INSIDER


84
   JX 392; JX 401; JX 416; JX 454; JX 990; JX 1000; JX 1020; see Harrington Tr. 426-27.
A number of these documents were withheld as attorney-client privileged under a common
interest. See JX 392.
85
     Chioini Tr. 111.
86
  JX 277 at 4-5; JX 292 (“Mr. Tudor has surreptitiously engaged himself in a stockholder
group consisting of, at a minimum, Mr. Deutsch and Mr. Kellner.”).
87
     JX 292; JX 277 Ex. A.
88
     JX 277 at 5.
89
     Kellner Tr. 258-59.
                                          15
TRADING?”90 Kellner also wrote the names “Robb [sic] Chioini” and “Michael

Zeaniack [Xirinachs],” noting: “our plans – get a lawyer.”91

           H.    The Jorgl Nomination
           In late June, the nomination effort needed both a stockholder nominator and a

nominee since Ring dropped out. On June 21, Lautz texted Tudor and asked, “were

you able to find someone to be the face of the activist?”92 Tudor responded: “We

are still looking.”93

           The next day, Chioini recruited Michael Rice to be his co-nominee.94 Rice is

a co-founder of Life Sci Advisers, which served as Rockwell Medical’s investor

relations consultant during Chioini’s tenure.95 Like Chioini, Rice is not an AIM

stockholder.96 Chioini sent Rice’s contact information to Tudor, and Tudor sent Rice

a description of AIM.97




90
     JX 278 at 1.
91
     Id.
92
     JX 280.
93
     Id.
94
     Chioini Tr. 78.
95
     JX 404 at 44.
96
     JX 393 at 52.
97
     JX 284; JX 283.
                                             16
         Rice was able to supply the “body” (to use Chioini’s word) to make the

nomination.98 At Rice’s request, Jonathan Jorgl—a friend that Rice surfed with—

bought 1,000 shares of AIM stock on June 27.99 Jorgl had never heard of AIM

beforehand, but was willing to join the cause so long as he was not responsible for

attorneys’ fees.100 With help from Rice and Xirinachs, Jorgl put the shares into his

name of record just before the nomination deadline.101 On July 8, Jorgl submitted

his nomination notice with Chioini and Rice as his proposed nominees.102

         The next day, Kellner had a call with Tudor to discuss the nomination.103

During the call, Kellner took contemporaneous handwritten notes. He wrote:

“Annual meeting is October 7th[.] Franz submitted 2 new directors on Friday July

8th: 1. Mike Rice[;] 2. Rob Chioini.”104


98
   JX 291 at 2 (Chioini to Rice: “We really need to get your body to by [sic] the shares
today every day matters.”); JX 295.
99
 Jorgl Dep. 17, 32-33; see Jorgl v. AIM Immunotech Inc., 

, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 28, 2022).
100
      See JX 321; Jorgl Dep. 63 (noting that he was unwilling to take on legal fees).
101
      See JX 288; JX 290; JX 294; JX 321.
102
      JX 322.
103
      See JX 325.
104
   Id. at 1. Kellner testified that he was mistaken in noting that Tudor submitted the
nomination and meant to write Jorgl. But since Jorgl did not enter the picture until late
June and Kellner was in regular contact with Tudor, it makes more sense that Kellner’s
notes reflect his belief that Tudor was driving the effort. See Kellner Tr. 239-40 (“Q: Why
did you identify the stockholder as Mr. Franz Tudor if, as you just testified, that is not
correct? Kellner: Well, I can only describe—the Jorgl name had only become known to
me, I think, a month before, and when the Jorgl suit here—I’ve never, to this day, talked
                                              17
            On July 19, AIM rejected Jorgl’s nomination notice.105 AIM General Counsel

Peter Rodino wrote that Jorgl’s notice “fail[ed] to satisfy Section 1.4 of [AIM’s]

[b]ylaws and applicable law by, among other things, making false and misleading

statements in lieu of providing [the required] information.”106 Section 1.4(c) of

AIM’s bylaws, as adopted in 2016 (the “2016 Bylaws”), required a stockholder

proposal to disclose “arrangements or understandings . . . pursuant to which the

nomination(s) are to be made.”107 Because the deadline for providing notice of

nominations for the 2022 annual meeting had passed, Jorgl was unable to amend his

notice or submit a new one.108

            On July 29, Jorgl filed a Verified Complaint in this court seeking a declaration

that the Board had violated AIM’s advance notice bylaw by refusing to accept his

notice.109 On August 1, he filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to cause the




with Mr. Jorgl. I didn’t remember.”). Kellner’s testimony that he meant “Jorgl” instead
of “Franz” is also belied by his August 2022 description of the prospective proxy contest.
See infra note 143 and accompanying text; see also JX 522.
105
      JX 344.
106
      Id.
107
      JX 23 (“2016 Bylaws”) § 1.4(c).
108
      JX 344.
109
      Jorgl, 

, at *9.
                                               18
Board to place his nominees on AIM’s universal proxy card.110 Expedited discovery

ensued.

            Litigation was simultaneously unfolding in Florida, where AIM sued Tudor,

Deutsch, Kellner, Jorgl, Lautz, Chioini, and Rice.111 AIM alleged that the defendants

violated Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act and sought a permanent injunction to

prevent them from “committing any further violations of federal securities laws.”112

AIM later amended its complaint to remove Chioini and Rice as parties.113

            I.    The 2022 Annual Meeting

            On August 23, 2022, while litigation in Delaware and Florida was ongoing,

Kellner drafted an update to The Beta Fund Investment Club.114 The club members

are Kellner’s fraternity brothers for whom he manages an investment portfolio.115

The fund’s portfolio includes AIM stock. Preparing to update the “Beta Funders,”

Kellner wrote:

            In Aim’s case, there is now a legal suit, which I am a part of, to replace
            management. . . . My view, along with two others joining me in the
            proxy battle, is that management has done an abominable job. . . . A
            couple of weeks ago, Todd Deutsch, who is known to several of you,

110
      Id.
111
      JX 1117 at 1.
112
      Id. ¶¶ 48-50, 53.
113
    See JX 497 at 1. Chioini and Rice were dropped from the lawsuit because the two
“claimed to not be stockholders” of AIM. Equels Tr. 611-12.
114
      JX 522; see Kellner Tr. 331-32.
115
      See JX 951 at 5.
                                               19
         and a gentleman named Franz Tudor, commenced a proxy to replace all
         of the directors and ultimately management [of AIM]. I am now a
         party to that proxy fight, which will hopefully commence with the
         replacement of the management team in the next twelve months. More
         on that as time progresses.116
         Meanwhile, Kellner was preparing for the 2022 annual meeting. On October

27, Kellner’s assistant told Tudor that “[Kellner] asked [her] to coordinate a

breakfast” before the meeting and “would like for Thomas [sic] Jorgl, Robert

Chioini, and Michael Rice to also come.”117 Jorgl’s preliminary injunction motion

was denied the next day.118

         Though the breakfast did not go forward, Kellner attended AIM’s annual

meeting in person. He found the experience disappointing and felt that his questions

were brushed off.119 All three company director nominees were reelected.120 While

driving home from the meeting, Kellner “became increasingly frustrated and angry

o[ver] what had transpired.”121


116
    JX 522 at 3 (emphasis added). Kellner testified that the “proxy fight” referenced him
voting his shares for the “gold card slate” at the annual meeting. Kellner Tr. 249. That
testimony is inconsistent with the record, as no gold card existed until September 15 when
Jorgl filed his preliminary proxy statement. JX 397. Kellner could not have voted the gold
card until after Jorgl filed his definitive proxy statement. See Kellner Tr. 340.
117
      JX 451; see Kellner Tr. 342.
118
      Jorgl, 

, at *17.
119
   JX 467 (“At the outset they excused me from the meeting to see if I could be included
given the fact that I did not vote the white proxy.”); Kellner Tr. 225-26.
120
      JX 473; JX 474 at 1; JX 475 at 1-2.
121
      Kellner Tr. 226.
                                            20
            That evening, Kellner reached out to Deutsch and Tudor via text message to

“get a sense as to what Jorgl and his team [wa]s up to” and discuss “next steps.”122

Kellner was “hoping this thing w[ould] still move forward and Jorgl [wa]s fully

committed.”123 Kellner remarked that he and Deutsch were “the only two guys

wi[th] skin in the game” and that they were “underwater by several million

dollars.”124 He asked to convene a call with “the Jorgl team and the three of us

[Kellner, Tudor, and Deutsch] to ascertain what the next steps are.”125

            Chioini, for his part, remained committed to getting on AIM’s Board. On

November 3, Chioini told the group’s proxy solicitor: “We do intend to contest next

year and will submit our nomination well in advance of the deadline to avert any

antics like this year.”126 Chioini copied Rice on the message and forwarded it to

Xirinachs.127

            J.    Preparations for 2023
            On November 9, the Board publicly announced that it had “initiated a process

to add two directors who bring diversity and additional biotechnology


122
      JX 467.
123
      

124
      

125
      

126
   JX 468 at 1; see Chioini Tr. 97-100. When questioned about who “we” referred to,
Chioini testified “[t]he ‘we’ is me.” Chioini Tr. 18.
127
      JX 468 at 1.
                                             21
commercialization experience.”128 The announcement stated that the Board would

also engage an independent consultant to evaluate the compensation structure of

AIM’s executives.129 Mitchell noted that the Board was “taking these important

steps in response to the feedback [the Board] received from shareholders in

connection with the recent 2022 Annual Meeting.”130

            Chioini interpreted the press release as a “an opportunity to open dialogue

with AIM and the board.”131 He directed John Harrington, his counsel from

BakerHostetler, to relay to AIM his and Rice’s continued interest in being

directors.132 Harrington shared these sentiments in a November 13 email to the

Board sent “on behalf of [his] clients” Chioini and Rice.133 Harrington stated: “[W]e

recommend that you appoint Mr. Chioini and Mr. Rice to the Board and appropriate

committees promptly. As you know, your stockholders have already expressed very

strong support for the election of both of them.”134




128
      JX 487 at 1.
129
      

130
      

131
      Chioini Tr. 19-20.
132
      Id. at 20-21.
133
   JX 499 at 3. Oddly, Harrington did not represent an AIM stockholder in making this
request. He was acting on behalf of two individuals who felt that they were entitled to a
Board seat because they viewed votes cast in the prior proxy contest as favorable to them.
134
      Id.
                                             22
         Chioini instructed Harrington to follow up, and on December 5, Harrington

called AIM’s Delaware counsel, Michael Pittenger of Potter Anderson & Corroon

LLP.135 Harrington told Pittenger that Chioini and Rice wanted to “avoid another

proxy contest” and would be amenable to “mutually agreeable directors” joining the

Board.136 Harrington stressed that Chioini and Rice grew “impatient” and would be

“ready to come out guns blazing” and “better organized next year.”137 Afterward,

Harrington emailed Chioini a recap of the call. Harrington relayed that Pittenger

“would be surprised if the AIM board appointed [Chioini] or Mike Rice based [on]

everything that ha[d] happened.”138

         Some days later, Chioini and Kellner spoke for the first time. In a December

14 text message to Harrington, Chioini recounted that he “spoke with Kellner last

week.”139 Chioini told Harrington that Kellner was “very interested in working with

[them] to remove these guys” and “want[ed] to keep in touch.”140




135
      See JX 825 at 5.
136
      Pittenger Tr. 709-11; see Harrington Tr. 392.
137
      JX 825; JX 526; Pittenger Tr. 709-11; Harrington Tr. 393-94.
138
      JX 525 at 1.
139
      JX 541.
140
  Id.; see Kellner Tr. 349 (testifying that he recalls the call with Chioini happened but not
what was discussed).
                                              23
            The following week, Kellner sent a final update letter to the Beta Fund

Investment Club.141 Regarding AIM, he wrote: “Two other investors are joining me

in a proxy battle to replace an inept management team. More on that as time

progresses.”142 It is more likely than not that the referenced “two other investors”

were Deutsch and Tudor.143

            In January 2023, Kellner texted Deutsch about their “AIM game plan” and

expressed his intention to “get this ball rolling!![hands clapping emoji; smiley

emoji]”144 On February 15, counsel at BakerHostetler sent Tudor and Deutsch’s

Florida counsel an email with the subject line “AIM Immunotech - Question re Share

Ownership.”145 This message was forwarded by Deutsch’s counsel to Deutsch and

Kellner.146 Kellner’s associate sent back the requested figures reflecting the Kellner

family’s AIM holdings as of February 14, 2023.147




141
      JX 557.
142
      Id. at 2.
143
   At trial, Kellner testified that the “two individuals” joining him were Chioini and Rice.
Kellner Tr. 245-46. But Chioini and Rice were not “investors.” See JX 557. Kellner had
just met Chioini. Moreover, Kellner’s August 2022 draft update expressly referred to
Tudor and Deutsch. Compare JX 522, with JX 557; see also Post-trial Oral Arg. Tr. (Dkt.
272) 33-34 (Kellner’s counsel arguing that Kellner was “confused”).
144
      JX 570; see Deutsch Tr. 199-200.
145
      JX 606 at 2.
146
      Id. at 1.
147
      Id.
                                            24
            K.   The Amended Bylaws

            Around this time, the Board began to consider amending AIM’s advance

notice bylaws.148 On March 17, Potter Anderson sent a proposed set of amendments

to the Board. An accompanying memo explained that certain amendments were in

response “to significant activist activity during 2022 in which an activist

group . . . engag[ed] in efforts to conceal who was supporting and who was funding

the nomination efforts and to conceal the group’s plans for the Company.”149 There

were also changes “to update and modernize certain aspects” of the bylaws and

“bring the [b]ylaws in line with recent amendments to” the Delaware General

Corporation Law.150 Many of the proposed amendments focused on the advance

notice procedures governing stockholder proposals and nominations for director

elections.151

            During a March 20 Board meeting, AIM’s directors discussed the possible

bylaw amendments.152          Pittenger presented the amendments to the Board and

described that “certain of the revisions [we]re designed to help better ensure that

stockholders seeking to propose business or make nominations cannot attempt to


148
      Pittenger Tr. 712-13.
149
      JX 633 at 1.
150
      Id.
151
      Id. at 5-11.
152
      JX 646 at 1-2.
                                           25
engage in the types of manipulative, misleading, and improper conduct in which Mr.

Jorgl, his nominees, Mr. Tudor, and others acting in concert with them engaged in

connection with their attempted nominations in 2022.”153 The Board discussed

making additional changes.154

            The Board concluded that the bylaw provisions were not “preclusive or

unreasonably restrictive” of stockholders’ ability to make proposals or

nominations.155       The directors determined that the amendments “clarified and

enhanced the rules and procedures for providing advance notice of stockholder

proposals and nominations and for regulating the conduct of stockholder

meetings.”156 On March 28, after minor changes and revisions to reflect director

feedback, the amendments were unanimously adopted by the Board (the “Amended

Bylaws”).157




153
      JX 647 at 2.
154
      Id.
155
      Id.
156
      Id.
157
      JX 679; see JX 686 (“Am. Bylaws”).
                                           26
         On March 29, Kellner had a phone call with his attorney and Deutsch

regarding AIM.158 On March 31, Chioini sent the Amended Bylaws to counsel at

BakerHostetler.159

         L.         The Effort Blooms
         During the spring of 2023, Kellner, Deutsch, and Chioini continued their work

toward a potential proxy contest. At some point in April or May, Kellner had

breakfast with Tudor in Florida.160 The two discussed the efficacy of Ampligen.161

         Other than this meeting, Tudor curiously faded from view. He is now

employed by Deutsch to do “back office” tasks.162 Tudor “works three hours a day”

sending Deutsch’s “trades to the prime brokers and the firms.”163

         On May 19, Kellner asked Deutsch to “[p]lease reach out [to Chioini] to hear

what his plan and that of Teresa [Goody Guillén of BakerHostetler] is regarding

AIM.”164 Kellner continued: “Time is becoming critical in moving this ball forward.




158
      See JX 695.
159
      JX 700.
160
      Tudor Tr. 440-41.
161
      Id. at 442.
162
      Deutsch Tr. 161-62.
163
      Id. at 162; see also JX 407; Tudor Dep. 48-49.
164
      JX 740.
                                             27
Let’s please talk later today.”165 Kellner followed that text with another to Chioini

saying: “Todd will call you momentarily[.]”166

            On June 15, counsel from BakerHostetler sent Kellner’s attorney a financial

breakdown of what a proxy contest would cost and the possible outcomes of that

contest.167 Counsel advised “not to have the shares transferred into [Kellner’s] name

until we have all our ducks in a row lined up” and cautioned that if the notice was

denied and litigated, the case could get assigned “to the Vice Chancellor who we had

last year (who favors defendants, not us).”168 These emails were forwarded to

Kellner, whose assistant printed them for him.169 Kellner’s assistant relayed that

Kellner would call Deutsch and Kellner’s counsel the next day.170

            Kellner’s assistant next began coordinating a “series of private jet stops” two

weeks later for a meeting at BakerHostetler’s Washington, D.C. offices.171 The

planned passengers were Kellner, Chioini, Deutsch, and Kellner’s counsel. Rice

was to join by video conference.172


165
      Id.
166
      JX 745.
167
      JX 758 at 3-4.
168
      Id.
169
      Id. at 2.
170
      Id. at 1.
171
      JX 765; see Kellner Tr. 352.
172
      Chioini Tr. 30.
                                              28
            On July 11, the group met in Washington, D.C. as scheduled. Kellner

characterized the meeting as a “final fact gathering meeting to determine what, if

anything, we would do.”173 The next day, BakerHostetler sent a draft engagement

letter to Kellner, Deutsch, Chioini, and Kellner’s counsel.174 On July 14, Kellner

sent a text message to Deutsch and Chioini stating that he was willing to risk more

and “commit more dollars proportionally to AIM going forward.”175           Kellner

promised to “commit [a] million dollars” and so long as Deutsch and Chioini

“committed $150,000,” Kellner would also “commit the next $200k up to $1.5

million of legal cost[s].”176 Kellner said that in his “view this [wa]s still a VERY

good offer for” Deutsch and Chioini.177         The final engagement letter with

BakerHostetler was signed by Kellner, Deutsch, and Chioini on July 17.178

            M.   The Kellner Nomination

            On July 24, Harrington emailed AIM on Kellner’s behalf to request the

Company’s form of director and officer (D&O) questionnaire and a representation




173
    Kellner Tr. 354. Chioini and Rice both asserted privilege when asked about the
discussions at the meeting. Chioini Dep. 138.
174
      JX 776.
175
      JX 781.
176
      Id.
177
      Id.
178
      JX 782 at 6.
                                          29
and agreement referenced in the Amended Bylaws.179 The Amended Bylaws gave

AIM five business days to respond.180 In the interim, AIM revised its D&O

questionnaire to require additional information.181

          On July 27, Kellner submitted a Schedule 13D filing with the SEC.182 The

filing stated Kellner “intend[ed] to provide notice to [AIM] of his intent to nominate

directors for election at the 2023 annual meeting of stockholders.”183

          On July 31, Rodino sent BakerHostetler the requested forms.184 The same

day, Equels contacted the Board to schedule a discussion about the “second attempt

of [a] hostile takeover.”185

          At 7:52 p.m. on August 3—the evening before the nomination deadline—

BakerHostetler submitted a letter from Kellner.186 The letter provided notice of

Kellner’s intent to nominate himself, Chioini, and Deutsch as director candidates for

election at AIM’s 2023 annual meeting (the “Kellner Notice”).187



179
      JX 821 at 2-3.
180
      Am. Bylaws § 1.4(e).
181
      Pittenger Tr. 732-35; see JX 821 at 1; compare JX 858, with JX 1131, and JX 943.
182
      JX 831.
183
      Id. at 5.
184
      JX 1226 at 1.
185
      See JX 842.
186
      JX 870.
187
      Id. at 2; JX 875 (“Kellner Notice”).
                                             30
          On August 7, AIM’s outside communications advisor sent a draft press release

to Equels, AIM’s counsel, and AIM’s investor relations representatives.188 The draft

said that “[a] hostile takeover of the Board would not only put shareholders’

investments at risk, it would also be detrimental to the patients for whom we are

working to bring new life-saving oncology therapies to market—most notably by

repurposing our lead drug, Ampligen.”189 Counsel recommended revisions to the

messaging since “no determination ha[d] been made yet as to whether the notice

complies with AIM’s advance notice bylaws.”190 The draft press release was a

“contingency” that AIM would issue should they reject the Kellner Notice.191 It was

not shared with the Board beyond Equels.192

          N.      The Board’s Rejection

          The Board met on three occasions to discuss the Kellner Notice: August 8,

August 21, and August 22.

          On August 8, the Board held a 50 minute meeting at which Equels and counsel

provided information about the 2022 proxy contest, the Amended Bylaws’




188
      JX 1140; see Equels Tr. 605-06.
189
      JX 1142 at 5.
190
      Id. at 4.
191
      Equels Tr. 606.
192
      See id. at 609.
                                           31
requirements, and the process for evaluating the notice.193 During the meeting,

Equels noted that many of the players from Jorgl’s 2022 nomination were involved

in Kellner’s submission.194 Equels cautioned that “protecting stockholders was

paramount” in “view of the troubling background”—namely, the failed 2022

nomination, the “guns blazing” call in December 2022, and overlapping persons

present in the current and prior efforts.195 Equels also highlighted that Kellner,

Deutsch, and Chioini intended to seek “reimbursement from AIM for their expenses

relating to the 2023 Annual Meeting, as well as all the expenses (including litigation

expenses) incurred by the 2022 Group related to the 2022 Attempt.” 196 The Board

decided to hire Potter Anderson and Kirkland & Ellis LLP to evaluate the Kellner

Notice.197

          Also on August 8, AIM’s legal team filed a motion to alter or amend the

previous Florida order, or, alternatively, a motion for relief from the order.198 The

motion characterized the Kellner Notice as “fail[ing] to account for the remaining

8.5% to 11.5% of AIM common stock that Kellner believed the Group beneficially



193
      JXs 881-83.
194
      JX 883 at 1-3.
195
      Id. at 3.
196
      Id. at 2.
197
      Id. at 3; see Bryan Tr. 660.
198
      JX 878.
                                         32
owned in 2022.”199 It also claimed that Kellner and Deutsch’s Schedule 13D filing

was misleading since it “disclose[d] only a July 26, 2023 group agreement with

Chioini, omitting any reference to their mutual cooperation in the attempted proxy

contest in 2022 or any other member of the Group.”200 These failings were,

according to AIM, evidence that Kellner, Deutsch, and other group members posed

an “ongoing . . . threat to AIM and its shareholders.”201

            The Board met again on August 21, with counsel in attendance.202 Before the

meeting, counsel distributed materials to the Board that provided a chronological

overview of the Kellner Notice, explained the Board’s fiduciary duties in connection

with its review of the notice, and analyzed whether the notice complied with the

Amended Bylaws.203           These issues were discussed with the Board during the

meeting.204

            Counsel advised that they found numerous deficiencies in the Kellner

Notice.205 These included:



199
      Id. at 9.
200
      Id. at 10.
201
      Id.
202
      JX 907; see Pittenger Tr. 740.
203
      JX 909; JX 911; see Pittenger Tr. 741-42.
204
      See JX 907 at 3-23.
205
      JX 909 at 14-21.
                                             33
               ▪ undisclosed agreements, arrangements, and understandings, including
                 between and among Kellner, Deutsch, Chioini, Lautz, Ring, and
                 Xirinachs;

               ▪ failure to disclose known supporters of Kellner’s purported
                 nominations;
               ▪ failure to disclose specific dates of first contact between relevant
                 parties; and
               ▪ other undisclosed information, including adverse recommendations
                 from proxy advisor firms concerning other public company board
                 service as called for in AIM’s form of D&O questionnaire.206

After outlining these perceived deficiencies, counsel presented on “potential next

steps.”207 Counsel also discussed “offensive litigation options” the Board could take

against Kellner and his party.208 The Board concluded that it needed additional time

to consider the Kellner Notice and information provided by counsel.

            The Board reconvened the following morning to continue its consideration of

the Kellner Notice.209 The Board unanimously approved resolutions rejecting the

Kellner Notice for violating the Amended Bylaws. It observed that the notice was

“designed to omit and conceal information and to provide incomplete or misleading

disclosures that destabilize the important disclosure function that [AIM’s] Advance




206
      Id.
207
      Id. at 23.
208
      Id. at 24.
209
      See JX 911 at 8-10.
                                             34
Notice Provisions were designed to serve.”210 The Board also authorized a letter to

Kellner summarizing the notice’s defects and the Board’s rejection of the notice.211

            On August 23, AIM’s counsel notified BakerHostetler that the Kellner Notice

had been rejected.212 The letter detailed the notice’s deficiencies and noncompliance

with provisions of the Amended Bylaws.213 It also highlighted that because the

deadline for submitting a timely nomination notice had passed, “any nominations

that purport to be made pursuant to the [Kellner] Notice w[ould] be disregarded and

[not] considered at the 2023 Annual Meeting.”214

            Later that day, BakerHostetler circulated emails with the subject line “Re:

Draft Complaint – AIM Nomination Notice Litigation” to Chioini, Kellner, Deutsch,

and others.215 On August 28, the Kellner group issued a press release urging AIM

stockholders to “disregard communications by AIM and its Board” with respect to

the proxy contest.216 It also announced that Kellner had filed litigation.




210
      Id. at 9-10.
211
      Id.
212
      JX 378.
213
      Id.; JX 918.
214
   JX 378 at 14. Kellner attempted to submit a supplemental nomination notice on
October 9 during this litigation. JX 975.
215
      JX 925 at 2.
216
      JX 929 at 1.
                                             35
         O.       This Litigation

         On August 25, Kellner filed a Verified Complaint in this court against AIM

and its directors.217 It advances three counts. Count I seeks a declaration that the

Amended Bylaws are invalid.218 Count II seeks, additionally and alternatively, a

declaration that the Board’s application of the Amended Bylaws to reject Kellner’s

notice is unlawful and inequitable.219 Count III seeks a declaration that the Board

members breached their fiduciary duties by adopting the Amended Bylaws and

rejecting Kellner’s notice.220

         On September 11, the defendants answered the complaint and AIM filed a

counterclaim against Kellner.221 The counterclaim seeks a declaratory judgment that

the Amended Bylaws are valid and lawful.222

         After expedited discovery, a three day trial was held on October 30 through

November 1.223 Post-trial argument was held on November 21.224 After submissions

regarding a trial exhibit submitted for in camera review were filed, the matter was


217
      Dkt. 1
218
      Compl. ¶¶ 103-13.
219
      Id. ¶¶ 114-28.
220
      Id. ¶¶ 129-33.
221
      Defs.’ Answer to Verified Compl. and Verified Countercl. (Dkt. 13) ¶¶ 100-01.
222
      Id. ¶¶ 67-73.
223
      Dkt. 256.
224
      Dkt. 268.
                                             36
taken under advisement on December 5.225 AIM’s 2023 annual meeting is set to

occur on or around December 29.226

II.      LEGAL ANALYSIS
         Kellner challenges both the Board’s adoption and application of the Amended

Bylaws. He first argues that the Amended Bylaws are invalid.227 He next asserts

that his notice complied with the Amended Bylaws’ requirements and that, even if

it did not, the Board applied the Amended Bylaws inequitably. The defendants

contend that the converse is true.228




225
      Dkts. 269, 271.
226
   Dkt. 270. At least, it was set to occur on December 29 as of the time that this decision
was being prepared for filing. The afternoon of December 28—at the proverbial eleventh
hour—counsel alerted chambers that AIM would push back its annual meeting another
week. I am unaware of the new annual meeting date.
227
     According to Kellner, AIM’s corresponding counterclaim “should have been
asserted . . . [a] compulsory counterclaim[] in the Jorgl Action.” Pl.’s Pre-trial Br. (Dkt.
243) 59-61. As the defendants correctly point out, however, AIM seeks a declaratory
judgment regarding Kellner’s nomination notice—not Jorgl’s. Defs.’ Post-trial Br. (Dkt.
261) 69. The court “is not confronted with a situation in which a [counter]plaintiff has
filed a second action against defendants they previously sued regarding the same
transaction.” Grunstein v. Silva, 

, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2011). AIM’s
counterclaim is properly raised in this action.
228
    The defendants aver that the doctrine of unclean hands “bar[s] [Kellner’s] claims for
equitable relief.” Defs.’ Post-trial Br. 70. The court “has broad discretion” to apply the
doctrine. RBC Cap. Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 

 (Del. 2015) (citation omitted).
I decline to do so here. Kellner’s conduct was not “so offensive to the integrity of the court
that [his] claims should be denied, regardless of their merit.” Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int’l,
Inc., 

 (Del. Ch. 2008) (quoting Gallagher v. Holcomb & Salter, 

, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 1991)).
                                             37
         My analysis of these arguments proceeds in three steps.            I begin by

considering the policy and practice integral to advance notice bylaws. With those

principles in mind, I assess whether the Amended Bylaws at issue are facially valid.

I then consider whether Kellner satisfied the relevant advance notice bylaws and

whether the Board acted reasonably in rejecting the Kellner Notice.

         A.     The Role of Advance Notice Bylaws

         Delaware law recognizes that stockholders have a fundamental right to

participate in the voting process, including the right to nominate directors.229 Yet

the Delaware General Corporation Law is nearly silent on how a stockholder should

nominate a director candidate for election.230         As a result, public companies

commonly implement advance notice bylaws to promote “orderly meetings and

election contests.”231




229
   E.g., EMAK Worldwide, Inc. v. Kurz, 

 (Del. 2012) (“The fundamental
governance right possessed by shareholders is the ability to vote for the directors the
shareholder wants to oversee the firm. Without that right, a shareholder would more
closely resemble a creditor than an owner.”).
230
      See JX 973 (Expert Report of Edward Rock) (“Rock Report”) ¶ 23; 8 Del. C. § 211(b).
231
   Openwave Sys. Inc. v. Harbinger Cap. P’rs Master Fund I, Ltd., 

(Del. Ch. 2007); see also BlackRock Credit Allocation Income Tr. v. Saba Cap. Master
Fund, Ltd., 

, 980 (Del. 2020) (describing advance notice bylaws as
“commonplace” (quoting Goggin v. Vermillion, Inc., 

, at *4 (Del. Ch.
June 3, 2011))); 8 Del. C. § 109(b).
                                            38
            Modern advance notice bylaws have two primary functions: timing and

disclosure.232 Regarding the former, advance notice bylaws set a deadline “by which

stockholders must give notice of their intention to nominate director candidates in

advance of an annual meeting.”233 In furtherance of the latter, advance notice bylaws

may require stockholders to provide information “allowing boards of directors to

knowledgably make recommendations about nominees and ensuring that

stockholders cast well-informed votes.”234

            Advance notice bylaws have evolved over time to serve these purposes. So-

called first generation advance notice bylaws obligated the proponent stockholder to

notify the company of its intention to nominate by a fixed time before the meeting

date and to provide basic information about the stockholder and its nominees.235 In


232
    See Openwave Sys., 

; Sternlicht v. Hernandez, 

,
at *14 (Del. Ch. June 14, 2023) (explaining that advance notice bylaws “serve dual
purposes: marshalling orderly meetings and election contests where the nominees are fixed
in advance of the annual meeting, and providing fair warning to the corporation so that it
can respond to stockholder nominations”); see also Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Gail Weinstein,
& Scott B. Luftglass, Takeover Defense: Mergers and Acquisitions, § 6.06[C][1] (9th ed.
2022) (“Advance notice bylaw provisions provide several benefits to a company, including
giving a board time to evaluate the proposed candidates and preventing last-minute
‘surprise attacks’ by third parties for control or board representation.”).
233
  Strategic Inv. Opportunities LLC v. Lee Enters., Inc., 

, at *9 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 14, 2022).
234
      

235
   See Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp., 

, at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept.
20, 1988) (considering whether the plaintiffs had a reasonable probability of success in
their challenge to the validity of a bylaw requiring stockholders to provide 60 days of notice
before submitting a nomination for a director election); see also Hubbard v. Hollywood
Park Realty Ent., Inc., 

, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1991) (addressing an
                                             39
response to case law developments and activism trends, a second generation of

advance notice bylaws emerged post-2008 that expanded on these requirements.

Second generation advance notice bylaws often include provisions mandating the

completion of nominee questionnaires and the disclosure of derivative positions,

compensation information, and persons acting in concert with the stockholder

proponent and its nominees.236        The scope of typical advance notice bylaws

continues to develop through an iterative process as new case law, rules, and

regulations emerge.237

         Advance notice bylaws are an area of renewed focus after the SEC’s

November 2021 adoption of Rule 14a-19, which requires registrants to use a

universal proxy card in contested elections.238 Previously, the company and a



advance notice bylaw requiring the movants to give notice of their intent to nominate a
competing slate of directors in light of a material post-deadline change of position by the
incumbent directors).
236
   See Donald F. Parsons & Jason S. Tyler, Activist Stockholders, Corporate Governance
Challenges, and Delaware Law, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 7
n.13 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016); see also Marc Weingarten &
Erin Magnor, Second Generation Advance Notification Bylaws, Harvard Law School
Forum on Corporate Governance (Mar. 17, 2009), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2009/03/17/second-generation-advance-notification-bylaws/; Charles Nathan, Second
Generation Advance Notice Bylaws and Poison Pills, Harvard Law School Forum on
Corporate Governance (Apr. 22, 2009), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2009/04/22
/second-generation-advance-notice-bylaws-and-poison-pills/.
237
      Rock Report ¶ 25.
238
   

.14a-19; see U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Final Rule,
Universal Proxy, https://www.sec.gov/rules/2021/11/universal-proxy (last visited Dec. 16,
2023).
                                            40
dissident stockholder nominating director candidates would each distribute separate

proxy cards. Now, the company must include the dissident nominees on a universal

proxy card, allowing stockholders to mix and match between slates.239 Numerous

public companies have amended their advance notice bylaws to account for the rule

change.240 Many have also taken the opportunity to revisit and enhance other

advance notice requirements.241 Some have gone to extremes.242


239
      See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Universal Proxy,
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/universal-proxy-secg (last visited Dec. 16, 2023) (“The
amendments will allow shareholders voting by proxy to choose among director nominees
in an election contest in a manner that more closely reflects the choice they could make by
voting in person at a shareholder meeting.”).
240
    See Rock Report ¶ 26 (citing Aaron Wendt & Krishna Shah, 2023 Proxy Season
Briefing: Key Trends and Data Highlights, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate
Governance (Aug. 17, 2023), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2023/08/17/2023-proxy-
season-briefing-key-trends-and-data-highlight/ (“More than 685 companies in our
coverage amended advance notice bylaws in response to universal proxy[.]”)); id. ¶ 37; see
also Douglas K. Schnell & Daniyal Iqbal, Lessons from the 2023 Proxy Season: Advance
Notice Bylaws and Officer Exculpation, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate
Governance (Sept. 5, 2023), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2023/09/05/lessons-from-
the-2023-proxy-season-advance-notice-bylaws-and-officer-exculpation/ (“[O]f the 70
companies in the SV150 that amended their bylaws between November 1, 2021, and July
31, 2023, 50 amended their bylaws explicitly to address Rule 14a-19, with 90 percent of
those amendments occurring after the August 31, 2022, effective date of Rule 14a-19.”);
Maia Gez et al., Amending Charters to Address Universal Proxy, Shareholder Activism
and Officer Exculpation, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance
(July 10, 2023),       https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2023/07/10/amending-charters-to-
address-universal-proxy-shareholder-activism-and-officer-exculpation/ (reporting that
based on a law firm survey, “200 companies in the S&P 500 have amended their bylaws to
address the SEC’s universal proxy rule and shareholder activism”).
241
      See supra note 240 (listing sources).
242
   E.g., Verified Compl. for Breach of Fiduciary Duties, Politan Capital Mgmt. L.P. v.
Kiani, C.A. No. 2022-0948-NAC (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2022) (Dkt. 1) (challenging the validity
of advance notice bylaws requiring any stockholder seeking to nominate directors to
identify, among other things, the investment fund’s limited partners, all arrangements or
                                              41
         Since the universal proxy rules took effect in August 2022, this court has only

begun to hear disputes involving the wave of new and amended advance notice

bylaws.243 Even with this limited set, it is apparent that the court must—more than

ever—carefully balance the competing interests at play.244           On one hand, it is

legitimate for companies to refresh their bylaws to comport with SEC rules and

further the twin goals of order and disclosure. On the other hand, onerous bylaws

that stray far afield from these purposes risk frustrating any nomination of alternative

director candidates.

         Advance notice requirements are “often construed and frequently upheld as

valid by Delaware courts”—particularly those adopted on a clear day.245 But the

discretion afforded a board’s adoption of advance notice bylaws is not limitless.246

If advance notice bylaws that materially interfere with stockholders’ voting rights


understandings between the limited partners and their family members, and plans the fund
has to nominate directors at other companies in the next year).
243
   See, e.g., id.; Paragon Techs., Inc. v. Cryan, 

 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30,
2023) (addressing a challenge to bylaws adopted after the universal proxy rules were
enacted).
244
   See Paragon Techs., 

, at *7 (remarking that the corporate goals of
advance notice bylaws “must be carefully balanced against stockholders’ ‘fundamental
governance right’ of voting for directors” (quoting Kurz, 

)).
245
      Openwave Sys., 

.
246
    See Lee Enters., 

, at *14 (“Schnell empowers the court to invalidate
certain board actions, including those that inequitably manipulate the corporate machinery
to impair the rights of stockholders. Put simply, directors’ inequitable acts towards
stockholders do not become permissible because they are legally possible.” (citing Schnell
v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 

 (Del. 1971))).
                                           42
are implemented, the justification for judicial deference is diminished.247 Thus,

constraints on stockholder voting power must be reasonably tailored to a legitimate

corporate end. Bylaws that “unduly restrict the stockholder franchise or are applied

inequitably [] will be struck down.”248

          B.     The Adoption Claim

          Kellner contends that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties by

approving the Amended Bylaws. In Kellner’s view, the Amended Bylaws were

adopted for the inequitable purpose of thwarting stockholders’ ability to run a

competing slate of director nominees.249 He asks that I declare the Amended Bylaws

invalid, meaning that AIM has no advance notice bylaws and must place his slate on

the 2023 ballot.

          Enhanced scrutiny—Delaware’s intermediate equitable standard of

review250—guides my assessment of this claim. Unlike the 2016 Bylaws, the



247
   See Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws, 106
CALIF. L. REV. 373, 409 (2018) (“[S]everal aspects of existing law limit the ability of
shareholders to participate on an equal footing with boards in the private ordering process.
This asymmetry undermines the justification for broad judicial deference.”).
248
      Openwave Sys., 

.
249
      Pl.’s Post-trial Br. (Dkt. 260) 23.
250
    See generally In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 

 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(“Enhanced scrutiny is Delaware’s intermediate standard of review. Framed generally, it
requires that the defendants ‘bear the burden of persuasion to show that their motivations
were proper and not selfish’ and that ‘their actions were reasonable in relation to their
legitimate objective.’” (quoting Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 

 (Del.
Ch. 2007))).
                                            43
Amended Bylaws were not adopted on a clear day.251 The skies were overcast in

March 2023, with storm clouds of a proxy contest gathering on the horizon.252

          Kellner argues that because enhanced scrutiny applies, the Board must prove

that it had a “compelling justification” for its actions.253 He misstates the applicable

standard of review.254 Instead, as the Delaware Supreme Court recently pronounced

in Coster, the court should apply Unocal “with sensitivity to the stockholder

franchise” that integrates the spirit of Blasius and Schnell.255




251
   Cf. Jorgl, 

, at *15 (finding that the 2016 Bylaws were “adopted on
a clear day . . . long before Tudor, Xirinachs, or Jorgl entered the picture”); see also AB
Value P’rs, LP v. Kreisler Mfg. Corp., 

, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2014)
(upholding an advance notice bylaw adopted on a “clear day” that was “long before the
present proxy challenge was contemplated by” the challengers).
252
   See infra notes 269-72 and accompanying text (discussing the Board’s awareness of the
potential for another proxy contest).
253
      Pl.’s Pre-trial Br. 2; see also id. at 3, 29, 31-32, 37; Pl.’s Post-trial Br. 2-4, 26.
254
   See Lee Enters., 

, at *16 (explaining that review of board action in the
advance notice bylaw context is fundamentally “one of reasonableness” viewed through
Unocal); see also Mentor Graphics v. Quickturn Design Sys., 

 (Del. Ch.
1998) (rejecting a challenge to an advance notice bylaw based on “the fiduciary principles
embodied in Unocal”); Mercier, 

.
255
   Coster v. UIP Cos., Inc., 

, 673 (Del. 2023) (“Experience has shown that
Schnell and Blasius review, as a matter of precedent and practice, have been and can be
folded into Unocal review to accomplish the same ends—enhanced judicial scrutiny of
board action that interferes with a corporate election or a stockholder’s voting rights in
contests for control.” (citing Lawrence A. Hamermesh et. al., Optimizing the World's
Leading Corporate Law: A Twenty-Year Retrospective and Look Ahead, 77 BUS. LAW.
321, 331 (2022))).
                                                  44
          This approach “requires a context-specific” review of the directors’

conduct.256 “Fundamentally, the standard to be applied is one of reasonableness.”257

First, the court “review[s] whether the board faced a threat ‘to an important corporate

interest or to the achievement of a significant corporate benefit.’”258 Second, the

court “review[s] whether the board’s response to the threat was reasonable in relation

to the threat posed and was not preclusive or coercive to the stockholder

franchise.”259 The defendants bear the burden of proof.260

          Here, the Amended Bylaws are a mixed bag. Certain of the Amended Bylaws

reflect changes to address Rule 14a-19 and cohere with the DGCL.261 Kellner does

not quibble with these amendments,262 and neither will I. Other aspects of the



256
   Coster, 300 A.3d at 671 (quoting Lee Enters., 

, at *16); see also
Paragon Techs., 

, at *12.
257
    Lee Enters., 

, at *16; see In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders
Litig., 

 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“In itself, the Unocal test is a straightforward
analysis of whether what a board did was reasonable.”); see also In re Dollar Thrifty
S’holder Litig., 

 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“In a situation where heightened
scrutiny applies, the predicate question of what the board’s true motivation was comes into
play. The court must take a nuanced and realistic look at the possibility that personal
interests short of pure self-dealing have influenced the board[’s decision making].”).
258
   Coster, 300 A.3d at 672 (quoting Phillips v. Instituform of N. Am., Inc., 

,
at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 1987)).
259
      Id. at 672-73.
260
      Id. at 672.
261
  E.g., Am. Bylaws §§ 1.4(c)(3)(b), 1.4(g); see JX 647; JX 635; Mitchell Tr. 637;
Appelrouth Tr. 687; Pittenger Tr. 712-13, 719-20.
262
   Pl.’s Post-trial Br. 31 (“The updates to technical mechanics . . . and those addressing
legal developments . . . are not at issue.”).
                                             45
Amended Bylaws are bolstered disclosure requirements that Kellner insists are

inequitable and invalid. Although the Board has proven it reasonably identified a

threat to proper corporate objectives that prompted it to amend AIM’s bylaws, it has

failed to show that certain of the provisions are proportionate in relation to those

objectives.

              1.     Reasonableness

       The first Unocal prong requires the Board to demonstrate that it conducted a

reasonable and good faith investigation through which it identified “grounds for

concluding that a threat to the corporate enterprise existed.”263 The classic Unocal

pattern is an imperfect fit for advance notice bylaws. “Corporate democracy is not

an attack” in and of itself.264 The threat identified cannot simply be that the board

feels certain director nominees would be worse for the company than themselves.265




263
  Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 

 (Del. 2010); accord Coster, 300
A.3d at 661-62.
264
   In re Aerojet Rocketdyne Hldgs., Inc., 

, at *15 (Del. Ch. June 16,
2022).
265
   See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 

 (Del. Ch. 1988) (explaining
that though it may be true “for any number of matters” that “the board knows better” than
shareholders what is in the company’s best interest, “it is irrelevant (except insofar as the
shareholders wish to be guided by the board’s recommendation) when the question is who
should comprise the board of directors”); see also Coster, 300 A.3d at 672 (“As Chancellor
Allen stated long ago, the threat cannot be justified on the grounds that the board knows
what is in the best interests of the stockholders.”); Mercier, 

.
                                             46
Instead, the threat must be to matters of “corporate policy and effectiveness which

touches on issues of control.”266

         AIM’s Board had an objective of obtaining transparency from a stockholder

seeking to nominate director candidates. The Board’s Delaware counsel advised it

on the importance of knowing “who is making and supporting [a] proposal or

nominations” and “whether they have conflicts of interest or other interests, motives,

or plans that should be disclosed to the board and stockholders.”267 The Board asked

counsel to update AIM’s advance notice bylaws “to better protect AIM and its

stockholders against potentially abusive and deceptive practices.”268

         The Board made a reasonable assessment, in reliance on the advice of counsel,

that this information-gathering objective was threatened.269 AIM had just endured a

proxy contest where it seemed that the nominating stockholder was a façade

concealing the identities of individuals responsible for the effort.270 By December

2022, the Board had reason to believe that the group behind the prior proxy contest




266
    In re Ebix, Inc. S’holder Litig., 

, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 17, 2018)
(citation omitted).
267
      JX 635 at 5; see also Equels Tr. 524; Mitchell Tr. 638.
268
      JX 635 at 1.
269
      See id.; Equels Tr. 525, 531; Appelrouth Tr. 688; Pittenger Tr. 827.
270
      See JX 647; Jorgl, 

, at *17.
                                              47
was “threatening to revive [its] efforts” for the 2023 election.271 In revisiting AIM’s

advance notice bylaws, the Board sought to prevent “the types of manipulative,

misleading, and improper conduct” experienced in 2022 from happening again.272

                  2.    Proportionality

            The second Unocal prong requires the court to undertake a substantive review

of the Board’s response to the perceived threat.273 I begin by considering whether

the Amended Bylaws are “draconian, by being either preclusive or coercive.”274 If

they are not, I must assess whether the challenged provisions fall “within a range of

reasonable responses” in relation to the corporate interest at risk.275

            Kellner asserts that the Amended Bylaws are preclusive because they

eliminate any prospect of election competition and coercive because they prevent

dissident nominations, leaving the incumbents as the sole choice.276 This coercion




271
  JX 600 at 5; see also Equels Tr. 624; Pittenger Tr. 712; Mitchell Dep. 188-90; Pittenger
Dep. 73-74; JX 526; JX 601; JX 940; JX 948.
272
      JX 647.
273
    Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 

 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“Once the
board has reasonably perceived a legitimate threat, Unocal prong 2 engages the Court in a
substantive review of the board’s defensive actions: Is the board’s action taken in response
to that threat proportional to the threat posed?”).
274
      Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 

 (Del. 1995).
275
      

276
   Pl.’s Post-trial Br. 37 (citing Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 

 (Del.
Ch. 2000)); see also Pl.’s Pre-trial Br. 39.
                                             48
argument rests on the premise that the bylaws are preclusive. If the bylaws were not

preclusive, then the vote would be uncoerced.

       A measure is preclusive if it makes a dissident’s “ability to wage a successful

proxy contest . . . ‘realistically unattainable.’”277 The Amended Bylaws are lengthy,

dense, and require meaningful effort to satisfy. That does not mean that they are

preclusive.278 The line may be crossed where bylaws contain requirements that

unduly restrict the stockholder franchise.279

       Kellner focuses on six specific provisions of the Amended Bylaws in arguing

that the Board’s response was out of line with its objectives.280 For two provisions,




277
  Selectica, 

 (citing Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 

 (Del.
Ch. 1998)).
278
    See Yucaipa Am. All. Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 

 (Del. Ch. 2010) (holding
that a rights plan was not coercive where the plaintiff could “succeed in a proxy contest”),
aff’d, 

 (Del. 2011); Unitrin, 

.
279
   See JANA Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 

 (Del. Ch.
2008) (warning that “when advance notice bylaws unduly restrict the stockholder
franchise . . . they will be struck down” (citing Openwave Sys., 

)), aff’d,

 (Del. 2008) (TABLE).
280
   Pl.’s Post-trial Br. 8-11. Various other provisions were addressed at times in pre-trial
briefing or in expert reports. Given the expedited nature of this decision, it is unnecessary
(and would be irresponsible) to opine on every provision that changed between the 2016
Bylaws and Amended Bylaws. I therefore focus on the provisions expressly challenged in
Kellner’s post-trial brief. See In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 

 (Del. Ch.
2001) (noting that a party waived an argument by omitting it from post-trial briefing);
Oxbow Carbon & Mineral Hldgs., Inc. v. Crestview-Oxbow Acq., LLC, 

, 502
n.77 (Del. 2019) (“The practice in the Court of Chancery is to find that an issue not raised
in post-trial briefing has been waived, even if it was properly raised pre-trial.” (citation
omitted)).
                                             49
the Board proved that they are non-preclusive and reasonable means to obtaining

enhanced disclosure. It fell short regarding four others.

                       a.     The AAU Provision

         Section 1.4(c)(1)(D) of the Amended Bylaws (the “AAU Provision”) requires

the disclosure of all arrangements, agreements, or understandings (“AAUs”),

“whether written or oral, and including promises,” relating to a Board nomination.281

Generally speaking, this bylaw promotes a proper corporate objective: enabling the




281
      Am. Bylaws § 1.4(c)(1)(D). The full text of the provision states:
         a complete and accurate description of all agreements, arrangements or
         understandings (whether written or oral, and including promises) between or
         among any two or more of any Holder, any Stockholder Associated Person
         (as such terms “Holder” and “Stockholder Associated Person” are defined in
         this Section 1.4), any Stockholder Nominee, any immediate family member
         of such Stockholder Nominee, any Affiliate or Associate of such Stockholder
         Nominee, any person or entity acting in concert with any of the foregoing
         persons or entities with respect to the nominations or the Corporation
         (including the full legal name (and any alias names) of any such person or
         entity acting in concert), and/or any other person or entity (including the full
         legal name (and any alias names) of any such person or entity), existing
         presently or existing during the prior twenty-four (24) months relating to or
         in connection with the nomination of any Stockholder Nominee or any other
         person or persons for election or re-election as a director of the Corporation,
         or pursuant to which any such nomination or nominations are being made, or
         relating to or in connection with the funding or financing of any nomination
         or nominations of any person or persons (including, without limitation, any
         Stockholder Nominee) for election or re-election to the Board of Directors,
         including, without limitation, the funding or financing of any proxy
         solicitation or litigation relating to such nomination or nominations.
See infra note 293 (defining “Holder”); infra note 294 and accompanying text (defining
“Stockholder Associated Person,” “Affiliate,” and “Associate”).
                                               50
Company and Board to evaluate who is making and supporting a proposal.282 Such

information would also be important to stockholders’ consideration of a nominator

or nominees’ motivations when voting to elect directors.283

         The AAU Provision builds on a similar requirement found in the 2016

Bylaws.284 The record suggests that the AAU Provision was amended in 2023 to

better “protect AIM and its stockholders against potentially abusive and deceptive

practices by activists or hostile acquirors.”285 The Board would have been sensitive




282
      See JX 635; see also Equels Tr. 524; Mitchell Tr. 638.
283
    See Jorgl, 

, at *16 (“[This] information would have been important
to stockholders in deciding which director candidates to support.”); see also Brisach v. The
AES Corp., C.A. No. 4287-CC, at 21 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2009) (TRANSCRIPT) (noting that
a diminished disclosure requirement “impoverishes the informational base available to
other investors in a situation when it may be extremely relevant to know what the economic
motivations are of the proponents of some important corporate action”); Rock Report ¶¶
60, 68 (observing that many public companies have AAU provisions in their advance
notice bylaws).
284
      The 2016 Bylaw provision stated:
         For any Stockholder Proposal that seeks to nominate persons to stand for
         election as directors of the Corporation, the stockholder's notice also shall
         include (i) a description of all arrangements or understandings between such
         stockholder and each proposed nominee and any other person or persons
         (including their names) pursuant to which the nomination(s) are to be made.
JX 23 at 4. This version of the bylaw was adopted on a clear day. See Jorgl, 

, at *15 (stating that the 2016 Bylaws were “adopted on a clear day”).
285
   See JX 635; JX 647 at 2 (counsel advising that “certain of the revisions are designed to
help better ensure that stockholders seeking to propose business or make nominations
cannot attempt to engage in the types of manipulative, misleading, and improper conduct”
observed in 2022).
                                              51
to this risk given its experience in the 2022 proxy contest where a nominating

stockholder seemingly evaded disclosure requirements.

          As before, the Board’s objective to discover AAUs behind a nomination is

reasonable.286 But Kellner argues that the revised AAU Provision’s terms sweep too

far.287 He highlights two aspects of the AAU Provision that he deems particularly

problematic.

          First, the AAU Provision contains a bespoke 24-month lookback provision.288

The record reflects that this term was added after Equels questioned whether the

bylaw was ambiguous since it did not specify the time period for which AAUs were

to be disclosed.289 The Board wanted to clarify this in light of the 2022 proxy

contest, where the plaintiff took the position that certain persons had dropped out of

the contest just before the nomination notice was submitted.290 The revision adopted

by the Board reduced the risk of gamesmanship through overly narrow readings of

the bylaw. The 24-month period was chosen after the Board considered that the


286
   See Jorgl, 

, at *16 (“There are legitimate reasons why the Board
would want to know whether a nomination was part of a broader scheme relating to the
governance, management, or control of the Company.”).
287
      Pl.’s Pre-trial Br. 39; Pl.’s Post-trial Br. 37-38.
288
      Rock Tr. 807.
289
    Pittenger Tr. 722 (expressing agreement with Equels that the bylaw was ambiguous
since “it wasn’t clear if it was just seeking present, current [AAUs] that are still in effect
or whether it goes back in time. And if it goes back in time, does it go back to the beginning
of time.”).
290
      See id. at 722-23.
                                                  52
2022 nomination followed about 18 months of activity.291 The lookback is neither

preclusive nor unreasonable. A stockholder could easily understand what it requires

and disclose information accordingly.

         Second, the AAU Provision requires a nominating stockholder to disclose

AAUs both with persons acting in concert with the stockholder and any “Stockholder

Associated Person” (or “SAP”).292 Stockholder Associated Person is defined, in

relation to a “Holder,”293 as:

         (i) any person acting in concert with such Holder with respect to the
         Stockholder Proposal or the Corporation, (ii) any person controlling,
         controlled by, or under common control with such Holder or any of
         their respective Affiliates and Associates, or a person acting in concert
         therewith with respect to the Stockholder Proposal or the Corporation,
         and (iii) any member of the immediate family of such Holder or an
         Affiliate or Associate of such Holder.294


291
      Equels Tr. 529-30; Pittenger Tr. 724.
292
   Am. Bylaws § 1.4(c)(1)(D). I note that the SAP term is used at least thirty times in the
Amended Bylaws, typically alongside additional references to persons acting in concert
with, a family member of, or in another relationship with other persons. Unless the
information is required to be disclosed under SEC rules or regulations, the use of the SAP
term appears quite broad in a number of instances. I decline to issue an advisory opinion
on every provision mentioning SAPs. Instead, I have addressed the use of the term in the
Amended Bylaw provisions that Kellner raises in his post-trial brief and that are relevant
to my expedited determination of whether Kellner’s nominees should be placed on the
2023 ballot.
293
   “Holder” is defined as the nominating stockholder and each beneficial holder on whose
behalf the nomination is made. Am. Bylaws § 1.4(i)(6).
294
    Am. Bylaws § 1.4(i)(8). “Affiliate” and “Associate” have “the meaning[s] attributed to
such term[s] in Rule 12b-2 under the Exchange Act.” Id. § 1.4(c)(i)(1), (2); see 

.12b-2 (stating that “[a]n ‘affiliate’ of, or a person ‘affiliated’ with, a specified person,
is a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is
controlled by, or is under common control with, the person specified”); 

 (stating that
                                               53
In the context of the AAU Provision, a nominating stockholder would need to

disclose any AAUs that an SAP had with a holder, nominee (and his or her

immediate family members, affiliates, or associates), persons acting in concert with

any SAP, holder, nominee (and family, affiliates, or associates), and “any other

person or entity.”295

         It is here that the AAU Provision goes off the rails, undermining an otherwise

reasonable and appropriate bylaw. Read literally, the interplay of the various

terms—“acting in concert,” “Associate,” “Affiliate,” and “immediate family” within

the SAP definition, and SAPs within the AAU Provision—causes them to multiply,

forming an ill-defined web of disclosure requirements.296 For example, if the mother

of an associate of a beneficial holder had an agreement with the estranged sister of

a nominee to finance the nomination of a third-party nominee to the Board (who is

unknown to both the nominating stockholder and the nominee), then the nominating




“the term ‘associate’ used to indicate a relationship with any person, means (1) any
corporation or organization (other than the registrant or a majority-owned subsidiary of the
registrant) of which such person is an officer or partner or is, directly or indirectly, the
beneficial owner of 10 percent or more of any class of equity securities, (2) any trust or
other estate in which such person has a substantial beneficial interest or as to which such
person serves as trustee or in a similar fiduciary capacity, and (3) any relative or spouse of
such person, or any relative of such spouse, who has the same home as such person or who
is a director or officer of the registrant or any of its parents or subsidiaries”).
295
      Am. Bylaws § 1.4(c)(1)(D).
296
      See supra notes 281, 293-94 and accompanying text.
                                             54
stockholder would (arguably) be required to mention it in the notice.297 The

nominating stockholder would also seemingly be required to disclose an oral

arrangement between the brother of an affiliate of a beneficial holder of the

stockholder and any “any other person” “relating to or in connection with” AIM

director nominations.298 There are unending permutations of this hypothetical.299

         The Board presented no evidence to suggest that the inclusion of broadly

defined SAPs in the AAU Provision is proportionate to its objective of preventing

stockholders from misconstruing and evading the Amended Bylaws’ disclosure

requirements.300 The expansive text is more akin to a tripwire than an information



297
    This interpretation reads the phrase “any member of the immediate family of such
Holder or an Affiliate or Associate of such Holder” in the definition of SAP to mean an
immediate family member of: (1) the Holder, or (2) an Affiliate of the Holder or (3) an
Associate of the Holder. One could also read it to mean the family member of the Holder
or an Associate of the Holder or an Affiliate of the Holder.
298
      Am. Bylaws § 1.4(c)(1)(D).
299
    Cf. Williams Cos. S’holder Litig., 

, at *37 (Del. Ch. Feb 26, 2021)
(finding a rights plan’s “acting in concert” feature to unreasonably “sweep[] up benign
stockholder communications,” giving the board discretion to determine if the plan was
triggered, and using language that “gloms on” a “daisy-chain concept that operates to
aggregate stockholders even if members of the group have no idea that other stockholders
exist”), aff’d, 

 (Del. 2021) (TABLE).
300
    The defendants argue that incorporation of the SAP term in the AAU Provision does
not cause the nominator and nominees to disclose persons “unlinked” to them. Defs.’ Post-
trial Br. 38. They believe that is fair to require the nominator and nominees “to disclose
any AIM nomination related AAUs among, on the one hand, themselves or persons with
whom they have a discernable connection—family members, SAPs, persons acting in
concert with SAPs, etc.—and, on the other hand, any other person or entity.” 

 Yet the
inclusion of the SAP definition (and terms within it) significantly expands the scope of
what a nominator is obligated to disclose. The requirement is far more onerous than the
                                           55
gathering tool. It renders the AAU Provision overbroad, unworkable, and ripe for

subjective interpretation by the Board.301 Knowing that a proxy contest was coming,

augmenting the AAU Provision with vague requirements about far-flung, multi-

level relationships suggests an intention to block the dissident’s effort.

                       b.      The Consulting/Nomination Provision

         Section 1.4(c)(1)(E) of the Amended Bylaws requires disclosure of AAUs

between the nominating stockholder or an SAP, on one hand, and any stockholder

nominee, on the other hand, regarding consulting, investment advice, or a previous

nomination for a publicly traded company within the last ten years (the

“Consulting/Nomination Provision”).302 The provision not only suffers from the



closest comparator provision found in the defendants’ expert’s sample set. See JX 985
(Rebuttal Report of Andrew M. Freeman) (“Freeman Report”) ¶¶ 58-59; Rock Tr. 815.
301
      See Freeman Tr. 846; Freeman Report ¶ 101.
302
   Am. Bylaws § 1.4(c)(1)(E). The Consulting/Nomination Provision requires the noticing
stockholder to disclose, as to each nominee:
          (i) a complete and accurate description of all agreements, arrangements or
         understandings (whether written or oral, and including promises) between or
         among each Holder and/or any Stockholder Associated Person (as such terms
         “Holder” and “Stockholder Associated Person” are defined in this Section
         1.4), on the one hand, and any Stockholder Nominee, on the other hand, (x) to
         consult or advise on any investment or potential investment in a publicly
         listed company (including the Corporation), and/or (y) to nominate, submit,
         or otherwise recommend the Stockholder Nominee for appointment, election
         or re-election (or, for the avoidance of doubt, as a candidate for appointment,
         election or re-election) to any officer, executive officer or director role of any
         publicly listed company (including the Corporation), in each case, during the
         past ten (10) years; and (ii) a complete and accurate description of the
         outcome of any situations described pursuant to the foregoing clause (i).
                                                56
same problem as the AAU Provision insofar as it includes SAPs. It also imposes

ambiguous requirements across a lengthy term.

         The defendants made no effort to justify this provision in relation to their

stated objectives, except to argue that this court previously blessed advance notice

bylaws requiring the disclosure of AAUs “towards the shared goal of the

nomination.”303      The Consulting/Nomination Provision does not stop with the

present nomination—or even AAUs about AIM. It implicates a decade of AAUs

(including “advice” on “potential investments”) involving other publicly traded

companies as well. Would a notice need to reveal if the spouse of an associate of a

nominee had an understanding with the nominating stockholder nine years ago that

they would exchange investment tips and was told that Apple shares were a good

buy, but the investment was not pursued?

         Mitchell acknowledged that the importance of the information sought in the

Consulting/Nomination Provision is “arguable” at best.304 At worst, it is draconian




303
    Defs.’ Post-trial Br. 41 (quoting Jorgl, 

, at *12); 

 at 41 n.19
(mentioning the Consulting/Nomination Provision once); see Freeman Report ¶ 47 (noting
that the defendants did not ask their expert to address the propriety of the
Consulting/Nomination Provision and observing that the bylaw is “uncommon”); Mitchell
Dep. 152 (testifying that he is not aware of similar provisions); Appelrouth Dep. 159
(same).
304
      Mitchell Dep. 150.
                                          57
and would give the Board license to reject a notice based on a subjective

interpretation of the provision’s imprecise terms.305

                       c.     The Known Supporter Provision

         Section 1.4(c)(4) requires the nominator and nominees to list all known

supporters (the “Known Supporter Provision”).306 The defendants argue that this

bylaw requires disclosure of known supporters in accordance with the Court of

Chancery’s decision in CytoDyn.307 But the provision goes farther than what the

precedent supports. In CytoDyn, Vice Chancellor Slights observed that a bylaw

mandating the disclosure of known financial supporters elicited information that is

“vitally important” to voting stockholders.308 By contrast, the Known Supporter

Provision here seeks disclosure of any sort of support whatsoever, including that of

other stockholders known by SAPs to support the nomination.


305
   Freeman Tr. 846 (opining that the Consulting/Nomination Provision is “egregious,”
“overbroad,” and allows “subjective” interpretation).
306
      The provision requires that the nominator disclose, as to each nominee:
         the names (including, if known, the full legal names and any alias names
         used) and addresses of other stockholders (including beneficial owners)
         known by any Holder or Stockholder Associated Person to support such
         Stockholder Proposal or Stockholder Proposals (including, without
         limitation, any nominations), and to the extent known, the class or series and
         number of all shares of the Corporation’s capital stock owned beneficially or
         of record by each such other stockholder or other beneficial owner.
Am. Bylaws § 1.4(c)(4).
  Defs.’ Post-trial Br. 31 (citing Rosenbaum v. CytoDyn, Inc., 

, at *19
307

(Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 2021)).
308
      CytoDyn, 

, at *19.
                                              58
      The limits of this provision are ambiguous—both in the terms of the types of

support and supporters one must disclose. For example, if Kellner had posted on

social media that he was running a proxy contest and an AIM stockholder liked his

post, would Kellner be required to mention it in his notice? Or would Kellner need

to disclose if his associate’s mother (an SAP) learned that an AIM stockholder who

attends her church offered prayers for the proxy contest to succeed? The defendants

presented no evidence to demonstrate that such information is reasonably linked to

the objectives they identified. And even if a stockholder attempted to comply, the

Board could take a broad reading of the Known Supporter Provision and reject the

nomination as noncompliant for reasons a stockholder could not realistically

anticipate.

      Had the Board crafted a bylaw mandating the disclosure of known supporters

providing financial support or meaningful assistance in furtherance of a nomination,

it might have taken a legitimate approach to ensuring adequate disclosure.309

Instead, it overreached. As drafted, the Known Supporter Provision impedes the

stockholder franchise while exceeding any reasonable approach to ensuring

thorough disclosure.




309
    In fact, the AAU Provision requires the disclosure of AAUs concerning “funding or
financing” arrangements related to the nominations. Am. Bylaws § 1.4(c)(1)(D).
                                         59
                    d.     The Ownership Provision

      Section 1.4(c)(3)(B) requires a nominating stockholder to disclose, among

many other things, a Holder’s ownership in AIM stock (including beneficial,

synthetic, derivative, and short positions) (the “Ownership Provision”).310


310
    Am. Bylaws § 1.4(c)(3)(B). The Ownership Provision requires that a notice disclose,
as to Holders:
      as of the date of the notice (which information, for the avoidance of doubt,
      shall be updated and supplemented pursuant to subclause (g) of this Section
      1.4), (i) the class or series and number of shares of capital stock of the
      Corporation of each such class and series which are, directly or indirectly,
      held of record or owned beneficially by each Holder and any Stockholder
      Associated Person (provided that, for purposes of this Section 1.4, any such
      person or entity shall in all events be deemed to beneficially own any shares
      of stock of the Corporation as to which such person has a right to acquire
      beneficial ownership at any time in the future (whether such right is
      exercisable immediately or only after the passage of time or the fulfillment
      of a condition, or both)), (ii) any short position, profits interest, option,
      warrant, convertible security, stock appreciation right or similar rights with
      an exercise or conversion privilege or a settlement payment or mechanism at
      a price related to any class or series or shares of the Corporation or with a
      value derived in whole or in part from the value or any class or series of
      shares of the Corporation or with a value derived in whole or in part from the
      value of any class or series of shares of the Corporation, or any derivative or
      synthetic arrangement having the characteristics of a long position in any
      class or series of shares of the Corporation, or any contract, derivative, swap
      or other transaction or series of transactions designed to produce economic
      benefits and risks that correspond substantially to the ownership of any class
      or series of shares of the Corporation, including due to the fact that the value
      of such contract, derivative swap or other transaction or series of transactions
      is determined by reference to the price, value or volatility of any class or
      series of shares of the Corporation, whether or not such instrument, contract
      or right shall be subject to settlement in the underlying class or series of
      shares of the Corporation, through the delivery of cash or other property, or
      otherwise, and without regard to whether the Holder and any Stockholder
      Associated Person may have entered into transactions that hedge or mitigate
      the economic effect of such instrument, contract or right, or any other direct
      or indirect opportunity to profit or share in any profit derived from any
                                            60
increase or decrease in the value of shares of the Corporation (any of the
foregoing, a “Derivative Instrument”) directly or indirectly owned or held,
including beneficially, by each Holder or any Stockholder Associated
Person, (iii) a description of any proxy, contract ,agreement, arrangement,
understanding or relationship pursuant to which each Holder and/or any
Stockholder Associated Person has any right to vote or has granted a right to
vote any shares or stock or any other security of the Corporation, (iv) any
agreement, arrangement, understanding, relationship or otherwise, including
any repurchase or similar so-called “stock borrowing” agreement or
arrangement, involving any Holder or any Stockholder Associated Person,
on the one hand, and any person acting in concert therewith, on the other
hand, directly or indirectly, the purpose or effect of which is to mitigate loss
to, reduce the economic risk (of ownership or otherwise) of any class or series
of the shares of the Corporation by, manage the risk of share price changes
for, or increase or decrease the voting power of, such Holder or any
Stockholder Associated Person with respect to any class or series of the
shares or other securities of the Corporation, or which provides, directly or
indirectly, the opportunity to profit or share in any profit derived from any
decrease in the price or value of any class or series of the shares or other
securities of the Corporation (any of the foregoing, a “Short Interest”), and
any Short Interest held by each Holder or any Stockholder Associated Person
within the last twelve (12) months in any class or series of the shares or other
securities of the Corporation, (v) any rights to dividends or payments in lieu
of dividends on the shares of the Corporation owned beneficially by each
Holder or any Stockholder Associated Person that are separated or separable
from the underlying shares of stock or other securities of the Corporation,
(vi) any proportionate interest in shares of stock of any class or series or other
underlying securities of the Corporation or Derivative Instruments held,
directly or indirectly, by a general or limited partnership or limited liability
company or other entity in which any Holder or any Stockholder Associated
Person is a general partner or directly or indirectly beneficially owns an
interest in the manager or managing member of a limited liability company
or other entity, (vii) any performance-related fees (other than an asset-based
fee) that each Holder or any Stockholder Associated Person is or may be
entitled to based on any increase or decrease in the value of the stock or other
securities of the Corporation or Derivative Instruments, if any, including
without limitation, any such interests held by members of the immediate
family as such Holder or any Stockholder Associated Person, (viii) any direct
or indirect legal, economic, or financial interest (including Short Interest) of
each Holder and each Stockholder Associated Person, if any, in the outcome
of any (X) vote to be taken at any annual or special meeting of stockholders
of the Corporation or (Y) any meeting of stockholders of any other entity
                                       61
The requirements extend to SAPs, immediate family members, and persons acting

in concert with a nominee.311

         I cannot say whether the Ownership Provision would choke a horse.312 But it

has certainly flummoxed this judge. Mitchell testified that the bylaw was written in

such a way that “no one would read it” and that if the directors had started reading

it “line by line” during their March 2023 Board meeting, they “would still be in the

meeting.”313 Though I have tried to read and understand it, the bylaw—with its

1,099 words and 13 subparts—is indecipherable.


         with respect to any matter that is related, directly or indirectly, to any
         nomination or business proposed by any Holder under these by-laws, (ix) any
         direct or indirect legal, economic or financial interest or any Derivative
         Instrument or Short Interests in any principal competitor of the Corporation
         held by each Holder or any Stockholder Associated Person, (x) any direct or
         indirect interest of each Holder or any Stockholder Associated Person in any
         contract with the Corporation, any Affiliate of the Corporation, or any
         principal competitor of the Corporation (including, in any such case, any
         employment agreement or consulting agreement); and (xi) any material
         pending or threatened action, suit or proceeding (whether civil, criminal,
         investigative, administrative or otherwise) in which any Holder or any
         Stockholder Associated Person is, or is reasonably likely to be made, a party
         or material participant involving the Corporation or any of its officers,
         directors or employees, or any Affiliate of the Corporation, or any officer,
         director or employee of such Affiliate (the information specified in this
         paragraph (c)(3)(B) of this Section 1.4 shall be referred to as the “Specified
         Information”).
311
      Am. Bylaws § 1.4(c)(3)(B).
312
    PS Fund 1, LLC v. Allergan, Inc., C.A. No. 10057-CB, at 35 (Del. Ch. Sept. 22, 2014)
(TRANSCRIPT) (describing a bylaw that would require a stockholder to disclose two years
of trading history and all associates in which the stockholder held a stake of more than 10
percent as a “horse-choker of a bylaw”).
313
      Mitchell Dep. 161-63.
                                              62
         The Board apparently set out to add a bylaw requiring the disclosure of not

only beneficial ownership but also synthetic and derivative ownership, short

interests, and hedging arrangements.314             Provisions to that end are “very

common.”315 They appear to have proliferated as a means to close loopholes in

Section 13(d) involving synthetic equity.316

         A provision requiring a stockholder to disclose such information seems

perfectly legitimate. The problem for AIM is that the Ownership Provision as

drafted sprawls wildly beyond this purpose. As one example, it requires the

disclosure of “legal, economic, or financial” interests “in any principal competitor”

of AIM.317 The term “principal competitor” is undefined, creating ambiguity.318 As

another example, it calls for disclosure of “[a]ny performance-related fees that each

Stockholder Associated Person is entitled to, including interests held by family

members.”319       The plain terms of this requirement call for the disclosure of


314
      See JX 635; Pittenger Tr. 730-31.
315
      Pittenger Tr. 730-31; see Rock Report ¶ 67.
316
   Although these provisions emerged as part of the second generation of advance notice
bylaws, they also respond to recent changes to Schedule 13D’s beneficial ownership
reporting requirement. See supra note 236 (discussing second generation advance notice
bylaws); Rock Report ¶ 25 n.14 (listing sources).
317
      Am. Bylaws § 1.4(c)(3)(B)(ix).
318
   See generally Levitt Corp. v. Office Depot, Inc., 

 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14,
2008) (considering an ambiguous bylaw); Sherwood v. Chan Tsz Ngon, 

(Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2011) (same); JANA Master Fund, 

 (same).
319
      Am. Bylaws § 1.4(c)(3)(B)(vii).
                                             63
performance-related fees that any family members of SAPs may receive. Since

SAPs include immediate family members, would a nominating stockholder be

required to disclose the entitlement of her mother’s second cousin to such fees? Or

would she be required to track down and disclose her affiliate’s father’s regular

investments in actively managed mutual funds or ETFs that are, in turn, invested in

one of AIM’s “principal competitors”? I cannot say for sure.

       Any justifiable objectives that might be served by aspects of the Ownership

Provision are buried under dozens of dense layers of text. The provision seems

designed to preclude a proxy contest for no good reason; none were given. A

stockholder could not fairly be expected to comply.

                     e.     The First Contact Provision

       Section 1.4(c)(1)(H) of the Amended Bylaws requires disclosure of the dates

of first contact among those involved in the nomination effort (the “First Contact

Provision”).320 The defendants argue that this provision is not preclusive because

one could “determine, from any number of sources . . . the dates (or at the very least,

the approximate dates) they first had contact with their nominees regarding director




320
   Id. § 1.4(c)(1)(H) (requiring a notice to set out “the dates of first contact between any
Holder and/or Stockholder Associated Person, on the one hand, and the Stockholder
Nominee, on the other hand, with respect to (i) the Corporation and (ii) any proposed
nomination or nominations of any person or persons (including, without limitation, any
Stockholder Nominee) for election or re-election to the Board of Directors”).
                                            64
nominations or AIM.”321 I agree. With a few email or text message searches, a

nominee should be able to discern when they first had these contacts.322

          Kellner asserts that the provision is unusual, but that is not the test. The First

Contact Provision is tailored to provide “a logical and reasoned approach [to]

advanc[e] a proper objective” unique to AIM.323 It relates to the Board’s desire to

elicit sufficient information for the Board to make a recommendation about the

nominations and stockholders to cast informed votes. The Board would have been

focused on securing this knowledge after its experience with the 2022 proxy contest.

The First Contact Bylaw would help alert the Board and stockholders to similar

maneuvering.

                        f.        The Questionnaire Provisions

          Sections 1.4(c)(1)(L) and 1.4(e) of the Amended Bylaws require nominees to

complete a form of D&O questionnaire (the “Questionnaire Provisions”).324 Such




321
      Defs.’ Post-trial Br. 39.
322
   Unlike the problems with the use of the SAP term discussed above, the provision here
calls for a more defined set of information that could be known or knowable with
reasonable diligence.
323
      Dollar Thrifty, 

.
324
    Am. Bylaws § 1.4(c)(1)(L) (requiring the nominating stockholder to submit, for each
nominee, “a completed and signed questionnaire, representation and agreement and any
and all other information required by paragraph (e) of this Section 1.4”); see id. § 1.4(e)
(requiring each nominee to “deliver in writing” “a written questionnaire in the form
provided by the Secretary with respect to the background, qualifications, and independence
of such Stockholder Nominee (which questionnaire shall be provided by the Secretary upon
                                               65
provisions are fairly standard in second generation advance notice bylaws and have

been for some time.325              Appropriately so.   “Requiring that nominees submit

responses to a questionnaire” created by the company “furthers the information-

gathering and disclosure functions of advance notice bylaws.”326

          There is nothing unreasonable about the Questionnaire Provisions on their

faces. Kellner questions one aspect: the allowance of five business days for AIM to

send the form of questionnaire to a stockholder, which he avers might allow the

company time to make unfair revisions.327 It would amount to hair splitting for me

to conclude that five days is unreasonable, but a slightly shorter time period (say,

three days) is not. If the directors had manipulative goals in mind, one would assume

that they could readily achieve them in a shorter time period. Such matters are better

addressed in considering whether the Board’s enforcement of the Questionnaire

Provisions was equitable.

                                    *           *            *

          Four of the challenged Amended Bylaw provisions (the AAU Provision,

Competitor/Nominating Provision, Known Supporter Provision, and Ownership



written request of any stockholder of record identified by name within five (5) Business
Days of such written request”).
325
      See Rock Report ¶¶ 46-47, 61; Pittenger Tr. 729.
326
      Lee Enters., 

, at *18.
327
      Pl.’s Post-trial Br. 11-12.
                                                66
Provision), as drafted, do not afford stockholders “a fair opportunity to nominate

candidates.”328 Rather than further the identified purpose of obtaining transparency

thorough disclosure, these provisions seem designed to thwart an approaching proxy

contest, entrench the incumbents, and remove any possibility of a contested election.

As a result, they run afoul of Delaware law.329 The provisions are “of no force and

effect.”330

         That does not mean that the Amended Bylaws are void in total, as Kellner

would have me declare. In Kellner’s view, I should take an “all or nothing” approach




328
      Hubbard, 

, at *11.
329
   See 8 Del. C. § 109(b) (“The bylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent with
law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the
conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders,
directors, officers or employees.”); Blasius, 

 (recognizing that “[t]he
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of
directorial power rests”); cf. Hubbard, 

 at *11 (“[A]n advance notice by-
law will be validated where it operates as a reasonable limitation upon the shareholders'
right to nominate candidates for director. More specifically, such a by-law must, on its
face and in the particular circumstances, afford the shareholders a fair opportunity to
nominate candidates.”).
330
   Hollinger Int’l Inc. v. Black, 

 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff’d, 

 (Del. 2005); see Openwave Sys., 

; In re Osteopathic Hospital
Ass’n of Del., 

 (Del. Ch. 1963) (“It is accepted law that a by-law which
is unreasonable, unlawful, or contrary to public polic[y] may be declared void though
adopted by legitimate procedures.”); see also Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 

 (Del. 1985) (“The bylaws of a corporation are presumed to be valid, and the courts
will construe the bylaws in a manner consistent with the law rather than strike down the
bylaws. A bylaw that is inconsistent with any statute or rule of common law, however, is
void.”).
                                             67
to analyzing the validity of the Amended Bylaws as adopted.331 That blunt tactic

would yield extreme and unnecessary relief, especially given that the Board

identified a proper corporate interest that it sought to protect by adopting the

Amended Bylaws. Instead, I have undertaken a careful analysis of the specific

provisions Kellner highlighted and found some aspects of the Amended Bylaws to

be inequitable.332 The rest of the Amended Bylaws stand.

       C.     The Application Claim

       Kellner contends that the Board cannot lawfully reject his notice because it

satisfies AIM’s advance notice bylaws and that—even if it did not—the Board’s

application of the bylaws was inequitable. Analyzing the enforcement of an advance

notice bylaw begins with a contractual analysis. If circumstances require, the court

will go on to assess whether there is a “basis in equity to excuse strict compliance”

with the bylaws.333


331
    See Pl.’s Post-trial Br. 34. This is unlike the situation highlighted in Kellner’s brief
where the court looked at “all of the circumstances” surrounding the adoption of defensive
actions. Phillips, 

, at *7. Of course, it may be appropriate to consider how
bylaws work together in assessing whether they are reasonable. But one bylaw straying
too far does not mean other legitimate bylaws should be invalidated.
332
   See Hollinger, 844 A.3d at 1078 (“Delaware’s public policy interest in vindicating the
legitimate expectations stockholders have of their corporate fiduciaries requires its courts
to act when statutory flexibility is exploited for inequitable ends.”); Giuricich v. Emtrol
Corp., 

 (Del. 1982) (explaining that the court must apply “careful judicial
scrutiny” where “the right to vote for the election of successor directors has been effectively
frustrated”).
333
   Sternlicht, 

, at *14; see also Schnell, 

 (stating that
equity will prohibit attempts to “utilize the corporate machinery” for the “purpose of
                                              68
                1.      Whether the Notice Complied with the Bylaws

         Corporate bylaws are “part of a binding broader contract among directors,

officers and stockholders formed within the statutory framework of the Delaware

General Corporation Law.”334 Delaware courts employ “principles of contract

interpretation” when construing a corporation’s bylaws.335 In the context of advance

notice bylaws, the court asks: “were the bylaws clear and ambiguous, did the

stockholder’s nomination comply with the bylaws, and did the company interfere

with the plaintiff’s attempt to comply.”336

         When analyzing the first two questions, unambiguous terms will be “given

their commonly accepted meaning”337 and “[a]ny ambiguity in an advance notice

bylaw is resolved ‘in favor of the stockholder's electoral rights.’”338 The third

question likewise draws upon contract law.              Compliance with advance notice

requirements is effectively a condition precedent to a company being obligated to



obstructing the legitimate efforts of dissident stockholders in the exercise of their right to
undertake a proxy contest against management”); Coster, 300 A.3d at 667 (explaining that
Delaware courts deploy the Schnell doctrine in “cases where the board acts within its legal
power, but is motivated for selfish reasons to interfere with the stockholder franchise”).
334
      Hill Int’l, Inc. v. Opportunity P’rs L.P., 

 (Del. 2015).
  Brown v. Matterport, Inc., 

, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 2022), aff’d, 2022

 (Del. Ch. July 27, 2022) (ORDER).
336
      Lee Enters., 

, at *9; see also Sternlicht, 

, at *14.
337
   Hill Int’l, 

 (quoting Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 

 (Del. 2010)).
338
      Jorgl, 

, at *10 (quoting Saba Cap., 224 A.3d at 977).
                                               69
act, such as by accepting a stockholder proposal.339 “Delaware courts follow the

principle that a party who wrongfully prevents a thing from being done cannot avail

itself of the nonperformance it has occasioned.”340 Kellner bears the burden of

showing that his notice fulfills the bylaws’ requirements.341

                      a.     The AAU Provision

         The bulk of the parties’ briefing focuses on whether the Kellner Notice

complied with the AAU Provision. As discussed above, Section 1.4(c)(1)(D) of the

Amended Bylaws is invalid because aspects of it are inequitable.342 Its prior iteration

in the 2016 Bylaws (the “2016 AAU Provision”) does not suffer from the same flaws

as the amended version. The scope of the 2016 AAU Provision is fully within and

narrower than the 2023 AAU Provision. Given the vital corporate considerations at

risk if nominating stockholders conceal AAUs, it would risk further inequity to

excuse the Kellner Notice from disclosing them when AIM had a validly enacted




339
      See Lee Enters., 

, at *13 n. 142.
340
   W & G Seaford Assocs. v. E. Short Mkts., 

 (D. Del. 1989)
(describing the “cardinal principle of contract law regarding conditions” (citing
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 245 (1981))).
341
    See Totta v. CCSB Financial Corp., 

, at *12 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2022),
aff’d, 

 (Del. 2023); Jorgl, 

, at *13-14.
342
      See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
                                            70
provision in place pre-amendment.343 Accordingly, I revert to assessing whether the

Kellner Notice complied with the 2016 AAU Provision.

         The 2016 AAU Provision requires a notice to describe “all arrangements or

understandings between such stockholder and each proposed nominee and any other

person or persons (including their names) pursuant to which the nomination(s) are

to be made.”344 “Arrangements” and “understandings” are not defined in the 2016

Bylaws.      When met with undefined contract terms, Delaware courts turn “to

dictionaries for assistance in determining the plain meaning.”345 “Arrangement”

means “a measure taken or plan made in advance of some occurrence sometimes for

a legal purpose; an agreement or settlement of details made in anticipation.”346

“Understanding” means “an agreement, especially of an implied or tacit nature.”347

These terms are unambiguous.




343
    See Hollinger, 844 A.3d at 1078 (holding that bylaws are improperly adopted when
“they were adopted for an inequitable purpose” despite being statutorily sound and taking
a provision-by-provision approach to reviewing them); cf. Rainbow Mountain, Inc. v.
Begeman, 

, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2017) (holding that without “any
proof [a later set of bylaws] were ratified” the earlier and properly adopted set “remain[ed]
the operative bylaws”).
344
      2016 Bylaws § 1.4(c).
345
      Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy Found., 

 (Del. 2006).
346
      Arrangement, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
347
      Understanding, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
                                             71
            In Jorgl, this court construed the meaning of the 2016 AAU Provision using

the terms’ commonly accepted meanings.348 The decision explained that the phrase

“arrangement or understanding,” as it relates to nominations, requires disclosure of

“any advance plan, measure taken, or agreement—whether explicit, implicit, or tacit,

with any person toward the shared goal of the nomination.”349 A “quid pro quo” is

not required, but mere discussions or sharing of information “is not alone sufficient”

to form an “arrangement or understanding.”350            Because “arrangements” and

“understandings” include “agreements,” the fact that the 2016 Bylaws do not

expressly mention “agreements” does not diminish the bylaw’s scope.351 It can be

interpreted consistent with the discussion of AAUs in other corporate law

contexts.352




348
      

, at *11.
349
      Id. at *11-12.
350
      

351
   Jorgl, 

, at *11-12 (noting that “an ‘arrangement’ can be shown by
an ‘agreement’”) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)).
352
    E.g., Totta, 

, at *24-25 (discussing how “the general corporate law
understanding that persons act in concert when they have an agreement, arrangement, or
understanding regarding the voting or disposition of shares”); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore,

 (Del. Ch. 2000) (discussing that in the context of Section 203, the terms
“agreement,” “arrangement,” or “understanding” “permit a fairly high degree of
informality in the form in which the parties come together” but “presuppose[] a meeting of
the minds”).
                                            72
         Since the 2016 Bylaws lack a 24 month lookback, I consider only whether the

Kellner Notice omits or misrepresents AAUs for the current effort.353 The Kellner

Notice states that before July 2023, “no decision was made [for any of Kellner,

Deutsch, or Chioini] to work together to advance potential nominations or otherwise

take any action with respect to the Company.”354 This statement is false.

         Kellner, Chioini, and Deutsch testified that no AAU relating to the 2023 effort

existed until July 11 when they flew together on Kellner’s jet for a meeting at

BakerHostetler’s offices.355 This day was perhaps the culmination of the group’s

labors. But an AAU can “take the form of a ‘measure’ or ‘plan’ before an event.”356

Well before July, Chioini, Kellner, and Deutsch took measures to prepare for

nominations and a proxy contest.

         The 2023 effort was—in many ways—a continuation of the 2022 attempt. As

early as November 2022, Kellner requested a meeting with Tudor and the Jorgl team




353
   Were the 24-month lookback in place, this section of my analysis would have provided
an extended discussion of the central role Tudor played in the 2022 nomination effort.
Strikingly, the Kellner Notice does not disclose any AAU with Tudor. Because the AAU
Provision exceeded equity’s limits, the reader was spared additional pages in this already
lengthy decision.
354
      Kellner Notice 11.
355
   Chioini Tr. 29; Kellner Tr. 229; Deutsch Tr. 188-89; JX 765; see also Pl.’s Post-trial
Brief 51.
356
      Jorgl, 

, at *12.
                                           73
to discuss “next steps.”357 At the same time, Chioini expressed that he and Rice

intended to pursue nominations in 2023.358 In December, Chioini spoke to Kellner

and told his counsel that Kellner was “very interested in working with us to remove

these guys” and “want[ed] to keep in touch.”359

         Kellner’s update to his fraternity brothers shortly after he spoke to Chioini is

particularly revealing.360 Kellner wrote that “[t]wo other investors [we]re joining

[him] in a proxy battle.”361 Although he could not recall at trial who the two other

investors were, he had named Deutsch and Tudor in an earlier draft.362 About two

weeks after sending the final update, Kellner told Deutsch that he was reaching out

to his attorney and would loop Deutsch in to “get this ball rolling!!”363

         The ball rolled—albeit slowly since AIM’s annual meeting was 10 months

away.       Still, in February, BakerHostetler began requesting information from

Kellner’s attorney about his AIM stock ownership in emails forwarded to both




357
      JX 467.
358
      JX 468; see also JX 498; JX 526.
359
      JX 541.
360
      JX 557; see Kellner Tr. 346.
361
      JX 557.
362
   See supra note 143 (discussing that the reference was not to Chioini and Rice because
they are not investors).
363
      JX 570.
                                            74
Kellner and Deutsch.364 Various calls were scheduled between Kellner, Deutsch,

Chioini, and counsel throughout the spring.365 The group kept abreast of AIM’s

bylaw amendments.366

            Kellner’s May 19 text to Deutsch further reflects that the group’s activities

since late 2022 or early 2023 were coordinated actions directed toward a shared goal

of nominating director candidates.367 In the text, Kellner directed Deutsch to contact

Chioini and learn his plan “regarding AIM.”368 Because the annual stockholder

meeting approached and the stockholder nomination deadline was imminent, time

was “becoming critical.”369 Kellner was ready to “mov[e] th[e] ball forward” once

again with Deutsch and Chioini.370 There is no evidence that any other potential

nominees were considered for Kellner’s nomination.



364
      JXs 605-06.
365
      JX 695; JX 713; JX 740; JX 746.
366
      JX 700.
367
      JX 740.
368
      Id.
369
      Id.
370
    Id.; Deutsch 199-200. Deutsch testified that Kellner’s use of the idiom “get the ball
rolling” could “mean many things.” Deutsch Tr. 199-200. In common parlance, “get the
ball rolling” means to “begin an activity or process.” Get/set/start the ball rolling,
Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/get%2Fset%2Fstart%20
the%20ball%20rolling (last visited Dec. 21, 2023). Kellner had consulted his attorney and
asked Deutsch to get in touch with Chioini to start working towards submitting a
nomination. There was no other reason to reach out to Chioini except to advance his
nomination in 2023. Chioini was not (and is not) an AIM stockholder.
                                              75
         Even if the exact time at which an AAU among Kellner, Deutsch, and Chioini

arose could not be identified with precision, it preceded July 2023. It is possible that

no formal decision was reached before then for Kellner, Deutsch, or Chioini to

submit a slate to AIM. But there was undoubtedly a tacit understanding before that

while multiple preparations were undertaken. The Kellner Notice therefore omitted

and misrepresented meaningful AAUs.

                      b.    Other Bylaw Provisions

         Beyond the non-disclosure of AAUs, AIM detailed numerous other purported

flaws in the Kellner Notice.371 They are of varying degrees of importance.372

Because I have already found that the notice was deficient regarding the

misstatements about AAUs for the 2023 nomination, I will highlight just two others.

         First, the Kellner Notice violated the First Contact Provision. Kellner was

required to disclose “the dates of first contact between a nominating stockholder

and/or [any SAP], on the one hand, and the Stockholder Nominee, on the other hand”

regarding AIM or the Board nominations.373 The Kellner Notice does not include



371
      See JX 378.
372
    For example, AIM’s rejection letter states that the Kellner Notice did not list the full
name of Deutsch’s family office or its address. JX 378 at 9. It also states that the Kellner
Notice fails to provide information required by Schedule 14A because each nominee
consented to “being named as a nominee in any proxy statement” rather than “being named
in proxy statements.” Id. at 11 (emphasis in original).
373
      Am. Bylaws § 1.4(c)(1)(H).
                                            76
any date of first contact between Kellner and Deutsch about the present

nomination.374 Kellner attempts to justify this omission by asserting that “the Bylaw

Amendments do not require an exact date.”375 Maybe so. He made no attempt,

however, to provide an approximate date. Regarding Chioini, the Kellner Notice

merely states that Kellner was first in contact with him about AIM or the

nominations in “late 2022.”376 This is fuzzy. Kellner only needed to check his

record to give specifics.

          Second, the Kellner Notice does not comply with the requirement that

questionnaires submitted by nominees be certified as accurate in accordance with

Section 1.4(c)(5) of the Amended Bylaws.377 The questionnaires required nominees

to disclose any adverse recommendation from proxy advisory firms in connection

with their service on other boards.378 Kellner, Deutsch, and Chioini each had prior

“withhold” recommendations that they neglected to disclose.379


374
    Kellner Notice 11 (“In and around early 2021, Mr. Deutsch, who had started investing
in the Company in the prior year, shared with Mr. Kellner his views on the significant
potential of the Company’s lead candidate, Ampligen, for multiple indications. Thereafter,
Mr. Kellner invested in the Company and the Reporting Persons continued to communicate
from time to time with respect to their investments in the Company.”).
375
      Pl.’s Post-trial Br. 60.
376
      Kellner Notice 11.
377
      Id. at 20.
378
      Kellner Notice 35, 79, and 123.
379
  Id. at 35, 79, and 123; JX 2; JX 6; JX 10; JX 13; JX 20; JX 34; JX 263; JXs 1013-14.
When a plurality voting standard is used, proxy advisors issue a “for” or “withhold”
                                           77
         The three maintain that they were unaware of any withhold recommendations

until this litigation and note that such recommendations are not publicly available.380

One would expect that, with the assistance of sophisticated counsel, Kellner,

Deutsch, and Chioini could have gathered the data needed to respond. In any event,

their questionnaires could have explained that they were unaware of any adverse

recommendations or that they lacked knowledge. Instead, they each affirmatively

checked “no.”381 Those representations were untrue.

                2.      Whether the Rejection of the Kellner Notice Was Equitable

         Kellner’s notice contravened the clear and unambiguous requirements of

AIM’s bylaws. “The court’s analysis does not necessarily end if a stockholder fails

to comply with the plain terms of an advance notice bylaw.”382 “Delaware courts

have reserved space for equity to address the inequitable application of even validly-

enacted” provisions.383 Where appropriate, the court will consider whether a board

“utilize[d] the corporate machinery . . . [to] obstruct[] the legitimate efforts of




recommendation. If a board uses a plurality voting standard, a “withhold” recommendation
is the adverse recommendation. See Harrington Tr. 403; Equels Tr. 567.
380
      See Chioini Tr. 40; Harrington Tr. 402; JX 960 at 8-12.
381
      Defs.’ Post-trial Br. 55; Kellner Notice 35, 79, 123.
382
      Lee Enters., 

, at *9.
383
      CytoDyn, 

, at *15 (emphasis omitted).
                                               78
dissident stockholders in the exercise of their rights to undertake a proxy contest

against management.”384

         That inquiry is warranted here.          I have already found that the Board

unreasonably implemented certain bylaws that infringed upon the stockholder

franchise after it anticipated a proxy contest. Further, Kellner insists that the Board’s

process in rejecting the Notice was unreasonable, inequitable, and manipulative.

         The parties agree that the Board’s decision to reject Kellner’s notice is subject

to enhanced scrutiny. As discussed above, the relevant standard is a “situationally

specific” application of Unocal.385 The Board must prove that it identified a threat

“to an important corporate interest” and that its response was “reasonable in relation

to the threat posed.”386

                       a.    Reasonableness

         The Board has proven that its actions served proper corporate objectives.

Specifically, it sought to obtain full and fair disclosure so that it could adequately

evaluate a nomination and that stockholders could cast informed votes.387 The Board

retained independent counsel to evaluate the Kellner Notice with these goals in


384
   Schnell, 

. If a board frustrated a stockholder’s effort to comply with an
advance notice bylaw, the stockholder’s non-compliance would arguably be excused as a
matter of contract law as well as equity. See supra notes 339-40 and accompanying text.
385
      Coster, 300 A.3d at 672; see supra notes 256-57.
386
      Coster, 300 A.3d at 672-73.
387
      See, e.g., Lee Enters., 

, at *9; Jorgl, 

, at *14-16.
                                             79
mind.388 Counsel provided a detailed analysis.389 The Board then considered that

advice when reviewing the Notice.390

         With the guidance of counsel and based on its experience in 2022, the Board

concluded that the Kellner Notice failed to disclose AAUs.391 The Board viewed the

Kellner Notice as obscuring the roles of Deutsch, Tudor, and others in the 2022

nomination effort.392 It also decided that the Kellner Notice was false and misleading

with regard to the group’s plans for the 2023 nomination effort.393 It was reasonable

for the Board to conclude that the objective of preserving an informed stockholder

vote was threatened.




388
   See Equels Tr. 544-52, 625-28; Mitchell Tr. 640-41; Bryan Tr. 660-61, 666-67;
Appelrouth Tr. 694-95.
389
      JX 907.
390
   JX 911; see Cirillo Fam. Tr. v. Moezinia, 

, at *12 (Del. Ch. July 11,
2018) (“Delaware law statutorily encourages directors to rely on . . . counsel[] to inform
themselves and properly discharge their fiduciary duties.” (citing 8 Del. C. § 141(e));
Carlton Invs. v. TLC Beatrice Int’l Hldgs, Inc., 

, at *12 (Del. Ch. May
30, 1997).
391
      JX 911; see also Pittenger Tr. 741-45.
392
   Equels Tr. 543-77; Bryan Tr. 611-64; Pittenger Tr. 738-49; Appelrouth Tr. 693-95. The
Board had another reason to be concerned. A fee shifting petition remains pending in the
Jorgl action, BakerHostetler’s fees from the 2022 litigation are unpaid, and the Kellner
Notice expressly stated that if successful, the group would seek repayment of fees from
2022. The Board considered the intended reimbursement and determined that payment of
$2 million for Chioini and Xirinachs’ 2022 expenses would harm AIM. See JX 911; Equels
Tr. 554; Pittenger Tr. 749; Appelrouth Tr. 691-92.
393
      Equels Tr. 556-57; Bryan Tr. 662-63; Pittenger Tr. 742-45.
                                               80
                        b.      Proportionality

         The Board has also proven that rejecting the Kellner Notice was a

proportionate means to promote the Board’s objectives. “[T]he context in which the

Board received” the Kellner Notice “cannot be ignored.”394 The Kellner Notice

followed a proxy contest where Jorgl became an AIM stockholder solely to front a

nomination and shield undisclosed persons behind the scenes. Those persons

included two white collar criminals—one of whom had become increasingly hostile

to AIM and had misrepresented himself as an AIM representative to third parties. It

would have been obvious to the Board that the new nomination behind Kellner

carried over from the prior year. Chioini was a constant, Deutsch remained involved

(now as a nominee), and BakerHostetler continued to advise the effort. The threat

to return “guns blazing” in 2023 came to fruition.395

         The rejection was not, as Kellner argues, preordained. Kellner cites to a filing

in the Florida litigation and a draft press release as evidence that the Board prejudged

the Kellner Notice.396 The weight of the record shows otherwise.397 With regard to

the filing, AIM told the Florida court that the Kellner Notice violated federal




394
      Jorgl, 

, at *16.
395
      JX 825; JX 526.
396
      See Pl.’s Post-trial Br. 69-70; Pl.’s Pre-trial Br. 46-47.
397
      See supra notes 388-93 and accompanying text.
                                                 81
securities laws one business day after the notice was submitted.398 But Equels

credibly testified that the filing was to rebut Kellner and Deutsch’s representation to

the Florida court that a “[Schedule] 13D issue” had become “moot.”399 As to the

press release, it was prepared by an outside public relations advisor, was

“contingent,” and (of the Board members) only shared with Equels.400

         Further, the Board’s actions were not manipulative. The Board did nothing to

prevent Kellner from complying with the valid provisions of AIM’s advance notice

bylaws.401 Kellner seems to believe that AIM’s advance notice requirements are

problematic because stockholders are required to comply with them while incumbent

directors are not.402 But that is how advance notice bylaws work.

         This is both non-controversial and logical. Incumbent directors are subject to

fiduciary duties and certain securities law disclosure requirements that do not apply

to nominating stockholders.403 Additionally, the company already has access to

information about incumbent directors that it can disclose to stockholders. Advance



398
      JX 878 at 9.
399
      Equels Tr. 601; id. at 595. This testimony is not inconsistent with the filing.
400
      Equels Tr. 626-67; see JX 1140; JX 1142.
401
      See Lee Enters., 

, at *17.
402
      See Pl.’s Post-trial Br. 72; Am. Bylaws §§ 1.4(a)(1), (a)(2), (c).
403
   See generally Equels Tr. 547, 557-58; Pittenger Tr. 731; Bryan Tr. 671-72; see also
Rock Report ¶ 42 (noting that “the proxy rules do not require any evidence that the
nominating stockholder has complied” with SEC Rule 14a-19).
                                                82
notice bylaws elicit information about nominating stockholders and their nominees

so that the Board and stockholders can become informed.404

         Kellner also avers that the Board’s revision of the D&O questionnaire during

the five days between his request and receipt of the form amounts to manipulation.405

The form was made 14 pages longer through two rounds of edits during that five-

day period.406 Although undertaking revisions after the form was requested is

suboptimal, there is no evidence of bad faith.407 The 2016 Bylaws lacked a provision

requiring nominees to complete questionnaires.            The addition of the D&O

Questionnaire Provision necessitated a change to the Company’s form so that it also

applied to nominees.408 After the form was revised, AIM’s incumbent directors

likewise completed it.409

         Moreover, amending the questionnaire did not amount to the sort of material

changes indicative of manipulation targeting stockholder rights.410 The revisions to


404
      See Saba Cap., 224 A.3d at 980.
405
      See JX 834; JX 841; see also JX 821 at 2.
406
      JX 834; JX 841.
407
   See Pittenger Tr. 734 (testifying that he meant to update the form before the window
closed and the delay was inadvertent).
408
      Pittenger Tr. 732-35.
409
      Compare JXs 941-43, and JX 1131 with JX 875; see also JX 821 at 1.
410
    E.g., Hubbard, 

, at *11-13 (holding that post-deadline actions that
“result[ed] in potentially significant changes in the corporation’s management personnel
and operational changes in its business policy and direction” and “generat[ed] controversy
and shareholder opposition” were inequitable); Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 

the questionnaire are non-preclusive. The updated form is longer than the previous

questionnaire originally designated for directors. It includes an additional section

for stockholder nominees.411 But it mostly consists of yes or no questions. Kellner

was able to answer a majority of the sections that required narrative explanations

with internal references to other parts of the completed notice.412

                               *             *             *

         Ultimately, the nondisclosure of certain AAUs is fatal to Kellner’s nomination

effort. After the Jorgl litigation, Kellner, Chioini, Deutsch and their counsel should

have been closely attuned to the importance of completely disclosing all relevant

arrangements and understandings. Still, they flouted the Company’s advance notice

requirements. Because of the timing of Kellner’s submission—the night before the

submission deadline—there was no possibility of correcting any deficiencies.413

         The concealment of arrangements and understandings that go to the heart of a

nomination effort risks undermining the essential disclosure function of advance


906, 912-14 (Del. Ch. 1980) (concluding that a board lacked a justification for setting a
meeting date that made it impossible for a stockholder to timely give notice of an intention
to nominate); see also Schnell, 

.
411
      Kellner Notice 150.
412
      Id. at 33-162.
413
   JX 911 at 3; see CytoDyn, 

, at *2 (“Where Plaintiffs ultimately went
wrong here is by playing fast and loose in their responses to key inquiries embedded in the
advance notice bylaw, and then submitting their Nomination Notice on the eve of the
deadline, leaving no time to fix the deficient disclosures when the incumbent Board
exposed the problem.”).
                                            84
notice bylaws. Directors and stockholders would justifiably want to know whether

a nomination is part of a broader scheme. Such information was withheld from or

obfuscated in the Kellner Notice.

         In these circumstances, the Board acted reasonably and equitably in rejecting

the Kellner Notice. It did not breach its fiduciary duties in enforcing valid advance

notice bylaws. The plaintiff’s group—not the Board—are “the ones engaging in

manipulative conduct.”414

III.     CONCLUSION

          Regarding Kellner’s claim concerning the validity of the Amended Bylaws

and AIM’s counterclaim, judgment is entered for Kellner in part and for AIM in part.

Regarding Kellner’s claim concerning his compliance with the Amended Bylaws

and the Board’s rejection of the Kellner Notice, judgment is entered in favor of the

defendants. Counsel for the parties shall confer on a form of order to implement this

decision as soon as practicable, and no later than five days.




414
      Jorgl, 

, at *17.
                                           85